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dc.contributor.authorGALEOTTI, Andrea
dc.contributor.authorGOLUB, Benjamin
dc.contributor.authorGOYAL, Sanjeev
dc.date.accessioned2018-03-14T08:07:13Z
dc.date.available2018-03-14T08:07:13Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/52264
dc.description.abstractIndividuals interact strategically with their network neighbors. A planner can shape incentives in pursuit of an aggregate goal, such as maximizing welfare or minimizing volatility. We analyze a variety of targeting problems by identifying how a given profile of incentive changes is amplified or attenuated by the strategic spillovers in the network. The optimal policies are simplest when the budget for intervention is large. If actions are strategic complements, the optimal intervention changes all agents’ incentives in the same direction and does so in proportion to their eigenvector centralities. In games of strategic substitutes, the optimal intervention is very different: it moves neighbors’ incentives in opposite directions, dividing local communities into positively and negatively targeted agents, with few links across these two categories. To derive these results and characterize optimal interventions more generally, we introduce a method of decomposing any potential intervention into principal components determined by the network. A particular ordering of principal components describes the planner’s priorities across a range of network intervention problems.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2018/01en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectNetwork interventionsen
dc.subjectNetwork gamesen
dc.subjectD85en
dc.subjectC72en
dc.titleTargeting interventions in networksen
dc.typeWorking Paperen


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