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dc.contributor.authorZWART, Sanne
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-31T08:08:40Z
dc.date.available2007-05-31T08:08:40Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/6856
dc.description.abstractThe majority of the participating voters in referenda does not necessarily reflect the majority of the whole population since voters can abstain. This paper shows that a quorum exists for which the outcome of the referendum coincides with the population preference. However, a second equilibrium can exist in which the proposal is always rejected. When insufficient information makes the optimal quorum unknown, it is in general more harmful to set the quorum too high than too low. Robustness of the results is analyzed by allowing pressure groups to encourage or discourage participation after the quorum is set.en
dc.format.extent530975 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEuropean University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2007/07en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectElectoral engineeringen
dc.subjectquorumen
dc.subjectreferendumen
dc.subjectvoting/not-voting decisionen
dc.subjectvoting rulesen
dc.subjectD72en
dc.titleFixing the quorum : representation versus abstentionen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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