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dc.contributor.authorGALBIATI, Marco
dc.date.accessioned2006-07-06T14:57:56Z
dc.date.available2006-07-06T14:57:56Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/6092
dc.description.abstractWe consider the problem of allocating a finite number of divisible homogeneous goods to N ≥ 2 individuals, in a way which is both envy-free and Pareto optimal. Building on Thomson (2005 Games and Economic Behavior), a new simple mechanism is presented here with the following properties: a) the mechanism fully implements the desired divisions, i.e. for each preference profile the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of fair divisions; b) the set of equilibria is a global attractor for the best-reply dynamics. Thus, players myopically adapting their strategies settle down in an fair division. The result holds even if mixed strategies are used.en
dc.format.extent284724 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEuropean University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2006/24en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectFair divisionsen
dc.subjectenvy-freeen
dc.subjectimplementationen
dc.subjectbest reply dynamicsen
dc.titleFair Divisions as Attracting Nash Equilibria of Simple Gamesen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorGALBIATI|Marco|aut|
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