dc.contributor.author | BOLLEYER, Nicole | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-09-22T14:02:52Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-09-22T14:02:52Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Publius, 2006, 36, 4, 1-32 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/6242 | |
dc.description.abstract | This article argues that internal substate dynamics can systematically account for the organization of intergovernmental relations (IGR) in dual federal systems. Whereas majoritarian executive-legislative relations tend to weaken the institutionalization of intergovernmental arrangements (IGAs), power-sharing executive-legislative relations tend to facilitate it. Two of the mechanisms at work serve to illustrate this point. Given one-party majority cabinets, complete government alternations strongly alter actors' interest constellations over time, thereby increasing the costs of maintaining stable cross-boundary IGR. Moreover, the heavy impact of a potential electoral loss induces politicians to shift blame to other governments, thereby undermining cross-boundary cooperation. Majoritarian dynamics also weaken integration between IGAs. Furthermore, integration is weakened by compulsory power-sharing structures unbridged by party ties. In contrast to noncompulsory party cooperation, such internal constitutional divides easily undermine the setup of strong interorganizational linkages | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.title | Federal Dynamics in Canada, the United States, and Switzerland: How Substates' Internal Organization Affects Intergovernmental Relations | en |
dc.type | Article | en |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |