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Title:Money is an Experience Good: Competition and Trust in the Private Provision of Money Author(s):MARIMON, Ramon EUI affiliated

; NICOLINI, Juan Pablo; TELES, PedroDate:2011Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2011/24Abstract:We study the interplay between competition and trust as efficiency-enhancingmechanims in the private provision of money. With commitment, trust is automatically achieved and competition ensures efficiency. Without commitment, ...

Title:Pre-announcement and Timing - The Effects of a Government Expenditure Shock Author(s):KRIWOLUZKY, AlexanderDate:2009Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2009/40Abstract:This paper investigates the effect of a government expenditure shock on consumption and real wages. I identify the shock by exploiting its pre-announced nature, i.e. different signs of the responses in investment, hours ...

Title:Inventors and Impostors: An Economic Analysis of Patent Examination Author(s):SCHUETT, FlorianDate:2009Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2009/28Abstract:The objective of patent examination is to separate the wheat from the chaff. Good applications - those satisfying the patentability criteria, particularly novelty and nonobviousness - should be accepted, while bad applications ...

Title:Matching Theory and Data: Bayesian Vector Autoregression and Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models Author(s):KRIWOLUZKY, AlexanderDate:2009Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2009/29Abstract:This paper shows how to identify the structural shocks of a Vector Autoregression (VAR) while simultaneously estimating a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that is not assumed to replicate the data-generating ...

Title:Nested Models and Model Uncertainty Author(s):KRIWOLUZKY, Alexander; STOLTENBERG, Christian A.Date:2009Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2009/37Abstract:Uncertainty about the appropriate choice among nested models is a central concern for optimal policy when policy prescriptions from those models differ. The standard procedure is to specify a prior over the parameter space ...

Title:Competition, Human Capital and Income Inequality with Limited Commitment Author(s):MARIMON, Ramon EUI affiliated

; QUADRINI, VincenzoDate:2008Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2008/21Abstract:We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with two-sided limited commitment to study how barriers to competition, such as restrictions to business start-up, affect the incentive to accumulate human capital. We show ...

Title:Subjective performance evaluation of employees with biased beliefs Author(s):FOSCHI, Matteo EUI affiliated

; SANTOS-PINTO, Luís PedroDate:2017Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2017/08Abstract:This paper analyses how worker optimism (and pessimism) affects subjective performance evaluation (SPE) contracts. We let an optimistic (pessimistic) worker overestimate (underestimate) the probability of observing an ...

Title:Labor share decline and intellectual property products capital Author(s):KOH, Dongya; SANTAEULÀLIA-LLOPIS, Raül; ZHENG, Yu EUI affiliated

Date:2015Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2015/05Abstract:We study the behavior of the US labor share over the past 65 years. We find that intellectual property products (IPP) capital entirely accounts for the observed decline of the US labor share, which otherwise is secularly ...

Title:How to Attain Minimax Risk with Applications to Distribution-Free Nonparametric Estimation and Testing Author(s):SCHLAG, Karl H.Date:2007Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2007/04Abstract:We show how to a derive exact distribution-free nonparametric results for minimax risk when underlying random variables have known finite bounds and means are the only parameters of interest. Transform the data with a ...

Title:Distribution-Free Learning Author(s):SCHLAG, Karl H.Date:2007Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2007/01Abstract:We select among rules for learning which of two actions in a stationary decision problem achieves a higher expected payoffs when payoffs realized by both actions are known in previous instances. Only a bounded set containing ...

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