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MWP 2016/01
Max Weber Programme

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Democracy from Electoral Authoritarian Rule

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EUI Working Paper **MWP** 2016/01

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ISSN 1830-7728

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Printed in Italy
European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
Italy
www.eui.eu
cadmus.eui.eu

Abstract

Why do some electoral authoritarian regimes survive for decades while others become democracies? This article explores the impact of constitutional structures on democratic transitions from electoral authoritarianism. We argue that under electoral authoritarian regimes, parliamentary systems permit dictators to survive longer than they do in presidential systems. This is because parliamentary systems incentivize autocrats and ruling elites to engage in power sharing and thus institutionalize party organizations, and indirectly allow electoral manipulation to achieve an overwhelming victory at the ballot box, through practices such as gerrymandering and malapportionment. We test our hypothesis using a combination of cross-national statistical analysis and comparative case studies of Malaysia and the Philippines. Employing a cross-national dataset of 170 countries between 1946 and 2008, dynamic probit models provide supporting evidence that electoral authoritarianism within parliamentary systems is less likely to lead a country to democracy than within presidential systems. The results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, including instrumental variable estimation and additional controls. Two carefully selected case studies have been chosen for comparative analysis—Malaysia's *Barisan Nasional* (National Front) regime (1957 to present) and the Philippines's electoral authoritarian regime (1978 to 1986)—which elucidate causal mechanisms in the theory.

Keywords

Democratization, electoral authoritarianism, presidentialism vs. parliamentarism, Southeast Asia, political institutions.

Acknowledgments

Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 2014 annual meetings of American Political Science Association (Chicago, USA) and Japanese Political Science Association (Tokyo, Japan), the Workshop on Conflict at Michigan State University, and the 2015 annual meetings of Taiwan Political Science Association (Kinmen, Taiwan), and Asian Political International Studies (Phnom Penh, Cambodia). We wish to thank all the participants in these conferences. We are also grateful to Stefano Bartolini, Takeshi Kawanaka, and Yoshikuni Ono for their helpful comments.

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1. Introduction

In the wake of the Cold War, most authoritarian countries hold national elections that allow opposition parties to compete for and gain seats, despite a manipulated electoral system in favor of the dictators and their ruling parties. Although such authoritarian elections are often extensively rigged and do not allow the possibility of government turnover, the growing pressure from the international community no longer permits them to avoid holding periodical elections with the participation of opposition parties.¹ This post-Cold War proliferation of “electoral authoritarianism”² or “competitive authoritarianism”³ revived the study of authoritarian politics in the field of comparative politics. Nevertheless, there is a large variation in the durability of electoral authoritarian regimes. Some electoral authoritarian countries such as Malaysia (1957–present), Singapore (1965–present), Zimbabwe (1970–present), and Egypt (1979–2011) are examples in which dictators succeeded in staying in power for long periods of time, while other electoral authoritarian regimes in countries such as the Philippines (1978–1985), Kenya (1992–1997), Guatemala (1955–1957), and Honduras (1954–1956) collapsed relatively soon after establishment, and were followed by democratic transitions. What explains these variations?

Many studies have found an answer to this question in seemingly democratic institutions such as legislatures, elections, and political parties. According to the burgeoning literature on this issue, these institutions contribute to authoritarian durability in a variety of ways:

- Strong party organizations consolidating authoritarian rule⁴ by facilitating long-lasting power sharing between the dictator and ruling elites;⁵
- Multi-party legislatures helping dictators make credible policy concessions toward opposition groups;⁶
- Encouraging economic growth and providing opportunities for the citizenry to engage in economic distribution;⁷
- Parliaments allowing authoritarian leaders to divide and conquer opposition camps;⁸
- Authoritarian elections contributing to displaying regime strength by ensuring an overwhelming electoral victory;⁹
- Gathering information on the distribution of popular support through electoral results.¹⁰

Although scholars’ views differ considerably regarding the roles of quasi-democratic institutions, they agree that these institutions are not mere window dressing but do indeed benefit authoritarian leaders.

In this paper, we focus on an institutional factor that helps explain the longevity of electoral authoritarian regimes, but which has escaped close scrutiny thus far: executive–legislative relations, or the distinction between parliamentary systems on the one hand and presidential and semi-presidential systems on the other. Briefly, the major difference between these two systems is this: in parliamentary systems, the chief executive is elected from, and accountable to, the legislature; while in presidential/semi-presidential systems the chief executive is chosen directly by voters and his tenure is

¹ Norris, 2014, 78–81.

² Schedler (2013).

³ Levitsky and Way (2010).

⁴ Huntington (1968); Brownlee (2007); Geddes (1999).

⁵ Magaloni (2008); Svoboda (2012).

⁶ Gandhi (2008); Gandhi and Przeworski (2007).

⁷ Blaydes (2011); Magaloni (2006); Wright (2008).

⁸ Lust-Okar (2004).

⁹ Geddes (2006); Magaloni (2006); Simpser (2013); Wright (2008).

¹⁰ Blaydes (2011); Cox (2009); Miller (2014); Reuter and Robertson (2012).

not dependent on parliamentary support. This difference under electoral authoritarianism, in our view, is as important as that in democracies. Specifically, we argue that this difference influences electoral authoritarian regimes with parliamentary systems to be less likely to democratize than those with presidential systems, for the following reasons. First, parliamentarism facilitates credible power sharing among ruling elites, often enabling dictators to institutionalize a dominant party. Deterring ruling elites' defections from the regime, parliamentarism can effectively prevent democratic transitions. Second, most parliamentary elections have multiple electoral districts and thus dictators retain much more room to arbitrarily redistrict and apportion according to their interests and those of their parties compared with presidential elections. These indirect measures of electoral manipulation allow dictators to enjoy bias in parliamentary seats to maintain an overwhelming majority without relying on more risky and blatant electoral fraud, which often backfires on dictators.¹¹ By allowing dictators to score an overwhelming majority by these indirect methods, parliamentarism prevents democratization through elections.

We empirically test our hypothesis through cross-national statistical analysis and comparative case studies of Malaysia and the Philippines. Our statistical analysis shows that electoral authoritarian regimes with parliamentarism are less likely to democratize than those with presidentialism. This statistical result is robust to a battery of sensitivity analysis such as instrumental variable (IV) estimation, different samples of electoral authoritarianism, various estimation methods, potential outliers, and additional control variables. We also provide additional cross-national evidence on the causal mechanisms that parliamentarism is more likely to generate dominant party regimes and less likely to engage in risky, blatant electoral fraud. Given their similarity as countries, comparative case studies of Malaysia and the Philippines elucidate causal mechanisms linking executive–legislative structures and the survival of electoral authoritarian regimes.

This study contributes to the literature on authoritarian politics, on political institutions, and on regime change. First, we introduce a new factor to the body of knowledge on authoritarian politics that influences the survival of electoral authoritarian regimes, namely, the executive–legislative structure. Second, our focus on the executive–legislative structure provides a framework to understand how elections, parties, and legislatures serve to prolong the longevity of authoritarian regimes. Among existing studies, conflicting effects of these political institutions have been observed. For example, sometimes elections help dismantle authoritarian rule, but in other cases they are tools for autocrats to stay in power. By incorporating the executive–legislative structure, we provide a framework to cohesively understand conditions under which elections, parties, and legislatures help lengthen the time in power of authoritarian regimes. Further discussion on this point is found in the Conclusion.

Third, the present research paves a way forward to approach the impact of executive–legislative relations on regime transition. Starting from the seminal work by Juan Linz,¹² a vast majority of literature on this topic has almost exclusively focused on democratic breakdown. Trichotomously categorizing political regimes (closed authoritarianism, electoral authoritarianism, and democracy), we show that the distinction between presidentialism/semi-presidentialism and parliamentarism is an important factor that influences regime transition from electoral authoritarianism to democracy. In this light, this study brings constitutional structures back to the study of regime transition.

This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we theorize the executive–legislative relationship and democratic transitions in electoral authoritarian countries and propose a testable hypothesis. In Section 3, we conduct cross-national statistical analysis, covering 170 countries from 1946 to 2008, in order to empirically examine the hypothesis. Finally, comparative case studies of Malaysia and the Philippines follow to illuminate the causal mechanisms proposed in our theory.

2. Executive–Legislative Structure and Democratic Transitions

Two broad types of argument have been advanced to explain the survival of electoral authoritarianism. The first focuses on international factors. Scholars have emphasized the role of “international

¹¹ Tucker (2007); Hafner-Burton et al. (2014).

¹² Linz (1990a)

diffusion”,¹³ foreign intervention such as the support for the promotion of democracy, conditions placed on aid, and electoral monitoring,¹⁴ and international ties such as trade and investment, as well as human exchange with Western democracies.¹⁵ The second type of argument looks at domestic politics. Among these, two strands exist. One of these emphasizes opposition strategies. For example, Howard and Rossler¹⁶ and Donno¹⁷ maintain that the formation of broad opposition coalitions significantly increases the chances of replacing competitive authoritarian regimes with electoral democracy. By studying post-Soviet countries, Bunce and Wolchik¹⁸ argue that in addition to having a unified opposition, the adoption of “sophisticated, intricately planned, and historically unprecedented electoral strategies”¹⁹ can maximize opposition votes in order to replace dictators. The second strand, related to domestic politics, is institutional. As discussed above, scholars have investigated how elections, political parties, and legislatures affect the longevity of authoritarian regimes.

This study belongs to the institutionalist camp, and sheds light on an aspect that has escaped scholarly attention thus far: the executive–legislative structure.²⁰ Specifically, we argue that electoral authoritarian regimes that adopt parliamentary systems tend to survive longer than those using a presidential or semi-presidential form of government, other things being equal. In parliamentary systems, the chief executive (prime minister) is elected by the legislature and his/her tenure depends on the confidence of the legislative majority. Presidential systems are characterized by the origin and survival of the executive being separate from the legislature: the chief executive (president) is directly elected by voters and does not rely on the confidence of the legislature for his/her survival. In semi-presidentialism, there is a president elected by voters, and a prime minister elected by the legislature; the tenure of the prime minister depends on parliamentary confidence, while that of the president does not.²¹ We expect that these constitutional differences create the conditions for the following two mechanisms.

First, parliamentarism is more conducive to institutionalizing the ruling party’s organization. While the notion of institutionalization in this context is difficult to define precisely,²² an institutionalized political party has a well-structured organization and the allegiance of its members to the party’s goals and decisions.²³ Although not exactly adopting the concept of institutionalization, many have pointed out that systems with a directly elected chief executive tend to have less institutionalized parties than parliamentary systems.²⁴ Empirically, Samuels and Shugart²⁵ convincingly demonstrate that presidential and semi-presidential systems tend to produce less institutionalized parties than parliamentary governments. When the chief executive is directly elected, which is the core feature of presidential and semi-presidential systems, parties tend to become “presidentialized.” In such parties, according to Samuels and Shugart,²⁶ party organization and

¹³ Brinks and Coppedge (2006); Gleditsch and Ward (2006); Huntington (1993).

¹⁴ Donno (2013); Kelley (2012); Pevehouse (2002).

¹⁵ Levitsky and Way (2010); Eichengreen and Leblang (2008). In addition to international factors, Levitsky and Way also emphasize the “organizational power” of the incumbent regime. We discuss this as a separate group of theories.

¹⁶ Howard and Rossler (2006).

¹⁷ Donno (2013).

¹⁸ Bunce and Wolchik (2010).

¹⁹ The concrete examples include voter registration and turnover drives, monitoring procedures, and orchestrated political campaigns.

²⁰ For recent discussions on the importance of constitutional frameworks in authoritarian regimes in general, see Ginsburg and Simpser (2014).

²¹ Shugart and Carey (1992).

²² c.f. Randall and Svåsand (2002).

²³ Huntington (1968); Mainwaring and Scully (1995).

²⁴ Fujiwara (1994), 256–261; Linz (1990b), 89; Shugart (1998), 2.

²⁵ Samuels and Shugart (2010).

²⁶ *ibid.*

activities are strongly influenced to maximize the chances of winning presidential elections. For example, parties tend to field presidential candidates who may be new to the party but have a good chance of winning; to pursue vote-maximizing policies at the cost of promoting the party's ideological positions; and to concentrate party resources on winning presidential elections rather than building the party as a whole. In combination, these features hinder the institutionalization of parties—both the ruling party and the opposition—in presidential and semi-presidential systems.

When the ruling party in electoral authoritarianism is institutionalized well, the country is less likely to democratize. The institutionalized governing party serves as a device for credible power sharing among ruling elites.²⁷ In such circumstances, the autocratic leader can credibly signal that he would not abuse his power against regime elites. For those elites within the ruling circle, they can expect their career ambitions to be fulfilled and to receive perks from being part of the regime in the future. When the ruling party functions in this way, regime elites have less incentive to defect to the opposition, and less interest in staging a palace coup to oust the ruler by force. At the same time, when the party is institutionalized, leadership succession takes place according to party rules: the resignation, death, or retirement of the chief executive is less likely to cause political disturbance, thus prolonging authoritarian rule. In addition, an institutionalized ruling party can facilitate efficient and effective distribution of patronage to voters, thereby contributing to winning big in elections.²⁸

Second, autocrats in parliamentary systems have a *wider* variety of electoral maneuvering tactics than those in presidential/semi-presidential systems. Scholars have pointed out that there are three main types of electoral malpractice: manipulation of electoral rules, manipulation of vote choice, and manipulation of electoral administration.²⁹ It is in the first type that parliamentary autocrats enjoy an advantage over their presidential counterparts. This happens because presidents are elected directly by voters from a single nationwide constituency,³⁰ while a parliamentary majority elects the prime minister. What this means is that, in order to remain in power, presidents need to win at least a plurality of votes among the electorate, while prime ministers need to have their party win a plurality of seats in legislative elections.

Against this backdrop, prime ministers can resort to two additional strategies of manipulation that presidents cannot. The first is malapportionment, which refers to a disproportionate allocation of legislative seats in light of the number of people making up the electorate. The ruling party can apportion a larger number of seats to their bailiwicks in order to win a greater number of seats with a fewer numbers of votes. The second is gerrymandering—drawing district boundaries in a politically calculated manner. Typically, the ruling party can minimize the number of opposition seats by packing opposition supporters into districts where the ruling party is certain to win, and/or splitting the opposition stronghold into several districts that the opposition would lose. While malapportionment and gerrymandering can also exist in legislative elections in presidential systems, legislative elections under presidentialism are beyond the scope of our analyses because they do not affect the choice of the chief executive (president). One precondition for such strategies is that legislative elections *do not* use a proportional representation (PR) electoral formula with a nationwide single constituency. In such an electoral system, technically speaking, neither malapportionment nor gerrymandering can occur. Nevertheless, electoral authoritarian regimes that use nationwide PR are few in number.³¹

Malapportionment and gerrymandering can facilitate the survival of the electoral authoritarian regime in several ways. First, autocrats have less need to rely on more direct, blatant electoral manipulation such as electoral violence and tampering with the ballot box; thus, there is less chance of

²⁷ Magaloni (2006, 2008).

²⁸ Magaloni (2006), Greene (2009).

²⁹ Birch (2011); Schedler (2002).

³⁰ Exceptions are those presidential elections that use an electoral college as in the United States, and Argentina until the 1994 presidential election.

³¹ In our sample of countries, Kyrgyz (2007–present), Kazakhstan (2007–present), Peru (2000–2006) and Russia (2005–present) use such an electoral rule. As we show later in robustness checks, our main results remain robust even if we exclude these countries from our sample.

mass protests that could result in democratic transitions. Second, they facilitate the appearance of the “overwhelming victory” of the ruling party,³² as the percentage of seats won by the winning party is disproportionately larger than the percentage of votes in highly malapportioned and/or gerrymandered elections. Third, they allow for a “spurious majority,” which refers to election results where a party wins a majority of seats while another party wins the majority of votes.³³ As we discuss later, Malaysia’s general election in 2013 yielded a spurious majority where the ruling *Barisan Nasional* (National Front, hereafter BN) coalition won fewer votes than the opposition coalition *Pakatan Rakyat* (People’s Pact), but BN still won the majority of seats. If the same result was obtained in a presidential or semi-presidential election, the opposition would have seized power and democratization would be the likely result.³⁴

As far as we are aware, this paper is the first comprehensive attempt to investigate the link between executive–legislative relations and democratic transitions. In a recently published article, Roberts³⁵ examined a similar argument—presidential authoritarian regimes are shorter-lived than parliamentary counterparts—yet his analyses differ from ours in several important respects. First, he is concerned with the change in autocratic regimes, but not necessarily the transition to democracy, as we are. Second, he limited his theory to party-based authoritarian regimes, excluding military and personalist regimes.³⁶ Our theoretical argument applies to electoral authoritarian regimes in general, which includes military and personalist sub-categories, while excluding closed authoritarian regimes. We believe the logic provided here should apply to all sub-categories of authoritarian regimes as long as regular and somewhat competitive elections are held. Third, our analyses cover a longer time period, from 1945 to 2008, while Roberts’ data spans from 1975 to 2012. As we show later, as a robustness check, it turns out that by utilizing this more extensive dataset the executive—legislative structure better explains democratic transitions rather than autocratic breakdown. In short, our analyses are concerned with the issue of democratic transitions and cover a wider range of sub-regime categories and time periods.³⁷

The argument we make parallels the debate on the “perils of presidentialism,” which relates to the stability of democracy in developing countries.³⁸ In analyzing the factors influencing democratic stability, scholars have debated whether parliamentary systems lead to stability while presidentialism is prone to democratic breakdown.³⁹ Empirical analyses have not yielded conclusive results, with some showing parliamentary stability,⁴⁰ while others show that presidentialism *per se* is not the cause of democratic breakdown,⁴¹ but is instead the product of presidentialism combined with other political factors.⁴² Our argument suggests that executive–legislative relations may not only affect the stability of democratic regimes but also have an impact on democratic transitions from electoral authoritarian regimes, as we posit that the institutions regulating executive–legislative relations exert a similar influence in the context of limited, but not entirely limited, electoral competition. At the same time, it

³² Magaloni (2006); Simpser (2013).

³³ Siaroff (2003).

³⁴ One exception to the rule is presidential elections in the United States. As a result of the adoption of an electoral college with a plurality system in most states, the actual winner can receive fewer popular votes, as happened in the case of Al Gore vs. George W. Bush in 2000.

³⁵ Roberts (2015).

³⁶ cf. Geddes et al. (2014).

³⁷ In addition to Roberts (2015), Templeman (2012) makes a similar argument about the effect of executive–legislative relations on the longevity of one-party dominant regimes, but his scope of analyses covers both democracies and autocracies.

³⁸ Linz (1990a).

³⁹ Horowitz (1990); Lijphart (1991); Linz (1990a).

⁴⁰ Stepan and Skach (1993); Przeworski et al. (2000).

⁴¹ Cheibub (2007).

⁴² Mainwaring (1993); Shugart and Carey (1992).

should be noted that we expect these effects to be seen only in electoral authoritarianism, but not the closed variant. This is because we expect that the above two mechanisms emanating from the presidential-parliamentary difference only occur when some degree of electoral competition is present. In closed authoritarian regimes, by definition, there is no electoral competition where a real (not pseudo-regime) opposition has a chance of winning a seat.

3. Cross-National Statistical Analyses

Following recent studies on authoritarian regimes, we assume that there are at least two subtypes of authoritarian regime in light of their electoral competitiveness. The first is the closed authoritarian regime where there is no meaningful electoral competition.⁴³ The second subtype is the electoral authoritarian regime in which there is a certain level of electoral competition but the competition is severely limited in favor of the ruling party. Adding the democratic regime category gives a threefold categorization: (1) democracy, (2) electoral authoritarianism, and (3) closed authoritarianism. To empirically identify these three types of political regimes in a rigorous way, we rely on the following two measurements of political regimes.

The first measure is based on the work of Kinne and Marinov,⁴⁴ in which they make a trichotomous measure of political regimes by combining Przeworski's definition of democracy with Hyde and Marinov's⁴⁵ measure of electoral competition. According to the dataset by Przeworski et al.,⁴⁶ and an extended version of that by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland,⁴⁷ a country is regarded as democratic if it satisfies the following four conditions: (1) the executive is elected, (2) the legislature is elected, (3) there is more than one political party, and (4) an incumbent regime has lost power. Otherwise, the country is deemed authoritarian. Although useful to distinguish democracy from autocracy, the dataset does not allow us to disaggregate the data to see which conditions authoritarian countries fail to satisfy and thus why they are categorized as authoritarian. To fill this gap and distinguish electoral authoritarian regimes from closed authoritarianism, we use Hyde and Marinov's⁴⁸ National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA). NELDA enables us to identify whether authoritarian elections allow *ex ante* electoral uncertainty, or competition, and therefore is useful in further categorizing authoritarian regimes. Following Hyde and Marinov⁴⁹ and Kinne and Marinov,⁵⁰ within authoritarian regimes we code a country as electoral authoritarian if its national elections meet all of the following three conditions: (1) opposition parties are allowed to participate in elections, (2) more than one party is legal, and (3) there is a choice of candidates on the ballot. If an authoritarian country fails to meet at least one of these three conditions, the country is regarded as a "closed" authoritarian regime. When all the three conditions are satisfied, then the authoritarian country is an "electoral" authoritarian regime. Referring to these definitions, we categorize all the country-year observations from 1945 to 2010 as closed authoritarian, electoral authoritarian, or democracy.

The second way to categorize political regimes is by using criteria originally proposed by Brownlee.⁵¹ He uses the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions (DPI)⁵² and constructs a

⁴³ In some closed authoritarian regimes, parties other than the ruling party may participate and win seats in elections, as in China and Vietnam. However, their presence does not satisfy the conditions to classify them as electoral authoritarian, because these parties are regime-supported and electoral competition is not substantially meaningful.

⁴⁴ Kinne and Marinov (2013).

⁴⁵ Hyde and Marinov (2012).

⁴⁶ Przeworski et al. (2000).

⁴⁷ Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2009).

⁴⁸ Hyde and Marinov (2012).

⁴⁹ *ibid.*

⁵⁰ Kinne and Marinov (2013).

⁵¹ Brownlee (2009).

⁵² Beck et al. (2001); Brownlee (2009) covers the period between 1975 and 2006.

dummy variable for the presence of limited multi-party elections in authoritarian regimes. According to his definition, a country is electoral authoritarian if the DPI codes its national elections such that (1) multiple parties are legal but only one party wins seats; (2) multiple parties win seats but the largest party receives more than 75% of the seats; or (3) the largest party get less than 75% of the seats. Conversely, authoritarian regimes are viewed as closed if (1) there is no legislature; (2) there is an unelected executive/legislature; (3) although there is an elected executive/legislature, only one candidate is allowed; or (4) although multiple candidates run for the election, there is only one political party. While dichotomously distinguishing democracies from autocracies, Svobik also updates this DPI variable by expanding time periods to 1946–2008.⁵³ We thus use Svobik’s dataset to create trichotomous political regimes (democracy, electoral authoritarianism, and closed authoritarianism).⁵⁴




Figure 1: Time Series Trends in Political Regimes and Executive—Legislative Relations

Note: Political regimes in Figure 1-(a) are from authors’ coded data based on Hyde and Marinov⁵⁵ and Kinne and Marinov.⁵⁶ Dichotomous categorization of executive–legislative relations (presidentialism and parliamentarism) is based on the DPI and the authors’ coded data.

Figure 1-(a) shows time series changes in political regimes using Kinne and Marinov’s trichotomous categorization. Consistent with Schedler⁵⁷, the graph tells us that the proportion of electoral authoritarianism tends to become larger after the end of the Cold War (1990: 14.7%, 2010: 31.6%), whereas the proportion of closed authoritarianism, which had been the dominant form of dictatorship before the 1990s, tends to shrink (1990: 42.2%, 2010: 11.1%).

Our variable of interest is executive–legislative relations, that is, the difference between parliamentary systems on the one hand, and between presidential and semi-presidential systems on the other. We use the *SYSTEM* variable in the World Bank’s DPI⁵⁸ to code executive–legislative relations in our sample countries. The *SYSTEM* variable distinguishes three types of executive–legislative relations: (1) *parliamentary*, (2) *assembly-elected president*, and (3) *presidential* systems. A country is coded *parliamentary* when the legislature elects the chief executive. A system of *assembly-elected president* refers to a government where the assembly-elected chief executive (president) cannot be “easily recalled.”⁵⁹ A country is *presidential* when chief executives are elected directly by the voters

⁵³ Svobik (2012).

⁵⁴ Svobik’s (2012) measure of political regimes is highly correlated with Kinne and Marinov’s (2013) ($r = 0.89$), suggesting that they have high measurement validity.

⁵⁵ Hyde and Marinov (2012).

⁵⁶ Kinne and Marinov (2013).

⁵⁷ Schedler (2013).

⁵⁸ Beck et al. (2001).

⁵⁹ The conditions here are (1) if a two-thirds vote is needed to impeach the chief executive, or (2) the legislature must dissolve itself while forcing him or her out (Keefer 2012, 4).

or by an electoral college. In the DPI, a country that has both a directly elected president and an assembly-elected prime minister is classified as presidential if the president can veto legislation and the legislature needs a supermajority to override the veto, or if they can appoint and dismiss the prime minister and dissolve parliament. In light of the standard definitions of parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential systems discussed above, the DPIs (1) and (2) are parliamentary, and (3) incorporate both presidential and semi-presidential systems. Thus, we create a dummy variable called “executive–legislative relations,” which is coded 1 if a country is either *parliamentary* or *assembly-elected* in the DPI, and 0 if a country is *presidential*, that is, a presidential or semi-presidential system in the conventional terminology of the literature on comparative presidentialism. While the DPI covers the period 1975–2008, we expand our coverage to 1946–2008 using various data sources (see Appendix E) and follow the DPI’s classification schemes. Figure 1-(b) shows time series changes in executive–legislative relations (presidentialism and parliamentarism) among electoral authoritarian regimes between 1946 and 2008.⁶⁰

Our analysis includes a host of control variables. One of the most important variables explaining democratization is *economic development*.⁶¹ While Przeworki et al.⁶² famously argue that the level of economic development does not induce democratic transition but helps countries sustain democratic regimes, other scholars contend that economic prosperity is also conducive to democratic transition.⁶³ The level of economic prosperity is measured by the natural log of GDP per capita.⁶⁴ Membership of international organizations may also affect a country’s democratization prospects. If the country joins international organizations that include many democratic countries, then political pressure in favor of democratization would be strong.⁶⁵ We measure *international pressures for democratization* by identifying each country’s membership of international organizations at each year using the State System Membership Dataset by the Correlates of War Project (2011 version).⁶⁶ We then calculate how democratic each international organization is by taking the average of ACLP’s measure of democracy for all member states other than the country under study. Third, the extent to which the country is economically interdependent with other countries has been emphasized in the studies of democratization and authoritarian politics.⁶⁷ *Trade openness* is introduced in our models by using the sum of total imports and total exports, measured as a percentage of the country’s GDP. The data source is the Penn World Table 7.1.⁶⁸ Researchers have argued that *natural resource wealth* enables dictators to prevent democratization because such unearned income can improve the capability of authoritarian leaders to distribute economic resources and strengthen the military without taxing citizens⁶⁹, while other scholars argue that natural resource wealth either does not affect democratization⁷⁰ or its effect is conditional.⁷¹ To control for the impact of natural resource endowment on regime change, oil and gas value per capita in constant 2000 dollars is included in models.⁷² The oil–gas variable is calculated by multiplying a country’s total oil–gas production by the

⁶⁰ In Appendix D, we also show which system each electoral authoritarian country adopted during the same period of time.

⁶¹ Lipset (1959).

⁶² Przeworki et al. (2000).

⁶³ Boix (2011); Boix and Stokes (2003); Epstein et al. (2006).

⁶⁴ Bolt and van Zanden (2013).

⁶⁵ Pevehouse (2002).

⁶⁶ Membership of international organizations between 1945 and 1965 is identified every five years, so the first year’s score in each five-year interval is used to cover the rest of the four years (for instance, for the period 1946–1949, the score in 1945 is used).

⁶⁷ Eichengreen and Leblang (2008); Levitsky and Way (2010).

⁶⁸ Heston et al. (2012).

⁶⁹ Ross (2012).

⁷⁰ Haber and Menaldo (2011).

⁷¹ Dunning (2008).

⁷² Ross (2012).

current oil–gas price and then dividing this by the total population. To smooth the distribution of the oil–gas variable, the variable is logged after adding 1. Finally, to capture the impact of the effects of learning on political leaders, we include the leader’s length of tenure. As authoritarian leaders with longer tenure might be better at dealing with regime crisis, the longer a leader stays in power, the more resilient the country may be to democratization. We measure a leader’s tenure length using Archigos (version 2.9.), constructed by Goemans et al.⁷³ In addition to these control variables, we run additional models that include other relevant control variables as robustness checks.

Statistical Methodology

We explore whether parliamentarism lowers the probability of democratization in electoral authoritarian regimes. Following previous literature, we employ a dynamic probit model to address this question, while using time series cross-section data (TSCS data) covering a maximum of 170 countries in the period 1946–2008.

Previous work on democratization⁷⁴ has used Markov regressions or dynamic probit (logit) models after categorizing political regimes dichotomously (democracy and dictatorship). This study, however, employs a three-state model that allows us to estimate six different regime transitions: closed authoritarianism to electoral authoritarianism, electoral authoritarianism to democracy, and closed authoritarianism to democracy, as well as the reverse of each.⁷⁵

The dynamic probit model estimates the probability of moving from any given state to another state in a single period of time.⁷⁶ This model assumes that the conditions existing in one period can have an impact on the probability of different types of regime transition in the subsequent period. Since we are particularly interested in regime transitions from electoral authoritarianism to democracy, we focus on the following equation that models transition from electoral authoritarianism at $t-1$ period to democracy at t period:

$$\Pr(Y_{it} = D \mid Y_{it-1} = EA) = F(X_{i,(t-1)} + X_{i,(t-1)}\beta_{EA})$$

where EA and D denote electoral authoritarianism and democracy, respectively.⁷⁷ Considering the likelihood that errors are correlated within each unit (country), we report clustered robust standard errors. As the dependent variable is binary, employing country fixed effect models leads to dropping countries that have never experienced regime change during the period, which may bias the results. Furthermore, in many electoral authoritarian countries, executive–legislative relationships do not change over time (See Appendix D); therefore, it is difficult to distinguish the within-group effects from the between-group effects by using country fixed effects models. Hence, we do not use country fixed effects models to control for country-specific heterogeneous effects that do not temporarily change. Instead of adopting country-level fixed effects models, we introduce five regional dummies⁷⁸ to take into account regional-specific heterogeneous effects. Moreover, we include 5-year interval dummies to control for temporal-specific confounding factors. In addition to dynamic probit models, we show the results of standard probit regressions.

⁷³ Goemans et al. (2009).

⁷⁴ Przeworski et al. (2000); Boix (2003); Dunning (2008); Houle (2009).

⁷⁵ It is our understanding that Epstein et al. (2006) is the only study that uses the same three-state model to address democratic transition and consolidation, but the authors’ way of categorizing political regimes is different from our study. Using Polity IV scores, they categorized democracy, partial democracy, and autocracy without drawing attention to possible differences within authoritarian regimes.

⁷⁶ Our statistical method is largely based on Epstein et al. (2006). For more details on how to model and interpret three-state dynamic logit models, see Appendix B.

⁷⁷ For more details about how to interpret three-state dynamic probit models, see Appendix B.

⁷⁸ More specifically, we include the western world (Western Europe, North America, and Japan), East European countries, Latin American countries, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia as regional dummies, setting North Africa and the Middle East as the reference category.

One may wonder whether weak autocrats facing serious threats of democratization will adopt presidential systems to strengthen their power and thus there might be a possibility of reverse causation between executive–legislative relationships and democratization. To deal with these endogeneity concerns, we employ instrumental variable (IV) probit estimation. Colonial origins strongly influence what executive–legislative relationships a country adopts after independence and contemporary democratization does not change their old colonial masters. Therefore, the former colonial power of each country is a very good candidate as an instrumental variable. Specifically, while countries that were British colonies are very likely to have inherited parliamentary systems from the British Empire,⁷⁹ countries under French and Spanish dominance tended to adopt presidential systems. Exploiting this historical legacy, our IV probit model first predicts the likelihood of adopting parliamentary systems by including the dummies of British and French colonies⁸⁰ from Hensel’s ICOW Colonial History Dataset.⁸¹ In the second model, we regress democratic transitions on the instrumented executive–legislative relations dummy.⁸²

Statistical Results

Table 1: Parliamentarism Prevents Democratic Transitions from Electoral Authoritarianism

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Estimation Method	Dynamic Probit	Dynamic Probit	Dynamic Probit	Dynamic Probit	Probit	Probit	IV Probit	IV Probit
Definition of Political Regimes	KM	BS	KM	BS	KM	BS	KM	BS
Sample	All Regimes	All Regimes	All Regimes	All Regimes	EA Regimes	EA Regimes	EA Regimes	EA Regimes
Transition Type	EA => D	EA => D	EA => D	EA => D	EA => D	EA => D	EA => D	EA => D
Executive-Legislative Relations	-0.538*** (0.004)	-0.0822*** (0.0004)	-0.2832* (0.067)	-0.3043** (0.0317)	-0.7002*** (0.0080)	-0.71** (0.0016)	-0.937*** (0.010)	-1.014** (0.0210)
Logged GDP per capita			0.0912** (0.0192)	0.045 (0.2057)	0.174 (0.3600)	-0.3965* (0.0710)	0.138 (0.439)	-0.0186 (0.9260)
International Organizations			3.292** (0.0318)	7.322*** (0.000)	3.141** (0.037)	9.152*** (0.000)	4.447*** (0.007)	6.336*** (0.000)
Trade Openness			-0.004 (0.2149)	-0.001 (0.7418)	-0.003 (0.2500)	-0.001 (0.8370)	-0.003 (0.165)	-0.00178 (0.5460)
Logged Oil per capita			-0.055 (0.2819)	-0.056 (0.3065)	-0.037 (0.4420)	-0.059 (0.2110)	-0.026 (0.561)	-0.0473 (0.2800)
Leader Tenure			0.0215** (0.0183)	-0.0026 (0.9558)	0.0171 (0.1330)	0.0010 (0.9420)	0.0238** (0.040)	0.0319*** (0.0030)
Constant	1.515*** (0.0000)	1.548*** (0.0000)	-1.235* (0.0920)	-2.867*** (0.0000)	-5.65*** (0.0000)	-2.5780 (0.1750)	-5.813*** (0.000)	-8.281*** (0.0000)
Regional Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Half Decade Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	7,636	6,835	5,545	5,040	1,206	1,078	1,209	1,081
Number of Countries	170	166	149	147	87	75	87	75
Wald Chi^2	1055.99***	805.81***	1218.47***	1114.77***	60.93***	113.15***	104.65***	391.72***
Log Likelihood	-675.95	-488.35	-468.03	-338.66	-112.78	-165.36	-543.18	-467.80

Note: P-values in parentheses. For dynamic probit models (Models 1–4), p-values are computed using clustered robust standard errors and a joint Chi-squared test for the variable of interest and its interaction with a regime type at (t–1) year. ***denotes significance at 0.01; **denotes significance at 0.05; *denotes significance at 0.1. All included variables are lagged by one year. For guidance on how to model three-state dynamic probit models, see Appendix B. The “executive–legislative relations” variable is a dummy variable (0: presidential systems, 1:

⁷⁹ Wiseman (1990), 21; Cheibub (2007), 150–151.


⁸⁰ We could not include the dummy of Spanish colony in the first model because the dummy perfectly predicts the emergence of presidentialism.

⁸¹ Hensel (2014). For details on the first model, see Appendix G.

⁸² Because the models become too complicated to estimate if we combine dynamic probit models with two-stage IV probit estimation, we here use a standard probit regression after limiting the sample to electoral authoritarian regimes. In addition, since both the instruments and the dependent variable are binary, we cannot use standard IV probit models packaged in STATA 13. Thus, we use Roodman’s (2011) conditional mixed process (CMP) regression in which we can flexibly construct simultaneous equation models, including variables with continuous, ordinal, and binary scales on both sides of each equation.

assembly-elected president or parliamentary systems). Using conditional mixed process (CMP) regression⁸³, Models 7 and 8 estimate IV probit models by setting British and French colonies as instruments for the executive–legislative relations dummy.

Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of Democratic Transitions



Note: Figures 2-(a) and 2-(b) are drawn based on the results of Models 5 and 6, respectively.

Table 1 shows our main results. Using different measurements of electoral authoritarianism, Models 1 and 2 each estimate the impact of executive–legislative relations on democratic transition from electoral authoritarian regimes, without including relevant control variables. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 0.1% level, suggesting that parliamentary systems are negatively correlated with the probability of democratic transitions from electoral authoritarianism. Dynamic probit models 3 and 4 then include all the relevant control variables and again find that parliamentary systems are negatively correlated with the probability of democratization from electoral authoritarian rule.

Models 5 and 6 estimate standard probit regressions by restricting the sample to electoral authoritarian regimes. The results again show that electoral autocracies with parliamentarism are less likely to democratize in both models. Figures 2-(a) and (b) graphically show differences in the predicted probabilities of democratic transitions from electoral authoritarianism between presidential and parliamentary systems. If an electoral authoritarian country adopts a presidential system, the probability of democratic transition in the next year is 3.5%–7%. The cases in point are Guatemala (1954-1958; 1985-1986), Panama (1982-1989), Ecuador (1972-1979), Bolivia (1971-1979), Argentina (1958-1963), Serbia (1991-2000), Ghana (1981-1993), the Central African Republic (1981-1993), Kyrgyzstan (1991-2005), Pakistan (1999-2008), and the Philippines (1978-1986). Conversely, the probability that an electoral authoritarian country with a parliamentary system will transition to democracy at t year is only 0.78%–2.2%, meaning that electoral authoritarian regimes with parliamentary systems are 2.7%–4.8% less likely to democratize than those with presidential systems. Examples of stable authoritarian regimes with parliamentary systems are Togo (1967-2008), Zimbabwe (1980-2008), Botswana (1966-2008), Egypt (1980-2008), Malaysia (1957-2008), Singapore (1965-2008), and Indonesia (1966-1999). These results remain robust in the IV probit estimation where we use British and French colonial origins as instrumental variables for executive–legislative relationships (Models 7 and 8. See also Appendix G).

Among the control variables, membership of democratic international organizations tends to have a significant effect on the dependent variable. Leadership tenure is only positively correlated with the probability of democratic transition in Model 3, suggesting that electoral autocrats who are in power longer tend to experience democratization, but this finding is not well supported in Models 4–6.

⁸³ Roodman (2011).

The coefficient of economic development is positive and statistically significant in Model 3 but it is negative or statistically insignificant in other models. Trade openness and natural resource wealth have an insignificant impact on both democratic transitions. As previous studies suggest,⁸⁴ the coefficient of logged natural resources is consistently negative but it cannot reject the null hypothesis even at the 10% level.

Robustness Checks

In order to ensure the robustness of the statistical results presented above, we investigate additional issues: (1) comparison between our model and Roberts'⁸⁵, (2) alternative estimation methods of panel data analysis, (3) potential heteroscedasticity within regions, (4) time dependence, (5) influential outliers, (6) inclusion of additional control variables, and (7) potential spurious correlations.⁸⁶ Democratization is one form of authoritarian breakdown and thus one may wonder whether executive–legislative relations explain autocratic breakdown in general, as suggested by Roberts. Using our dataset, which covers a more extensive time period (1946–2008) than Roberts',⁸⁷ we replicate Roberts' study and then compare his model of authoritarian breakdown with our models in which the dependent variable is democratic transitions. We include almost the same set of control variables,⁸⁸ as well as an estimation method⁸⁹ identical to Roberts'. Random effects logit models indicate that parliamentarism tends to decrease the probability of democratic transitions in statistically significant ways, which is consistent with the results presented above. Conversely, negative associations between parliamentarism and authoritarian breakdown do not reach the 10% statistical significance level (Appendix Table C-1). This suggests that executive–legislative relationships might be more relevant in explaining democratic transitions than authoritarian breakdown.

We also adopt random effects dynamic probit models that account for the likelihood that the effects of the main variables may differ systematically for each country (Appendix Table C-2). This alternative estimation method does not change the main results. Instead of probit regressions, we also alternatively adopt another functional form of non-linear regression, namely, logit models, to examine if the results are sensitive to our choice of functional form. Results produced by dynamic logit models are virtually identical to those of dynamic probit models (Appendix Table C-3).

As Eichengreen and Leblang⁹⁰ and Levistky and Way⁹¹ argued, the likelihood of democratic transition may change depending on the geographical proximity to the “West” or the country’s regional location. This may make measurement errors correlate within each region, which possibly induces an underestimation of standard errors. Thus, instead of clustered standard errors by country, we adopt robust standard errors clustered by region; however, the main results do not change (Appendix Table C-4). We also deal with potential autocorrelation by introducing either time lapse since the last democratic transition and three cubic splines⁹² or cubic time polynomials,⁹³ yet the main results remain unchanged (Appendix Table C-5).

We exclude each electoral authoritarian country consecutively to investigate whether our results change as a result of some influential outliers, although exclusion of any country does not

⁸⁴ For example, Ross (2012).

⁸⁵ Roberts (2015).

⁸⁶ Regarding model specifications for each additional estimation, see Appendix C.

⁸⁷ Following Roberts (2015), we here restrict our sample to non-monarchical electoral authoritarian regimes by excluding monarchical autocracies based on Geddes et al. (2014).

⁸⁸ Different from Roberts (2015), only foreign aid per capita could not be summed up with natural resource wealth per capita to measure unearned incomes because the foreign aid variable does not cover the period before the 1970s.

⁸⁹ Here we employ random effects logit models with cubic time polynomials.

⁹⁰ Eichengreen and Leblang (2008).

⁹¹ Levistky and Way (2010).

⁹² Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998).


⁹³ Carter and Signorino (2010).

affect the results. We also introduce additional control variables that are deemed important in studies of democratization to ensure our empirical tests are not vulnerable to omitted variable bias. We include economic growth, logged population, urban population (% of total population residing in urban areas, and Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization),⁹⁴ and the result indicates that the executive–legislative relations variable is still negative and highly statistically significant (Appendix Table C-6).

We test whether our results are driven by spurious correlations with military regimes. Cheibub argues that presidentialism itself does not necessarily lead to democratic breakdown but that military intervention is more likely to occur under presidential systems, which makes presidential democracies vulnerable to collapse.⁹⁵ Presidentialism is also frequently observed in military dictatorships, and military dictatorships are more likely to break down.⁹⁶ Therefore, limiting our sample to electoral authoritarian countries,⁹⁷ we estimate standard probit regressions to check whether authoritarian regime types influence our main results (Web Appendix C-6). Even after controlling for regime types of military, party-based, and personalist regimes,⁹⁸ parliamentarism still has a negative effect on democratic transition in statistically significant ways.

Testing Causal Mechanisms: Dominant Party Emergence and Electoral Transparency in Parliamentary Electoral Authoritarianism

Figure 3: Dominant Party Emergence and Electoral Transparency in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes



Note: For detailed estimation results, see Appendix E.

We have argued that two mechanisms exist through which electoral autocracies with parliamentarism are less likely to democratize. First, parliamentarism is more likely to incentivize ruling elites to engage in power sharing through institutionalized party organizations and thus often lead to the construction of a dominant party. Second, as parliamentary elections are often divided into various constituencies, autocrats can engage in gerrymandering and enjoy a larger seat bias generated by

⁹⁴ Roeder (2001).

⁹⁵ Cheibub (2007).

⁹⁶ Geddes (1999).

⁹⁷ As the variables of autocratic regime types are missing for democratic countries, we cannot estimate dynamic probit models.

⁹⁸ Geddes et al. (2014). The reference category is monarchical regimes.

malapportionment. These indirect techniques of electoral manipulation enable them to win elections with fewer votes and thus prevent democratization through elections. To statistically test the first mechanism, our additional statistical analysis estimates the impact of executive–legislative relationships on the emergence of dominant party regimes.⁹⁹ Here the dependent variable is whether a country has a dominant party regime, which is measured using Geddes et al.¹⁰⁰ We use probit regressions (Appendix Table E-1).

It is extremely difficult to directly test the second mechanism because there is no extensive data on gerrymandering and malapportionment that cross-nationally covers electoral authoritarian regimes. There is one possible observable implication, however, which can empirically confirm if the second mechanism is working: in elections under parliamentary systems, autocrats may not need to use extensive electoral fraud because other indirect manipulation techniques (i.e., malapportionment and gerrymandering) are available to facilitate an election victory. As electoral fraud is risky,¹⁰¹ autocrats holding such indirect manipulation tools should be less likely to engage in blatant fraud at the ballot box. To empirically assess this, we regress electoral fraud on a series of covariates, including the executive–legislative relations dummy variable. To measure electoral fraud, we use Hyde and Marinov’s NELDA,¹⁰² in which the authors provide a dichotomous assessment of whether there are significant concerns that elections will not be free and fair before elections (NELDA 11). The unit of analysis used here is country-election year, and we adopt probit regressions with a series of relevant control variables explaining electoral fraud.¹⁰³

Figure 3 presents cross-national statistical evidence for the two causal mechanisms. Even after controlling for relevant confounding factors, using different estimation methods and adopting an instrumental variables approach (Appendix Table E-1), the executive–legislative relations dummy is strongly and positively correlated with the emergence of a dominant party, suggesting that countries adopting parliamentary systems tend to construct dominant party regimes. Figure 3a shows that while in presidentialism, the probability that an autocrat constructs a dominant party is less than 50%, approximately 80% of authoritarian leaders with parliamentarism succeed in building up dominant party regimes.¹⁰⁴ Many parliamentary autocracies tend to have dominant party organizations, including Gambia, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Egypt, Taiwan, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia.

Figure 3b shows that electoral autocrats with parliamentary systems tend to rely less on electoral fraud. Under parliamentarism, only around 40% of elections in electoral authoritarianism tend to be rigged with serious electoral malpractice. For instance, in some electoral authoritarian regimes such as Gambia, Botswana, Egypt (1979), Taiwan (1991, 1995), Cambodia (1998, 2003), Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, electoral fraud tends to be less extensive. On the other hand, in presidentialism more than 60% of autocratic elections are manipulated with autocrats allegedly engaging in electoral fraud. Electoral authoritarian regimes with presidentialism are likely to experience blatant electoral fraud, including Haiti, Guatemala, El Salvador, Bolivia, Serbia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Central African Republic, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and the Philippines. This result remains robust with different estimation methods and different samples of autocratic elections (Appendix Table E-2).

⁹⁹ For details on model specification, see Appendix Table E-1.

¹⁰⁰ Geddes et al. (2014).

¹⁰¹ Tucker (2007).

¹⁰² Hyde and Marinov’s (2012).

¹⁰³ For details on model specification, see Appendix Table E-2.

¹⁰⁴ This result suggests that parliamentarism and dominant party emergence are not randomly assigned to each country, but the former is highly likely to bring the latter. In this respect, our findings are different from Roberts’ (2015), arguing that the causal effect of parliamentarism on authoritarian breakdown tends to be magnified if autocrats are armed with dominant parties.

4. Comparative Case Studies: Malaysia and the Philippines

Our case studies augment the findings of the statistical analysis. A comparison of electoral authoritarianism in Malaysia (1957–present) and the Philippines (1978–1986) follows a “most similar” method of case selection. The countries are similar in many aspects, such as level of socio-economic development¹⁰⁵ and geographic location,¹⁰⁶ other than our variable of interest.¹⁰⁷ In other words, Malaysia has adopted parliamentarism and the Philippines’s electoral authoritarianism existed within a semi-presidential system, while other potentially important factors influencing democratization were alike. We illustrate how this institutional variation has exerted a differing political impact by focusing on the two mechanisms discussed above: party institutionalization and manipulation of the electoral process.

Malaysia, 1957–2014

Malaysia adopted the parliamentary form of government, following its colonial master, the United Kingdom. Since its independence from Britain in 1957 up to the time of writing of this paper (mid-2015), Malaysia has been under an electoral authoritarian regime, where the coalition government is led by BN.¹⁰⁸ BN is a multi-ethnic alliance composed of a dozen parties, but its unquestioned leader is the Malay-based United Malays National Opposition (UMNO), which holds around 60% of BN seats. Other major partners include the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC).

UMNO is a highly institutionalized political party with the character of a mass party.¹⁰⁹ It was founded in 1946 mainly by aristocratic Malays as a reaction to Britain’s proposal for the creation of the Malayan Union, a post-colonial unitary state that would have reduced the traditional authorities of sultans. The party started as a loose gathering of local Malay-based associations with 110,000 members.¹¹⁰ Half a century later, it had developed into a hierarchical organization with more than 2 million members and 16,500 branches that form the base unit of the party.¹¹¹ Its president and other key party positions are elected by several thousand party delegates every three years.¹¹² Financially, the party is stable and rich, with its corporate holdings valued at more than 1 billion US dollars.¹¹³

With the aforementioned characteristics of a well-institutionalized party, UMNO has functioned as a credible power-sharing device for regime elites. For example, succession in UMNO

¹⁰⁵ Both are classified as middle-income countries by the World Bank. When the Philippines democratized in 1986, its GDP per capita was 535 USD, while Malaysia’s was 1,741 USD in the same year (World Bank 2012). In light of the “Lipset hypothesis” (countries with higher levels of socio-economic development are more likely to democratize), a theoretical expectation is that Malaysia should democratize ahead of the Philippines.

¹⁰⁶ Both are members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Unlike other regional organizations such as the EU and OAS, ASEAN does not specifically promote democracy among its members. Some might point out that the Philippines’ close ties with the US government could have put the country under pressure for democratization. However, the Regan administration pressured Marcos to democratize (asked him to resign) *after* the military defections in February 1986 (Franco 2001, 181).

¹⁰⁷ One potentially important difference is the democratic past: the Philippines experienced democracy from the early 20th century until the martial law in 1972 (the first legislative election was held in 1907 for the National Assembly, and the first presidential election was held in 1935), while Malaysia has been under electoral authoritarianism since independence from British rule. One could argue that because of this difference, the Philippines had experienced stronger democratizing pressure and thus a shorter authoritarian period. We do not agree with this claim, since the democracy movement has been quite strong in Malaysia over the past decade, to the extent that the opposition coalition won the majority of votes in 2013.

¹⁰⁸ The BN was called the Allied from 1957 to 1974, and has adopted the name BN since 1974.

¹⁰⁹ cf. Duverger (1959). To read about the organizational characteristics and development of UMNO, see Funston (1980).

¹¹⁰ Stockwell (1977).

¹¹¹ Levitsky and Way (2010).

¹¹² The delegates are elected by each party branch. The number of voting delegates has increased to 100,000 since 2013 (*The Economist*, September 28, 2013)

¹¹³ Gomez and Sundaram (1999).

leadership has been relatively smooth. Thus far, there have been six UMNO presidents, who also became prime ministers: Abdul Rahman, Abdul Razak Hussein, Hussein Onn, Mahathir Mohamad, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, and Najib Razak. All climbed the career ladder within UMNO to be elected first as the party leader and then as the prime minister. When they □ with the exception of Najib Razak, who is currently in office □ left the position of prime minister, a new leader was elected by the party convention. These leadership changes caused little disruption within the party, except in 1987,¹¹⁴ or to electoral performance following the leadership succession.

Another indication of UMNO's power-sharing function is seen in the very few number of defections to the opposition camp; stories of defection are rare, and any defectors have been seriously punished through UMNO's access to state power. In the late 1980s, ex-Finance Minister Tengku Razaleigh challenged the leadership of Mahathir Mohamad as party president. After lengthy legal battles, Razaleigh and his followers formed a party called *Semangat '46* (Spirit of '46). In its electoral bid in 1990, Mahathir successfully persuaded candidates of *Semangat* to rejoin UMNO with carrots (patronage) and sticks (e.g., threats of tax audit). Another famous breakaway was Anwar Ibrahim, the vice president of UMNO and deputy prime minister until 1997 who became increasingly critical of Mahathir's leadership.¹¹⁵ Mahathir purged Anwar and his allies in 1998; Anwar was charged with corruption and sodomy and spent 7 years in prison.

With regard to electoral manipulation, UMNO leaders have extra tools that presidential autocrats do not: malapportionment and gerrymandering in parliamentary elections. This is not to say that UMNO has not resorted to the usual list of manipulative activities—such as vote buying, ballot stuffing, using government machinery, and physically harassing opposition candidates and supporters—indeed reports abound that they do engage in these practices.¹¹⁶ In addition, BN has apportioned a larger number of seats to their strongholds, and drawn district lines so that they can gain the districts supported by the opposition. In comparative terms, Malaysia has one of the highest levels of malapportionment in the world, on a par with countries such as Kenya and Tanzania, and many scholars have pointed out BN's heavy reliance on gerrymandered constituency boundaries in order to secure their seats.¹¹⁷ While some of the tools of electoral manipulation are illegal, these are legally sanctioned because the Constitution has been amended to allow for allocation of more seats for rural areas, and also because the parliamentary majority, not the Election Commission, has the final decision-making authority over delimitation.¹¹⁸

These manipulations of the electoral system “saved” the BN regime at the 2013 election. As shown in Figure 4, BN won only 47.4% of the popular vote but 59.9% of the seats. The opposition coalition *Pakatan Rakyat*, on the other hand, won 50.9% of popular votes and 40.1% of seats. This disproportionality (the gap between the vote share and seat share) is to the result of institutionally induced mechanisms only available in parliamentary elections, namely, the adoption of a single-member plurality system, malapportionment, and gerrymandering of constituencies.

After the 2013 election, the opposition forces protested against the results, but to no avail. The main issues they raised were BN's manipulation, such as harassing opposition candidates, creating phantom voters to vote for them by holding rallies, and using indelible ink that was easily removed.¹¹⁹ The opposition also denounced malapportionment and gerrymandering, but it is difficult to bring these issues to court because, at least formally, this must be done according to constitutional procedures.¹²⁰

¹¹⁴ In 1987, when Prime Minister Mahathir was up for re-election for the UMNO presidency, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah challenged his bid; this resulted in the “Constitutional Crisis of 1988” (Lee, 1995).

¹¹⁵ Initially, Anwar's protest was made with the purpose of returning to UMNO, but it later changed to an anti-UMNO movement (*Malay Mail*, September 9, 1998, cited in Masuhara and Suzuki, 2014, 221).

¹¹⁶ e.g., Pemantau (2014).


¹¹⁷ Lim (2005); Ong (2005).

¹¹⁸ Lim (2005).

¹¹⁹ Pemantau (2014).

¹²⁰ Author's interview with Maria Chin, Executive Director of Bershi 2.0, April 30, 2015, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Figure 4 Lower Chamber Election Results in Malaysia (1959–2013)



Source: Compiled by the authors based on Chin and Wong (2009) and Ostwald (2013).

In sum, the parliamentary system in Malaysia has contributed to the longevity of the BN regime in two respects. First, it contributed to the institutionalization of UMNO, which in turn facilitated credible power sharing among regime elites. Second, the SMD plurality system with high degrees of gerrymandering and malapportionment led to a highly disproportional votes-to-seats transformation, which in turn sustained the majority status of BN. Particularly in 2013 election, BN lost the popular vote but still won the majority of seats because of the highly disproportional electoral system. If the election was conducted with a nationwide constituency electing the chief executive, the *Pakatan Rakyat* could have replaced BN, possibly ending Malaysia’s competitive authoritarian regime.

Philippines, 1978–1986

Although the dictatorship under Ferdinand Marcos spanned from the declaration of martial law in 1972 to the People Power Revolution in 1986, the period that classifies electoral authoritarianism is between 1978 and 1986, because there was no national-level election for the first six years of martial law. Legislative elections were held in 1978 and 1984, and presidential elections took place in 1981 and 1986.

For most of the period of electoral authoritarian rule in the Philippines, a semi-presidential form of government was in place. Since independence in 1946, the country has employed a pure presidential form of government. With the ratification of the 1973 Constitution, this was replaced with a system of modified parliamentary government.¹²¹ The chief executive (called the President) was elected from the legislature (the National Assembly), although the chief executive was not responsible to the legislature¹²². The National Assembly changed its official name to the *Batasan Pambansa* (National Legislature) in the 1976 Constitutional amendment. In 1981, the Constitution was further amended and a semi-presidential form of government was installed. This period (1981–1986) is often referred to as the Fourth Republic. With this amendment, the President was elected directly by voters for a fixed period of 6 years, without any limit to the number of terms. At the same time, the Prime Minister is elected by *Batasan Pambansa*, to which he is responsible. The President can dissolve the

¹²¹ This term is used in *Batas Pambansa Bilang 122*.

¹²² The Vice President, who is also elected by the National Assembly, may be nominated and elected as Prime Minister (Article VII, Section 2).

legislature, as in the presidential-parliamentary variant of semi-presidentialism.¹²³ Philippines specialists analyze that semi-presidentialism was adopted largely because Marcos gave in to pressure from opposition politicians.¹²⁴

Shortly before the 1978 legislative election, Marcos organized an umbrella coalition called the New Society Movement for the Nationalists, Liberals, and Others (*Kilusang Bagong Lipunan ng mga Nacionalista, Liberal at Iba Pa*, hereafter KBL).¹²⁵ While it became an accredited political party in late 1979, as its full name suggests it was primarily just a mixture of his supporters and politicians formerly affiliated with the *Nacionalista* Party (NP) and the Liberal Party (LP), which were the two major parties before the collapse of democracy.

KBL was a typical cadre party¹²⁶ with few features of institutionalization. Jose Abueva, a prominent Filipino political scientist and a contemporary of Marcos, quipped that the KBL “wasn’t even an organization”.¹²⁷ Traditionally, pre-martial law parties (NP and LP) never developed well-institutionalized organizations; they did not have grassroots party branches as UMNO has had. In most cases, local “party organizations” were personally managed by individual politicians, and party switching was frequent.¹²⁸ It can be said that KBL inherited many of the features of NP and LP because many KBL members were former members of those parties; for example, KBL suffered from defection to other parties. Salvador Laurel, a scion of a prominent political family from the province of Batangas, ran under the banner of KBL in 1978, but broke away after the election and later founded a new party called the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO).¹²⁹ Shortly before the 1980 local election, Marcos issued a “turncoat ban” decree that prohibits switching parties six months before election day. Such a decree was motivated by the fact that many local politicians had, or were about to, desert KBL.

Unlike UMNO leaders, it is difficult to find evidence that Marcos tried to build KBL using state resources. His regime belongs to the personalistic regime subcategory, often dubbed as a conjugal dictatorship¹³⁰ or sultanistic regime¹³¹. Marcos concentrated political power in the hands of himself, his wife, and a narrow circle of cronies. The legislature was bypassed as he ruled through issuing presidential decrees, and only a few of his crony capitalists were KBL politicians.¹³² During the election campaign, Marcos did help KBL candidates by providing them with material resources, and by manipulating the Election Commission to boost their votes. Yet these activities were not effective in creating loyalty to the party among KBL members *per se*, as indicated by the quick dissolution of KBL after the Marcos regime collapsed.

The presidential elections were held twice under the Fourth Republic, in 1981 and 1986. Marcos won in 1981 with 88% of votes, partly because the main opposition party boycotted the election. In February 1986, Marcos called for a snap election, ahead of the constitutionally determined date of May 1987 because of pressure from the opposition and the U.S. government to put his

¹²³ Shugart (2005). *Batas Pambansa Bilang* 122. One month before the ratification of the 1981 Constitutional amendment, Marcos lifted Martial Law.

¹²⁴ Asano (1992), 153. For example, in 1979 the leaders of LP released a public statement demanding a return to presidentialism, and in 1980, an NL stalwart Salvador Laurel submitted a resolution to IBP asking for the return of presidentialism that assembled 70 signatures of IBP members.

¹²⁵ Celozza (1997).

¹²⁶ c.f. Duverger (1959).

¹²⁷ Slater (2010).

¹²⁸ Marcos himself was a “turncoat,” a politician who switched parties for electoral convenience. He switched from LP to NP when he lost his bid to become the presidential nominee for LP in 1961.

¹²⁹ The alleged reason was that Marcos undermined his political stature by ensuring that his vote count slipped behind that of two Cabinet members running on the ruling party ticket in the same region (Franco 2001, 156).

¹³⁰ Mijares (1976).

¹³¹ Thompson (1998).

¹³² There were some exceptions. For example, Danding Cojuangco, who was one of the crony capitalists close to Marcos, also had the title of KBL vice president for Luzon.

legitimacy to popular test. Marcos ran as the administration presidential candidate being the incumbent president, while the opposition forces unified themselves to support the candidacy of Corazon Aquino, the wife of the popular assassinated senator Benigno Aquino Jr.

In the wake of the presidential election on February 7, conflicting results were reported.¹³³ On the one hand, the official result, counted by the Commission on Elections, declared Marcos the winner with 53.6% of the vote. On the other hand, the independent election observer, the National Citizen's Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), announced that Aquino won with 51.5% of the votes.¹³⁴ From the grassroots level to the national tallying process, there were numerous reports about Marcos' cheating. These reports, together with the dubious nature of the official result, sparked civic revolt, which in turn prompted a faction of the military to defect on February 21. In the following days, hundreds of thousands of civilian protesters gathered at Epifanio De La Santos Avenue (EDSA) to protest against Marcos and protect military rebels from a government offensive. On the evening of February 25, Marcos fled to Hawaii on a US Air Force plane and his 14 years as dictator ended. If Marcos had conducted a parliamentary election with high degrees of malapportionment and gerrymandering, he would still have legitimately won a majority of seats regardless of which vote count was correct, as happened in Malaysia's 2013 election, and therefore would have lengthened his reign.

The above comparison of electoral authoritarianism in Malaysia and the Philippines suggests that Malaysia's parliamentary system of government has contributed to UMNO's long reign over the last 57 years by helping to institutionalize the party, fragment the opposition, and manipulate elections through malapportionment and gerrymandering. The Marcos regime, on the other hand, with a semi-presidential form of government, could not benefit from these methods and lasted only 14 years.

5. Conclusion

Although many scholars have labeled the parliamentary system as virtuous,¹³⁵ our analyses in this paper suggest that it could be a peril¹³⁶ to democracy in the sense that it can prolong electoral authoritarianism. This happens because a parliamentary system of government is likely to impart the following: the ruling party becomes more institutionalized and can function as a power-sharing device among authoritarian elites; and the governing elite has a wider menu of electoral manipulation tactics to win elections. We have examined whether electoral authoritarian regimes with parliamentary forms of government tend to survive longer than those adopting presidential or semi-presidential systems through statistical and case-study methods, and both types of analyses support our claim.

In addition, the present study provides some implications for the unresolved issue of the actual level of influence political institutions have on authoritarian survival. As we noted in the Introduction, conflicting observations and arguments have been made about this issue. For example, in some cases autocrats have used the legislature to divide and conquer opposition parties,¹³⁷ but in other cases, they have failed to do so.¹³⁸ As for the role of ruling parties, scholars seem to agree that an institutionalized ruling party lengthens regime survival. Yet it is puzzling why some dictators succeed in institutionalizing the ruling party (Malaysia's UMNO, Zimbabwe's ZANU-PF, and United Russia under Putin), while others fail (e.g., Kyrgyzstan, Marcos's Philippines). Similarly, some elections triggered the ousting of autocrats (e.g., Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and the Philippines in 1986), but others have contributed to prolonging authoritarian rule (Malaysia, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Singapore). One way to reconcile these conflicting observations is to incorporate the dimension of executive-legislative structure into the institutional analyses. Under the parliamentary system, legislatures tend to become a tool to develop an institutionalized ruling party, and deftly

¹³³ For the sequence of events around the time of the February Revolution, see Thompson (1995).

¹³⁴ The civic group count was performed by NAMFREL. The vote result figures are from Nohlen et al. (2001, 221–228).

¹³⁵ Linz (1990b); Horowitz (1990); Lijphart (1991).

¹³⁶ c.f. Linz (1990a).

¹³⁷ Lust-Okar (2004).

¹³⁸ Gandhi and Reuter (2013).

manipulate election results, whereas these abilities may be absent in presidential and semi-presidential systems. Our statistical analyses and comparative case studies of Malaysia and the Philippines suggest functions of these seemingly democratic institutions in autocracies may be different depending on executive–legislative relations.

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Web Appendix

This supplementary appendix shows additional analyses and robustness checks that were not included in the main text because of limited space.

Appendix A shows descriptive statistics of the mail variables.

Appendix B and Table B-1 explain how to interpret the results of the three-state dynamic probit models employed in Models 1-4 in Table 1.

Appendix C shows the results of robustness checks. Broadly, the tables and figures of the robustness checks contain the following methodological issues: (1) model comparison between Roberts' (2015) and ours (**Table C-1**), (2) different estimation methods (**Tables C-2 and C-3**), (3) heteroskedasticity within regions (**Table C-4**), (4) time dependence (**Table C-5**), and (5) additional controls (**Table C-6**).

Appendix D shows a list of electoral authoritarian countries (1945-2010) analyzed in the paper.

Appendix E presents the results of additional analyses to test causal mechanisms. Specifically, the tables report the determinants of dominant party construction (**Table E-1**) and electoral fraud (**Table E-2**).

Appendix F lists data sources for the cross-national statistical analyses.

Appendix G reports estimation results of the first model in instrumental variables estimation (Models 7 and 8 in Table 1).

- **Table B-1:** Presents the original results of the three-state dynamic probit models.
- **Table C-1:** Compares our models of democratic transitions with Roberts' (2015) models of autocratic breakdown. **World Share of Democracy** is the yearly mean of the proportion of democratic countries in the world (using Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland's (2009) dichotomous measure of democracy and dictatorship). **Autocratic regime breakdown** is identified using Geddes et al. (2014). Data sources of the other variables are identical with the main analysis.
- **Table C-2:** These models employ random-effects probit estimation to take into account country-specific heterogeneities.
- **Table C-3:** These models employ logistic regressions to investigate whether the results are sensitive to an alternative functional form of non-linear models.
- **Table C-4:** These models use region-clustered robust standard errors to deal with possible correlations within regions.
- **Table C-5:** The models employ either (1) time lapse since the last democratic transitions and three cubic splines or (2) cubic time polynomials to deal with possible time dependence in binary dependent variable models.
- **Table C-6:** These models include additional relevant control variables.

- **Economic Growth (% of GDP):** Measured by using World Development Indicators.
- **Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF):** Measured by Philip Roeder's (2009) Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Indices for 1961 and 1985. The higher scores indicate more ethnically diverse countries.
- **Logged Population:** Measured by using total population in World Development Indicators. The variable is logged.
- **Urban Population (% of total population):** Taken from World Development Indicators.
- **Authoritarian Regime Types (Military, Personalist, and Dominant Party Regimes):** Measured by using Geddes et al. (2014). When introducing the variables, monarchy regimes are used as the reference category.
- **Table E-1:** Shows the results of determinants of dominant party regimes. All the three models employ probit regression with regional and half-decade dummies. The dependent variable, **Dominant Party Regime**, is binary taken from Geddes et al. (2014).
 - In the first model, we estimate the effect of parliamentarism on the probability of the emergence of dominant party regimes without introducing control variables.
 - In the second model, we introduce relevant control variables that may affect dominant party emergence such as logged GDP per capita, economic growth, natural resource wealth, leader's length of tenure, total population, and ethno-linguistic fractionalization.
 - In the third model, we use instrumental variables estimation in which the executive-legislative relations variable is instrumented by colonial origins (i.e. British and French colonies).
- **Table E-2:** Shows the results of determinants of electoral fraud in electoral authoritarian regimes. Using a country-election year dataset, all the three models employ probit regression. The dependent variable, **Electoral Fraud**, is binary taken from Hyde and Marinov's (2012) NELDA 11. NELDA 11 provides a dichotomous assessment of whether there are significant concerns that elections will not be free and fair before elections. Based on previous work on electoral manipulation, we introduce the following control variables.
 - **Logged GDP per capita (one year lagged):** Measured by using World Development Indicators.
 - **Economic Growth (% of GDP, one year lagged):** Measured by using World Development Indicators.
 - **Freedom House Index (3 year moving average lagged by one year):** Higher value indicates less repressive countries. According to Hafner-Burton et al. (2014), extent of political repression in non-election years affects electoral fairness.
 - **Election Administrative Capacity:** Measured by Kelley's (2012) Quality of Elections (QOE) Dataset. Independent, professional electoral management bodies improve the quality of elections (Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo. 2008). Higher values indicate better election administrative capacity.
 - **Leader's Tenure Length (one year lagged):** Measured by using Goemans et al. (2009) Archigos 2.9.

- **Rural Population (% of total population, one year lagged):** Measured by World Development Indicators. In rural societies authoritarian governments find it easier to engage in electoral fraud (Burch 2011, 62).
- **Domestic Election Monitoring:** Measured by using Kelley's (2012) QOE. Domestic Election Monitoring is effective to lower the level of fraud (Ichino and Schuendeln 2012). We use Kelley's (2012) dummy variable identifying whether domestic election monitoring exists in a given election.
- **International Election Monitoring:** Measured by using Kelley's (2012) QOE. The presence of international election monitoring tends to improve election fairness (Hyde 2007; Kelley 2012). We use Kelley's (2012) dummy variable identifying whether international election monitoring exists in a given election.
- **Foreign Aid (% of GDP, one year lagged):** Measured by Ahmed (2012). The more dependent a country is on foreign aid, the more likely it may be to hold less fraudulent elections because of concern for their international reputation.
- **Authoritarian Regimes Types (Party, Military, and Personalist, one year lagged):** Measured by Geddes et al. (2014). Military dictators are more likely to step down and thus may allow fair and free elections (Geddes 1999).

Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics of the Cross-National Statistical Analysis

Variables	Number of					Data Sources
	Observations	Mean	SD	Min	Max	
Democracy (Kinne and Marinov 2013)	8,110	0.395	0.48	0	1	Authors' Coding based on Kinne and Marinov (2013)
Democracy (Svolik 2012)	7,721	0.416	0.49	0	1	Svolik (2012)
Executive-Legislative Relations (Binary)	8,385	0.442	0.49	0	1	Authors' Coding based on DPI (2012)
Executive-Legislative Relations (Trichotomy)	8,385	0.729	0.87	0	2	Authors' Coding based on DPI (2012)
Logged GDP per capita	7,650	7.94	1.06	5.33	10.66	Maddison (2011)
Memberships of International Organizations	7,402	0.43	0.14	0	0.7	State System Membership Dataset (2011) and Cheibub et al. (2009)
Trade Openness (sum of import and export, % of GDP)	7,270	62.04	42.34	1.16	433	World Development Indicators
Logged Oil-Gas value per capita	7,612	2.32	2.8	0	11.14	Ross (2012)
Leader's Tenure Length	7,536	6.82	7.67	0	47	Archigos version 2.9
Economic Growth	6,049	3.77	6.17	-51.38	88.95	World Development Indicators
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	8,543	0.45	0.27	0.003	0.984	Roeder (2001)
Logged Population	7,933	15.93	1.53	5.79	21	World Development Indicators
Urban Population (% of total population)	7,142	46.83	24.32	2.08	100	World Development Indicators

For more detail information on the data sources, see Appendix F.

Appendix B: Modeling Three-State Dynamic Probit Model

Markov regression models, or dynamic probit estimation, are expressed here as the following equation:

$$F [(Pr(Y_{it} = b | Y_{it-1} = a))] = \theta_{ab} + X_{it}\beta_a$$

where a and b are regime categories for country i during year t or $(t - 1)$ and $F(\cdot)$ is a function from the $[0,1]$ interval to the probit $\Phi^{-1}(x)/\sqrt{\frac{\pi}{8}}$. The equation models the idea that variables should have different impacts on the probabilities of a regime type b at t year, depending on a regime type a at $(t-1)$ year.

Table B-1: Trichotomous Measure of Political Regimes

	Closed Authoritarianism	Electoral Authoritarianism	Democracy
$Y:$	0	1	2
Y_0^*	1	0	0
Y_1^*	1	1	0

We follow Epstein et al. (2006) to estimate three-state dynamic logit models. In our case, there are three ordered categories of the dependent variable (closed authoritarianism: $Y_{it} = 0$, electoral authoritarianism: $Y_{it} = 1$, and democracy: $Y_{it} = 2$). We introduce two dummy variables (Y_0^* and Y_1^*) to model Markov logit regressions. When two dummy variables in the table above interact with each independent variable, it becomes possible to estimate different effects of the variables on political regime change at t year, depending on a regime type at $(t - 1)$ year. As we focus on transitions to democracy, $P(D_{it})$, we can express Markov logit regressions for the impact of a variable X on democratic transitions as follows:

$$P(D_{it}) = F(\beta_0 Y_0^* + \beta_1 Y_1^* + \beta_2 X_{i(t-1)} + \beta_3 X_{i(t-1)} + \beta_4 X_{i(t-1)} Y_0^* + \beta_5 X_{i(t-1)} Y_1^*)$$

where Y_0^* and Y_1^* are both lagged by 1 year. To assess the impact of X on democratic transitions from electoral authoritarianism, we need to focus on the summed coefficients ($\beta_2 + \beta_4$), where $Y_0^* = 0$ and $Y_1^* = 1$. (cf. For democracy to democracy, the coefficient is just β_2 , where $Y_0^* = 0$ and $Y_1^* = 0$. For closed authoritarianism to democracy, the coefficient is $[\beta_2 + \beta_3 + \beta_4]$). We use a Chi-squared joint test to assess statistical significance for the summed coefficient ($\beta_2 + \beta_4$), which is easily computed through a post-estimation command in STATA 13.1.

Table B-2 shows original results using the dummy variables (Y_0^* and Y_1^*) and their interactions with the independent variables. For example, in Model 3, the coefficient of the executive-legislative relations variable (Presidentialism: 0, Parliamentarism: 1) for the transition from Electoral Authoritarianism to Democracy can be calculated as $0.375 - 0.658 = -0.283$, which is identical to the coefficient shown in Table 1. Conducting a joint Chi-squared test, it turns out that the p-value is equal to 0.067, suggesting that the summed coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level.

Table B-1: Dynamic Probit Estimation Results

Estimation Method Definition of Political Regime	Model B-1	Model B-2	Model B-3	Model B-4
	Dynamic Probit Kinne and Marinov (2013)	Dynamic Probit Svolik (2012)	Dynamic Probit Kinne and Marinov (2013)	Dynamic Probit Svolik (2012)
Lagged Y0	-0.068 (0.11)	-0.082 (0.18)	-0.338* (0.19)	-0.208 (0.31)
Lagged Y1	-3.579*** (0.14)	-3.708*** (0.16)	-2.891*** (0.19)	-3.084*** (0.25)
Executive-Legislative Relations (ELR)	0.381** (0.16)	0.748*** (0.20)	0.375* (0.21)	0.682** (0.27)
ELR*Y0	0.214 (0.22)	-0.177 (0.29)	-0.123 (0.31)	-0.0837 (0.42)
ELR*Y1	-0.818*** (0.25)	-0.830*** (0.25)	-0.658** (0.30)	-0.987** (0.45)
Logged GDP per capita			0.249*** (0.10)	0.188 (0.12)
GDP per capita*Y0			0.217** (0.10)	0.0926 (0.10)
GDP per capita*Y1			-0.157* (0.10)	-0.143 (0.13)
International Organizations (IOs)			2.158* (1.10)	5.712*** (1.10)
IOs*Y0			-1.257 (1.31)	-0.307 (1.55)
IOs*Y1			1.135 (1.39)	1.611 (1.69)
Trade Openness			0.000 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)
Trade*Y0			0.00027 (0.00293)	0.00010 (0.00349)
Trade*Y1			-0.004 (0.00369)	-0.003 (0.00442)
Logged Oil per capita			-0.041 (0.04)	-0.052 (0.04)
Oil*Y0			-0.000747 (0.05)	0.0713 (0.07)
Oil*Y1			-0.014 (0.05)	-0.004 (0.07)
Leader Tenure			0.035 (0.02)	-0.004 (0.02)
Tenure*Y0			-0.0442*** (0.01)	-0.0242 (0.02)
Tenure*Y1			-0.014 (0.03)	0.001 (0.03)
Constant	1.516*** (0.21)	1.549*** (0.22)	-1.235* (0.73)	-2.868*** (1.04)
Regional Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Half Decade Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	7,636	6,835	5,545	5,040
Number of Countries	170	166	149	147
Wald Chi ²	1778.27***	1364.05***	2107.00***	1858.64***
Log Likelihood	-673.64	-488.71	-467.84	-339.12

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level; ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level; * denotes significance at the 0.1 level. All variables included are lagged by one year to mitigate simultaneity bias. The Executive-Legislative Relations” variable is a dummy variable (0: presidential systems, 1: assembly-elected president or parliamentary systems). Models B-1 and B-2 correspond with Models 1 and 2 in Table 1. Model B-3 corresponds to Models 3 in Table 1. Models B-4 corresponds to Model 4 in Table 1.

Appendix C: Robustness Checks

Table C-1: Democratization vs Authoritarian Breakdown

Estimation Method	Random Effects Logit	Random Effects Logit	Random Effects Probit	Random Effects Probit
Dependent Variable	Democratization	Regime Breakdown	Democratization	Regime Breakdown
Sample	EA	EA	EA	EA
Executive-Legislative Relations	-2.293** (1.131)	-0.338 (0.489)	-0.961** (0.419)	-0.199 (0.228)
Logged GDP per capita	0.484 (0.490)	-0.363 (0.313)	0.185 (0.184)	-0.175 (0.143)
GDP Growth	-0.0854** (0.033)	-0.0927*** (0.022)	-0.0409*** (0.014)	-0.0475*** (0.011)
World Share of Democracy	1.448 (3.398)	-1.799 (1.978)	0.7 (1.201)	-0.792 (0.901)
Logged Oil per capita	-0.0424 (0.135)	-0.0642 (0.097)	-0.0362 (0.052)	-0.0387 (0.045)
Party Regime	-2.624** (1.171)	-3.218*** (0.699)	-1.089*** (0.272)	-1.557*** (0.341)
Personalist Regime	-3.066*** (1.100)	-1.889*** (0.595)	-1.288*** (0.317)	-0.987*** (0.301)
Regional Dummies	No	No	No	No
Half Decade Dummies	No	No	No	No
Number of Observations	1,033	1,067	1,033	1,067
Number of Countries	71	71	71	71
Wald Chi ²	20.52***	52.78***	30.46***	51.79***
Log Likelihood	-76.53	-152.08	-76.17	-152.08

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Following Roberts (2015), we mainly employ a random-effects logistic model with cubic time polynomials.

Table C-2: Random-Effects Dynamic Probit

Estimation Method	Dynamic RE Probit	Dynamic RE Probit	Dynamic RE Probit	Dynamic RE Probit
Definition of Political Regimes	KM	BS	KM	BS
Sample	All	All	All	All
Transition Type	EA => D	EA => D	EA => D	EA => D
Executive-Legislative Relations	-0.4545*** (0.0004)	-0.0873*** (0.0000)	-0.2832** (0.043)	-0.3043*** (0.0007)
Logged GDP per capita			0.0912** (0.0310)	0.045 (0.1557)
International Organizations			3.285** (0.0221)	7.323*** (0.000)
Trade Openness			-0.004 (0.3902)	-0.001 (0.6130)
Logged Oil per capita			-0.055 (0.2323)	-0.056 (0.6130)
Leader Tenure			0.0215* (0.0505)	-0.0026 (0.9664)
Regional Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Half Decade Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	7,636	6,835	5,545	5,040
Number of Countries	170	166	149	147
Wald Chi ²	2391.69***	2069.93***	1702.4***	1324.51***
Log Likelihood	-673.27	-488.35	-467.84	-339.12

Note: P-values in parentheses. P-values are computed using standard errors and a joint Chi squared test for the variable of interest and its interaction with a regime type at (t-1) year. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level;

** denotes significance at the 0.05 level; * denotes significance at the 0.1 level. All variables included are lagged by one year. “EA => D” indicates transitions from electoral authoritarianism to democracy. Regarding how to model three-state dynamic probit models, see Appendix B. The executive-legislative relations variable is a dummy variable (0: presidential systems, 1: assembly-elected president or parliamentary systems).

Table C-3: Dynamic Logit Models

Estimation Method	Dynamic Logit	Dynamic Logit	Dynamic Logit	Dynamic Logit
Definition of Political Regimes	KM	BS	KM	BS
Sample	All	All	All	All
Transition Type	EA => D	EA => D	EA => D	EA => D
Executive-Legislative Relations	-1.1483*** (0.0016)	-0.1154*** (0.0001)	-0.6281* (0.053)	-0.7005** (0.0213)
Logged GDP per capita			0.2452** (0.0195)	0.165 (0.1556)
International Organizations			6.644* (0.0681)	15.92*** (0.0000)
Trade Openness			-0.007 (0.3539)	-0.004 (0.7686)
Logged Oil per capita			-0.117 (0.2845)	-0.136 (0.3092)
Leader Tenure			0.671** (0.0248)	0.0003 (0.8103)
Regional Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Half Decade Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	7,636	6,835	5,545	5,040
Number of Countries	170	166	149	147
Wald Chi ²	1035.05***	813.35***	1702.4***	1324.51***
Log Likelihood	-674.23	-487.52	-468.03	-338.66

Note: P-values in parentheses. P-values are computed using clustered robust standard errors and a joint Chi squared test for the variable of interest and its interaction with a regime type at (t-1) year. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level; ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level; * denotes significance at the 0.1 level. All variables included are lagged by one year. “EA => D” indicates transitions from electoral authoritarianism to democracy. Regarding how to model three-state dynamic probit models, see Appendix B. The executive-legislative relations variable is a dummy variable (0: presidential systems, 1: assembly-elected president or parliamentary systems).

Table C-4: Region-Clustered Robust Standard Errors

Estimation Method	Dynamic Probit	Dynamic Probit	Dynamic Probit	Dynamic Probit
Definition of Political Regimes	KM	BS	KM	BS
Sample	All	All	All	All
Transition Type	EA => D	EA => D	EA => D	EA => D
Executive-Legislative Relations	-0.437*** (0.0050)	-0.0822*** (0.0000)	-0.2832*** (0.000)	-0.3043*** (0.0030)
Logged GDP per capita			0.0912*** (0.0003)	0.0453* (0.0063)
International Organizations			3.2928* (0.0734)	7.3229*** (0.0000)
Trade Openness			-0.004 (0.4149)	-0.001 (0.4981)
Logged Oil per capita			-0.0547*** (0.0046)	-0.056*** (0.0047)
Leader Tenure			0.0215*** (0.0008)	-0.0026 (0.8960)
Regional Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Half Decade Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	7,636	6,835	5,545	5,040
Number of Countries	170	166	149	147
Log Likelihood	-673.64	-488.71	-467.84	-339.12

Note: P-values in parentheses. P-values are computed using region-clustered robust standard errors and a joint Chi squared test for the variable of interest and its interaction with a regime type at (t-1) year. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level; ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level; * denotes significance at the 0.1 level. All variables included are lagged by one year. "EA => D" indicates transitions from electoral authoritarianism to democracy. Regarding how to model three-state dynamic probit models, see Appendix B. The executive-legislative relations variable is a dummy variable (0: presidential systems, 1: assembly-elected president or parliamentary systems).

Table C-5: Time Dependence

Estimation Method	Dynamic Probit	Dynamic Probit	Dynamic Probit	Dynamic Probit	IV Probit	IV Probit	IV Probit	IV Probit
Definition of Political Regimes	KM	BS	KM	BS	KM	BS	KM	BS
Sample	All	All	All	All	EA	EA	EA	EA
Transition Type	EA => D	EA => D	EA => D	EA => D	EA => D	EA => D	EA => D	EA => D
Executive-Legislative Relations	-0.2251*	-0.2401**	-0.2227*	-0.242**	-0.936***	-1.0138**	-0.904**	-1.131***
	(0.081)	(0.0285)	(0.079)	(0.0296)	(0.010)	(0.0210)	(0.013)	(0.0040)
Logged GDP per capita	0.0714***	0.05876*	0.0655***	0.06**	0.137	-0.0186	0.131	0.0636
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.030)	(0.439)	(0.2005)	(0.464)	(0.7690)
International Organizations	3.5732**	7.757***	3.696**	7.726***	4.447***	6.336***	4.318***	6.1212***
	(0.0241)	(0.0000)	(0.0198)	(0.0000)	(0.007)	(0.000)	(0.008)	(0.000)
Trade Openness	-0.004	-0.002	-0.004	-0.002	-0.003	-0.0017	-0.003	-0.0012
	(0.158)	(0.728)	(0.147)	(0.726)	(0.165)	(0.5460)	(0.168)	(0.6100)
Logged Oil per capita	-0.054	-0.044	-0.052	-0.044	-0.026	-0.0472	-0.026	-0.069
	(0.2770)	(0.3303)	(0.2972)	(0.3290)	(0.561)	(0.2800)	(0.576)	(0.1530)
Leader Tenure	0.024**	0.005	0.0253***	0.004	0.0238**	0.0319***	0.0232**	0.0297***
	(0.0113)	(0.9243)	(0.0089)	(0.9313)	(0.040)	(0.0030)	(0.038)	(0.0070)
Regional Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time Lapse and 3 Cubic Splines	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Cubic Time Polynomials	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Half Decade Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	5,545	5,040	5,545	5,040	1,209	1,081	1,209	1,081
Number of Countries	149	147	149	147	87	75	87	75
Wald Chi ²	2104.05***	1898.08***	2075.94***	1777.59***	104.65***	391.72***	95.19***	351.36***
Log Likelihood	-465.29	-335.76	-465.75	-335.80	-543.18	-467.80	-543.91	-470.83

Note: P-values in parentheses. For dynamic probit models, p-values are computed using clustered robust standard errors and a joint Chi squared test for the variable of interest and its interaction with a regime type at (t-1) year. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level; ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level; * denotes significance at the 0.1 level. All variables included are lagged by one year. "EA => D" indicates transitions from electoral authoritarianism to democracy. Regarding how to model three-state dynamic probit models, see Appendix B. The executive-legislative relations variable is a dummy variable (0: presidential systems, 1: assembly-elected president or parliamentary systems).

Table C-6: Additional Controls

Estimation Method	Dynamic Probit	Dynamic Probit	Probit	Probit
Definition of Political Regimes	KM	BS	KM	BS
Sample	All	All	EA	EA
Transition Type	EA => D	EA => D	EA => D	EA => D
Executive-Legislative Relations	-0.4253** (0.0329)	-0.409** (0.0153)	-0.723** (0.0140)	-0.542* (0.0500)
Logged GDP per capita	0.0983 (0.5312)	0.0082 (0.6262)	0.616* (0.0710)	-0.124 (0.6850)
International Organizations	4.0814** (0.0206)	9.1472*** (0.0000)	-1.712 (0.5780)	7.586*** (0.0010)
Trade Openness	-0.0036 (0.4034)	-0.0011 (0.8855)	-0.00554 (0.3340)	-0.000656 (0.8990)
Logged Oil per capita	-0.0446 (0.4262)	0.0181 (0.6195)	-0.054 (0.5470)	0.025 (0.8000)
Leader Tenure	0.0217*** (0.0094)	-0.0047 (0.9238)	0.0556*** (0.0000)	0.0245* (0.0790)
Growth	-0.0145* (0.067)	-0.0216*** (0.002)	-0.0221 (0.308)	-0.0388** (0.025)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	0.1826 (0.854)	-0.3192 (0.214)	1.314** (0.022)	0.477 (0.397)
Logged Population	-0.0286 (0.793)	-0.0678** (0.017)	0.1960 (0.254)	-0.0853 (0.643)
Urban Population	-0.0113 (0.2084)	-0.0137 (0.1611)	-0.0176 (0.1460)	-0.0181* (0.0820)
Party Regimes			2.630*** (0.000)	3.782*** (0.000)
Personalist Regimes			3.225*** (0.000)	3.670*** (0.000)
Military Regimes			4.768*** (0.000)	4.830*** (0.000)
Regional Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Half Decade Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	4,780	4,385	983	926
Number of Countries	147	142	75	69
Wald Chi ²	1950.23***	2415.35***	639.86***	665.25***
Log Likelihood	-404.38	-294.20	-69.9	-54.25

Note: P-values in parentheses. For dynamic probit models, p-values are computed using clustered robust standard errors and a joint Chi squared test for the variable of interest and its interaction with a regime type at (t-1) year. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level; ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level; * denotes significance at the 0.1 level. All variables included are lagged by one year. "EA => D" indicates transitions from electoral authoritarianism to democracy. Regarding how to model three-state dynamic probit models, see Appendix B. The executive-legislative relations variable is a dummy variable (0: presidential systems, 1: assembly-elected president or parliamentary systems).

Appendix D: List of Electoral Authoritarian Regimes (1945-2010)

Electoral Authoritarianism	Time Period	Electoral Authoritarianism	Time Period
Afghanistan	2004-2010 (Pres)	Kosovo	2008 (Par)
Algeria	1995-2010 (Pres)	Kuwait	1963-2009 (Pres)
Angola	1992-1998 (Pres), 2008-2010 (Pres)	Kyrgyzstan	1995-2004 (Pres)
Argentina	1962 (Pres)	Laos	1965-1974 (Par)
Azerbaijan	1992-2010 (Pres)	Lebanon	1945 (Par), 1992-2010 (1992: Pres, 1993-2010: Par)
Bahrain	2002-2008 (Pres)	Lesotho	1966-1970 (1966-1969: Par, 1970: Pres), 1993 (Pres), 1998-2010 (Par)
Bangladesh	1972-1974 (Par), 1978-1981 (Pres), 2007-2010 (Par)	Liberia	1955-1962 (Pres), 1985-1989 (Pres), 1997-2002 (Pres), 2005 (Par)
Belarus	1994-2010 (Pres)	Libya	1951-1955 (Pres)
Benin	1960-1962 (Pres)	Madagascar	1962-1974 (Pres), 1992 (Pres)
Bolivia	1945-1963 (Pres), 1966-1968 (Pres), 1978-1979 (Pres)	Malaysia	1957-2010 (Par)
Bosnia	1996-2010 (1996-2002: Pres, 2003-2010: Par)	Mauritania	1992-2006 (Pres)
Botswana	1969-2010 (Par)	Mexico	1945-1999 (Pres)
Bulgaria	1945-1948 (Par)	Morocco	1963-2010 (Pres)
Burkina Faso	1978-1979 (Pres), 1992-2010 (Pres)	Mozambique	1994-2010 (1994: Par, 1995-2010: Pres)
Burundi	1962-1965 (Pres)	Myanmar	2010 (Par)
Cambodia	1953-1969 (Pres), 1972-1974 (Pres), 1993-2010 (Par)	Namibia	1994-2010 (1994: Par, 1995-2010: Pres)
Cameroon	1960-1969 (1960-1963: Par, 1964-1969: Pres), 1992-2010 (Pres)	Nepal	1959-1980 (Pres), 2002-2005 (2002: Par, 2003-2005: Pres)
Central African Republic	1981 (Pres), 1992 (Pres) 2005-2010 (Pres)	Nicaragua	1945-1978 (Pres)
Chad	1996-2010 (Pres)	Niger	1996-1999 (Pres)
Chile	1989 (Pres)	Pakistan	1977 (Par), 2002-2010 (2002-2008: Pres, 2009-2010: Par)
Colombia	1949-1952 (Pres)	Panama	1945-1958 (Pres), 1984-1988 (1984: Par, 1985-1988: Pres)
Comoros	1996-1998 (Pres)	Paraguay	1968-1988 (Pres)
Congo Brazzaville	2002-2010 (Pres)	Peru	1990-2000 (Pres)
Congo Kinshasa	2006-2010 (Pres)	Philippines	1965-1976 (Pres), 1978-1985 (Pres)
Cuba	1954-1958 (Pres)	Poland	1945-1951 (Par)
Cyprus	1962-1965 (Pres), 1968-1973 (Pres)	Russia	1992-2010 (Pres)
Czechoslovakia	1945-1947 (Par)	Rwanda	2003-2009 (Pres)
Djibouti	1992-2010 (Pres)	Senegal	1960-1967 (1960-1962: Par, 1963-1967: Pres), 1978-1999 (Pres)
Ecuador	1968-1971 (Pres), 1978 (Pres), 2000-2001 (Pres)	Serbia	1991-1999 (1991-1992: Par, 1993-1999: Pres)
Egypt	1979-2005 (Par), 2006-2010 (Pres)	Sierra Leone	1967 (Par), 1973-1981 (Pres)
El Salvador	1950-1959 (Pres), 1967-1978 (Pres)	Singapore	1965-2010 (Par)
Equatorial Guinea	1968-1978 (Pres), 1993-2010 (Pres)	Somalia	1969-1975 (Pres)
Ethiopia	1995-2010 (1995: Pres, 1996-2010: Par)	South Africa	1945-2010 (Par)
Fiji	1972-1986 (Par), 2001-2010 (Par)	South Korea	1948-1951 (Par), 1952-1959 (Pres), 1963-1971 (Pres), 1972-1978 (Par), 1981-1987 (Par)
Gabon	1990-2010 (Pres)	Sri Lanka	1977-1988 (1977-1982: Par, 1983-1988: Pres)
Gambia	1965-1993 (Pres), 1996-2010 (Pres)	Sudan	1958-1964 (1958-1963: Pres, 1964: Par), 2000-2010 (Pres)
Georgia	1991-2003 (Pres)	Syria	1946-1948 (Par), 1953-1957 (Par), 2007-2010 (Pres)
Ghana	1960-1965 (Pres), 1992 (Pres)	Taiwan	1986-1995 (Par)
Guatemala	1955-1957 (Pres), 1985 (Pres)	Tajikistan	1994-2010 (Pres)
Guinea	1993-2010 (Pres)	Tanzania	1962-1968 (Pres), 1995-2010 (Pres)
Guinea-Bissau	1994-1999 (Pres)	Thailand	1963-1965 (Pres), 1969-1970 (Par), 1971-1974 (Pres), 2006-2007 (Par)
Guyana	1968-2010 (Par)	Togo	1993-2009 (Par)
Haiti	1945-1949 (Par), 1957-1970 (Pres), 1987-2003 (Pres), 2006-2010 (Pres)	Tunisia	1959-1963 (Pres), 1979-2010 (Pres)
Honduras	1954-1956 (Pres), 1981 (Pres)	Turkey	1946-1960 (Par)
Hungary	1945-1948 (Par)	Uganda	2006-2010 (Pres)
Indonesia	1955-1965 (Par), 1971-1998 (Par)	Uruguay	1984 (Pres)
Iran	1960-1961 (Pres), 1971-1974 (Pres), 1980-1991 (Pres), 1998-2010 (Pres)	USSR	1991 (Par)
Iraq	1945-1957 (Pres), 2006-2010 (Par)	Uzbekistan	1992-1996 (Pres)
Ivory Coast	1990-1998 (Pres), 2000-2010 (Pres)	Venezuela	1957-1958 (Pres)
Jordan	1946-1960 (Pres), 1993-2010 (Pres)	Yemen	1993-2010 (Par: 1993-1999, Pres: 2000-2010)
Kazakhstan	1994-2010 (Pres)	Zambia	1964-1972 (Pres), 1991-2010 (Pres)
Kenya	1963-1972 (1963-1968: Par, 1969-1972: Pres), 1992-1997 (Pres)	Zimbabwe	1975-2010 (Par)

Note: “Pres” -- Presidentialism, “Par” – Parliamentarism or assembly-elected president. The countries listed above are all electoral authoritarian regimes satisfying (1) opposition parties are legal, (2) opposition parties are allowed to join elections, and (3) more than one candidate exist in elections (Hyde and Marinov 2012; Kinne and Marinov 2013).

Appendix E: Additional Data Analyses**Table E-1: Determinants of Dominant Party Regimes**

Estimation Method	Probit	Probit	IV Probit
Sample	EA	EA	EA
Definition of Political Regimes	KM	KM	KM
Executive-Legislative Relations	1.587*** (0.386)	1.218*** (0.376)	1.587*** (0.495)
Logged GDP per capita		0.791*** (0.277)	0.707** (0.297)
Growth		0.0166 (0.011)	0.0138 (0.011)
Logged Oil		0.116 (0.079)	0.115 (0.079)
Leader's Tenure Length		-0.00206 (0.017)	-0.00197 (0.017)
Logged Population		0.0764 (0.158)	0.0704 (0.154)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization		0.294 (0.820)	0.424 (0.819)
Constant	-0.646 (0.478)	-9.106** (4.058)	-8.370** (4.202)
Regional Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Half Decade Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	1,411	997	1,000
Number of Countries	88	71	71
Wald Chi ²	64.64***	99.52***	116.15***
Log Likelihood	-753	-442.91	-745.13

Note: Figure 3a is drawn based on Model 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level; ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level; * denotes significance at the 0.1 level. All variables included are lagged by one year. The executive-legislative relations variable is a dummy variable (0: presidential systems, 1: assembly-elected president or parliamentary systems). Using Conditional Mixed Process (CMP) regression (Roodman 2011), Model 11 estimate IV probit models by setting British and French colonies as instruments for the executive-legislative relations dummy.

Table E-2: Determinants of Electoral Fraud

Estimation Method	Probit		Probit	
	All Elections	Parliamentary Elections	All Elections	Parliamentary Elections
Executive-Legislative Relations	-0.477** (0.238)	-0.528** (0.245)	-0.632** (0.266)	-0.798*** (0.295)
Logged GDP per capita			0.0373 (0.306)	0.00868 (0.337)
Growth			-0.0162 (0.014)	-0.0156 (0.015)
Freedom House Index (3 years MA)			-0.179*** (0.053)	-0.163*** (0.055)
Administrative Capacity			-0.257** (0.104)	-0.255** (0.110)
Leader Tenure			0.0195* (0.011)	0.014 (0.010)
Rural Population			0.00904 (0.011)	0.0102 (0.012)
Domestic Election Monitoring			-0.101 (0.213)	-0.0279 (0.215)
International Election Monitoring			0.0535 (0.190)	0.0187 (0.190)
Foreign Aid (% of GDP)			-0.0239 (0.016)	-0.0307* (0.018)
Party Regimes			1.014** (0.515)	0.987** (0.473)
Military Regimes			0.788 (0.566)	0.711 (0.529)
Personalist Regimes			0.8 (0.535)	0.595 (0.508)
Constant	0.277** (0.114)	0.253** (0.119)	0.934 (3.010)	1.163 (3.257)
Number of Observations	377	239	332	206
Number of Countries	86	77	77	77
Wald Chi ²	4.01**	4.66**	55.32***	47.42***
Log Likelihood	-253.27	-160.59	-188.97	-117.55

Note: Figure 3b is drawn based on Model 14. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level; ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level; * denotes significance at the 0.1 level. The executive-legislative relations variable is a dummy variable (0: presidential systems, 1: assembly-elected president or parliamentary systems).

Appendix F: Data Sources of the Cross-National Statistical Analysis

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Appendix G: First Model of Instrumental Variables Estimation

Estimation Method	Probit	Probit
Dependent Variable	Executive-Legislative Relations	Executive-Legislative Relations
British Colony	1.415*** (0.404)	1.23*** (0.426)
French Colony	0.335 (0.445)	0.298 (0.423)
Logged GDP per capita	0.542* (0.279)	0.225 (0.277)
International Organizations	3.997 (2.602)	7.548*** (2.265)
Trade Openness	0.002 (0.003)	0.0016 (0.003)
Logged Oil per capita	-0.066 (0.078)	-0.03 (0.066)
Leader Tenure	-0.001 (0.018)	0.004 (0.017)
Constant	-7.527*** (2.083)	-8.281*** (1.668)
Regional Dummies	Yes	Yes
Half Decade Dummies	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	1,209	1,081
Number of Countries	87	75
Wald Chi ²	104.05***	391.72***
Log Likelihood	-543.18	-467.80

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level; ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level; * denotes significance at the 0.1 level.

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