Browsing MWP Working Papers by Subject "D82"

Now showing items 1-12 of 12

  • Title:Subjective performance evaluation of employees with biased beliefs  Author(s):FOSCHI, Matteo; SANTOS-PINTO, Luís PedroDate:2017Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2017/08Abstract:This paper analyses how worker optimism (and pessimism) affects subjective performance evaluation (SPE) contracts. We let an optimistic (pessimistic) worker overestimate (underestimate) the probability of observing an ...
  • Title:Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance  Author(s):FARINHA LUZ, VitorDate:2015Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI MWP; 2015/15Abstract:This paper provides a complete characterization of equilibria in a game-theoretic version of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s model of competitive insurance. I allow for stochastic contract offers by insurance firms and ...
  • Title:Group formation, in-group bias and the cost of cheating  Author(s):MICHAELI, MotiDate:2015Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI MWP; 2015/04Abstract:Group formation and in-group bias -- preferential treatment for insiders -- are widely observed social phenomena. This paper demonstrates how they arise naturally when people incur a psychological cost as the result of ...
  • Title:Continuous-time contracting with ambiguous information  Author(s):DUMAV, Martin; RIEDEL, FrankDate:2014Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI MWP; 2014/16Abstract:This study examines the contracting problem in continuous time with ambiguous information. A problem of this nature arises, for example, in an employment relationship where there is limited knowledge, or ambiguity, about ...
  • Title:Pundits and quacks : financial experts and market feedback  Author(s):RUDIGER, Jesper; VIGIER, AdrienDate:2014Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI MWP; 2014/22Abstract:By choosing whether or not to follow a financial expert’s advice, a privately informed trader implicitly screens the ability of this expert. We explore the performance of the resulting feedback mechanism. In the medium ...
  • Title:Cross-checking the media  Author(s):RUDIGER, JesperDate:2013Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI MWP; 2013/17Abstract:A characteristic of the news market is that consumers often cross-check information, i.e. observe several news outlets. At the same time, data on political media suggest that more partisan consumers are more likely to ...
  • Title:Efficiency, equity, and optimal income taxation  Author(s):BRENDON, CharlesDate:2013Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI MWP; 2013/22Abstract:Social insurance schemes must resolve a trade-off between competing efficiency and equity considerations. Yet there are few direct statements of this trade-off that could be used for practical policymaking. To this end, ...
  • Title:Financial Markets as a Commitment Device for the Government  Author(s):SIMON, JennyDate:2012Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI MWP; 2012/12Abstract:How does the presence of financial markets shape the government's ability to implement social redistribution? Individuals do not typically constrain consumption to equal their net-of-tax income every period. Instead, access ...
  • Title:Optimal Debt Bias in Corporate Income Taxation  Author(s):SIMON, JennyDate:2012Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI MWP; 2012/13Abstract:I present a rationale for a government to discriminate between debt and equity financing when taxing corporate income. For risk-averse entrepreneurs, equity generates more surplus than debt, because it provides financing ...
  • Title:Credibilty Concerns in Optimal Policy Design  Author(s):LU, Yang K.Date:2010Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI MWP; 2010/16Abstract:This paper provides a transparent framework for thinking about optimal investment in reputation by a trustworthy government. This topic has been neglected by the existing literature on reputation games but is potentially ...
  • Title:Inventors and Impostors: an Economic Analysis of Patent Examination  Author(s):SCHUETT, FlorianDate:2009Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI MWP; 2009/15Abstract:The objective of patent examination is to separate the wheat from the chaff. Good applications – those satisfying the patentability criteria, particularly novelty and non-obviousness – should be accepted, while bad ...
  • Title:Inventors and Impostors: An Economic Analysis of Patent Examination  Author(s):SCHUETT, FlorianDate:2009Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2009/28Abstract:The objective of patent examination is to separate the wheat from the chaff. Good applications - those satisfying the patentability criteria, particularly novelty and nonobviousness - should be accepted, while bad applications ...