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dc.contributor.authorFERI, Francesco
dc.contributor.authorMELÉNDEZ-JIMÉNEZ, Miguel A.
dc.contributor.authorPONTI, Giovanni
dc.contributor.authorVEGA-REDONDO, Fernando
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-13T13:29:49Z
dc.date.available2008-02-13T13:29:49Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/8085
dc.description.abstractThe paper reports an experimental study based on a variant of the popular Chinos game, which is used as a simple but paradigmatic instance of observational learning. There are three players, arranged in sequence, each of whom wins a fixed price if she manages to guess the total number of coins lying in everybody’s hands. Our evidence shows that, despite the remarkable frequency of equilibrium outcomes, deviations from optimal play are also significant. And when such deviations occur, we find that, for any given player position, the probability of a mistake is increasing in the probability of a mistake of her predecessors. This is what we call an error cascade, which we rationalize by way of a simple model of “noisy equilibrium”.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEuropean University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2008/14en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectC92en
dc.subjectD8en
dc.subjectpositional learningen
dc.subjecterror cascadesen
dc.titleError Cascades in Observational Learning: An Experiment on the Chinos Gameen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorFERI|Francesco|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorMELÉNDEZ-JIMÉNEZ|Miguel A.|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorPONTI|Giovanni|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorVEGA-REDONDO|Fernando|aut|EUI70011
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