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dc.contributor.authorTAS, Bedri Kamil Onur
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-26T14:47:05Z
dc.date.available2019-02-26T14:47:05Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.issn1028-3625
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/61366
dc.description.abstractI examine a manipulation scheme that public authorities can use to exercise more discretion in public procurement. I propose that regression discontinuity manipulation tests can be implemented to identify manipulative authorities. I investigate the European Union public procurement data set. I find that 10-13% of examined authorities have high probabilities of bunching estimated costs just below thresholds. Manipulative authorities have significantly lower probabilities of employing competitive procurement procedure. The bunching manipulation scheme significantly diminishes cost-effectiveness of public procurement. On average, prices of below threshold contracts are 18-28% higher when the authority has an elevated probability of bunching.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI RSCASen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2019/17en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesGlobal Governance Programme-338en
dc.relation.ispartofseries[Global Economics]en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectPublic procurementen
dc.subjectManipulationen
dc.subjectCompetitionen
dc.subjectEuropean Unionen
dc.subjectC31en
dc.subjectD44en
dc.subjectH57en
dc.subject.otherRegulation and economic policyen
dc.titleBunching below thresholds to manipulate public procurementen
dc.typeWorking Paperen


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