dc.contributor.author | ZILLER, Jacques | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-12-06T08:16:02Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-12-06T08:16:02Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1028-3625 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/6390 | |
dc.description.abstract | The paper examines deals with the possibility to keep the 'acquis' of the Constitutional Treaty in terms of simplification of the EC-EU treaties and of rationalisation of the EU legal system if the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe were not to be ratified in the form it has been signed on 29 October 2004. The basic assumption of the paper is that contrary to what is too often said, not only the length of the treaty may not be seen as a primary cause of its rejection in the French and Dutch referendums of 2005, but also that a shorter treaty might not serve better the objective of clarity than a longer one. Five basic elements are being identified as the European Convention’s 'acquis' which should be maintained in the future: the suppression of the pillar structure, the integration of the Charter of fundamental right in the EU fundamental treaty, the reorganisation of the treaties - as done in part III of the Constitution for Europe - the typology of legal instruments of the Union and the typology of competences. While acknowledging that a number of formal, technical and political improvements could further be added to the existing text, which could also formally be split in two if necessary, the paper is rather sceptical about the political feasibility of scenarios which would not be based on the ratification of the existing European Constitution’s content. | en |
dc.format.extent | 226157 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | fr | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI LAW | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2006/31 | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.subject | Referendum | en |
dc.subject | European law | en |
dc.subject | Fundamental/human rights | en |
dc.subject | International agreements | en |
dc.subject | Judicial review | en |
dc.subject | Amsterdam Treaty | en |
dc.subject | Enlargement | en |
dc.subject | European Convention | en |
dc.subject | Founding Treaties | en |
dc.subject | IGC 1996 | en |
dc.subject | IGC 2000 | en |
dc.subject | Intergovernmental conferences | en |
dc.subject | Maastricht Treaty | en |
dc.subject | Nice Treaty | en |
dc.subject | Treaty on European Union | en |
dc.subject | Treaty reform | en |
dc.subject | Joint decision making | en |
dc.subject | Legislative procedure | en |
dc.subject | Majority voting | en |
dc.subject | National parliaments | en |
dc.subject | Qualified majority | en |
dc.subject | Unanimity | en |
dc.subject | Law | en |
dc.title | Une constitution courte et obscure ou claire et détaillée ? Perspectives pour la simplification des traités et la rationalisation de l’ordre juridique de l’union européenne | fr |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
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