| dc.description.abstract | Table of Contents
1. Law, economics, and institutional complexity: an introduction (F. Cafaggi, A. Nicita, U. Pagano)
Part I. Complexity in law and economics
2. The future of law and economics (T.S. Ulen)
3. Law and economics in historical perspective (D.C. North)
4. Legal positions and institutional complementarities (U. Pagano)
5. Legislate today or wait until tomorrow? An investment approach to lawmaking (F. Parisi, N. Ghei)
Part II. Private orderings, efficiency, and the role of the state
6. The enforcement of contracts and the role of the state (A. Schwartz)
7. Minimal liberty and the 'Coasean Liberal': boundaries and complementarities between the state and the market (A. Nicita, E. Savaglio)
8. Private orderings and intellectual property: what is the best incentive system? (N. Galliani, S. Scotchmer)
9. Fairness ad welfare: are they really competing values? (F. Dennozza)
Part III. Contractual incompleteness and the nature of endogenous enforcement
10. Costly contingent contracts: a failure of the Coase theorem (L. Anderlini, L. Felli)
11. Game-theoretic solutions to endogenous contractual incompleteness (F. Farina)
12. Customary contracts (H.P. Young)
13. Group relations and industrial districts (A. Battistini)
Part IV. Governance models and corporate ethics
14. What is corporations? The corporate personality controversy and the fiduciary principle in corporate governance (K. Iwai)
15. Fiduciary duties, models of firms, and organizational theories in the context of relational interdependencies (F. Cafaggi)
16. Incomplete contracts and corporate ethics: a game theoretical model under fuzzy information (L. Sacconi) | en |