The Bargaining Family Revisited: A Comment

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dc.contributor.author MIZUSHIMA, Atsue
dc.contributor.author FUTAGAMI, Koichi
dc.date.accessioned 2007-10-22T16:24:21Z
dc.date.available 2007-10-22T16:24:21Z
dc.date.issued 2007
dc.identifier.issn 1725-6704
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/7168
dc.description.abstract This paper reexamines results of Konrad and Lommerud (2000). They construct a two-stage game model of a family. We show that their result crucially depends on their linear payoff function and obtain an opposite result if the interaction within a family is represented by a non-linear function; that is, the interaction exhibits strategic complementarity. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher European University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI ECO en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2007/28 en
dc.subject D13 en
dc.subject J24 en
dc.subject public goods en
dc.subject cooperative game en
dc.subject non-cooperative game en
dc.title The Bargaining Family Revisited: A Comment en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.neeo.contributor MIZUSHIMA|Atsue|aut|
dc.neeo.contributor FUTAGAMI|Koichi|aut|
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