dc.contributor.author | SARTOR, Giovanni | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-03-20T10:53:47Z | |
dc.date.available | 2007-03-20T10:53:47Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1725-6739 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/6747 | |
dc.description.abstract | I shall compare two views of legal concepts: as nodes in inferential nets and as categories in an ontology
(a conceptual architecture). Firstly, I shall introduce the inferential approach, consider its implications,
and distinguish the mere possession of an inferentially defined concept from its endorsement, which also
involves the acceptance of the concept’s constitutive inferences. For making this distinction, I shall combine
the inferential and eliminative analysis of legal concepts proposed by Alf Ross with the views of
theoretical concepts in science advanced by Frank Ramsey and Rudolf Carnap. Then, I shall consider how
concepts can be characterised by defining the corresponding terms and placing them within an ontology.
Finally, I shall argue that there is a tension between the inferential and the ontological approach, but that
both need to be taken into account, to capture the meaning and the cognitive function of legal concepts. | en |
dc.format.extent | 489879 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | European University Institute | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI LAW | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2007/08 | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.subject | Law | en |
dc.title | The Nature of Legal Concepts: Inferential Nodes or Ontological Categories? | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |