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dc.contributor.authorBALTER, Janine
dc.contributor.authorRANCAN, Michela
dc.contributor.authorSENYUTA, Olena
dc.date.accessioned2019-03-01T14:54:04Z
dc.date.available2019-03-01T14:54:04Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationInternational journal of computational economics and econometrics, 2016, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 413-431
dc.identifier.issn1757-1170
dc.identifier.issn1757-1189en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/61543
dc.description.abstractWe study congested matching markets, such as the PhD academic job market, and consider alternative mechanisms that could be implemented by a social planner. Building on the Gale and Shapley algorithm, we analyse (i) a procedure accounting for a limit in the number of applications PhD graduates can submit (PhD-LIMIT), and (ii) a procedure accounting for a limit in the number of applications universities can evaluate (UNI-LIMIT). We find that the PhD-LIMIT procedure improves the matching outcome and is preferable to a UNI-LIMIT procedure. The optimal limit in the number of applications balances the trade-off between being unmatched and gaining a better match in the aggregate, and the benefit can be considerable if the graduates' preferences over the positions are not very correlated. Overall, we suggest a direction to improve the matching market for PhD candidates by improving the outcome of their matches and lowering the hiring costs for universities.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherInderscience Enterprises Ltden
dc.relation.ispartofInternational journal of computational economics and econometrics
dc.subjectMatching markets
dc.subjectTruncation
dc.subjectGale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm
dc.titleLimit your applications : dealing with congested markets in the matching procedure
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1504/IJCEE.2016.079534
dc.identifier.volume6
dc.identifier.startpage413
dc.identifier.endpage431
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dc.identifier.issue4


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