Unemployment and Within-Group Wage Inequality: Can Information Explain the Trade-Off?

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dc.contributor.author FACCINI, Renato
dc.date.accessioned 2007-08-27T07:52:17Z
dc.date.available 2007-08-27T07:52:17Z
dc.date.issued 2007
dc.identifier.issn 1725-6704
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/6978
dc.description.abstract In Italy, following WWII, speci c hiring procedures were developed that prevented rms from screening workers. More in particular, these institutions char- acterized the Italian labor market with respect to the US labor market, and were gradually removed during the 1990s. A simple matching model in which the usual Nash bargaining criterion is replaced by a game of incomplete information, shows that such hiring procedures endogenously generate wage compression within groups of observationally equivalent workers, as well as higher unemployment rates. Both the estimated behavior of within-group wage inequality in Italy, computed from the micro-data of the SHIW panel of the Bank of Italy, and the behavior of the unemployment rate in the late 1990s, are consistent with the predictions of the model. en
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher European University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI ECO en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2007/14 en
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject Job-search en
dc.subject Labor market institutions en
dc.subject Within-group wage inequal en
dc.subject Bargaining with incomplete information en
dc.subject Screening en
dc.subject C78 en
dc.subject J31 en
dc.subject J64 en
dc.title Unemployment and Within-Group Wage Inequality: Can Information Explain the Trade-Off? en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.neeo.contributor FACCINI|Renato|aut|
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