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dc.contributor.authorTRANTIDIS, Aris 
dc.contributor.authorTSAGKRONI, Vasiliki
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-30T14:37:56Z
dc.date.available2018-01-30T14:37:56Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.citationThe British journal of politics and international relations, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 263-281en
dc.identifier.issn1369-1481
dc.identifier.issn1467-856X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/50910
dc.descriptionFirst Published March 30, 2017en
dc.description.abstractHow do strategies of state capture adapt to tight fiscal conditions? The article uses a historical institutionalist approach and content analysis to study the case of Greece. Three theoretically relevant patterns of institutional adaptation are unearthed: first, limited resources for state capture do indeed trigger self-limitation initiatives as expected, but these initiatives replace costly benefits with less costly ones. Second, different forms of capture have different implications for the terms of political competition. Third, there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between clientelism and corruption, which becomes pronounced in the creative ways by which strategies of capture adjust to shifting opportunities and constraints. Clients are appointed in state offices and extract bribes directly from citizens. ‘Client corruption’ replaces extraction from the state with extraction through the state, which is less costly for the public finances: the benefit the governing party gives to its clients is the ‘right’ to extract rents for themselves.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofThe British journal of politics and international relationsen
dc.titleClientelism and corruption : institutional adaptation of state capture strategies in view of resource scarcity in Greeceen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/1369148117700658
dc.identifier.volume19en
dc.identifier.startpage263en
dc.identifier.endpage281en
dc.identifier.issue2en


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