Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorTRANTIDIS, Aris 
dc.contributor.authorTSAGKRONI, Vasiliki
dc.identifier.citationThe British journal of politics and international relations, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 263-281en
dc.descriptionFirst Published March 30, 2017en
dc.description.abstractHow do strategies of state capture adapt to tight fiscal conditions? The article uses a historical institutionalist approach and content analysis to study the case of Greece. Three theoretically relevant patterns of institutional adaptation are unearthed: first, limited resources for state capture do indeed trigger self-limitation initiatives as expected, but these initiatives replace costly benefits with less costly ones. Second, different forms of capture have different implications for the terms of political competition. Third, there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between clientelism and corruption, which becomes pronounced in the creative ways by which strategies of capture adjust to shifting opportunities and constraints. Clients are appointed in state offices and extract bribes directly from citizens. ‘Client corruption’ replaces extraction from the state with extraction through the state, which is less costly for the public finances: the benefit the governing party gives to its clients is the ‘right’ to extract rents for themselves.en
dc.relation.ispartofThe British journal of politics and international relationsen
dc.titleClientelism and corruption : institutional adaptation of state capture strategies in view of resource scarcity in Greeceen

Files in this item


There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record