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dc.contributor.authorFUDENBERG, Drew
dc.contributor.authorLEVINE, David K.
dc.date.accessioned2019-03-01T14:53:25Z
dc.date.available2019-03-01T14:53:25Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationJournal of economic perspectives, 2016, Vol. 30, No.4, pp. 151-170
dc.identifier.issn0895-3309
dc.identifier.issn1944-7965en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/61465
dc.description.abstractGame theory has been a huge success in economics. Many important questions have been answered, and game theoretic methods are now central to much economic investigation. We suggest areas where further advances are important, and argue that models of learning are a promising route for improving and widening game theory's predictive power while preserving the successes of game theory where it already works well. We emphasize in particular the need for better understanding of the speed with which learning takes place.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherAmerican Psychological Associationen
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of economic perspectives
dc.subjectNormal-Form Gamesen
dc.subjectInfinitely Repeated Gamesen
dc.subjectEquilibrium Selectionen
dc.subjectPublic Informationen
dc.subjectFolk Theoremen
dc.subjectCooperationen
dc.subjectEvolutionen
dc.subjectDynamicsen
dc.subjectModelsen
dc.subjectSupergamesen
dc.titleWhither game theory? : towards a theory of learning in games
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1257/jep.30.4.151
dc.identifier.volume30
dc.identifier.startpage151
dc.identifier.endpage170
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dc.identifier.issue4


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