Agenda Control in Presidential Systems Measurements Alternatives to Capture Latent Variables

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Show simple item record AJENJO FRESNO, Natalia 2006-10-25T15:41:02Z 2006-10-25T15:41:02Z 2006
dc.identifier.issn 1725-6755
dc.description.abstract This paper presents alternative modeling strategies to capture latent variables such as agenda control. The methodological approach offers competing models for theory testing among institutional, partisan and procedural variables grounded on the typical analysis of interbranch interaction in presidential systems. The focus is on lawmaking in two Central American countries which share key values of the independent variables (particularly, moderate multiparty systems) while substantially diverge on their patterns of inter-branch relations. The substantive contribution of this working paper is that agenda control is better explained by the informational advantages available to majority political actors than by authoritative constitutional rules empowering the Executive. Second, the pressures of the political timing sourcing from the electoral cycle are a key factor for explaining strategic behavior of actors in lawmaking. Finally, it appears that partisan characteristics - specifically cohesion and discipline - explain the interactions between the Executive and the legislature regarding the incentives to exert agenda control of the former. en
dc.format.extent 321080 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI SPS en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2006/05 en
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject Agenda control en
dc.subject Executive dominance en
dc.subject presidential systems en
dc.subject institutional analysis en
dc.title Agenda Control in Presidential Systems Measurements Alternatives to Capture Latent Variables en
dc.type Working Paper en
eui.subscribe.skip true

Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record