The German 4G spectrum auction : design and behavior
Title: The German 4G spectrum auction : design and behavior
Citation: Economics journal, 2017, Vol. 127, No. 605, pp. 305-324
ISSN: 0013-0133; 1468-0297
The 2010 German 4G spectrum auction was an unusually large simultaneous ascending multi-band auction. The bidding was competitive, the final assignment was efficient and the revenue was close to expectations. However, our analysis suggests that, theoretically, independent and rational bidders had an opportunity to implicitly coordinate on a low-revenue outcome. Coordination was difficult, though, because of a multiplicity of focal points. One important focal point involved post-auction negotiations, posing risks to bidders and the auctioneer. We analyze different bidding scenarios and in particular how post-auction negotiations can affect values, bidding and efficiency. We also briefly discuss how the simultaneous ascending auction format can be augmented to mitigate the risks implied by the possibility of strategic play.
First published: 24 October 2017. Creative Commons
Type of Access: openAccess
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