dc.contributor.author | RUTA, Michele | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-09-27T12:33:04Z | |
dc.date.available | 2007-09-27T12:33:04Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1028-3625 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/7084 | |
dc.description.abstract | Is the politicisation of monetary policy in a currency union desirable? This paper shows that in a
setting where political influence by national governments is modeled as a common agency game with
rational expectations, the answer to this question crucially depends on whether the common central
bank can commit to follow its policy. | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI RSCAS | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2007/21 | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.subject | Common Agency | en |
dc.subject | Political Pressures | en |
dc.subject | European Monetary Union | en |
dc.subject | F33 | en |
dc.subject | E58 | en |
dc.subject | D78 | en |
dc.title | Monetary Politics in a Monetary Union: A Note on Common Agency with Rational Expectations | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |