dc.contributor.author | SARTOR, Giovanni | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-12-22T13:17:28Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-12-22T13:17:28Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1725-67-39 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/6423 | |
dc.description.abstract | The legal nature of digital agents is considered, and it is argued that it is possible to attribute
to such artificial entities intentional (mental) states that are legally relevant. Consequently we
may recognise their legal capacity to act as representative of their users, and the users’ power to
delegate them the performance of cognitive tasks. The implications in various areas of the law is
then discussed. | en |
dc.format.extent | 233848 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | European University Institute | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI LAW | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2006/35 | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.subject | Law | en |
dc.title | Cognitive automata and the law | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |