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dc.contributor.authorMIZUSHIMA, Atsue
dc.contributor.authorFUTAGAMI, Koichi
dc.date.accessioned2007-10-22T16:24:21Z
dc.date.available2007-10-22T16:24:21Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/7168
dc.description.abstractThis paper reexamines results of Konrad and Lommerud (2000). They construct a two-stage game model of a family. We show that their result crucially depends on their linear payoff function and obtain an opposite result if the interaction within a family is represented by a non-linear function; that is, the interaction exhibits strategic complementarity.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEuropean University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2007/28en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectD13en
dc.subjectJ24en
dc.subjectpublic goodsen
dc.subjectcooperative gameen
dc.subjectnon-cooperative gameen
dc.titleThe Bargaining Family Revisited: A Commenten
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorMIZUSHIMA|Atsue|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorFUTAGAMI|Koichi|aut|
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