Western Europe and the breakup of Yugoslavia : a political failure in search of a scholarly explanation

Abstract

On June 26, 1991, after some 46 years without a war in Europe, violent conflict erupted in the territory of what used to be the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It took more than four years of atrocities before a peace agreement was finally negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995. This book provides a detailed analysis of the response of Western Europe to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The account pays particular attention to the behaviour of the major Member States of the European Community (later Union), such as France, Britain, and Germany, in two crucial moments of debate and decision-making: the diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, and the debate on the desirability and form of a possible military intervention in the warring country. By combining three theoretical approaches to the study of international politics - neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and liberal intergovernmentalism - Lucarelli provides a theoretically informed analysis of the main forces behind Western Europe's response to the Yugoslav wars. Conclusions are drawn on the major characteristics of Western Europe's management of the conflict, the interplay of international and domestic factors behind the behaviour of Western European states, the relative explanatory power of each of the three theoretical perspectives and their common research tradition, and the perspective of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. The book's reconstruction and evaluation of conflict management in ex-Yugoslavia, its attention to the influence of the European integration process on the foreign policy of its Member States, and its use and assessment of International Relations theoretical tools, should make it of topical interest for a wide range of scholars interested in both international and European political affairs.