The Bargaining Family Revisited: A Comment

dc.contributor.author	MIZUSHIMA, Atsue
dc.contributor.author	FUTAGAMI, Koichi
dc.date.accessioned	2007-10-22T16:24:21Z
dc.date.available	2007-10-22T16:24:21Z
dc.date.issued	2007
dc.identifier.issn	1725-6704
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/1814/7168
dc.description.abstract	This paper reexamines results of Konrad and Lommerud (2000). They construct a two-stage game model of a family. We show that their result crucially depends on their linear payoff function and obtain an opposite result if the interaction within a family is represented by a non-linear function; that is, the interaction exhibits strategic complementarity.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.publisher	European University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseries	EUI ECO	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2007/28	en
dc.subject	D13	en
dc.subject	J24	en
dc.subject	public goods	en
dc.subject	cooperative game	en
dc.subject	non-cooperative game	en
dc.title	The Bargaining Family Revisited: A Comment	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en
dc.neeo.contributor	MIZUSHIMA\|Atsue\|aut\|
dc.neeo.contributor	FUTAGAMI\|Koichi\|aut\|
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