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Browsing Max Weber Programme (MWP) by Author "RONZONI, Miriam"
Now showing items 1-6 of 6
Title:Teleology, deontology, and the priority of the right: on some unappreciated distinctions
Author(s):RONZONI, MiriamDate:2010Type of Publication:ArticleAbstract:The paper analyses Rawls's teleology/deontology distinction, and his concept of priority of the right. The first part of the paper aims both 1) to clarify what is distinctive about Rawls's deontology/teleology distinction ...
Title:The Global Order as a Potential Case of Background Injustice
Author(s):RONZONI, MiriamDate:2009Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI MWPAbstract:Is the global order unjust? And if so, why? The paper argues that the central question to be asked within the debate on global distributive and economic justice is not whether the global order is characterized by the ...
Title:On the Meta-ethical Status of Constructivism: Reflections on G. A. Cohen’s ‘Facts and Principles’
Author(s):RONZONI, Miriam; VALENTINI, LauraDate:2008Type of Publication:ArticleAbstract:In his article `Facts and Principles', G.A. Cohen attempts to refute constructivist approaches to justification by showing that, contrary to what their proponents claim, fundamental normative principles are fact-insensitive. ...
Title:What Makes a Basic Structure Just?
Author(s):RONZONI, MiriamDate:2008Type of Publication:ArticleAbstract:In his multi-faceted attack on Rawls’s account of justice, G.A. Cohen has argued that the notion of basic structure is necessarily insensitive to the importance of informal social norms to social justice. The paper argues ...
Title:On the Meta-Ethical Status of Constructivism: Reflections on G.A. Cohen's 'Facts and Principles'
Author(s):RONZONI, Miriam; VALENTINI, LauraDate:2008Type of Publication:ArticleAbstract:In his article 'Facts and Principles', G.A. Cohen attempts to refute constructivist approaches to justification by showing that, contrary to what their proponents claim, fundamental normative principles are fact-insensitive. ...
