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dc.contributor.authorFACCINI, Renato
dc.date.accessioned2007-08-27T07:52:17Z
dc.date.available2007-08-27T07:52:17Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/6978
dc.description.abstractIn Italy, following WWII, speci c hiring procedures were developed that prevented rms from screening workers. More in particular, these institutions char- acterized the Italian labor market with respect to the US labor market, and were gradually removed during the 1990s. A simple matching model in which the usual Nash bargaining criterion is replaced by a game of incomplete information, shows that such hiring procedures endogenously generate wage compression within groups of observationally equivalent workers, as well as higher unemployment rates. Both the estimated behavior of within-group wage inequality in Italy, computed from the micro-data of the SHIW panel of the Bank of Italy, and the behavior of the unemployment rate in the late 1990s, are consistent with the predictions of the model.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEuropean University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2007/14en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectJob-searchen
dc.subjectLabor market institutionsen
dc.subjectWithin-group wage inequalen
dc.subjectBargaining with incomplete informationen
dc.subjectScreeningen
dc.subjectC78en
dc.subjectJ31en
dc.subjectJ64en
dc.titleUnemployment and Within-Group Wage Inequality: Can Information Explain the Trade-Off?en
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorFACCINI|Renato|aut|
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