Fixing the quorum : representation versus abstention

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Show simple item record ZWART, Sanne 2007-05-31T08:08:40Z 2007-05-31T08:08:40Z 2007
dc.identifier.issn 1725-6704
dc.description.abstract The majority of the participating voters in referenda does not necessarily reflect the majority of the whole population since voters can abstain. This paper shows that a quorum exists for which the outcome of the referendum coincides with the population preference. However, a second equilibrium can exist in which the proposal is always rejected. When insufficient information makes the optimal quorum unknown, it is in general more harmful to set the quorum too high than too low. Robustness of the results is analyzed by allowing pressure groups to encourage or discourage participation after the quorum is set. en
dc.format.extent 530975 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher European University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI ECO en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2007/07 en
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject Electoral engineering en
dc.subject quorum en
dc.subject referendum en
dc.subject voting/not-voting decision en
dc.subject voting rules en
dc.subject D72 en
dc.title Fixing the quorum : representation versus abstention en
dc.type Working Paper en
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