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dc.contributor.authorVINX, Lars
dc.date.accessioned2007-10-30T10:56:50Z
dc.date.available2007-10-30T10:56:50Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.issn1830-1541
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/7423
dc.description.abstractThis paper argues that Raz’s ‘normal justification thesis’ fails to explain how the law can meaningfully claim arbitrative authority. Given that the law’s claim to authority is usually understood to amount to (or at least to include) a claim to arbitrative authority, this result suggests that the law’s claim to authority will have to be justified in ways not captured by the normal justification thesis. If one rejects alternative means of justification not captured by the normal justification thesis, on the other hand, one should likewise abandon the thesis that the law necessarily claims practical authority.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEuropean University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI MWPen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2007/15en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectAuthorityen
dc.subjectArbitrationen
dc.subjectCoordinationen
dc.subjectDisagreementen
dc.subjectExpertiseen
dc.subjectLawen
dc.subjectLegitimacyen
dc.subjectLegal Positivismen
dc.subjectNatural Lawen
dc.subjectNormal Justification Thesisen
dc.subjectJoseph Razen
dc.titleAuthority, Arbitration and the Claims of the Lawen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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