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dc.contributor.authorTESCHE, Tobias
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-29T11:12:58Z
dc.date.available2018-11-29T11:12:58Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.issn2589-2398
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/59807
dc.description.abstractThis article categorizes newly created and proposed EMU institutions according to a new typology that broadens the well-established agent-trustee distinction to include cooptation and orchestration as two additional modes of indirect governance. Four empirical cases from the realm of EMU governance are provided, i.e. the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the European Central Bank (ECB), the proposed European Minister of Economics and Finance (EMEF) and the European Fiscal Board (EFB). The article asks how we can explain that the institutional response to the euro area crisis has produced such diverse governance arrangements. Empirically, it shows that supranational actors like the European Commission can bypass states through enlisting existing authority to deepen European integration.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMaastricht Universityen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCERiM Online Paper Seriesen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2018/13en
dc.relation.isreplacedbyhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/62526
dc.relation.urihttps://cerim.maastrichtuniversity.nl/publications/cerim-online-paper-seriesen
dc.relation.urihttps://ssrn.com/abstract=3266019
dc.titleSupranational agency and indirect governance after the euro crisis : ESM, ECB, EMEF and EFBen
dc.typeWorking Paperen


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