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dc.contributor.authorTESCHE, Tobias
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-13T14:56:22Z
dc.date.available2019-05-13T14:56:22Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.citationFlorence : European University Institute, 2019en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/62526
dc.descriptionDefence date: 13 May 2019en
dc.descriptionExamining Board: Prof. Philipp Genschel, European University Institute; Prof. Adrienne Héritier, European University Institute; Prof. C. Randall Henning, American University Washington D.C.; Prof. Manuela Moschella, Scuola Normale Superioreen
dc.description.abstractThis article-based dissertation traces the institutional responses to the euro area crisis in the realm of fiscal and financial governance. First, it shows why the diffusion of national fiscal councils in the EU has not led to institutional isomorphism. The troika institutions - the European Commission, the ECB and the International Monetary Fund - formed a technocratic consensus about the desirability of establishing national fiscal councils in the EU. Considerable disagreement existed, however, with regards to their design features. Each institution promoted a distinct fiscal council model in line with their institutional self-interest. Preference heterogeneity among the troika members ultimately prevented the spread of a one-size-fits-all fiscal council in the EU. Second, this thesis links three models of a fiscal council (agent, trustee and orchestrator) to three different sources of the deficit bias (i.e. forecasting errors, common pool problem, asymmetric information) and three different conceptions of legitimacy (input, output, throughput). Third, it explains why the ECB President started to visit national parliaments. The ECB’s unconventional monetary policy measures triggered unprecedented levels of public distrust, invigorated a fierce debate about central bank independence and led to deteriorating output legitimacy. Given the diverging demands from creditor and debtor states, the ECB saw an opportunity to reduce the audience costs of their policies by directly targeting national parliaments. Fourth, it shows how large cross-border banks stood to gain from the banking union because it would level the playing field, create regulatory savings and ultimately encroach on the business model of the smaller competitors that had, thus far, been shielded from competition through favorable regulation. Fifth, it discusses the European Stability Mechanism, the ECB, the proposed European Minister of Economics and Finance and the European Fiscal Board and relates them to strategies that supranational actors can pursue to deepen European integration.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEuropean University Instituteen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUIen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSPSen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPhD Thesisen
dc.relation.isbasedonhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/62884
dc.relation.isbasedonhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/61568
dc.relation.isbasedonhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/58065
dc.relation.isbasedonhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/57464
dc.relation.isbasedonhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/59807
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subject.lcshFiscal policy -- European Union countries
dc.subject.lcshMonetary policy -- European Union countries
dc.subject.lcshEurozone -- Economic conditions -- 21st century
dc.subject.lcshEuropean Union countries -- Economic policy -- 21st century
dc.titleInstitutional responses to the euro area crisisen
dc.typeThesisen
dc.identifier.doi10.2870/82282
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.description.versionChapter 2 draws upon an earlier article published in the JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies. Chapter 3 draws upon an earlier article published in the Journal of Contemporary European Research (JCER). Chapter 4 draws upon an earlier article published in the Journal of European Integration. Chapter 5 draws upon an earlier paper published in the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper Series. Chapter 6 draws upon an earlier paper published in the CERiM Online Paper Series.


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