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dc.contributor.authorDIMITROVA, Antoaneta
dc.date.accessioned2007-12-14T16:36:48Z
dc.date.available2007-12-14T16:36:48Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.issn1028-3625
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/7674
dc.description.abstractThis paper sets out to explore the puzzle of possible institutionalization or reversal of rules ‘imported’ by new member states from Central and Eastern Europe during their preparation for accession to the EU. It argues that the institutionalization of formal rules adopted as part of enlargement requirements is not automatic post accession. New formal rules can be reversed, supported by secondary rules and institutionalized or ignored and not implemented. The paper proposes a politics framework that suggests that these different outcomes will be influenced by the environment of weak post communist states and will depend on the area specific configuration of formal and informal veto players and on the EU’s ability to impose sanctions. In the case of non acquis imported rules, reversal of formal rules would be possible without sanctions whereas in the case of acquis rules, the likely outcomes are institutionalization or ‘empty shells’. Another outcome, ‘capture’ of the new rules is likely in areas with distributive implen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI RSCASen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2007/37en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectEnlargementen
dc.subjectCentral and Eastern Europeen
dc.subjectacquis communautaireen
dc.subjectinstitutionalisationen
dc.subjectadministrative adaptationen
dc.titleInstitutionalization of Imported Rules in the European Union’s New Member States: Bringing Politics Back in the Research Agendaen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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