dc.contributor.author | MICHAELI, Moti | |
dc.contributor.author | SPIRO, Daniel | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-02-27T16:22:32Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-02-27T16:22:32Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
dc.identifier.citation | American economic journal : microeconomics, 2017, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 152-216 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 1945-7669 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1945-7685 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/51974 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper studies a coordination game between a continuum of players with heterogeneous tastes who perceive peer pressure when behaving differently from each other. It characterizes the conditions under which a social norm-a mode of behavior followed by many-exists in equilibrium and the patterns of norm compliance. The emergent norm may be biased compared to the average taste in society, yet endogenously upheld by the population. Strikingly, a biased norm will, under some circumstances, be more sustainable than a non-biased norm, which may explain the bias of various social and religious norms. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | American Economic Association | en |
dc.relation.ispartof | American economic journal : microeconomics | en |
dc.title | From peer pressure to biased norms | en |
dc.type | Article | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1257/mic.20150151 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 9 | en |
dc.identifier.startpage | 152 | en |
dc.identifier.endpage | 216 | en |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | en |