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dc.contributor.authorFACCINI, Renato
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-14T16:03:50Z
dc.date.available2008-07-14T16:03:50Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/9008
dc.description.abstractStandard models of temporary contracts are either inconclusive, or fail to ac- count for the positive correlation between temporary contracts and the employ- ment rate, and for the high transition rates into permanent employment measured in Europe. This paper shows that a matching model in which rms use temporary contracts to screen workers for permanent positions can successfully ful ll this task. When the model is calibrated to the Italian economy, it accounts for salient statistics including the worker turnover rate, the transition rates into permanent employment, and the drop in the unemployment rate following the reforms im- plemented in the late 1990s. When temporary contracts are used as a screening device, they can increase both productivity and welfare. Their quantitative impact crucially hinges on dismissal costs and minimum wages.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEuropean University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2008/27en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectjob-searchen
dc.subjecttemporary contractsen
dc.subjectlabor market institutionsen
dc.subjectscreen-ingen
dc.subjecthiring proceduresen
dc.subjectturnover ratesen
dc.subjectwage differentialsen
dc.subjectJ31en
dc.subjectJ41en
dc.subjectJ63en
dc.subjectJ64en
dc.subjectJ65en
dc.titleReassessing Labor Market Reforms: Temporary Contracts as a Screening Deviceen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorFACCINI|Renato|aut|
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