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## Social Movements in Europe: Movement Society or Europeanization of Conflict?

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In this paper, I want to argue three things:

first, that Europe -- like America -- is becoming a "movement society", but what this means may not be what the social movements would like. It means the generalization of contentious collective action, but it also means its normalization -- and perhaps its banalization;

second, that the "globalization" of conflict that some theorists have been writing about has affected Europe only indirectly. Global trends insinuate themselves into Europe through economic interdependence, through the collapse of the Soviet empire and through population movement -- but there is little sign yet of the direct diffusion of conflict into Europe;

and, third, that there are hints of a Europeanization of conflict in some respects but not in others. Europe is definitely in movement but there is little sign so far of a Europe of movements.

The social movement was a particular product of the modern state; it responds to the political opportunity structure of national politics; and, much more than interest groups, movements remain prisoners of the state that have a hard time connecting to the non-state character of the European Union. As a result, I will argue, although the EU coopts groups and regulates the activities that interest them, there is little sign yet that movements are engaged in sustained conflictual interaction at the European level.

## Gramsci and Globalization

I want to begin with that quintessentially Italian figure, Antonio Gramsci, and what he thought about European social movements. Gramsci, as is well known, came out of the European periphery -- from Sardinia, in fact -- and went to Turin as a student, where he joined the Socialist party. In 1919, he published a series of enthusiastic -- if not very well-informed -- analyses of the Bolshevik revolution. He thought the conditions that had produced the Russian revolution obtained in Italy too: the devastating effects of the war that had just ended, the spirit of insurgency among its workers, and the presence of a large and backward southern peasantry that was ripe, so he thought, for insurrection.

So it was not surprising that Gramsci cast his lot with the most radical faction in the Italian Socialist party, the "abstentionists" who led the way out of the party and into the third international. And it was not surprising that he believed the Turinese factory movement would replace the party in the vanguard of the revolution. -- just as, so he thought, the workers' and peasants' soviets had done in Russia. What Gramsci saw was a Europeanization of conflict moving from Europe's periphery to its core, from East to West, from Russian peasants to Turinese workers. He saw its cause in the collapse of world capitalism and its outcome a Europe-wide socialist revolution. What happened to Gramsci and his vision of Italy "doing like the Russians did" should give pause to those who think the current disorder in the East is the sign of a globalization of conflict.



In fact, Gramsci changed his vision of Europe after his arrest. For not only did he realize that the forces of reaction were much stronger in Western Europe than he had thought; sitting in his prison cell, he saw the whole strategy that had succeeded in Russia -- what he called "the war of movement" -- as a massive error in the West. Gramsci came to the conclusion that, while the Russian state -- once taken over -- yielded the entire society to the Bolsheviks, western states were buttressed by much stronger civil societies that needed to be conquered slowly from the inside before the state could be brought down. Thus he concluded that the revolution could not have been expected to sweep triumphantly from east to west, and that the future struggle had to take the form of a "war of position" in "the trenches and fortifications" of each western society".

Generalizing from Gramsci's conversion to the language of social science: what Gramsci learned was that even when disorder intrudes on a region from abroad -- as it is doing in Europe today -- social movements triggered by that disorder cannot escape from the structure of political opportunities and constraints of their own nation-states. Movements are often seen as wildly unruly, enemies of routine political processes and able to leap from state to state. But in fact, as I have recently argued in my forthcoming book, Power in Movement (1994), movements are particularly prone to respond to national political opportunities. This is because they have neither consistent ideological world-views, disciplined organizations nor can offer material incentives to hold their supporters together. They are thus dependent on responding to

the conditions of the political struggle and the initiatives of powerholders. Movements, far more than interest groups or parties, are prisoners of the state.

### **The Globalization Thesis**

A great deal has changed in Europe since Gramsci imagined in 1919 that Bolshevik revolution would spread to western Europe in the same form as it had taken in Russia. But in international political economy, there is an interesting parallel to Gramsci's revolutionary optimism: the theory of global turbulence. If the thesis is correct, then just as students of European institutions are looking to the European Union, and students of interest groups are looking to European lobbies, we should expect a Europeanization of movement. By the same token, if the thesis is wrong, we will have to continue to deal with the same old tired nation-states that produced the French revolution, Italian fascism and German national socialism and the movements of the 1960s. I want to examine this thesis before raising the question: "is there a movement society in Western Europe?" And, if so, does it look anything like the Europeanization of conflict that Gramsci predicted?

### **The Rosenau Thesis**

First the thesis: In his 1990 book, Turbulence in World Politics (Princeton, 1990), James Rosenau argued not only that the world has become more integrated since the end of World War Two, but that it is becoming more turbulent. Among the factors that convinced him that ours is an era of turbulence



is "a marked increase in the number of spontaneous collective actions" and their rapid spread around the globe (p. 369). All over the world, he writes, people's "cathectic capabilities" are growing. Just as power is becoming more centralized and more distant from ordinary citizens, they are coming together in decentralized politics of identity and interest to react against this centralization and impersonalism.

Four trends can be adduced in support of Rosenau's thesis:

-- First, the dominant economic trends of the late twentieth century have been toward greater international interdependence. The internationalization of capital markets is matched by the mobility of industry and the transnational integration of production. This extends beyond the production of goods to the production of culture; you can watch CNN from a hotel in Hong Kong and decisions about an amusement park outside of Paris are made in Hollywood.

-- Second, with some notable exceptions, the economic growth of the 1970s and 1980s has increased the imbalance of wealth and poverty between the North and West and the East and South. The important point is not the wealth and poverty itself but the fact that interdependence and communication have brought citizens of these regions cognitively and physically closer to one another. One outcome of this is the shift of migration from the intra-Western flows of the nineteenth century to the South-to-West flows of the 1960s-1980s. And since 1989, we see an East-to-West flow that are producing similar tensions in Europe today.

-- Third, transnational economic regimes and wider political institutions appear to be undercutting the old bases of political organization. The national state appears to be losing ground to this combination of economic and cultural transnationalism; Philippe Schmitter displays his a strong belief in globalization when he writes:

the contemporary context systematically favors the transformation of states into either confederatii, condominii or federatii (sic.) in a variety of settings (quoted in Mann 1993: 115).

--fourth, what Rosenau calls "global television" brings news of collective protest from one part of the world to another much faster than in the past. Students in Beijing try to copy what they saw students in Europe doing on TV a few weeks earlier; tapes produced in Teheran sell Islamic fundamentalism in Khartoum and Algiers; ethnic groups in the Balkans are trying to accomplish bloodily what ethnic groups in the Baltics did peacefully in the late 1980s.

In summary, the globalization thesis holds that because of spatial, economic, political and cultural trends, the previously national bases of social movements are being undercut and strands of transnational movement tissue are connecting movements around the world in a long wave of global turbulence. If Rosenau is right, the implications for the future of civil politics are serious, because the modern social movement grew up around the national state, and it was in interaction with the national state that it was tamed. The mass petition, the strike, the peaceful demonstration, the

organized trade union all developed in interaction with the state; outside of it, the volatile power of the social movement may be unleashed -- as we see in the former Yugoslavia today.

But does the theory of globalization apply to Europe? If globalization is a real trend and Europe is smaller than the world, then ceteris parabis, Europeanization must be happening too. Let me turn to that question now.

### **The Movement Society**

When we look at the amount of collective action in Europe today, there is little doubt that it has grown since the 1960s. First the student and anti-war movements of the '60s; then the women's and environmental movements of the 1970s; then the enormously powerful peace movement of the 1980s involved hundreds of thousands of Europeans in sustained sequences of contentious direct action with authorities, elites and opponents -- which, incidentally, is my definition of a social movement.

Not only that: new forms of organization and direct action like the sit-in have been invented and diffused, so that people from Latvia to London know how to use it effectively for goals that range from national liberation to keeping the channel tunnel railway out of one's backyard. The social movement has become typical, widespread and modular.

These movements have of course been cyclical, and have been followed by defection, disillusionment, cooptation and institutionalization by the party system, like movements in the past. But it is interesting that the magnitude of



collective action at the end of each cycle appears to be higher than at its beginning.

I can illustrate this for you in the pattern of Italian collective action in the late 1960s and early 70s. As you can see from Figure 1, I have taken collective action and strikes of all kinds in Italy from news reports and aggregated them into one curve (Tarrow 1989). Although the heights of collective action were reached in Italy in 1970-71, there was more collective action remaining at the end of the decade than at the beginning.

(See figure 1, page 23).

Moreover, in the 1960s, the same new forms of protest begin to appear simultaneously in different European countries. The student movement of the late 1960s was the first such instance; in Berlin and Paris, Rome and London, students began to assemble, march, occupy premises, sing songs of protest, wear their hair long and do all the things that we now identify with the culture of the sixties. In the 1970s, similar environmental movements exploded throughout Europe and a woman's movement more quietly crept across national boundaries with the themes of difference and identity. By the mid-1980s, we see a new social movement --the peace movement --developing massive cycles of protest in different countries at the same time.

Finally, the co-occurrence of movement cycles in different countries is no accident. From the 1960s on, there has been increasing transnational communication and

coordination among European social activists. For example, in the 1970s, French and German anti-nuclear movements coordinated their activities and participated in one another's protests across the border; and in the 1983, the peace movement produced probably the largest coordinated transnational demonstration in history, to protest the planned expansion of Europe's nuclear arsenal.

In summary, there is a lot of evidence of the increasing magnitude, simultaneity and coordination of European social movements.

#### **Normalization and The Constraints of Politics**

But observe two things before concluding that Europe is exploding into a future of disorder and turbulence:

first, the growth of collective action has brought with it a peculiar kind of paradox. As protest becomes omnipresent, it becomes acceptable and predictable. When protesters first burst onto the streets they create confusion, excitement and amusement. But as protest becomes more generalized, it loses its power to surprise and amuse and triggers controlled reactions that the movement's power to create uncertainty -- and thus policy responses -- declines.

We see this already in the movements of the 1960s: as students sat in, teachers taught in, and hippies were in, the forces of order learned that responding with a shrug and a smile is more effective than swinging a baton or spraying protesters with water cannon. A jurisprudence and legitimation

of Non Violent Direct Action soon developed, making it part of the political process -- and therefore removing its teeth.

Kafka had a parable that reflects the paradox of normalization: "The leopards," he wrote, break into the temple. They knock over the holy vessels and kill the priests. Over the years, they do it again and again. Until they become part of the ceremony." In a sense, European social movements have become "part of the ceremony" of the modern state, so an increase in collective action may not signify so much an increase in turbulence as its normalization.

Second, and this follows from the first point, the political opportunity structure of each western European state creates numerous but different and segmented channels for collective action so that even the same movement looks different in each country. Occupy a factory in Germany and you will be dragged into court; do the same thing in Italy and the police will let your wife bring your lunch in. Throw fish in the street in Britain and people will tut-tut at the waste of good food; do the same thing in France and the government will raise your subsidy; do it in Sweden and the government will appoint a commission. Just as Gramsci's "trenches and fortifications" stopped the revolution in the West, the globalization of movements is impeded by the strength and variety of the political opportunity structures of western European states.

### **The European Crisis**

So European social movements have been normalized and channeled by the political opportunity structure of their



respective national states. There is little evidence here of a globalization of conflict. But after a temporary ebullience and optimism, the changes in Europe since 1989 have given way to widespread conflict, and this may create the conditions for the generalization of turbulence that Rosenau thought was happening. What are its sources? Three stand out -- the absorption of East-Central Europe; the conflicts over European integration and the European recession:

-- first, as east-central Europe is assimilated to the idea of Europe, its transitional pains are being transferred into Europe's problems.

-- second, the European recession has created a level of unemployment and disinvestment greater than at any time since the 1930s;

-- third, as the process of European integration becomes more conflictual -- as it surely has since Maastricht -- uncertainty is growing about the level of government at which key conflicts are addressed. "Imagine a polity," writes Schmitter, that lacks a locus of clearly defined authority, an established central hierarchy of public offices, a pre-defined sphere of competence and a fixed and contiguous territory, but "did have the capability to take decisions, resolve conflicts, produce public goods" and a variety of other things (1993: 4-5). This uncertainty alone could create conflict.

These three crises combine to produce new axes of conflict and intensify old ones:

first, population moving in from the East combines with the recession in the West to feed resentment of foreigners, produce racist violence and anti-racist reactions;

second, the disappearance of the threat of international communism lowers the barriers to internal realignment and -- at least in Italy -- has made possible a movement against corruption and in favor of separatism;

third, imports of European community agricultural goods that undercut French prices combine with the recession to produce a series of increasingly violent farmers' and fishermen's protests.

### **Globalization and Europeanization**

The first major sign of a change is an upsurge of violence. The three major waves of European social movement mobilization in the postwar period -- the strike wave of the early postwar years, the student and worker movements of the 1960s and the "new" social movements of the 1970s -- were largely peaceful. Let me illustrate this with the Italian data, because Italy probably had the most unruly cycle in the 1960s and early 1970s (Tarrow 1989):

(See table 1, page 24)

### **The Return of Violence**

In contrast, what Rosenau's theory suggests (and what the years since 1989 appear to support) is a pattern of increasingly violent contention. The attacks on immigrants in Germany, the desecration of synagogues in France and Germany

and the ethnic warfare in ex-Yugoslavia go against the grain of the routinization of conflict that we saw in the West in previous cycles of protest. But can it be generalized to all of European contention?

Take the ethnic violence since 1989: every revolution and every collapse of multinational empires in the past have led to ethnic fragmentation and interethnic conflict, from the 1848 revolution to the collapse of the Czarist and Ottoman empires in 1917 and 1918 to British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent. It pays to recall that one of the first slogans to emerge in the German states during the Springtime of Freedom of 1848 as "Juden Raus!"

With respect to skinhead violence, there are a couple of things to be said about it:

But not all skinheads are racist and second, not all racists are skinheads. There are skinhead groups in East-central Europe who attack German skinheads when they appear in Hungary or the Czech Republic -- not because they are fascist but because they are German -- and there are racist groups in Western Europe that are not skinheads. In fact, the most worrying trend in France in the last decade has not been violence against immigrants but the polite racism of the bourgeoisie that translates into votes for the Front national; it is not the thugs who attack North Africans on the street who have fueled the anti-immigrant policy of the current French government but the people of the beaux quartiers who now find it reasonable to acceptable to distinguish between "les francais de souche" and lesser mortals.



### The Diffusion of Conflict

The second aspect of globalization in Rosenau's theory is the rapid diffusion of conflict. The 1989 events did spread like wildfire and were fueled by global television, radio and travel. But these were in eastern and southeastern Europe, and they have had very little echo in western Europe or the United States, except among the immigrant relatives of the combatant Serbs, Croats and Bosnians who engage in a sort of "long-distance nationalism" on their behalf.

Besides, is rapid diffusion such a recent phenomenon? Those whose historical memory goes back before 1960 can think of other cycles of protest when -- without benefit of global television or cheap airfares -- collective action spread rapidly across national boundaries. The revolution of 1848 is a good example: it began in Italy in 1847, spreading up and down the peninsula from Rome after a new pope promised reforms. It's peak came in Paris in February 1848, after which it spread across the Rhine to the German states, to Austria and Hungary, and back to northern Italy with insurrections in Venice and Milan.

We could multiply the examples of the diffusion of conflict in past waves of collective action, but I think I have made my point: if the Europe of 1848 could produce a continent-wide revolution in a matter of weeks, even in the absence of global television, we should be cautious about inferring a radically new diffusion of conflict because CNN makes it possible for people in one part of the world to instantly see protests occurring in another.

### Euromovements?

This takes us to my final point -- Schmitter's "confederatii, condominii and federatii" and the effects of the European community on collective action. Is European union bringing about the kind of generalization of conflict that the young Gramsci thought would follow the Russian Revolution? Or was he right later that the domestic structures of civil society are strong enough to resist global trends and domesticate conflict into their various national traditions?

Before turning to the Community, let's recall that the social movement as we know it grew out of the efforts of European states in the 18th and 19th centuries to consolidate their power, integrate their peripheries and standardize relations among citizens and rulers. Many of the characteristics of the movements of the past two hundred years grew out of that relationship -- including the conventionalization of collective action, the channelling of movements by national opportunity structures and the institution of citizenship itself. As Michael Mann has recently written:

States were becoming cages, trapping subjects within the bars. They were empowered by the contemporary development of a capitalist civil society, which in Europe...always accompanied the rise of the modern state. They demanded changes in the conditions of their cages (1993: 117).

State elites had no wish to provide frameworks for social movements -- although the provision of national electoral machinery provided them with what Tilly calls umbrellas for

activism. But to advance their ambitions, they built roads, raised armies and collected the taxes, lodged the soldiers and occupied the territories to do so. This not only created "reactive movements" but created a fulcrum for "proactive" ones too. States wove together national categories of identity and built a national playing field -- never level, but increasingly visible -- on which people fought out their conflicts. The national state was the fulcrum around which the social movement developed. Movements needed national states to create new categories of social identity, provide large and visible targets for collective action and take the place of the material incentives that they didn't possess with political opportunities that they could temporarily appropriate.

I have stressed the state-centered structuring of social movements because movements, for the most part, still lack the ideological coherence, the organization and the internal resources to raise and sustain mobilization without outside stimulus. If they are becoming transnational, it will only happen to the extent that they can cohere around supranational institutions and policy processes that provide identities, targets and political opportunities in the same way as the national state does.

But the conflicts created by European integration are very real. "How long," asks Philippe Schmitter, "will Euro-proletarians, Euro-professionals, Euro-consumers, Euro-environmentalists, Euro-feminists, Euro-regionalists, Euro-youths or just plain Euro-citizens tolerate such a benevolent hegemony before demanding a greater voice?" (1993: 38);



Charles Tilly thinks the Europeanization of conflict may already be happening. One of the pioneers of the state-centered theory of social movement development, he recently wrote; "The increasing fluidity of capital, labor, commodities, money, and cultural practices undermines the capacity of any particular state to control events within its boundaries" (1991: 1). Movements, he speculates, may be becoming ex-prisoners of the state. What are the signs that this is happening in Europe?

#### **The Dog that Didn't Bark**

In this brief discussion, I cannot do more than allude to some of the evidence for the transnational effect of European integration on social movements. Before I do so, let me point to a complicating factor that makes this effect extremely hard to measure -- the independent impact of international economic integration:

If the international economy is as integrated as many students say, then as firms move around in Europe, there may be transnational strikes and protests that have nothing directly to do with the European Community. Of course, the firms' moves themselves may have been encouraged by the climate of European integration, but we can't know that in a specific enough way to attribute a rise in strikes against that company to the community.

This said, there is now a great deal of lobbying within the EU; much domestic political conflict about the community; occasional well-publicized strikes and demonstrations in this country or that against a particular policy that is identified

with the community: but there isn't much of what students of social movements would consider a social movement: that is, the organization and mounting of sustained sequences of contentious collective action in interaction with the elites, the institutions or the authorities of the european union.

I should add that I have not yet done the research to support this generalization, but there is scattered evidence for it from four different movements:

For example, in the area of farmers' organizations, when Rose-Marie Lagrave wrote a paper on European farm organizations for Les syndicats agricoles en Europe, she could only call it "La représentation de la représentation -- so elusive was the presence of the farmers' organizations in Brussels (1992). And in writing of the weakness of transnational labor organization, Lowell Turner described it as "a story...about something that unions for the most part are not doing that they need to do" (1993). As for the women's movement, most of the reforms that Gisela Kaplan was able to attribute to the community came as the result of executive initiative and not the challenge of the women's movement (1992). The anti-nuclear movement has been similarly unsuccessful in using the EC to advance its goals (Marks and McAdam 1993). Only the environmental movement has seen a good part of its program adopted by the European Community, and this has happened largely because the commission shared its goals. Besides, the environmental movement has gone furthest in the direction of becoming a lobby of all of Europe's social movements.

These scattered findings lead to a strong impression that Europe has not become a fulcrum for social movements as the national state did before it. The answer to Schmitter's rhetorical "how long?" question may be "a very long time indeed." Let me focus on the possible reasons for why the European movement dog hasn't yet barked:

The first is the invisible way that the Union implements much of its regulations: it seldom creates large, visible targets to administer its policies, but sets up general norms and regulations that are implemented by national institutions (see Giandomenico Majone's various papers on the European Union). As a result, we are more likely to see protests against national states than against the community. Where these are successful, the result may be to transfer the arena of conflict to disputes between national states and the community, or to cause "selective defection" from community norms on the part of national states under domestic pressure (Schmitter 1993: 17);

The second is the absence of a truly representative body that credibly makes supranational policy that would attract protest around it, as the house of commons, for example, attracted an increasing use of the mass petition between the late 18th and the early 19th century.

The final reason has to do with the question of strategic arenas of conflict. The presence of strong lobbying organizations of business in Brussels reflects the mobility of capital and the fact that concentrations of money, power and organization have the greatest effect at that level. As Streek and Schmitter write, the "Euro-Bourgeoisie has at long last



found in the EC the Executive committee for managing its common affairs (1991). In contrast, movements generally represent those who have only their numbers and their potential disruptiveness to gain them leverage, and the strategic arena for these is still the national state.

So paradoxically, the national state, which was created by European elites to integrate the periphery, extract a surplus, create order and enforce discipline, becomes the redoubt of those who can best use their numbers and their disruptiveness within it. I would hazard the guess that a major axis of conflict of the next decade will pit national political centers, strongly influenced by social movements, against transnational institutions, strongly influenced by lobbies. Because it is only in national politics that movements have the chance to use the trenches and fortifications created by Europe's elites, while business -- paradoxically -- has become the European actor that Gramsci saw in the working class.

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
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FIGURE 1  
TOTAL PROTEST EVENTS  
BY SEMESTER, 1966-73



**TABLE 1** *Conventional, confrontational, and violent forms of action as percentage of total forms and total events*

Type of form	% of total forms of action	No. of forms
Conventional forms	56.1	6745
Confrontational and symbolic forms	18.9	1698
Violent forms	23.1	2075
Other, unclassifiable	2.1	186
<b>Total forms</b>	<b>100.2</b>	<b>9006</b>



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