| dc.contributor.author | ESCUDÉ, Matteo | |
| dc.contributor.author | SINANDER, Carl Martin Ludvig | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-02-22T15:48:20Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-02-22T15:48:20Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Mathematical social sciences, 2020, Vol. 107 , pp. 13-16 | en |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0165-4896 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1879-3118 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/70058 | |
| dc.description | First published online: September 2020 | en |
| dc.description.abstract | A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to strict monotonicity plus the envelope formula, echoing a well-known characterisation of (weak) strategy-proofness. A consequence is that strategy-proofness can be made strict by an arbitrarily small modification, so that strictness is 'essentially for free'. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | en |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier Ltd | en |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Mathematical social sciences | en |
| dc.relation.isreplacedby | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/70876 | |
| dc.title | Strictly strategy-proof auctions | en |
| dc.type | Article | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.07.002 | |
| dc.identifier.volume | 107 | |
| dc.identifier.startpage | 13 | |
| dc.identifier.endpage | 16 | |
| eui.subscribe.skip | true | |