Date: 2012
Type: Working Paper
Envy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining
Working Paper, EUI ECO
KOHLER, Stefan, Envy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining, EUI ECO - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/32593
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
Bargainers in an open-ended alternating-offer bargaining situation may perceive envy, a utility loss caused by receiving the smaller share that is modeled in some social preferences in addition to self-interest. I extend Rubinstein (1982)’s original solution of the bargaining problem for two self-interested bargainers to this strategic situation. Bargainers still reach agreement in the first period and their bargaining shares increase in the strength of their own envy.
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/32593
ISSN: 1725-6704
Series/Number: EUI ECO
Keyword(s): Alternating offers Bargaining Bargaining power Behavioral economics Envy Equity Fairness Inequality aversion Negotiation Social preferences C72 C78 C91 D03 D31 D63
Published version: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/27195