The Politics of Differentiated Integration: What do Governments Want? Country Report – Bulgaria

The report analyses the salience of differentiated integration in the programmes of Bulgarian governments, speeches by heads of governments and heads of state and parliamentary debates between 2007 and 2020 using both quantitative and qualitative methods. Salience analyses produce two key findings. First, the salience of DI models and mechanisms is generally low in official government positions and parliamentary debates. Second, in the case of Bulgaria, the salience of Schengen and EMU is an expression of a preference for more integration, given that fully-fledged participation in these areas has been consistently considered not only an obligation deriving from EU Membership but also a priority by Bulgarian decision-makers ever since 2007. The report shows that European policy and debates on Europe’s future are not central in Bulgarian government positions. Governing parties and opposition parties share a clearly negative stance towards models of DI. In the rhetoric of national politicians, ‘core Еurope’ is used in parallel with ‘periphery,’ triggering negative associations with second-class membership in a union of more developed and powerful countries. While the position on DI seems to be independent of context, the position towards deepening European integration seems to be more complex and context-driven.


How salient is DI for
Bulgaria's membership was subjected to safeguard clauses in the areas of organised crime, corruption and judicial reform through the EU's Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification. As of 2020 Bulgaria has not been able to join the Schengen area due to it being blocked by certain Member States, particularly the Netherlands, over rule of law concerns. In mid-2020 it joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM-II) but it has not accepted the euro yet. Bulgaria has joined new integration processes, such as the European Prosecutor and Permanent structured cooperation in defence (PESCO).
The present report analyses the salience of differentiated integration in the programmes of Bulgarian governments, speeches by heads of governments and heads of state and parliamentary debates between 2007 and 2020 (Appendix 1) using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The salience of DI in these documents was assessed by counting the prevalence of DI-related key words. The assumption is that the more a government talks about DI, the more relevant it is. While key word counts in government programmes and PM speeches show the salience of DI at specific moments in time, an analysis of parliamentary debates allows us to identify trends over time and situational peaks.
The list of key words (Appendix 2) reflects three levels of abstraction. First, two different models of DI are distinguished at the conceptual level. On the one hand, the 'multi-speed EU' model depicts DI as a temporary phenomenon and implies that all Member States (MSs) will ultimately reach the same level of integration. On the other hand, the 'multi-end EU' model depicts DI as a potentially permanent feature of European integration. In this model, the MSs do not necessarily strive to reach similar levels of integration. Instead, each MS can 'pick and choose' to adjust its own level of integration to national preferences and capacities. Second, the analysis focuses on mechanisms of DI. On the one hand, the enhanced cooperation mechanism allows a limited group of MSsunder certain conditionsto pursue deeper integration without having to involve all MSs. On the other hand, the opt-out mechanism allows MSs to refrain from participating in common policies. In short, enhanced cooperation allows a MS to integrate more than other MSs, while an opt-out allows a Member State to integrate less than other MSs. Finally, the analysis looks at various instances of differentiated policies and policy fields. A total of twenty-one instances are included in the analysis. They are grouped in four different categories: (a) instances of enhanced cooperation, (b) instances of opt-out policy fields, (c) instances of inter se agreements and (d) instances of external agreements. Inter se agreements are agreements which EU Member States conclude outside the framework of the European Union. External agreements pertain to agreements between the EU and non-EU states.
The report consists of two sections. The first section contains a quantitative analysis of the salience of DI-related key words. The second section consists in a quantitative and qualitative analysis of positions of Bulgarian governments on DI. It is important to note that, unlike in the old MSs, in the Bulgarian case the salience of Schengen and eurozone DI instances reflects a strong preference for more integration. This is due to the fact that fully-fledged participation in these areas has been consistently considered not only an obligation deriving from EU Membership but also a priority by Bulgarian decision-makers ever since 2007, when the country became a member of the European Union. Accession to the eurozone is generally perceived as an objective process, with Bulgarian governments and all the important political parties supporting it, although with different views about the speed and sequencing of the necessary economic measures. This, however, is not the case with Bulgaria's accession to the Schengen area, which despite the country's technical readiness has not gained political approval in the European Council. * I wish to thank Mrs. Claudia Badulescu, the author of the Romanian report, who has been an important guide for my own work. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers

How salient is DI for Bulgarian governments?
The salience of DI in Bulgarian governments' programmes and positions has been analysed using computer-assisted word counting, manual word counting and close reading of officially published documents.

Salience of DI in government programmes
Bulgarian government programmes issued in 2005-2017 (see Appendix 2) have been searched for references to DI, also with reference to domestic policies by using a combination of computer-assisted word counting and close reading of documents.
The results of the computer-assisted word count show that government programmes did not refer to the key words associated with DI models (see Appendix 5). With respect to DI mechanisms, no reference was made to the enhanced cooperation DI mechanism (with the exception of the expression 'closer cooperation' appearing twice with reference to the Single Supervisory Mechanism in one of the eight government programmes analysed). No specific reference was found for 'opt-out.' To demonstrate the salience of EU-related issues in government programmes, the salience of the terms 'EU,' 'Europe' and 'European' was compared with key terms from the domestic policy field and with the salience of the term 'Bulgarian.' As Figure 1 shows, in total, 'Europ*' is the most salient string after 'Bulgar,*' being in most cases more central to Bulgarian politics than economic, political, social or judicial issues. These trends reflect how, since Bulgaria's accession to the EU in 2007, Europe has become central to the country's government priorities. The government programme that applied to the preparation and the first years of EU membership (BSP coalition government of Sergey Stanishev 2005-2009) was entitled 'Government Programme for European Integration, Economic Growth and Social Responsibility.' The name of the pro-European centre-right political party GERB, which has ruled the country for most of the time between 2009 and 2020 is the abbreviation in Bulgarian of 'Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria.' Its government programme for the period 2009-2014 (first Borissov government) was entitled 'Programme of the Government for Stable Development of the Republic of Bulgaria.' As Figure 2 shows, Europe is only less salient in the programme of the shortlived BSP coalition government of Plamen Oresharski of 2013.  Figure 2 shows that issues that relate to DI instances in the EU, such as the eurozone (n=12), Schengen (n=12), security policy (n=9), defence policy (n=6) and common foreign policy (n=4), are quite salient in the programmes of Bulgarian governments. To compare, common energy policy (n=1) and common transport policy (n=1) have lower salience, while the CAP is very salient (n=16).

Figure 2 -Salience of EU-related issues in government programmes
English translation of search items from left to right: eurozone; Schengen; security policy; defence policy; common foreign policy; common energy policy For the sake of comparison and considering the importance of EU funds for public finance and economic convergence, we counted the salience of another set of key words. The salience of 'operational programme' (n=45), 'absorption' (n=43), 'European Funds' (n=23), 'harmonisation of (legislation)' (n=15), 'European standards' (n=8) and 'European requirements' (n=7) on the whole is more significant compared to DI instances (Figure 2 above).

Salience of DI in the context of the presidency of the EU Council
For the first time since it joined the EU in 2007, Bulgaria held the EU Council presidency from January to June 2018. Its presidency was part of a trio presidency composed of Estonia, Bulgaria and Austria. In terms of priorities, the Bulgarian Government declared its ambition to achieve progress in the fields of security, employment, sustainable growth and ensuring a stronger EU presence on the world stage. In particular, it tasked itself with focusing on youth questions and security issues as horizontal priorities. Three broad messages for its programme were announced: consensus, competitiveness and cohesion.
In view of this, this study proceeds with an analysis of Bulgaria's government programme for the presidency, together with key speeches made by President Rumen Radev and PM Boyko Borissov (available in English). In addition, national parliamentary debates in relation to the adoption of the presidency programme and priorities and the debate in the European parliament where these were discussed were analysed. The computer-assisted analysis indicates that at both the domestic and European levels there was a relatively significant salience of DI-related key words in the government's official communications relating to DI instances and less salience of DI models and DI mechanisms.
In terms of DI instances in the Bulgarian official position and EU presidency programme, the most salient key words were 'migration' and also 'justice' and 'rights.' No reference was found for DI models. One reference was found for DI mechanisms (enhanced cooperation, regarding taxation). When analysing the salience of DI instances in parliamentary debates in the national and in the European parliaments, reference was found to the terms (in descending order of frequency) 'rights,' 1 'security,' 1 Used mainly with reference to the European Pillar of Social Rights and fundamental rights.

Salience of DI in government key speeches
The analysis continues with a close reading of investiture speeches given in the Bulgarian Parliament by Prime Ministers and Presidents (8 speeches between 2007 and 2017), together with their speeches relating to the EU or to the future of European integration, but excluding the government's discourse with respect to Bulgaria's presidency of the European Council, which was analysed in the previous section.
DI-related models and mechanisms are not mentioned in the PMs' and Presidents' key speeches in parliament (a total of 8 documents were analysed for this search). The analysis found no strict reference to the enhanced cooperation DI mechanism, while 'enhancing integration' was used in the political vocabulary of Prime Minister Borissov when discussions on the future of Europe took place in the national assembly.
References to DI models and mechanisms were not found in official first speeches in parliament. At the same time, the key string 'Europ*' is the second most salient key string after 'Bulgaria'. Quite naturally, the most references to Europe were registered in 2007, when Bulgaria entered the EU. The analysis of DI instances in Bulgarian Prime Ministers' and Presidents' first speeches indicates a relatively significant salience of key words: 'rights' (n=63), 'foreign policy' (n=15), 'Schengen' (n=4), 'security and defence' (n=2), 'eurozone' (n=2), 'area of freedom, security and justice' (n=1), 'future of the (European) Union' (n=1).

European Council Statements
With regard to this part of the analysis, limitations 2 in finding the original speeches of Bulgarian Prime Ministers and Presidents on the occasion of EU summits should be set out. Available media reports, which include only a limited and selected range of citations, were not included in the computer-based search analysis.
Pursuant to Art. 105, para. 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria and Art. 97 of the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly, Bulgarian Prime Ministers present to the MPs reports 3 on the participation by Bulgaria in the decision-making process of the European Union during the rotational presidencies of the EU. After Bulgaria's accession to the European Union, a special advisory body was formed at the Council of Ministersthe Council for European Affairs 4 (CEA). This is a body 5 in which all Bulgarian country positions submitted to the European Council, the Council of the European Union 2 Relevant documents for the purposes of the analysis cannot be found on the official website of the government: www.government.bg. URLs published in limited media reports directing to original PM EU Council statements on the government's official website are invalid as of July-August 2020. "The Bulgarian PM has the habit of abandoning the summit table to speak to his country's media," wrote Gergi Gotev on the occasion of Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borissov taking "the liberty of commenting on Brexit on the sidelines of the EU summit on Thursday (14 December 2017), using language that obviously diverges from the common line adopted by the EU27." Article published on www.euractiv.com (euractiv.com/section/uk-europe/news/borissov-on-brexit-nothing-is-agreed-until-everything-isagreed/) 3 Such Reports are not available for download on the site www.parliament.bg. For the present analysis, relevant transcripts from the plenary sittings of the national assembly containing the speeches by the Prime Minister and the subsequent debates were used. 4 In Bulgarian: Съвет по европейски въпроси 5 As of July-August 2020 the official website of the EU Coordination Mechanism in Bulgaria http://www.euaffairs.government.bg cannot be reached. and its working bodies are coordinated, after which ministers submit them for approval to the Council of Ministers.
The following citation from a parliamentary control session of the national assembly in 2018 with the BSP opposition leader Kornelia Ninova in a declaration addressing the PM as unaccountable before the parliament in presenting the country's EU Councils positions is quite illustrative for this part of the research: "Dear Mr. Prime Minister Borissov, welcome! You have not come to the parliament since July 7, 2017 -11 months, to answer to parliamentary control. I dare say that there is no such miracle in the world. For almost a year, the prime minister has not appeared before parliament to report on the government's work. I recently met with party leaders from the Visegrad Four and I assure you, Mr Borissov, it is a brilliant example of a functioning parliamentary democracy. Even these strong leaders, before every meeting of the European institutions, appear before their parliaments, receive support and go to the (European Council) meetings with confidence that their parliaments are behind them. In our country we have never heard in the National Assembly on any of the important topics, for example, the Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union. We did not discuss them, we did not support you in order to give you this self-confidence, which you really need in order to appear with the power of the whole people's representation. Analysis of Prime Ministers' reports before and after European Council meetings between 2008 and 2020 reveals no salience of key words related to DI models and mechanisms (Appendix 7). There is a significant salience of DI instances referring to Bulgaria's accession to the Schengen Agreement (n=8) and the eurozone (n=8) and Economic and Monetary Union (n=2). Notably, 'cohesion' is very salient in reports on Bulgaria's EU Council priorities (n=17). This can be explained by the fact that in Bulgaria, being the poorest county in the EU, 8 public investment crucially depends on EU funding. Macroeconomic analysis shows that EU funds have had a sizeable effect on Bulgarian growth and there have been other beneficial macroeconomic effects including on consumption, inflation, trade, wages, 6 Original text in Bulgarian: "Уважаеми господин премиер Борисов, добре дошли! Не сте идвали в парламента от 7 юли 2017 г. -11 месеца, да отговаряте в парламентарен контрол. Смея да твърдя, че такова чудо няма по света. Почти година премиерът не е стъпвал пред парламента, за да отчете работата на правителството. Скоро се срещнах с лидери на партия от Вишеградската четворка и Ви уверявам, господин Борисов -брилянтен пример за работеща парламентарна демокрация. Дори тези силни лидери, преди всяко заседание на европейски институции се явяват пред парламентите си, получават подкрепа и отиват със самочувствие на срещите, че зад тях стоят парламентите им. У нас нито веднъж не чухме -в Народното събрание, по нито една от важните теми -например по Председателството на България на Съвета на Европейския съюз. Не ги обсъдихме, не Ви подкрепихме, за да Ви дадем това самочувствие, от което наистина имате нужда, за да се явите със силата на цялото народно представителство.
[…]" 7 DI salience in speeches/priorities during the Bulgarian presidency in the first half of 2018 were discussed separately in a previous section of the current report. 8 According to Eurostat's definition of at-risk-of-poverty, 23.4% of the Bulgarian population (1,665 thousand persons) lived below the poverty line in 2017 (i.e. below 60% of the median income). This was among the highest rates of relative poverty in the European Union. The at-risk-of-poverty rate for the whole EU-28 in 2017 was 16.9%. According to Eurostat, in 2017 38.9% of the Bulgarian population lived at risk of poverty or social exclusion ('People at Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion -Statistics Explained' 2019). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers employment and investment. 9 Brexit was not mentioned in any of the documents that were analysed in this search.
We also analysed DI salience in the parliamentary debates following PMs' statements on European Council meetings. Unlike in Prime Ministers' reports, here the search indicates a scarce presence of DI models (two-speed Europe (n=2) and multi-speed Europe (n=1)) and mechanisms. The transcript of the plenary sitting of the national assembly on the occasion of the ratification of the Lisbon treaty in 2008 was included in the computer-based search and analysis and this is where 'enhanced cooperation' was mentioned once. As for DI instances, these are quite salient and, similarly to PMs' European Council-related reports, most of all include Schengen and the eurozone, which is explainable in view of Bulgaria's long-lasting ambition to fully integrate in the Schengen area and enter the EMU. Other key words found (with low salience) include 'fundamental rights,' 'defence,' 'justice,' 'European patent,' 'common foreign policy' and 'European Prosecutor's Office.' Brexit was mentioned only once in 2018 in the course of discussions over the multiannual financial framework and cohesion policy. The insignificant salience of Brexit is surprising considering that disintegration processes in the EU pose a significant risk for Bulgaria and can cause uncertainty and a sense of losing direction in Bulgarian society. In particular, Brexit poses serious direct challenges as many Bulgarians study and work in the UK, but a Brexit-induced economic shock in the largest EU economies is an even bigger threat.

Salience of DI in national parliament debates
The report continues with a review of Bulgarian parliamentary debates in 2007-2020 using computerassisted methods and manual counting of key words in repositories of parliamentary debates. 10 The results indicate that the salience of DI models was higher in parliamentary debates than in government speeches or programmes. For the years 2007-2020, a total of 105 references to DI models were found, most of them including the key words 'two-speed Europe' and 'multi-speed Europe.' No references were found for 'coalition of the willing,' 'variable geometry' or 'two-tier Europe.' As Figure 3 shows, the most salient DI model was 'two-speed Europe' (n=56, with peaks in 2011 and 2017), which was followed by 'multi-speed Europe' (n=28), 'core Europe' 11 (n=17), 'concentric circles' (n=2) and 'à la carte' (n=1). The share of 'multiple speed' DI models accounts for around 80% of all references made to DI models in parliamentary debates. As we can see, the peaks of DI-related debates were in 2011 and 2017, with gradual decreases in 2012 and 2018. In the peak year of 2017, the most common key words were 'two-speed Europe' (35%), 'multi-speed Europe' (33%), 'core Europe' (27%) and 'concentric circles' (5%). As before, the multi-speed model is more prevalent than the multiple ends model. such as the Committee on European Affairs and Oversight of European Funds, and committees on foreign policy, defence, labour and social policy, the budget and finance. 11 А closer look at references to the term 'core Europe' shows that it was mentioned in debates with reference to Bulgaria being perceived as on the 'periphery' of Europe and a catching-up EU member state.

Figure 5 -Salience of the 'enhanced cooperation' DI mechanism (2007-2020)
Next, the analysis moves from DI mechanisms to instances of differentiated policies. The search indicated that key words referring to DI Instances in Bulgarian parliamentary debates are more salient compared to DI mechanisms. Figure 6 shows the salience of policy fields in which opt-outs by some Member States exist. As we will see in the second part of this report, while in theory opt-out instances of internal DI indicate a preference for less integration, in Bulgaria's case the preference is for more integration through involvement in DI instances such as Schengen (n=2011), EMU (n=820), Security and Defence Policy (n=150), the Charter of Fundamental Rights (n=120), the European Social Charter (n=94) and the area of freedom, security and justice (n=42). The high salience of Schengen found in parliamentary debates is in line with the results found in the previous analyses, with it being the most salient DI instance across all the documents analysed for this report.

Figure 7 -Salience of instances of enhanced cooperation in parliamentary debates
Subsequently, we analysed the salience of five inter se agreements ( Figure 8). We found a significant salience of 'Fiscal compact' (n=489 with a peak in 2012 when the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU was signed by the EU Member States, with the exceptions of the Czech Republic and the United Kingdomalthough the Treaty was not binding for states that were not members of the eurozone, Bulgaria, like Romania, chose to opt in and to ratify the Fiscal Compact The 'Prüm Convention' (n=14) was relatively salient in 2009 after Bulgaria ratified the agreement.

Figure 8 -Salience of inter se agreements
Finally, we analysed the salience of four instances of external association agreements. The search found that there is a predominant salience of the 'European Economic Area' (EEA) with 80% of all instances (n=456), while the 'Eastern Partnership' (n=73) and 'Euromed' also appear (n=37). There is almost no evidence of salience of the Turkey/Customs Union, as is reflected in Figure 9 below. The significant salience of the EEA can be easily explained by the fact that after its accession to the EU, Bulgaria became a beneficiary state under the EEA and the Norway Financial Mechanism and it receives funds according to the relevant memoranda of understanding with the donor states, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, in each programme period. Strengthening Bulgaria's leading role in the region, including active participation in the Eastern Partnership policy, was a declared goal of the Bulgarian government.

A short overview of the political system and governments in the period 2007-2020
The current Constitution of Bulgaria was adopted in 1991 and established a The Stanishev government managed Bulgaria's EU accession and initially enjoyed high rates of economic growth and improved economic performance. However, at the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, Bulgaria's economy and industrial base suffered unexpected losses from the global recession, which was gaining momentum. Since 2009, the political landscape has been dominated by a succession of three centre-right governments led by the political party GERB. Since its creation in 2007, GERB has adopted a populist discourse that initially attacked corrupt elite members with a law and order agenda, but after nearly a decade of rule it has become subject to the same accusations. 12 The commitment of the first Borisov government to fight corruption and organised crime was a particular source of disappointment. In February 2013, this government resigned following months of anti-poverty demonstrations. The next coalition government of Prime Minister Plamen Oresharski led by BSP collapsed in less than 18 months after another round of street protests, but not before the MRF withdrew its support in the national assembly. After a turbulent two-year period with two rounds of early elections, in 2015 Bulgaria got another coalition government led by Prime Minister Boyko Borisov with partners from the left and the right. Bulgaria's pro-European direction has not changed despite the difficult coalition of GERB with the United Patriots (three Eurosceptic far-right nationalist parties). However, grand reform pledges were not fulfilled and the second Borissov government resigned in November 2016 after GERB lost the presidential election to General Rumen Radeva newcomer to politics supported by the BSP. The resignation of the second GERB cabinet was followed by re-election of the same party and the appointment of the third government of Prime Minister Boyko Borissov in a difficult coalition with far-right nationalist parties (United Patriots). The next section presents the position of successive Bulgarian governments regarding DI, including a holistic grading analysis.

Quantitative overview of government positions (holistic grading)
In a next step, government positions on DI in the periods 2008, 2012 and 2017-2020 were graded to register: 1. DI saliencefrom 0 (no reference to DI) to 2 (direct/central reference to DI), and 2. DI positionfrom 0 (negative) to 2 (positive). A total of 27 documents were graded following this procedure.
References to the enhanced cooperation DI mechanism in government statements are either neutral (in presenting the Lisbon Treaty) or positive (more specifically, with reference to the European Prosecutor's Office).
"I would like to point out here that we are talking about two groups of countries. We are participating in the group of initiators of the so-called 'enhanced presence,' 'enhanced cooperation,' and the rest of the group, which is happily becoming less and less, and I hope that by October, when the regulation is approved by the European Parliament, all will have joined the enhanced cooperation.

Qualitative assessment of government positions
A qualitative analysis of government positions generally confirms the observations in the quantitative analysis in the first part of this report. European policy and debates on Europe's future are not central in Bulgarian government positions. The national parliament has a somewhat nominal role in producing inputs and in discussing and confirming national visions and European Council positions. The legislature is often bypassed by the executive.
In the text of the programme of the third cabinet of Prime Minister Borissov (2017-2021) we found the expression 'different levels of integration' used in a negative sense in connection with Brexit, and this is the only exception from what was said above.
"The prospect of EU fragmentation following the UK referendum seems increasingly real. The existence of different levels of integration of EU Member States is a source of instability. We are in favour of preserving the unity of the EU and welcome a future deepening of integration between the Member States." 23 Government Programme of the Republic of Bulgaria for the period 2017-2021.
Overall, it can be concluded that at a conceptual level Bulgarian governments prefer more integration and a stronger European Union so national interests can be better defended. However, while the question of 'how much Europe' receives more or less a short answer, the question of (exactly) 'what Europe' is more complex and context-driven. Indicative of this observation is the fierce discussion around the EU 'Mobility package,' in which arguments in support of social fairness gave way to fears of economic losses. In this discussion, Bulgaria declared the EU stance disproportionate and discriminatory against peripheral countries. The Bulgarian Prime Minister was quoted as saying that the rules included in the legislation package did not meet the EU's social agenda, 24 had a negative impact on environmental objectives and would unfavourably influence the European economy as a whole. On the other hand, an example of backing joint policies is the Prime Minister's expressed view of the advantages for Bulgaria deriving from the European Energy Union. Borissov was quoted as saying in his typical inimitable style, "We are categorically for a European energy union, because fraternal Russia sells to fraternal Bulgaria the most expensive gas in Europe. If there is an energy union, we will have a lower gas price." 25 DI-related models and mechanisms are not mentioned in the PMs' and Presidents' key speeches in parliament (a total of 8 documents were analysed for this search). The analysis found no strict reference to the enhanced cooperation DI model, while 'enhancing integration' was used by Prime Minister Borissov when discussions on the future of Europe took place in the national assembly. "Enhancing integration is what we are striving for in the development of Europe. On this basis, we need to deepen our participation in Economic and Monetary Union, as well as in the initiatives for social integration of the euro area countries. We also need a European Defence Force to complement NATO, for example, by guarding our external borders." 26 Prime Minister Boyko Borissov, National Assembly, 07.07.2017. 23 Original text in Bulgarian: "Перспективите за фрагментация на ЕС след референдума във Великобритания изглеждат все по-реални. Съществуването на различни нива на интеграция на странитечленки в ЕС, е източник на нестабилност. Ние се обявяваме за запазване на единството на ЕС и приветстваме бъдещо задълбочаване на интеграцията между държавите членки.Реформите в ЕС трябва да се основават на принципите и ценностите на европейската солидарност и равноправие при взаимно зачитане на интересите и доверието между държавите членки." 24 See also the article "All Bulgarian MEPs, across party lines, except one, are mobilised against the 'Macron package'," available at https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/eastern-europe-mobilises-against-macrons-mobility-package/ 25 Original text in Bulgarian: "Категорично сме за европейски енергиен съюз, защото смебратска Русия продава на братска България най-скъпия газ в Европа. Ако има енергиен съюз, ще имаме по-ниска цена на газа" Boyko Borissov, 08.05.2014 26 Original text in Bulgarian: "Засилващата интеграция е това, към което се стремим в развитието на Европа. На тази основа е нужно и задълбочаване на участието ни в Икономическия и валутен съюз, както и в инициативите за социална интеграция на страните от Еврозоната. Имаме нужда и от Европейски сили за отбрана, който да допълнят НАТО например при охраната на външните ни граници." Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers In terms of DI models, the results indicate the existence of a 'core-periphery' discourse in official statements since the very beginning of Bulgaria's EU membership, with the understanding that Bulgaria had to catch-up with high European standards by abiding by the rules. "The Union is not a horn of plenty, figuratively speaking; it is not a buffet for poor relatives on the European periphery, but a system of strict rules, norms and requirements." 27 President Georgi Parvanov, Formal plenary sitting of the national assembly dedicated to Bulgaria's membership of the European Union and to the European agenda of the national assembly, 11.01.2017.
A separate search for DI models in official government speeches (Prime Ministers and Presidents) in the context of the Future of Europe debate indicates that the emergence of two-speed and multiple-speed Europe is considered by the Bulgarian government in the same 'catch-up' and 'fully-fledged EU membership' discourse.
fight with our own demons for the different speeds of the European Union, this is not a conversation about geography, not a struggle for profit. This is a conversation: FOR our own ambitions; FOR the readiness to accelerate our development; FOR our responsibility to the Bulgarian citizens, who invariably declare support for our European membership." 28 Speech by Caretaker Prime Minister Ognian Gerdjikov in a public discussion 'The Future of Europe and the Bulgarian presidency of the EU' organised by PanEuropa Bulgaria, 16.03.2017.
"Bulgaria has to solve a very important issue regarding the public attitude towards the EU. We must achieve our full integration, enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon, and that means joining the euro area and the Schengen area. This means being full members of the EU, actively participating in all pillars and policies for decision-making. Bulgaria has not yet held a fully-fledged debate on both the benefits and risks on the road to the euro area and what to do to minimise these risks. There are risks, but they must be explained to the public and we must have a clear plan to overcome them." 29 Conference speech by President Radev, 'The EU: Going Know-Where?,' organised by the Institute of Economics and International Relations and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 24.06.2020.

The Politics of Differentiated Integration: What do Governments Want? Country Report -Bulgaria
European University Institute 17 DI models and mechanisms were also present in Prime Minister Borissov's interventions during parliamentary discussions, for example: "Scenarios related to a Europe at different speeds can only be considered acceptable if they are based on the will of a member country to decide for itself where it wants to be and not of another to determine its place. Bulgaria has an interest in participating in a strong and united Europe with more integration. I am convinced that the place of our country is in the core, not in the periphery of the European Union. Of particular importance to us is our inclusion in the Schengen area and in the eurozone, and Bulgaria successfully meets the criteria set out in the Stability and Growth Pact.

References in government programmes to the European Union
Having said this, we continue with a short list of the main EU-related priorities of consecutive governments.

2008 -The Lisbon Treaty
The government's position The government's position was a strong pro-European stance. Certain DI instances, such as regarding the Charter of Fundamental Rights, CFSP and energy policy were perceived by the government as sources of a stronger Europe and as an opportunity for Bulgarian citizens and Bulgarian society to defend national interests within the framework of the common European policy. 34 The leverage of the CVM is questioned by the expert community in several ways. However, the author agrees that "the role of the CVM at the level of public opinion and civil society, and as a mechanism that contributes to 'sandwiching' reformreluctant Bulgarian governments between pressure from Brussels and domestic pressure for reforms" should not be underestimated. According to a 2009 analysis by the Ministry of Defence, 35 the priorities declared by the First Bosissov government, such as placing Bulgaria "at the centre of European policies," "making the country a key factor for stability in the region and the world," "active foreign policy," "modern defence policy," "defence and security relevant to NATO and the EU" and "participation in missions and contribution to collective NATO and EU defence and in NATO and EU defence programmes and projects," were a serious challenge, especially "in the current context of economic crisis and an increasingly limited defence budget, in which the 'easy' answers to the above questions are usually contradictory and often mutually exclusive." The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty was voted on in the Bulgarian Parliament on 21 March 2008, with 195 votes for and 15 votes against.
During his speech in the national parliament on the occasion of the ratification, Prime minister Sergei Stanishev said it was only natural in view of the enlargement of the European Union, and in response to the new challenges in the world, to find a new basis and new instruments, so that the European Union became both more efficient and more transparent, more comprehensible to citizens and at the same time deepened its integration in areas that are important to European citizens.
"I am sure that both most Europeans and most Bulgarian citizens want no less European Union and no less Europe, but more, of course, preserving our national identity, seeking our national interests in harmony with other European nations and exercising civilian and national control over the development of the European Union […], the success of the Lisbon Treaty is very important for the whole future of Europe.
[…] Bulgaria actively participated and strongly and consistently supported both the German and Portuguese presidencies in the course of the negotiations on the Reform Treaty […] Our understanding was that major institutional changes contribute to increasing the democracy, efficiency and transparency of the European Union.
[…] I call on the Members of Parliament to support the Treaty of Lisbon, because it will be a success for Europe, it will make it stronger, more democratic, more effective, closer to the people. The implementation of this treaty will be a success for both our country and the Bulgarian citizens, so that we can live with the self-confidence of the citizens of a prosperous democratic legal state in a democratic and growing European Union in the global world." 36 Sergei Stanishev, Prime Minister (BSP), Bulgarian Parliament, 21.03.2008.

The opposition's position
The arguments of the opposition ultra-nationalist party Attack (Coalition Ataka) against the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty referred to fears of increasing pressure by the "core of the EU" on the poorer countries, the possibility of further limiting national sovereignty and the creation of a European superpower.
"Here (The Lisbon Treaty), however, is the aspiration of the core of the European Union of richer countries to secure their selfish interests over the whole community, imposing a disproportionate distribution of the benefits and costs of the integration process, especially on the newly admitted countries. The asymmetric approach to this distribution can only be to the detriment of smaller and poorer countries, which require sufficient guarantees by consensus or a full majority in votes on key issues of cooperation, as well as a fair asymmetric distribution between the powers of certain states." MP Stanislav Stanilov (Coalition Ataka), Bulgarian Parliament, 21 March 2008.
During the discussion in the parliament most of the MPs generally put the main emphasis on the treaty from the point of view of their political affiliationsthe treaty was presented as a step towards social Europe, an opportunity for more subsidiarity, less bureaucracy etc. "We in the opposition expected to hear political speeches from the government, but instead we heard several concise retellings of the Lisbon Treaty. There is no doubt that this is a significant event for Bulgaria, because through this ratification we, the Bulgarians, are deciding on the future of Europe.
[…] Today, when Bulgaria is shaken by another corruption scandal and obvious conflicts of interest, Bulgarian citizens hope to strengthen the control by the European institutions." 38 Nedzhda Mihaylova, (ODF) Bulgarian Parliament, 21 March 2008.
During the same debate in the national parliament, members of the government parties and of the opposition sought to defend the Lisbon Treaty for its role in securing citizen participation, social justice, economic growth, fundamental rights and a common foreign and security policy: "We believe that a strong European Union is in the national interest of Bulgaria. As proposed to us, the Treaty of Lisbon provides more opportunities for building a strong European Union. This is especially important for Bulgaria, being at the external border of the European Union. For us, in the debate that has taken place within the European Union on whether to create a union in which relations are weaker and there are no common systems, no common foreign policy, no common defence or security system, it was in Bulgaria's national interest to have such a common foreign and security policy." 39 Ekaterina Mhaylova, (DSB) Bulgarian Parliament, 21 March 2008.
[…] The Treaty of Lisbon improves the European Union's ability to act in several policy areas that are a priority for the Union and its citizens today, namely freedom, security and justice, the fight against terrorism and crime, energy policy, climate change, public health and others. This contract guarantees increased security for all." 40 Fatme Ilyaz, (MRF), Bulgarian Parliament, 21 March 2008.
The increased role of national parliaments in EU decision-making stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty was mentioned several times, both by the ruling party and by the opposition, as an important and very welcome step ahead, while Bulgaria's capacity to meet high expectations in terms of the MPs' expertise on EU matters was called into question. In general, all the important Bulgarian political parties support the strategy of accession to the eurozone, but with different views about the speed and the preconditions required. The most frequent objection is that the country should first more successfully catch up with the eurozone countries and only after substantially closing the gap in terms of GDP per capita can Bulgaria carry on with adopting the euro.
Our conclusions can be summarised as follows. First, the government and all the important political parties in Bulgaria support accession to the eurozone, although with different views about the speed and sequencing of the necessary economic measures.

iii. The Fiscal Compact Treaty
The government's position Regarding the Fiscal Compact, Bulgaria decided to opt in following PM Borissov's announcement at the Brussels European summit on 8-9 December 2011. The Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce 42 and Industry fiercely criticised the Prime Minister for not being aware of the commitment made and for not consulting on Bulgaria's position with stakeholders. As Euinside commented, 43 the only official Bulgarian position on the then draft treaty came from the then Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Nikolay Mladenov, who explained on the occasion of the 5th anniversary of Bulgaria's accession to the EU that the conclusion of the negotiations for a new 'fiscal union' of the EU was a priority task for the Member States and that Bulgaria would not make any financial commitments requiring additional instalments to the IMF or other financial institutions. "We say 'Yes' to fiscal discipline and 'No' to interference in our right to follow an independent tax policy," Mladenov was quoted as saying on the foreign ministry's web page. 44 Following this, on January 2012 the Bulgarian Parliament adopted the decision for Bulgaria to participate in the European Fiscal Pact. The majority voted in favour (178 deputies voted, 129 were in favour, 1 against, 48 abstained). On 2 March 2012 Bulgaria acceded to the agreement with the exception of the part related to the coordination of economic policies. "Bulgaria will apply the provisions of the part of the agreement that reaffirms the Maastricht criteria for fiscal discipline, i.e. achieving a balanced budget or budget surplus, a structural deficit of up to 1% of GDP with a gross government debt-to-GDP ratio below 60%," reads the announcement by the Bulgarian government.

The opposition's position
The main opposition party leader Sergei Stanishev (BSP) urged to not rush the signing of the Treaty: "There is a very dangerous tendency inherent in the approach that has been imposed in the formation of this intergovernmental treatybypassing the Community method, ignoring the European Parliament, the European Commission to a lesser extent, but also. And this puts a serious time bomb to turn Europe more and more into a Europe of several groups on different issues, at two, at three speeds. And this is a huge risk.
[…] I do not understand why a government that declares an ambitious policy is abandoning the fourth section (of the Treaty). This is the only section that talks about the real Bulgarian national priorities such as convergence, growth, overcoming unemployment, job creation. This is exactly what we are giving up, because of the imaginary fear for the time being regarding the tax policy that may be imposed on us. Believe me, if these same big ones decide to impose something on us, they will impose it without this chapter and without this contract.
[…] Therefore, for all these reasons, both pan-European and the approach of the Bulgarian government, we cannot support this draft decision. There remains an open question that needs to be discussed very seriously, since the government has apparently decided to join, and only the restrictive fiscal part of this draft treatyhow do we ratify it? First, there is no need for Bulgaria to hurry with this process. Twelve eurozone countries need to ratify it for it to take effect. Second, our status is not clear at all, when we will be invited there, how long we will be present, whether our voice can be heard in this new, imaginary format at all. Third, some countries, such as the Czech prime minister, have already said they will have to hold a referendum. This issue, this policy is longterm and serious commitments are being made. I believe that the topic of these policies, enshrined in this draft agreement, is one of the leading ones in determining the positions of the various parties in Bulgaria for the next parliamentary elections. And I do not rule out the possibility of raising the issue of a referendum, because we really have very serious tasks ahead of us." 45  The future of Europe is not mentioned in any of the programmes of successive Bulgarian governments in the period under review. However, subsequently with the presentation of the EC White Paper it became clear to the government that the debate on the future of the EU was naturally linked to the discussion on the priorities of the Bulgarian presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2018. The facts that the presidency was the first for Bulgaria, and that it followed shortly after the presentation of Junker's White Paper, were actually an opportunity for the country to play a central role in the discussion and the shaping of European Union policies.
A 2017 report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the level of implementation of the approved policies and programmes stated that "the results of the analysis contained in the Bulgarian Framework Position on the FOE approved by the Council for European Affairs (CEA) on 13 November 2017 showed that none of the presented scenarios for the future of the EU meet in its pure form the national interests of Bulgaria." Further on, the report says that "Each of the five models contains both opportunities and challenges. Both should be the subject of constant analysis in order to ensure the possibility for Bulgaria to make optimal use of the debates and the decisions that will be formulated in their course." In 2017-2018, debates on the future of Europe took place in the context of discussions on the priorities of the Bulgarian presidency. According to information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Bulgarian positions were also presented to the Bulgarian public through a number of public events (conferences, discussions) by representatives of the leadership of the MFA, and the Prime Minister participated in a number of meetings.

The oppositions' position
Representatives of the largest opposition party (the Bulgarian Socialist Party) often expressed discontent at the fact that the Prime Minister did not report to MPs 50 and bypassed the legislature in formulating 47 Moraliyska, Monika, "White Book on the Future of Europe and its Repercussions in Bulgaria" in "The EU after 2020: in search of identity, sustainability and growth" Reports from the Annual conference of the Bulgarian Association for European Studies, Sofia, 26 October 2017 http://www.becsa-bg.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-BESA-Conference-Papers.pdf 48 Original text in Bulgarian: "Истината в тази Бяла книга е, че не трябва да допуснем, първо, Европа на две или повече скорости и, второ, кохезията да отпадне. Това е." 49 Original text in Bulgarian: "нашият анализ и нашият прочит -ние искаме повече интеграция по-скоро". Стенограма от заседание на Комисия по европейските въпроси и контрол на европейските фондове от 13.06.2008. 50 Note by the author of the report: In the last 3 years and 8 months, Prime Minister Borissov was present only 6 times in the National Parliament (reference: www.parliament.bg). On 06.02.2019 the Committee on European Affairs and Oversight of the European Funds at the National Assembly (CEAOEF) adopted a report with recommendations on strengthening the role of the National Assembly on European issues. According to the report, "new priorities and ambitious goals were needed to strengthen the role of Bulgaria and the National Assembly in the development and reform of united Europe. The National Assembly may hold a hearing of the Prime Minister on the position of the Republic of Bulgaria in forthcoming meetings of the European Council, as stipulated in Art. 126 of the Parliament's rules of procedure". The report notes that since the launch of the 44th National Assembly no such hearing was held. "I set you one conditionall issues of the presidency are to be decided in parliament, because this (Bulgaria) is a parliamentary republic and before you go anywhere and express a position, let's discuss it here and accept it, and you will have our support, because this is a cause for Bulgaria. You promised, you said yes, we will do great in parliament. Of course, you lied to me, Mr. Borissov. You go, you make commitments. The Bulgarian parliament knows nothing. You say now that the national programme for the EU presidency is still being discussed and will be adopted, but you have already signed the priorities with the Trio. At the same time, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that your Estonian colleague, before signing, stood before the Estonian Parliament and spoke there, and received support before signing. You have signed something, and the national programme will be presented in September. Former Justice Minister Hristo Ivanov's 'Yes, Bulgaria' party was the first to spread a position saying that the risk for Bulgaria in the two-speed Europe scenario is not just of remaining on the periphery but of gradually dropping out of the EU altogether and moving away from any meaningful content of the concept of European membership. "This danger is caused by the fact that the Bulgarian mafia, which pretends to be the political elite, has wasted ten years of our membership. During this time, our main and most important task was to move to the A team in the EU," he said.
At the end of April 2018, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) hosted a meeting of the Party of European Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). MRF leader Mustafa Karadayi called for the EU to become a zone free from radicalism and was against a multi-speed-Europe. For the MRF, a scenario in which the EU would develop at several speeds was not a solution to common problems; it would only deepen them. In his words, the EU needed a common defence policy within NATO to ensure the prosperity and security of European citizens in an environment of changing geopolitical security.

ii. EMU and Schengen
"Bulgaria has an interest in participating in a strong and united Europe with more integration. I am convinced that the place of our country is in the core, not in the periphery of the European Union. Of particular importance to us is our inclusion in the Schengen area and in the eurozone, and Bulgaria successfully meets the criteria set out in the Stability and Growth Pact." 54 Prime Minister Borissov, National Assembly, 07.07.2017. 53 Original text in Bulgarian: "[…] И към момента са налице червени линии, от които България не трябва да отстъпва в отстояването на своята позиция.

iii. The eurozone
Although popular support for the adoption of the euro dwindled following the problems with excessive public debt in neighbouring Greece and other countries across the eurozone, the government kept its priority of entering ERM II and adopting the euro. Bulgaria's decision to enter the ERM II mechanism in the early summer of 2020, in the midst of the coronavirus crisis, received mixed responses.
Speaking at a forum on 26 June 2018, Prime Minister Boyko Borissov was quoted as saying that the "egotism" of Western countries was putting the future of the European Union at risk: "Why are you constantly changing the conditions for the eurozone? Where is the risk in Bulgaria being in the eurozone waiting room? It's zero! There is egotism, yesin the way you are working now, you will break Europe down the middle and this incredible creature will eventually be torpedoed by the egotism of every single state." Opposition's leader Kornelia Ninova said that the BSP should rethink the country's entry into the eurozone with the argument that the country and the banking sector were not yet ready. She called for a debate on how the adoption of the euro would affect the country and its economic development. Finally, on 10 July, Croatia and Bulgaria got the green light from European Union finance ministers to join the European Central Bank's Exchange Rate Mechanism II, a key step on the road to adoption of the euro.

iv. Schengen
Bulgaria and Romania meet all the technical requirements to be accepted in the Schengen area. This is the conclusion of many independent experts and of Bulgarian politicians. In 2018-2020, despite certain hesitation, 55 accession to the Schengen area remained at the top of the Bulgarian agenda and Bulgaria's entry was backed by European leaders on several different occasions. "All possible criteria for our Schengen membership have been met and there is nothing more to be done by Bulgaria," stated Prime Minister Boyko Borissov after a meeting with his Dutch counterpart Mark Rutte in the Hague in 2018.
At a conference on the 15th anniversary of the 2004 EU enlargement, "Looking back, looking forward," in 2019, Prime Minister Boyko Borissov said that full membership of the Schengen Area remained a key priority for Bulgaria: "Schengen is an achievement we must preserve; its future must be a symbol of a united Europe." In a TV interview on national television in 2018, Deputy Prime Minister Tomislav Dontchev expressed the opinion that what happened in Bulgaria was a manifestation of double standards. Donchev clarified that Bulgaria bore responsibilities that many of the Schengen countries do not tolerate and that accession to the Schengen area was more a matter of reputation and self-confidence for the country (Panorama, National TV, 02.02.2018).
During the opening of the Bulgarian presidency of the EU (12 January 2018), the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker reiterated that the place of Bulgaria and Romania was in the Schengen area for free movement of people. In December 2018, a majority of MEPs had voted in favour of a resolution that called for the accession of Bulgaria. за нас е включването ни в Шенгенското пространство и в Еврозоната, и България успешно покрива критериите, заложени в Пакта за стабилност и растеж." 55 In 2019 Bulgaria temporarily backed off from its bid to join the Schengen Area due to fears that the country may go through a migrant invasion as soon as it becomes part of the borderless area. In Bulgaria there are still political voices which are highly critical of Borissov's rule of the country over the last 10 years. According to the DSB opposition party, 56 although in 2018 the government had demonstrated foreign policy efforts, it had failed to mislead Bulgarian Western partners into patronising its own corruption and oligarchic dependencies. According to DSB, Bulgaria's remaining outside Schengen and the eurozone "poses a danger to Bulgaria's full membership of the EU and creates Euroscepticism among Bulgarian citizens." Lagging behind the core of a "high-speed Europe" would turn Bulgaria into a European periphery, threatened by the influence of non-EU countries and by the corruption, authoritarianism, poverty and geopolitical instability that characterised the western Balkans region. 57

Concluding remarks
This report has shown that European policy and debates on Europe's future are not central in Bulgarian government positions. Governing parties and opposition parties share a clearly negative stance towards models of DI. While the position on DI seems to be independent of context, the position towards deepening European integration seems to be more complex and context-driven. As such, Bulgarian governments have consistently rejected differentiated integration at a conceptual level, while they have favoured European solidarity (e.g. more European funds to support public finance and cohesion), a stronger European Union (e.g. CFSDP, enlargement with the western Balkan countries, given Bulgaria's geographical position) and further consolidation and joint action (i.e. a European energy union) in view of its national interest.
Greater integration in the Schengen area and the eurozone has been a priority for the government and the opposition parties since the country's accession to the EU. The significant salience of DI instances that are perceived by other countries as opt-out mechanisms, i.e. Schengen and the eurozone in the case of Bulgaria, does not indicate the salience of DI, but rather the salience of various 'core state power' policy fields and Bulgaria's ambition to end the current situation of involuntary differentiation. 56 Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria (Bulgarian: Демократи за силна България, Demokrati za silna Bălgarija, ДСБ, DSB).