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dc.contributor.authorALEXIADOU, Despinaen
dc.date.accessioned2006-06-09T09:04:22Z
dc.date.available2006-06-09T09:04:22Z
dc.date.created2005en
dc.date.issued2005en
dc.identifier.citationFlorence, European University Institute, 2005
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/5191
dc.descriptionDefence date: 12 December 2005
dc.descriptionExamining Board: Professor William Roberts Clark (Univ. Michigan) (external co-Supervisor); Professor Adrienne Héritier (EUI); Professor Fiona McGillivray (NYU); Professor Martin Rhodes (EUI) (Supervisor)
dc.descriptionFirst made available online 4 October 2016
dc.description.abstractWhy have some countries been more successful than others in keeping price stability? This thesis answers this question by exploring the political determinants o f the policies of price stability on the basis o f the political cost they incur to the government It challenges the universality o f conventional approaches to the politics o f inflation such as the role of independent central banks or the role o f wage moderation. It argues that price stability cannot be understood without taking into account the political costs politicians face in different political and economic systems when deciding to deflate. Price stability is a public good that has to be financed by all the groups in the society. At the same time, it is a good with negative externalities; some groups benefit more than others (for example savers and financial intermediaries) while some other groups pay higher cost than others (lower income groups that face higher risks of getting unemployed). The political dilemma is resolved by compensating those who bear the highest cost, as long as they have the political voice. The political inclusiveness o f the political party system determines whether the interests o f the disaffected minority will be represented in the government and will be taken care of through higher social transfers. As a result, price stability is a function o f the party system and of the welfare state. The thesis provides empirical support from 18 OECD countries of the positive role o f social insurance on deflation. It also shows that proportional electoral systems and coalition governments redistribute more through higher social spending than less proportional systems and single party governments. As a consequence, more proportional political systems have enjoyed higher price stability and have been less subjected to monetary political business cycles than less proportional systems.
dc.format.mediumPaperen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI PhD thesesen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDepartment of Political and Social Sciencesen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject.lcshEconomic development -- Social aspects -- OECD countries
dc.subject.lcshOECD countries -- Economic policy
dc.titleThe politics of redistribution and price stability : party systems and economic policies in OECDen
dc.typeThesisen
dc.identifier.doi10.2870/511710
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