Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorRUTA, Michele
dc.date.accessioned2007-09-27T12:33:04Z
dc.date.available2007-09-27T12:33:04Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.issn1028-3625
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/7084
dc.description.abstractIs the politicisation of monetary policy in a currency union desirable? This paper shows that in a setting where political influence by national governments is modeled as a common agency game with rational expectations, the answer to this question crucially depends on whether the common central bank can commit to follow its policy.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI RSCASen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2007/21en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectCommon Agencyen
dc.subjectPolitical Pressuresen
dc.subjectEuropean Monetary Unionen
dc.subjectF33en
dc.subjectE58en
dc.subjectD78en
dc.titleMonetary Politics in a Monetary Union: A Note on Common Agency with Rational Expectationsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
eui.subscribe.skiptrue


Files associated with this item

Icon

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record