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| Issue Date | View | Title | Author(s) | Type of Publication | Series/Report no. | Abstract |
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2012
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Working Paper
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EUI RSCAS; 2012/03; Global Governance Programme-12
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View Abstract
This working paper argues on European Defense issues, considering a triple perspective: Past Legacy, Present Changes and Future Challenges. The first part looks at European defense from an historical perspective; from its European integration origins to the foundation of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), reviewing its decade in existence. The second part analyzes the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty, as well as the most significant developments of a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP): solidarity clauses, mission enlargement, European Defense Agency (EDA), news forms of cooperation, CSDP democratic control. Thirdly, this paper considers future challenges and concludes the need for new developments: at the institutional level, the strengthening of European defense parliamentary control through the creation of a CSDP inter parliamentary assembly and the EU´s external action inter and cross pillar coordination; at the capability level, the need to strengthen EDA and implement new cooperation mechanisms foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty; at the strategic level, the drive to clarify the EU´s international identity and define a new international strategy enabling the EU as a global security producer.
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2012
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Working Paper
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EUI RSCAS; 2012/01; EUDO - European Union Democracy Observatory
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View Abstract
This paper, based on cross-regional empirical research, provides an integrated analytical framework for understanding the emergence of populism in seemingly different political contexts in both Europe (including Greece, France and the Netherlands) and Latin America (including Peru and Venezuela). It is found that, given an appropriate context, political leadership is the most important factor for setting in motion a number of interdependent causal mechanisms that may produce populism. Those mechanisms include the politicization of social resentment, the formation of new cleavage lines, and intense polarization. When successfully emergent, populism’s first and foremost outcome is the creation of new parties, or movements, of a distinctly personalist appeal. The causal explanation proposed in this paper is both parsimonious and credible. It also points to specific research themes related to successfully emergent populism.
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2010
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Working Paper
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CERGE-EI Working Paper; 2010/419; [Florence School of Regulation]
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View Abstract
Theories of fairness have typically used the assumption of ex-ante known pie size. Pie size, however, is rarely known ex ante. Using three simple allocation problems generally known as dictator, ultimatum and trust games, we explore the influence of ex-ante unknown pie size of varying degrees of risk on individual behavior. We derive theoretical predictions for two of these games using utility functions that capture additively separable constant relative risk aversion and inequity aversion. We test the theoretical predictions experimentally on two different subject pools: students of Czech Technical University and employees of Prague City Hall. We control for the risk attitude of our subjects through a variant of the Holt-Laury assessment instrument. We find statistically significant differences in giving behavior as a function of the degree of risk, and the degree of risk aversion, across individuals. We also find differences across the two subject pools but show that, once we control for various socio-demographic and cognitive characteristics, these differences evaporate. We discuss the policy and methodological implications of the results of our artefactual field experiment, as well as the implications for theories of fairness of reciprocity and their experimental test.
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2011
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Working Paper
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DIW Berlin Discussion Paper; 2011/1145; [Florence School of Regulation]
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View Abstract
We propose a merchant-regulatory framework to promote investment in the European natural gas network infrastructure based on a price cap over two-part tariffs. As suggested by Vogelsang (2001) and Hogan et al. (2010), a profit maximizing network operator facing this regulatory constraint will intertemporally rebalance the variable and fixed part of its two-part tariff so as to expand the congested pipelines, and converge to the Ramsey-Boiteaux equilibrium. We confirm this with actual data from the European natural gas market by comparing the bi-level price-cap model with a base case, a no-regulation case, and a welfare benchmark case, and by performing sensitivity analyses. In all cases, the incentive model is the best decentralized regulatory alternative that efficiently develops the European pipeline system.
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2011
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Working Paper
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Jean Monnet Working Papers; 2011/01
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View Abstract
Memory has become an object of dispute in the EU. Different groups and states do not have a full convergence of views and this raises the question as to whether the EU should or should not be involved. A pluralist conception of justice would argue that the recognition of memory is not excluded as a form of justice. Adopting this view, this paper argues that the recognition of memory can be addressed at the EU level if the different components of justice are allocated to the proper spheres (recognition, retribution and recognition) and levels (national and European).
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