dc.contributor.author | BINDI, Federiga M. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-05-14T14:20:42Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-05-14T14:20:42Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Finn LAURSEN (ed.), The Treaty of Nice : actor preferences, bargaining and institutional choice, Leiden ; Boston : Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, pp. 197-218 | en |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9789004148208 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/54424 | |
dc.description.abstract | The objective of this chapter is to test Moravcsik's theory in the light of the Nice Treaty negotiations. The attitude of Italian political parties vis-à-vis integration has generally been that of supporters of European integration. The duties of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in relation to the EU are multiple: to follow CSFP, the political and economic external relations of the EU, as well as eventual EU treaties negotiations. Italy's activities prior to the Nice IGC can be divided into two types the domestic process of defining a national position and the negotiations with the other Member States. The Italian government considered the most important issues of the IGC to be the extension of qualified majority voting and reinforced cooperation (or flexibility). Concerning what can be defined as Italian EU political diplomacy, one can report the role played by the Ambassadors stationed in the other Member States. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.title | Italy : when individual actors make the difference | en |
dc.type | Contribution to book | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1163/ej.9789004148208.i-564.80 | |