Reassessing Labor Market Reforms: Temporary Contracts as a Screening Device

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Show simple item record FACCINI, Renato 2008-07-14T16:03:50Z 2008-07-14T16:03:50Z 2008
dc.identifier.issn 1725-6704
dc.description.abstract Standard models of temporary contracts are either inconclusive, or fail to ac- count for the positive correlation between temporary contracts and the employ- ment rate, and for the high transition rates into permanent employment measured in Europe. This paper shows that a matching model in which rms use temporary contracts to screen workers for permanent positions can successfully ful ll this task. When the model is calibrated to the Italian economy, it accounts for salient statistics including the worker turnover rate, the transition rates into permanent employment, and the drop in the unemployment rate following the reforms im- plemented in the late 1990s. When temporary contracts are used as a screening device, they can increase both productivity and welfare. Their quantitative impact crucially hinges on dismissal costs and minimum wages. en
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher European University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI ECO en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2008/27 en
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject job-search en
dc.subject temporary contracts en
dc.subject labor market institutions en
dc.subject screen-ing en
dc.subject hiring procedures en
dc.subject turnover rates en
dc.subject wage differentials en
dc.subject J31 en
dc.subject J41 en
dc.subject J63 en
dc.subject J64 en
dc.subject J65 en
dc.title Reassessing Labor Market Reforms: Temporary Contracts as a Screening Device en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.neeo.contributor FACCINI|Renato|aut|
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