Early conclusion in the co-decision legislative procedure

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dc.contributor.author RASMUSSEN, Anne
dc.date.accessioned 2007-12-11T09:28:32Z
dc.date.available 2007-12-11T09:28:32Z
dc.date.issued 2007
dc.identifier.issn 1830-7728
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/7635
dc.description.abstract There are broader democratic implications in whether legislative deals are concluded between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers in the co-decision procedure at first reading, as the potential of different interests within the legislative bodies to affect the outcomes varies considerably between this and the later reading stages. This paper therefore examines the extent to which six different explanations can account for early agreement and uses a dataset with all procedures that had their first reading in the first five years after the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty. The key conclusion is that factors that the institutions themselves attached importance to before the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force, such as workload and the character of the file, do not have explanatory power, whereas others, such as how close a working relationship exists between the co-legislators, the size of the file negotiated, and whether it is a new act do. Moreover, the paper adds to existing evidence of the relevance of party politics within the institutions by demonstrating that party interests also play a role across them. The chance of early conclusion increases if the negotiators from the Council and the European Parliament come from the same party family. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI MWP en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2007/31 en
dc.subject Co-decision en
dc.subject bicameral bargaining en
dc.subject early agreement en
dc.subject European Parliament en
dc.subject Council of Ministers en
dc.subject Presidency en
dc.subject rapporteur en
dc.subject party politics en
dc.title Early conclusion in the co-decision legislative procedure en
dc.type Working Paper en
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