Rationality within REACH? On Functional Differentiation as the Structural Foundation of Legitimacy in European Chemicals Regulation

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dc.contributor.author KJAER, Poul
dc.date.accessioned 2007-07-16T13:08:17Z
dc.date.available 2007-07-16T13:08:17Z
dc.date.issued 2007
dc.identifier.issn 1725-6739
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/6948
dc.description.abstract This paper analyses the potential legitimacy basis of REACH, the new regulatory system for the EC chemicals market. It is argued that three different potential sources of legitmacy exists: i) the “quasi-democratic” process within which it was established; ii) proceduralisation; and iii) through an institutional design which is aimed at fostering deliberation. This threefold legitimacy basis reflects the hybrid nature of the regulatory structure of REACH. It is, however, also argued that the underlining feature of all three forms is that they are based on or conditioned by a high level of functional differentiation. Hence, it is argued that the prevalence of functional differentiation serves as a structural condition for the construction of an adequate legitimacy basis for transnational regulatory structures. In addition, functional differentiation must be regarded as a source of legitimacy in its own right. An adequate model of transnational governing and governance in the European context must therefore systematically confront the reality and necessity of functional differentiation. en
dc.format.extent 248836 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher European University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI LAW en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2007/18 en
dc.subject Governance en
dc.subject Legitimacy en
dc.subject Non-majoritarian Institutions en
dc.subject Regulation en
dc.subject Risk Regulation en
dc.title Rationality within REACH? On Functional Differentiation as the Structural Foundation of Legitimacy in European Chemicals Regulation en
dc.type Working Paper en
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