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dc.contributor.authorAJENJO FRESNO, Natalia
dc.date.accessioned2006-10-25T15:41:02Z
dc.date.available2006-10-25T15:41:02Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.identifier.issn1725-6755
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/6290
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents alternative modeling strategies to capture latent variables such as agenda control. The methodological approach offers competing models for theory testing among institutional, partisan and procedural variables grounded on the typical analysis of interbranch interaction in presidential systems. The focus is on lawmaking in two Central American countries which share key values of the independent variables (particularly, moderate multiparty systems) while substantially diverge on their patterns of inter-branch relations. The substantive contribution of this working paper is that agenda control is better explained by the informational advantages available to majority political actors than by authoritative constitutional rules empowering the Executive. Second, the pressures of the political timing sourcing from the electoral cycle are a key factor for explaining strategic behavior of actors in lawmaking. Finally, it appears that partisan characteristics - specifically cohesion and discipline - explain the interactions between the Executive and the legislature regarding the incentives to exert agenda control of the former.en
dc.format.extent321080 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI SPSen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2006/05en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectAgenda controlen
dc.subjectExecutive dominanceen
dc.subjectpresidential systemsen
dc.subjectinstitutional analysisen
dc.titleAgenda Control in Presidential Systems Measurements Alternatives to Capture Latent Variablesen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
eui.subscribe.skiptrue


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