dc.contributor.author | LOCKWOOD, Ben | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-05-31T08:04:42Z | |
dc.date.available | 2007-05-31T08:04:42Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1725-6704 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/6855 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper revisits the fiscal "decentralization theorem", by relaxing the role of
the assumption that governments are benevolent, while retaining the assumption of
policy uniformity. If instead, decisions are made by direct majority voting, (i) centralization
can welfare-dominate decentralization even if there are no externalities
and regions are heterogenous; (ii) decentralization can welfare-dominate centralization
even if there are positive externalities and regions are homogenous. The
intuition is that the insensitivity of majority voting to preference intensity interacts
with the different inefficiencies in the two fiscal regimes to give second-best results.
Similar results obtain when governments are benevolent, but subject to lobbying,
because now decisions are too sensitive to the preferences of the organised group. | en |
dc.format.extent | 374698 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | European University Institute | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI ECO | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2007/06 | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.subject | Decentralization | en |
dc.subject | majority voting | en |
dc.subject | lobbying | en |
dc.subject | local public goods | en |
dc.subject | H41 | en |
dc.subject | H70 | en |
dc.subject | H72 | en |
dc.title | Voting, Lobbying, and the Decentralization Theorem | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.neeo.contributor | LOCKWOOD|Ben|aut| | |
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