Fair Divisions as Attracting Nash Equilibria of Simple Games

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dc.contributor.author GALBIATI, Marco
dc.date.accessioned 2006-07-06T14:57:56Z
dc.date.available 2006-07-06T14:57:56Z
dc.date.issued 2006
dc.identifier.issn 1725-6704
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/6092
dc.description.abstract We consider the problem of allocating a finite number of divisible homogeneous goods to N ≥ 2 individuals, in a way which is both envy-free and Pareto optimal. Building on Thomson (2005 Games and Economic Behavior), a new simple mechanism is presented here with the following properties: a) the mechanism fully implements the desired divisions, i.e. for each preference profile the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of fair divisions; b) the set of equilibria is a global attractor for the best-reply dynamics. Thus, players myopically adapting their strategies settle down in an fair division. The result holds even if mixed strategies are used. en
dc.format.extent 284724 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher European University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI ECO en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2006/24 en
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject Fair divisions en
dc.subject envy-free en
dc.subject implementation en
dc.subject best reply dynamics en
dc.title Fair Divisions as Attracting Nash Equilibria of Simple Games en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.neeo.contributor GALBIATI|Marco|aut|
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