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dc.contributor.authorFINDEISEN, Sebastian
dc.contributor.authorSACHS, Dominik 
dc.date.accessioned2018-02-27T17:15:20Z
dc.date.available2018-02-27T17:15:20Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.citationScandinavian journal of economics, 2018, Vol. 120, No. 4, pp. 1075-1099en
dc.identifier.issn1467-9442
dc.identifier.issn0347-0520
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/51976
dc.descriptionAccepted manuscript online: 12 APR 2017en
dc.description.abstractWe study the implications of limited commitment on education and tax policies chosen by benevolent governments. Individual wages are determined by both innate abilities and education levels. Consistent with real world practices, the government can decide to subsidize different levels of education at different rates. The lack of commitment influences the optimal structure of education subsidies. The direction of the effect depends on the design of labor taxes. With linear labor tax rates and a transfer for redistribution, subsidies become more progressive. By contrast, if the government is only constrained by informational asymmetries when designing taxes, subsidies become more regressive.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.titleEducation policies and taxation without commitmenten
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/sjoe.12246
dc.identifier.volume120en
dc.identifier.startpage1075en
dc.identifier.endpage1099en
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue4en


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