Fair Divisions as Attracting Nash Equilibria of Simple Games

dc.contributor.author	GALBIATI, Marco
dc.date.accessioned	2006-07-06T14:57:56Z
dc.date.available	2006-07-06T14:57:56Z
dc.date.issued	2006
dc.identifier.issn	1725-6704
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/1814/6092
dc.description.abstract	We consider the problem of allocating a finite number of divisible homogeneous goods to N ≥ 2 individuals, in a way which is both envy-free and Pareto optimal. Building on Thomson (2005 Games and Economic Behavior), a new simple mechanism is presented here with the following properties: a) the mechanism fully implements the desired divisions, i.e. for each preference profile the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of fair divisions; b) the set of equilibria is a global attractor for the best-reply dynamics. Thus, players myopically adapting their strategies settle down in an fair division. The result holds even if mixed strategies are used.	en
dc.format.extent	284724 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.publisher	European University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseries	EUI ECO	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2006/24	en
dc.subject	Fair divisions	en
dc.subject	envy-free	en
dc.subject	implementation	en
dc.subject	best reply dynamics	en
dc.title	Fair Divisions as Attracting Nash Equilibria of Simple Games	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en
dc.neeo.contributor	GALBIATI\|Marco\|aut\|
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