Globalization and the Politics of Subsidies

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dc.contributor.author AYDIN, Umut
dc.date.accessioned 2008-04-30T10:58:58Z
dc.date.available 2008-04-30T10:58:58Z
dc.date.issued 2008
dc.identifier.issn 1830-7728
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/8511
dc.description.abstract State subsidies to attract investment have proliferated since the 1980s, yet we know little about the factors that influence governments’ subsidy policies. In this paper, I propose that in making subsidy policies, governments are influenced by capital mobility and domestic political institutions. Capital mobility influences subsidy levels in two ways. First, mobility increases the bargaining power of capital vis-à-vis governments in negotiations over subsidies, and, second, the ability of companies to move across borders triggers competition among neighboring countries, thus driving subsidy levels upwards. I argue, however, that the likelihood of governments to respond to the pressures from mobile capital will be higher in countries with electoral institutions that encourage personal vote-seeking, such as small district magnitudes and low political party discipline. The empirical analysis of subsidy levels in the EU member states during the period 1992-2006 lends support for these arguments. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI MWP en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2008/11 en
dc.subject Subsidies en
dc.subject state aid en
dc.subject capital mobility en
dc.subject globalization en
dc.subject distributive politics en
dc.subject electoral politics en
dc.title Globalization and the Politics of Subsidies en
dc.type Working Paper en
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