Abstract:
It is sometimes argued that social and natural inequalities which are both arbitrary from
a moral point of view should nevertheless have a different moral status in a theory of
justice: while inequalities of a social type should be rightfully neutralized, the effects of
natural inequalities should be respected, because they are a component of individual
identity, in a way that social inequalities are not. This paper argues against such a
distinction. It first clarifies the notion of “natural lottery”; it then draws a distinction
between the notion of “self-ownership” and the extensions of one’s rights over one’s
body. Subsequently, it argues that the appeal to competing conceptions of “the self” is
not helpful in this context, because a “thick” conception of the self is a proxy for a
particular normative conception of justice, rather than a metaphysical presupposition for
theories of justice. The paper concludes by suggesting an interpretation of the metaphor
of a “common pool of natural abilities” that would not be intrusive so as to effectively
respect the separate identity of individuals.
