dc.contributor.author | CATIGNANI, Sergio | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-02-19T16:59:22Z | |
dc.date.available | 2008-02-19T16:59:22Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1830-7728 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/8135 | |
dc.description.abstract | The following paper analyzes the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) counter-insurgency strategy and campaign carried out against the Palestinian insurgency within the Occupied/Disputed Territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000-2005). It provides a detailed examination of the tactics, operations and strategic effect that actions carried out by the Israel Defense Forces had on the overall conflict dynamic of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The paper argues that while the IDF was able to achieve quite significant tactical innovation and success, the overall strategic result of Israel’s counter-insurgency campaign during the Al-Aqsa Intifada was a stalemate rather than ‘victory’ given that, in effect, clear political goals and direction were lacking during the conflict. | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI MWP | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2008/04 | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.subject | Israel | en |
dc.subject | Palestinian Authority | en |
dc.subject | Israel Defense Forces | en |
dc.subject | counter-insurgency | en |
dc.subject | terrorism | en |
dc.subject | insurgency | en |
dc.subject | Islamic Jihad | en |
dc.subject | PLO | en |
dc.subject | Hamas | en |
dc.subject | Al-Aqsa Intifada | en |
dc.title | The Israel Defense Forces and the Al-Aqsa Intifada: When Tactical Virtuosity Meets Strategic Disappointment | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |