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The International Community and the Yugoslav Crisis: A Chronology of Events

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European University Institute, Florence

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BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI)

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An Introduction

The aim of the present working paper is to provide a detailed chronology of the international community's reaction to the Yugoslav crisis¹. It may be used as a sort of reference-handbook which may be consulted as a record of the most important events or declarations regarding the Yugoslav war(s).

It might be worth admitting that this chronology is neither smooth nor easy reading, as decisions and declarations from many different *fora*, and regarding various issues, are reported². However, the "red line" that guided the composition of the present "list of facts" was *the international community's response to the Yugoslav war/s*. Facts on the battle-field and declarations of leaders of the various warring factions are reported to put the international community's reaction to the Yugoslav crisis "in context". It will be up to the reader to evaluate

¹ For an assessment and critique of the literature on the definition "crisis": Robinson, 1968; Hermann, 1969; 1972; Snyder & Diesing, 1977; Lebow, 1981; George, 1984; 1991; Jervis, Lebow & Gross Stein, 1986; Bonanate & Santoro, 1986: 169-174, 243-315; Brecher, Wilkenfeld & Moser, 1988. Broadly-speaking, for "crisis" in political science is meant a *situation in which the decision-maker - either an individual, a group or a State - perceives: (1) a high probability of change in the surrounding environment, (2) a threat to its values and interests, and (3) an urgency to react. Given the above three perceptions, the actor reacts under stress conditions*. I would like to introduce a difference between the general term "crisis" and "international crisis" - which, in my opinion, lacks in the existing literature: *A local crisis or conflict assumes an international relevance only as far as it threatens other relevant international actors, and leads the international community to take specific steps in order to manage the situation*.

Therefore an inter-State or intra-State crises (between States or *within* the State) seldom becomes "international". It only happens when and if the international community *perceives* the situation as "threatening" (whatever the perceived type of "threat"). This definition applies particularly well to the Yugoslav case, where an intra-State crisis gave origin to an international one. In this particular case, a set of coexistent and partially over-lapping crises could be found: (i) *The crises between former Yugoslav Republics* (Slovenia-Serbia/Yugoslav Federation; Croatia-Serbia/Yugoslav Federation; Macedonia-Serbia; ...). They range from pre-war to intra-war crises; (ii) *The Yugoslav conflict/s as an international crisis/es* - as the term has been previously defined the term. The emergence of the Yugoslav conflict represented a "challenge to Europe", and to other particular international actors (some European States) with particular interests in the conflict (Germany, Greece, Italy), and (iii) *spillover crises*, that is, crises which arose as a consequence of the Yugoslav international crisis. An example of the latter is the *co-ordination crisis* which arise within the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in relation to the management of the Yugoslav international crisis, and which mainly regards the issue of recognition of former Yugoslav States as independent entities, and that of military intervention.

In the course of this chronology, therefore, the term "Yugoslav crisis" will be used with reference to the definition of "international crisis" here provided. For a wider analysis of the concept of international crisis here proposed see Lucarelli, 1993.

² A further disturbing feature of this work might be the use of acronyms. To facilitate the reader, a list of the used acronyms is attached at the end of the paper.

whether such reaction has always been "well in context" or it has responded belatedly or unappropriately.

This chronology remains largely descriptive, in spite of which it may be influenced by subjective elements. Facts are reported almost on a daily basis, and only occasionally are explanations proposed. This is intended to leave analytical data as neutral as possible. It will be up to researchers to do the difficult but overdue task of providing "theoretical lens" to make sense of this "anonymous list".

As a very basic effort to order the events regarding the international community's reaction to the Yugoslav war(s), four periods can be distinguished according to the arena of crisis management (exclusively European, mainly European, international) and/or the tools of the management (mediation, conciliation, use of coercive diplomacy).

1) Phase 1: June-September 1991: "The hour of Europe". The management of the Yugoslav crisis is almost entirely in the hands of the European Community (EC)³, which tries to broker a political settlement under the legitimation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)⁴. The most characteristic features of the international community's reaction at this time are the general consensus that the EC had to act, and the relative consensus that Yugoslavia should preserve its territorial integrity. Emblematic, in this respect, are the two principles stated by the first international peace conference: "*no solution would entail the change of boundaries unless by common agreement*" and "*none of the Republics will be recognised as independent and sovereign until an overall agreement, satisfactory to all parts, is reached*" (Carrington, 1992: 8). Traditional diplomacy is the main tool of the crisis management.

2) Phase 2: September 1991 - January 1992: "EC management with UN legitimation". The United Nations (UN) enters the scene, becoming the main source of legitimation for the EC mediation. On September 25, 1991 the UN adopts its first Resolution on the Yugoslav crisis, endorsing the EC call for an arms-embargo.

3) Phase 3: January 1992 - April 1993: "EC/EU-UN burden sharing". The recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as independent states breaks the principles of the first phase of the crisis management and delegitimises the authority of the commission for legal advice established within the peace conference. The UN

³ On November 1, 1993, the European Community officially becomes "European Union" (EU).

⁴ From January 1, 1995: "Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe" (OSCE).

assumes a more assertive role and an EC-UN co-sponsored conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina opens in Brussels in August 1991.

4) April 1993 - May 1994: "The uneven assertiveness of the West and Russia". A policy of empty words with isolated shows of strength characterises this phase of the crisis management even more than the previous ones. The unwillingness of the West to risk men and money in field operations to enforce the UN Resolutions, and the divergencies within the crisis management coalition between the EC, the US, and the new-assertive Russia, put any peace-making effort at danger. The resulting frequent "empty threats" seriously damage the credibility of the international institutions involved in the crisis management.

The rest of the paper accounts with more details for the international reaction to the Yugoslav crisis/es. The work will consist of five sections, one for each phase of the crisis management plus an introductory one on the events that precluded at the emergence of war in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).

1. Setting the Scene⁵

1.1. Post-Tito Yugoslavia: The (re-)emergence of nationalism (May 1980 - Winter 1990)

May 4, 1980 - Tito's death. New associations and groupings emerge. Nationalist movements emerge.

April, 1981 - Riots in Kosovo (an autonomous province within Serbia with an Albanian majority).

March, 1986 - *Memorandum* of the Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences, which becomes the manifesto of the Serb nationalist opposition.

December, 1987 - Internal putsch within the Serb communist party organisation: Milosevic takes the leadership.

1988 - Creation of the Committee for Protection of Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins, which becomes an instrument of the Milosevic's attempt to reshape the system.

⁵ For analysis of Yugoslav history see Banac, 1984; Castellán, 1991; Garde, 1992; Pavlowitch, 1988. For an analysis of the nationalities "break up" period 1980-1991: Cmornja, 1994; Garde, 1992; Magas, 1993; Piziali, 1991, and their bibliographies.

October 1988-February 1989 - The Governments of Vojvodina, Montenegro and Kosovo resign.

February, 1989 - The Serb Parliaments eliminates Vojvodina's and Kosovo's right to pass their own laws, and declares the Supreme Court of Serbia the highest court of appeal for Kosovians and Vojvodinans.

Autumn 1989 - The Slovenian constitution is amended and the Republic's unilateral right to secede introduced together with its exclusive right to impose a state of emergency or to authorise the presence/movement of military troops within the Republic's borders.

Autumn '89/Winter '90 - Tensions between Slovenia and Serbia over alternative political reforms of the SFRY grow. Economic, cultural and academic contacts between the two Republics atrophy.

1.2. Post-Communism and Neo-Nationalism: clear signals of crisis fall on deaf ears (Winter 1990 - June 1991)

January, 1990 - The Slovenian and Croat delegations abandon the Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). The League has finally come to an end.

A series of local elections bring non-communist forces to the Government of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Macedonia, communists are a minority in the Government coalition. In Serbia, Milosevic wins the elections and transforms the communist party into a socialist one.

March 1 - Emergency state declared in Kosovo.

July - Secret meeting of the Albanian deputies of Kosovo who proclaim their separation from Serbia.

October - The Slovenian parliament adopts a constitutional law partially or entirely annulling 30 federal laws.

December - Slovenia and Croatia agree to co-ordinate defence and security policies. Subsequently, Milosevic secretly meets the Croatian Leader Tudjman gaining the promise of a Croatian neutrality in an eventual Serbia-Slovenia conflict (Ramet, 1992: 86).

December 23 - Slovenia holds a referendum for the independence of the country: an overwhelming majority votes in favour.

Winter, 1991 - The leaders of the six Republics hold a series of meetings in order to find a compromise over the redefinition of the Yugoslav federation. Slovenia

and Croatia strongly in favour of a decisive decentralisation of power, threatening to dissociate from the Yugoslav federation unless an agreement is reached by June 26, 1991.

February-June - Krajina - the Croat region mainly inhabited by Serbs - declares its independence from Croatia. The region's authorities decide the secession of Krajina from Croatia in order to join Serbia (March 30). In May, an overwhelming majority of Krajina's inhabitants vote for independence from Zagreb. Violent incidents take place in the region.

May - The EC threaten to suspend the Second Financial Protocol and the negotiations over the EC-Yugoslavia association agreement unless fighting and revendications of independence are halted.

June 6 - Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina propose a plan to compromise both Serbia's federalist aspirations and the confederalist aspirations of the independentist Slovenia and Croatia. Ironically, on the very first day of armed conflict, the Yugoslav legislature judges the plan as "*a solid basis for the continuation of negotiations on Yugoslavia's future organisation*" (Ramet, 1992: 85).

June 15 - Slovenia and Croatia declare their decision to become independent and sovereign States.

June 20 - CSCE Council meeting in Berlin: the Foreign Ministers agree to support the democratic development and the territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia (*Guardian*, 28/6/1991).

June 21 - James Baker, during a visit in Belgrade, suggests that the two Republics should not take unilateral steps. On the same line, on June 23, the twelve EC Member States decide not to recognise any eventual unilateral declaration of independence from Slovenia and Croatia. **June 24** - The federal Parliament rejects the Slovenian declaration of "dissociation", and the federal Prime Minister Markovic proposes a joint declaration to safeguard the internal and external Yugoslav borders.

June 25 - Slovenia and Croatia declare their independence. The federal Parliament and Government reject it, and order the federal policy and the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) to control the federation's borders.

2. The International Reaction to the Yugoslav Wars: Crises in the Crisis⁶

2.1. "The hour of Europe". EC efforts to broker a political settlement under the CSCE legitimation (June - September 1991)

- *UN low profile: Pérez de Cuéllar's statement "Slovenia is not an independent UN member" is echoed by the US Ambassador to the UN assertion that "the UN has no role in Yugoslavia" unless the EC and CSCE efforts fail (Steinberg, forthcoming).*

- *The war in Slovenia (June 26- July 8, 1991). The Brioni Accord.*

- *The war erupts in Croatia*

- *First round of talks at EC-sponsored peace conference. Respect of the principles of no recognition of independence and break-up of Yugoslavia's territorial integrity.*

- *First debates on use of military tools (as the French proposal of sending a lightly-armed WEU peace-keeping force).*

June 26, 1991 - The JNA intervenes in Slovenia⁷. Belgrade authorities interdict Slovenian airspace. Contrary to the December 1990 agreement, Croatia does not support the Slovenian military defence.

- *Inter-ethnic fighting in Glina (Croatia). The JNA takes control of the area. Krajina's Serbs demand union with Serbia.*

June 26 - London, Washington, Paris, Bonn and various other Western Capitals deny the recognition of the two secessionist Republics.

June 27 - The federal Prime Minister Markovic proposes Slovenia and Croatia to suspend their declaration of independence for three months.

- *Austria notifies Belgrade its concern over the military activities in Yugoslavia and asks to clarify the situation to the Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna, as established by the agreements on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) and by the CSCE Charter (art.17).*

June 28 - Slovenia and the Federal Army sign a cease-fire agreement.

- *The European Council (EC heads of State and Government), meeting in Luxembourg, decides to send a "Troika" (Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium)⁸ bons*

⁶ There is a growing body of literature on this. This paper's bibliography contains a selection of the works already published on the Yugoslav crisis and its international management. Among them, Borden et al., 1992 ; Defarges, 1992; Garde, 1992 ; Gow & Smith, 1992; Heuven & Siccamo, 1992; Jørgensen, 1993; Ramet, 1992; Riva & Ventura, 1992; Zametica, 1992. The present chronology of events is primarily based on some of the above quoted works, on newspapers such as *Le Monde*, *The Guardian*, *The Independent*, *La Repubblica*, and others, together with official documents of the UN and the EC.

⁷ For an analysis of the JNA's role in the Yugoslav wars: Gow, 1992.

offices -mission to Yugoslavia, to support Austria's request to activate the CSCE emergency mechanism, and to freeze aid to Yugoslavia.

- Under the pressure of the European Troika, Slovenia and Croatia eventually accept to suspend their declaration of independence for three months, in order to re-establish peaceful negotiations. Slovenia demands that EC observers monitor the implementation of the agreement⁸.

June 29 - US's attitude is well expressed by a US official's statement: "*After all, it's not our problem, it's a European problem*" (*Financial Times*, 29-30/6/91).

June 30 - Thanks to the EC mediation, M. Stipe Mesic (Croat) becomes the new Federal President (for one year, according to the rotating rule).

July 1 - The national representatives within the Conflict Prevention Centre, decide that Yugoslavia, the chair of the Centre, has to leave its place to the next country in line, Albania (*The Times*, 1/7/1991). Germany chairs the specific subgroup in charge of the crisis mechanism.

July 2 - The Federal Army Chief General Adzic officially declares the state of war. Hostilities re-start in Slovenia.

July 3 - Prague, the 35 members of the CSCE agree over two diplomatic missions: a) A "good offices" mission to promote dialogue between the conflicting parties, in agreement with the Yugoslav authorities (condition under which Soviet Union accepted the CSCE involvement); and b) an EC "observatory mission" - enlargeable to other CSCE States - to monitor the cease-fire.

July 5 - The Twelve meet in The Hague and decide on a new Troika's mission in Yugoslavia, and an embargo on military goods, envisaging the suspension of EC

⁸ The Troika of the European Community/Union consists of the Foreign Minister of the country which holds the Presidency, the country that precedes and the one which follows the present holder of the Presidency (with a rotation system of six months each according to alphabetic order). The Italy-Luxembourg-Netherlands Troika changes on July 1st in the one Luxembourg-Netherlands-Portugal, as the Netherlands takes the Presidency. During the period here considered (June 1991-May 1994) it changed on January 1, 1992 (The Netherlands-Portugal-Great Britain), on July 1, 1992 (Portugal-Great Britain-Denmark), January 1, 1993 (Great Britain-Denmark-B), July 1, 1993 (Denmark-Belgium-Greece), January 1, 1994 (Belgium-Greece-Germany).

⁹ This initial success of the Community creates a sort of euphoria about the future of the EC's international role. Luxembourg's Foreign Minister, Jacques Poos (holding EC Presidency until July 1, 1991), enthusiastically affirms: "*this is the hour of Europe*" (*New York Times*, June 29, 1991), while for the Italian Foreign Minister, Gianni De Michelis, "*it is a good sign for the future of the political union*" (Steinberg, forthcoming).

aid to all Yugoslav Republics. The US joins EC in the arms embargo on July 8th.

July 7/8 - A third Troika mission meets representatives of the Serb, Slovenian and Croatian central Governments in the island of Brioni and, on the wave of the July 28 accord, sign a "Common Declaration on the Peaceful Resolution of the Yugoslav Crisis": Slovenia and Croatia accept to suspend their declaration of independence for three months, in order to re-establish peaceful negotiations on the future asset of the country. All parts refrain from unilateral acts. Annexed a call for 30/50 EC monitors to Slovenia and, possibly, to Croatia (*Le Monde*, 7/10/91).

July 10 - The EC Foreign Ministers deliberate the deployment of an EC observatory mission to monitor the implementation of the cease-fire in Slovenia¹⁰. The European Parliament passes a Resolution condemning the JNA use of force in Slovenia.

- The Federal Presidency adopts the Brioni accord.

July 18 - The JNA withdraws from Slovenia: Belgrade *de facto* recognises the independence of Slovenia. The attention shifts to Croatia, where no EC observers are deployed.

July 22 - Failed meeting of the Yugoslav leaders in Ohrid: Croatia does not accept any peace agreement until an unconditional withdrawal of the Federal Army from its territory is accomplished. Tension rises in Croatia.

July 29 - The EC Foreign Ministers, in a meeting attended also by representative of the Yugoslav federation, decide to extend the EC observatory mission to Croatia and to send a new Troika mission to Yugoslavia. They also suggest the creation of mixed patrols (Federal Army plus Croat Police) to implement a cease-fire in Croatia (*European Report*: 1698¹¹). Both Van den Broek and the British Foreign Secretary Hurd reject the French proposal of a WEU peace-keeping force (Steinberg, forthcoming). WEU Secretary General proposes to send a group of lightly armed WEU observers to control over the cease-fire (*The London Times*, July 29 and 30, 1991).

¹⁰ The observatory mission includes representatives from each of the EC nations and from the EC Commission. The German proposal of including representatives of other CSCE countries is rejected. Under strong pressure of Great Britain, the observers do not carry any form of weapon, and their mission is financed by national governments rather than by EC funds (*Agence France Presse*, 10/7/1991; *Le Figaro*, 11/7/1991). The mission mandate is initially limited to Slovenia, but the Brioni Declaration contemplates the possibility of extending it also to Croatia.

¹¹ From now on "ER: number of the issue".

August 3 - The Yugoslav Federal Presidency adopts a Resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire in Croatia and the deployment of inter-border mixed forces (Federal Police plus the police forces of Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia). Croatia rejects the Resolution.

August 4 - Serbia rejects the deliberation of the EC Member States adopted on July 29 (especially the extension of the EC observatory mission to Croatia).

August 6 - The EC Foreign Ministers meet in The Hague to discuss the French-German proposal of calling on the UN on the basis of art. 39 of the UN Charter. For this purpose, on August 7, France, Great Britain and Belgium send a common letter to the UN, but Russia and China oppose any intervention by the Security Council.

August 7 - The representant of the Member States of the Western European Union (WEU) discuss the French idea of sending a lightly armed peace-keeping force to Yugoslavia. under the aegis of the WEU. The plan is not implemented because of reservations by Great Britain, Spain, Greece and Germany (the latter favours the idea but constitutional constrains do not allow it to send troops).

August 8 - At the Prague meeting the CSCE decides - with Yugoslavia's agreement - to add Czech, Polish, Swedish and Canadian observers to the EC ones. The British/EC proposal for a peace conference is vetoed by Yugoslavia. The CSCE demands "*some form of negotiations*" to begin by August 15 (*Le Monde*, 19/8/1991).

August 9 - The EC demands more than twenty countries to stop arms exports to Yugoslavia.

- Milosevic tries to build up a "Yugoslav coalition" with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro.

August 15 - M.H. Wijnaendts (Belge Ambassador in Paris) is in Belgrade to encourage a negotiation between the fighting parties.

August 16-25 - The August 7 cease-fire is broken. War fighting in the whole Croatia. The Government of the Serb authonomists of Slavonia call for the mobilisation of all Serbs between 18 and 60 years old.

- Yugoslav Federal President Mesic accuses the JNA of entering Slavonia without authorisation. Bosnian and Macedonian leaders decide to refrain from sending their soldiers out of their Republic's borders. The JNA is now almost exclusively composed of Serbs and Montenegrins.

- Inter-ethnic conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosanska Krajina region, with a Serb majority, declares its autonomy; East Herzegovina, mainly inhabited by Serbs, creates a community of commons.

August 27 - EC Foreign Ministers decide (a) to organise a peace conference¹²; (b) to appoint a panel of five experts (two named by Yugoslavia and three by the EC) to arbitrate the dispute; and (c) to urge a cease-fire by September 1, threatening sanctions against Serbia if it does not agree on this last EC effort to re-establish peace¹³.

August 28 - President of Croatia, Tudjman, is received at the *Elisé*. On August 28, it is the turn of the President of Serbia, Milosevic.

August 30 - The Federal Government, as well as Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, accept the EC peace plan of August 27; only Serbia does not agree on it.

September 3 - The EC Foreign Ministers, meeting in the context of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) decide to convey a peace conference for Yugoslavia on September 7, in The Hague (ER 1701: I, 2).

September 5 - On the condition that dialogue is resumed between the parties, the EC Commission decides to grant 1 million ECU in emergency aid to the victims of the Yugoslav conflict. The aid will be delivered by the Red Cross and *Medicins sans Frontières* (ER 1701: I, 2).

September 7 - The Hague: opening session of the EC-sponsored peace conference on Yugoslavia, chaired by the former NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington. The EC Foreign Ministers, the Yugoslav Prime Minister and the Presidents of the six Republics are present. Although previously decided differently, the Conference opens while fighting in Croatia is still going on. In the opening statement the Community states the principle according to which "*no solution would entail the change of boundaries unless by common agreement*". The second principle on which the conference will work is that "*none of the Republics will be recognised as independent and sovereign until an overall agreement, satisfactory to all parts, is reached*" (Carrington, 1992: 8).

September 8 - Referendum in Macedonia : 90% of the 75% voting population support the independence. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Bulgaria promptly recognise the independence and sovereignty of the Republic. Nevertheless, Bulgaria repeats its long-standing claim that Macedonians actually are Western

¹² The Franco-German willingness to organise a peace conference as quickly as possible is not shared by all EC members: Great Britain and the Netherlands would prefer to delay it.

¹³ Both Germany and Italy threaten to recognise Slovenia and Croatia if this condition is not matched (*Financial Times*, 4/9/1991).

Bulgarians¹⁴. Immediate reaction by Athens which claims that the Bulgarian recognition of Macedonia "*endangers the security and stability in the Balkans*" (A. Samaras, Greek Foreign Minister, quoted in Ramet, 1992: 88).

- The EC observers team grows in size (soon about 300/350 officials will be deployed on the Croat territory). Wijnaendts is convinced this would help to gradually restore peace (ER 1702: I, 3).

September 10 - The conflict joints Dalmatia. Fighting in Fiume, very close to the Italian border.

September 11-12 - EP's Resolution 209 states that "*a legitimate representation of democratically elected parliaments of Kosovo and Vojvodine should be able to take part [to the peace conference]*". On the same line, the Dutch junior Foreign Minister Dankert, talking on September 10 in Strasbourg, warns: "*we must be sure that the different groups [...] are able to express their views*" (ER 1703: I, 2).

September 17 - A new cease-fire is signed.

- The idea of sending a WEU lightly armed peace-keeping force to control the cease-fire (working as a sort of buffer between the belligerent sides) is renewed by the Netherlands. The proposal entails a series of problems, such as the justification of an EC intervention, the different membership of EC and WEU, the requested UN legitimation for an operation of this type (ER 1704: I, 2). But, most of all, it entails the Europeans' willingness to create a real common foreign and security policy¹⁵.

September 19 - The French-German-Dutch plan of sending a light armed force in Yugoslavia is unable to overcome the unyielding stance of the British Foreign

¹⁴ That is, Bulgaria recognises the Macedonian *State* - but not the Macedonian *nation*.. Moreover, Sofia affirms that diplomatic relations with Skopje would be established only if it recognised that no Macedonian minorities exists in Bulgaria - which is not really true for the population of the Pirin region.

¹⁵ I personally believe that the debate that at the time was taking place within the EC about the future communitarian agreement on foreign and security policy has had a significant impact on the attitude EC Member States assumed in the management of the Yugoslav crisis. Particularly in the first two phases of the crisis management, when the two intergovernmental conferences on the Treaty on the Union were still going, most important decisions towards the Yugoslav crisis were deeply influenced by the EC internal debate. As will be noted in the proceeding of the chronology, not only the debate over the type of military instrument (WEU vs. NATO) was influence by the internal debate, but also the eventual recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. The two were unilaterally recognised by Germany only after the signature of the Maastricht agreement, and the other eleven immediately followed Germany despite the partially contrary advice of the Badinter Committee.

Secretary, Douglas Hurd, who considers it "premature" (ER 1705): the EC Foreign Ministers' declaration merely assigns to WEU the task of studying the possibilities of strengthening the EC observatory mission (ER 1705).

September 19-26 - The works of the peace conference are suspended due to the ineffectiveness of the first round of talks. At the re-start of works, on September 26, three working groups and an Arbitration Committee are formed. Of the working groups, one, chaired by the German diplomatic Ahrens, is concerned with minority rights; the second, chaired by the British Ambassador Crowe, examines institutional questions; the third, chaired by the EC Commission functioner Durieux, studies the future economic relations between the Yugoslav Republics. The Arbitration Committee is chaired by the French Judge R. Badinter. Among its members are the heads of the Belgian, German, Italian and Spanish constitutional courts.

2.2. EC turns to the UN. EC management with UN legitimation (September 1991 - January 1992)

- *EC efforts at a political solution. The EC-sponsored peace conference.*

- *UN peace-keeping efforts: the arms embargo on Yugoslavia (Resolution 713, 25/9/91); UN mission of military observers (Resolution 727, 6/1/91); UNPROFOR (Resolution 743, 23/2/92; and Resolution 749, 7/4/92)*

- *A turning point in EC crisis management: the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia (December 1991 - January 15, 1992). The recognition of Yugoslavia's break-up.*

September 17 and ss. - Austria, actually sitting in the UN Security Council as a temporary member, formally calls on it to organise a peace-keeping force (*Guardian*, 19/9/1991). France, chairing the UN Security Council in September, proposes the creation of a UN emergency force under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter - on the model of the precedent Resolution 688 of the Gulf Crisis - and to impose an arms embargo (*Le Monde*, 24/9/91). Britain opposes such a suggestion. Germany sympathises with the idea of a UN organisation of peace-keeping forces, as the UN is the only international organisation which can intervene militarily without the consent of all affected parts - which is not true for the WEU.

September 25 - Endorsing EC's calls, the UN Security Council passes Resolution 713 which imposes an arms embargo on Yugoslavia, supports the EC's peace-building efforts and invites the UN Secretary General to consult the

Yugoslav Government and report back to the Security Council¹⁶: the UN direct involvement in the crisis management begins.

September 30 - Brussels, WEU Ministers discuss the Dutch-proposed alternative plans of action: a) increasing the EC observatory mission (from 2.000 to 3.000), b) sending out body guards (4.000/6.000 men), c) providing peace troops to protect the observatory mission (4.500/5.000 soldiers together with 3.000/5.000 persons for logistical support), d) sending a peace-keeping force (30.000 soldiers). The Council eventually decides to leave the decision to the EC mediator, Lord Carrington (ER 1708).

October 1-3 - *Ultimatum* of JNA to Croatia, accused of having violated the September 22 cease-fire. The Croat President Tudjman, in a letter to Bush, calls for an immediate military mission to avoid a catastrophe. Serious JNA offensive in the region of Dubrovnik. By October 3 the city is besieged. Within three days the Serb forces are at 30 Km. from Zagabria and, on the following day, they bomb Tudjman's palace.

- The Federal Presidency, comprising Serbia and Montenegro (as Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia are absent), recognising the high risk of war in Yugoslavia, decides to use *all constitutional powers in its hands* to re-establish peace according to artt. 316 and 317 of the 1972 Yugoslav constitution (*Le Monde*, 4/10/1992). Due to the constitutional collegiality of the body, this sounds very much as a Serb usurpation of powers. The JNA supports the decision.

October 6 - The EC Foreign Ministers, coming together in an informal meeting in Haarzuilen (NL), condemn the usurpation of powers by some of the members of the Federal Presidency, and require the end of hostilities by October 7 (the expiration-day of the Slovenia's and Croatia's suspension of their declaration of independence), threatening economic sanctions, such as the suspension of the economic cooperation treaty, and the cancellation of Yugoslavia from the "preferred nations" list. Adopting a sort of "stick and carrot" approach, the EC Member States also point out that "*a political solution should be sought in the perspective of recognition of the independence of those Republics wishing it once peace negotiations are completed*" (ER 1710: I, 2).

¹⁶ China does not veto the Resolution only because the Yugoslav Government accepts it itself. Great Britain agrees on it only after France has retreated its call for an emergency force (*Le Monde*, 27/9/91).

The EC Commission's Eurobarometer for September reveals that 68% of Europeans interviewed - but only 39% of Greeks - were in favour to the Yugoslav Republics' self-determination (ER 1709).

October 7 - A brief truce - the eighth since the beginning of the fighting - allows for further peace-keeping efforts. On October 10, in The Hague, the fighting parties reconfirm the signed cease-fire and the withdrawal of the JNA from Croatia within four weeks (ER 1711).

October 8 - The UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar, applying Resolution 713, appoints former US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, as his personal envoy to Yugoslavia. Back in the US, Vance will affirm that Yugoslavia is a threat to international peace; therefore demanding further UN action (*Guardian*, 29/10/91).

October 9 - Yugoslavia's President Mesic, meeting the members of the European Parliament, points at the Serbian leader Milosevic as the aggressor, interested in the creation of a Greater Serbia (ER 1715: supplement).

October 10 - The European Parliament refuses to support Slovenia's and Croatia's declarations of independence.

- The CSCE invites Serbia and Croatia to respect the cease-fire, and recognises the Yugoslav Republics' right of independence within the framework of negotiations involving all parts.

October 14 - EC humanitarian aid convoy leaves to Vukovar (Croatia). It will not be able to enter the city despite a previous specific agreement¹⁷.

- At the peace conference, Serbia is becoming increasingly hostile to EC mediation which, in Federal Prime Minister's words, is becoming "*too aggressive and partial*" (ER 1712: I, 3).

October 15 - The Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina declares its State's independence and sovereignty. Three of the four Serbs enclaves in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosanska, Krajina, Herzegovina) immediately decide to isolate the rest of the country and apply the federal legislation. The fourth Serb enclave, Romanja, declares it will begin a process of disassociation from the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

¹⁷ The aspect of humanitarian aid to former Yugoslavia will not be analysed in detail in this chronology, for a detailed report of this aspect of the crisis see the ICRC Bulletins and the UNHCR Reports. Another aspect which will not be attentively analysed is the violation of the international humanitarian law in the Yugoslav conflict. About this aspect: Helsinki Watch Report, 1992; Jakovljevic, 1992; Sahovic, 1992; Kandic, 1992, Vasiljevic, 1992; Obradovic, 1992.

October 18 - At the extraordinary plenary session of the peace conference - all Yugoslav parties present, Van den Broek (Chairing EC Council's Presidency) and Lord Carrington propose a comprehensive plan of the future institutional asset of Yugoslavia. It calls for a "*free association of sovereign and independent Republics*", which allows for the recognition of independence to all requesting Republics, "within the existing boundaries"¹⁸.

- The plan is accepted by all Republics' Presidents except the Serbian Milosevic, who asserts that it would abolish Yugoslavia itself, deny autonomy for Croatian-Serbs, while restoring the autonomous status to Kosovo and Vojvodina (*Guardian*, 29/10/91).

- In a joint *communiqué* presented at the peace conference, the US and the USSR declare their "*support to the European community and its Member States in applying the CSCE mandate to mediate for a peaceful solution of the Yugoslav crisis*". The EC, the US and the USSR, continues the declaration, also support the efforts of the UN Secretary General.

October 22 - The Albanian Parliament recognises the independent Republic of Kosovo.

- Serbia, within a Federal Presidency meeting, proposes the constitution of a "mini-Yugoslavia", enclosing the so-willing Republics as well as the Serb autonomous regions of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (ER 1715). Subsequently, on October 24, Bosnian-Serbs create their own Assembly and request a referendum to test Bosnian-Serbs' willingness to remain in Yugoslavia.

October 26-28 - The EC Member States issue a declaration condemning Serbian repeated attacks on Croat cities. At their October 28 EPC meeting, the representatives of the Twelve announce immediate trade sanctions, and call for a UN-imposed oil embargo (for which the EC has no competence on its own) "*against any Republic which will not accept the plan by November 5*" (*Guardian*, 29/10/91). This represents an *ultimatum* to Serbia, the only Republic which has not yet accepted that plan and which is trying to short-circuit the

¹⁸ The Association and each independent Republic should guarantee the protection of human rights as well as ethnic and national groups. The document also suggests the creation of a common internal market and monetary system, on the model of the EC. Cooperation on foreign and security policy is regarded as desirable. The central institutions envisaged include a Council of Ministers, a Court of Justice and a Parliament, and are modelled to some extent on EC institutions.

European peace efforts¹⁹. For several weeks the EC Commission has been actually working on a legal text for the EC sanctions (ER 1715: I, 4).

October 31 - For the first time a humanitarian convoy, directed to Dubrovnik, reaches its destination.

- A new peace plan, with some concessions to Serbia, is submitted to the six Republics' representatives: It does not include the re-establishment of Kosovo's and Vojvodina's autonomy.

November 1 - In order to escape the EC's economic sanctions, Serbia accepts the EC proposal. However, the next day the JNA launches the decisive offensive in Vukovar and street manifestations take place in Belgrade against the EC - accused of favouring Croatia. Consequently, on November 5, in The Hague, Serbia rejects the new EC plan. It demands an "international tutorship" over the Croatian territory inhabited by Serbs, and the reconstitution of this people's right to remain in Yugoslavia²⁰.

November 5 - The Council of Europe demands sanctions against Serbia for boycotting the EC peace efforts. Croatian violations of the cease-fire are denounced.

November 8 - In conjunction with the NATO summit in Rome, the EC heads of State and Government confirm that any recognition of new independent and sovereign States is envisaged only within the framework of a general negotiation agreement. Furthermore, they decide (i) to impose economic sanctions against Yugoslavia²¹; (ii) to take unspecified compensatory measures for the Republics which will accept the EC peace plan; and (iii) to request a UN-imposed oil embargo. All EC measures are endorsed by the NATO summit (*Guardian*, 29/10/91).

¹⁹ "If one party refuses to accept the peace plan, the EC may implement the retaliatory measures decided on October 6", says EC's Council President Van der Broek (ER 1715: I, 4).

²⁰ The situation on the battle-field and the fighting parties' positions at the negotiations table are obviously always interlinked. However, in the case of the Yugoslav crisis, the relationship has been particularly evident. Very frequently the negotiations have caused further conflicts on the field, as it was in the disputants' wish to conquer the most before any agreement was signed in order to have the field-gains recognised on paper.

²¹ These include the suspension of the trade and cooperation agreement, limits to the Yugoslav textiles exports, and the cancellation of Yugoslavia from the list of "preferred nations".

November 12 - Both Croatia and the Serb-dominated Federal Presidency urge the deployment UN peace-keeping forces²². The Twelve, at their Noordwijk meeting, call the UN Security Council attention on the request.

November 14 - Lord Carrington, as well as Vance and Goulding, UN Under Secretary General for peace-keeping, are in Belgrade to achieve an agreement on a cease-fire and the subsequent deployment of peace-keeping forces either under the UN or EC/WEU auspices.

November 18-22 - At the WEU meeting (November 18), Great Britain, France and Italy show their willingness to deploy naval vessels providing support for humanitarian aid (*Guardian*, 19/11/91).

- M. Kouchner, the French Secretary of State in charge of humanitarian aid management, negotiates the creation of a humanitarian corridor to Vukovar which, besieged for three months, falls on November 19. After the Vukovar's fall, Croatia denounces the EC's observers' weakness and decides to recall its representative at the Federal Presidency, Mesic. At his resignation (retroactively valid from October 8), he affirms that "*Yugoslavia does not exist any more*" (Riva & Ventura, 1992: 11).

November 23 - The 14th cease-fire agreement is signed in Geneva under the UN auspices and in the presence of Lord Carrington: it is the first cease-fire with a direct UN involvement. It provides for the immediate cease-fire, the withdrawal of the JNA's forces from Croatia, and the dispatch of a UN peace-keeping force. Renewed demands for "Blue Helmets" came from both signing parts.

November 27 - Overcoming the strong resistance of non-aligned countries, the UN Security Council adopts Resolution 721 urging the deployment of a UN peace-keeping force conditioned on the respect of the last cease-fire agreement (*Guardian*, 28/11/91).

December 2 - The EC abolishes its economic sanctions against all Yugoslav Republics except Serbia and Montenegro (WEU doc. 1337). Meanwhile the US announces economic sanctions against the six Yugoslav Republics.

- The UNHCR (United Nation High Committee for Refugees) estimates that some 550.000 people are homeless.

December 4-6 - The Croat Parliament passes a law concerning the autonomy of the Serb enclaves in Croatia. Meanwhile violent fighting continues in West Slavonia.

²² Croatia would want it on the Republics' borders, while the Presidency demands it stationed between the fighting forces - which, viewed from the forces' position at the time, would imply immediate Serb territorial gains (Steinberg, *forthcoming*).

December 7 - Germany, supported by Italy and Denmark, confirms its intention to recognise Slovenia and Croatia by Christmas unless an agreement is reached by December 10 - the deadline previously imposed by the EC²³. Germany also decides on a humanitarian aid of 7-17 million Deutschmarks to the two Republics.

- Pérez de Cuéllar and Lord Carrington, supported by the US and Great Britain, strongly oppose the German proposal to recognise Slovenia and Croatia, claiming that it would exacerbate the conflict²⁴. Several EC leaders (including the French Foreign Minister Dumas) warn that a German unilateral action would be contrary to the recently-reached Maastricht agreement on a future European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

- The first advice of the Badinter Committee affirms that: "*the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is engaged in a process of dissolution*" (author's translation from French).

December 12 - The Federal Presidency poses all volunteers units under the control of the Federal Army and lengthen the military service.

December 13 - The UN Security Council Resolution 724 establishes the deployment of a small group of military personnel in order to prepare an possible peace-keeping operation.

December 16 - The EC Foreign Ministers adopt two texts regarding the EC "recognition policy" (a general one, and one specifically on Yugoslavia), and affirm that by January 15 they will examine any demand of recognition arrived at before December 23. The *sine qua non* condition is that candidate-States respect individual and minority rights, the rule of law, democratic processes, the existing borders (unless peacefully negotiated), the international engagements of the original State - on disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, regional security and

²³ Note that the date does not seem to be chosen randomly. It comes just after the conclusion of the IGCs: The Twelve, and Germany in particular, seem worried about jeopardising the Maastricht process through divergent points of view over the recognition question.

²⁴ As a matter of fact, the initial aim of the West to keep Yugoslavia united has already been abandoned from quite a while. The disappearance of Yugoslavia as a unitary State was already clear to EC leaders by September 1991, as testified by the Mitterrand's statement: "*Yugoslavia no longer exists in its original form [], a partition has been achieved from the expressed desire of two Republics*" (Wood, *forthcoming*). However France, as well as most of other EC members, continues to oppose the recognition of the two secessionist Republics arguing it would worsen the conflict. The question of recognition, therefore, becomes a great test of the Franco-German partnership (which seemed at work during the IGCs negotiations).

stability. It is to the Arbitration Committee to judge whether the candidates have the possibility and real intention to conform to those criteria.

Within the document, Greece obtains the insertion of a paragraph which invites Macedonia - without explicitly refer to this Republic - to constitutionally and politically guarantee the absence of any territorial revendications on Greece, and to abstain from any hostile form of propaganda against that State, "*including the use of a name which would imply territorial revendications*".

Serbia promptly protests against the EC deliberation, which is seen as a violation of the UN Charter (*The Times*, 18/12/91).

December 17 - Although Germany agreed on the EC recognition-policy texts, it begins to implement an informal recognition of the two secessionist Republics immediately after the EC meeting (*Washington Post*, 20/12/1991). Furthermore, on December 17 Germany's Foreign Minister Genscher announces his country's intention to recognise Slovenia and Croatia (officially from January 15) regardless of the Badinter Committee's report. For his part, Lord Carrington suggests a more prudent attitude towards Croatia.

December 19-20 - The Serb enclave of Kninska-Krajina in Croatia declares its independence and sovereignty.

- Bosnia-Herzegovina demands the EC recognition in spite of the Bosnian-Serbs' contrary advice.

December 21 - First bombing in Istria. Two Migs bomb the small Orsera's airport.

December 23 - Germany officially recognises Slovenia and Croatia.

- Bosnia-Herzegovina officially demands the deployment of UN Blue Helmets on its territory.

December 25 - The first Christmas of war. Osijek, third city of Croatia, is besieged and under bombing.

January 1, 1992 - Vance reaches agreement with Serbs and Croats over the deployment of Blue Helmets in Eastern and Western Slavonia and in Krajina, and over the JNA's withdrawal from Croatia. A new cease fire is signed in Croatia on January 2 (the 14th). Meanwhile, pan-Serb leaders are at work in Belgrade to discuss the shape of "the new Yugoslavia".

January 6 - The UN Secretary General, Boutros Ghali, announces the immediate departure of some fifty UN military observers (*Financial Times*, 15/1/92). Within two days, the UN Security Council Resolution 727 officially set up the mission. This UN peace-keeping operation arrives in Yugoslavia on January 14 and includes, for the first time, Russian/Soviet forces.

- An EC helicopter with five observers (four Italians and a French) is shot down by the Federal Army. The EC's observatory mission is suspended for some days.

January 9-10 - Bosnia-Herzegovina's Serbs proclaim their Republic. New epuration within the JNA: Slovenians and Croats blow out.

- The EC abolishes the economic sanctions also against Montenegro leaving only those against Serbia. The arms embargo remains on all Republics.

January 14 - The Badinter Commission reports its first conclusions on the request for recognition: Yes for: Slovenia and Macedonia; Reserve for Croatia (which must review the special status of the Serb minority), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (which must hold an internationally-monitored referendum on independence as a precondition to EC recognition).

January 15 - Notwithstanding the Badinter Report, EC Foreign Ministers unanimously agree to recognise both Slovenia and Croatia, while delaying any decision towards Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia²⁵. The EC action is immediately followed by New Zealand, Australia, Poland, Swaziland, Austria, Malta, Hungary, Canada. Bulgaria recognises all four Republics. Ukraine, the Baltic States, the Vatican, and Ireland had already recognised Slovenia and Croatia before January 15.

2.3. "EC/EU-UN burden sharing" (January 1992- April 1993)

- *The war breaks out in Bosnia-Herzegovina. An ad hoc peace conference opens in Brussels. Recognition of the Republic as an independent State.*

- *UN economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro - recognised as bearing the main responsibilities for the actual war (Resolution 757, 30/5/92). The policy of empty threats.*

- *New issues on the international agenda: human rights, humanitarian relief, refugees management, and the dramatic evidence of on-going "ethnic cleansing" (UN Security Council Resolution 752, 15/5/92). Fighting between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.*

- *EC internal division: the debate over military intervention and the question of Macedonia. WEU-NATO monitoring mission on the Danube (10/7/92), and on the Adriatic (18/11/92).*

- *The EC/UN co-sponsored peace conference (opening on 26-28/8/92). The Vance-Owen peace-plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina (October 27, 1992): partition*

²⁵ The recognition of Croatia despite the Badinter panel's suggestions is justified by Croatia's last minute guarantees to respect individual and minority rights. France and Great Britain announce they will delay any exchange-ambassadors until Croatia undertakes concrete measures in this direction (*Washington Post*, 16/1/92).

The recognition of Macedonia is obviously delayed in the light of strong opposition from Greece, which considers the use of the name "Macedonia" as an implicit territorial revendication of the Greek territory which goes under the same name.

of the Republic according to ethnic lines. The May 22, 1993 - deal over Bosnia-Herzegovina's division.

- No-fly-zone on Bosnia-Herzegovina: decision of October '92 (UN Security Council Resolution 781), NATO implementation by April '93.

- The US and Russia enter the scene (December 1992; Spring 1993).

January 25 - The Bosnian Parliament announces a popular referendum on independence for March 1. The EC launches an effort to reach a political accord between the three ethnic groups - Muslims, 43,7%; Serbs, 31,3%; Croats, 17,3% (*L'état du monde 1993* : 173).

January 30 - Gouling delays the deployment of the Blue Helmets as the leader of the Krajina-Serbs, Babić, continues to reject the UN plan.

January 31 - Slovenia and Croatia demand their admission to the CSCE as observers.

February 3 - The Federal Presidency ratifies the UN plan and launches a campaign against Krajina leaders. On February 17 Babić declares himself ready to accept the UN plan provided that Krajina becomes part of the political management of the crisis.

- The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe gives Slovenia the status of "special guest".

February 12 - After having received new assurances of Croats cooperation with UN's efforts - cooperation which seemed endangered by the recognition of Croatia, Vance suggests to the UN Secretary General the deployment of some 12.000/13.000 UN peace-keepers (*New York Times*, 13/2/92).

February 21 - The UN Security Council unanimously passes Resolution 743, establishing, for one year, the deployment of the second biggest UN peace-keeping force ever authorised: the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR)²⁶.

February 21-22 - Lisbon, in an EC-organised meeting, the representatives of the Serb, Muslim and Croat communities of Bosnia-Herzegovina reach a

²⁶ India does not allow the adoption of Resolution 743 under Chapter VII, affirming that it would be an unacceptable intrusion in a county's internal affairs (Steinberg, *forthcoming*).

At this stage UNPROFOR counts a force of some 11.000 military personnel and 3.000 civilians. Its task is to supervise the cease-fire, the withdrawal of JNA, the demobilisation of paramilitary forces in four "UN protected areas" (UNPAs), and to facilitate the refugees' return home. It has to assure protection to the Serb enclaves in Croatia. The deployment of UNPROFOR - composed by forces from some 30 countries under the command of the Indian General S. Nambiar - will start in March, but its actual full deployment will receive the UN Security Council's authorisation (Resolution 749) only on April 7 and will be accomplished between May 15 -Sector East - and June 20 - sector West (Steinberg, *forthcoming*).

compromise-agreement over the indivisibility and inviolability of external borders.

March 1 - Bosnia-Herzegovina: referendum on independence. Around 63% of the electors go to vote, some 90% of voters approve the country's independence (WEU doc. 1337). Serbs boycott the referendum. The leader of Bosnia's Serbs, Radovan Karadzic, announces his people will oppose Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence by any mean. The first barricades appear in Sarajevo (WEU doc. 1337). Various cities with an Albanian majority in the South Serbia hold a poll on the political and cultural autonomy. Soon pacifists demonstrations take place in Belgrade.

March 9 - Brussels: Lord Carrington convenes a separate peace conference for the negotiations on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina and proposes an institutional project of reform: A bicameral system with a Chamber of Citizens and Chamber with equal representation to the three constituent ethnic communities.

March 12 - The European Parliament calls for the EC recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

March 13 - The UN Headquarters settle in Sarajevo (WEU doc. 1337).

March 15 - 410 UNPROFOR's men commanded by General Nambiar arrive in Croatia.

March 18 - An accord of principles is achieved between the leaders of the three Bosnian communities on the reorganisation of the country in a State with three ethnically-based communities sharing their power with a central authority (WEU doc. 1337).

March 20 - Montenegrin electors vote to remain in a Yugoslav Federal State with other Republics who wish to do the same.

March 23-25 - Violent fighting in Bosnia both between Serbs and Muslims, and Serbs and Croats. The Bosnian Presidency demands the withdrawal of the Federal Army and the Serb paramilitary forces, and calls for an immediate cease-fire. Slovenia urges the CSCE to recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia (WEU doc. 1337).

March 29 - Bosnia, in the presence of the EC observers and the Federal Presidency representatives, a cease-fire agreement between the various militia is signed. From here on an astonishing number of unrespected cease-fire will be signed.

March 30 - Official opening of the conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina in Brussels.

April 1 - Brussels, the Presidents of all Republics sign a four points agreement to restore trade, transport and communications links (WEU doc. 1337).

April 6 - The EC Foreign Ministers decide to recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina, although they agree to wait one more day in order to simultaneously recognise the Republic with the US (*Financial Times*, 7/4/92). The UN recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia and Croatia on April 7.

- The Serb deputies of Bosnia proclaim the independence of the "Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina" (SRBH). Within two days they will leave the Bosnian Parliament. On April 17 they will demand to the EC the recognition of their self-proclaimed State and to the CSCE to accept it a new member.

April 7 - The UN Security Council Resolution 749 authorises the UNPROFOR full deployment and calls the fighting parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina to cooperate with the EC on-going mediating efforts. On April 10, the UN Security Council requests the Secretary General to send Vance to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

April 12 - New cease-fire in Sarajevo.

April 15 - The US condemn the behaviour of the Serb forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The EC set Serbia a deadline of April 29 by which it must stop its military support to the Bosnian-Serb nationalists. The CSCE schedules a meeting for the same day to discuss suspending Yugoslavia's (Serbia's) membership (Steinberg, *forthcoming*). Western countries threaten to abolish Yugoslavia's IMF membership.

April 17 - Fighting becomes increasingly more violent in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

April 24 - The UN Security Council calls for an immediate cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

April 27 - The Parliament of the ex-Yugoslavia announces the constitution of a new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), territorially including the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro.

May 2 - The Serb-Federal Army sequesters the President of the Bosnia-Herzegovina's Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic, for twenty-four hours.

- Guimaraes: The EC Foreign Ministers agree on a Dumas-proposal for a new plan of action: humanitarian aid through an aerial bridge to Sarajevo (from Germany, Austria and Italy); deployment of a UN observatory mission and new UN troops to protect particular places such as hospitals; an EC stronger diplomatic action. They also urge the JNA to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina, and declare their desire to recognise an independent and sovereign State within the frontiers of the old Republic of Macedonia, hoping the latter and Greece will soon be able to reach a compromise.

May 8 - New epurations within the JNA. The federal Army is now completely in pan-Serb hands.

May 11 - The Twelve decide to reinforce their diplomatic sanctions against Serbia: the ambassadors of the EC Member States in Belgrade are recalled home, and the Yugoslav delegation is excluded from the CSCE works (and internationally isolated) at least until June 29. The CSCE will confirm such a decision on May 12. The EC Foreign Ministers also call for the JNA to withdraw from Bosnia, for the airport of Sarajevo to be re-opened, and for a Serb-Croat agreement over Krajina. Meanwhile, following the killing of an EC observer in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EC suspends its observatory mission.

- The US adopt the same line recalling its ambassadors from Belgrade, forbidding any Yugoslav plane landing on US territory, prospecting its refusal to recognise the New Yugoslavia as a successor of the former one, ordering a closure of two of the three Yugoslav Consulates in the US, and announcing the interruption of all military contracts with the JNA. Canada follows on May 24.

May 12 - Responding to the demands of Bosnia-Herzegovina, France, Germany and Poland to extend UNPROFOR also to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UN Secretary General argues that on-going fighting prevents any UN peace-keepers deployment, and that, conversely, it might be more appropriate to deploy an EC peace-keeping force in the region. In his report to the UN Security Council, Boutros Ghali places the main responsibility for the fighting on the JNA and Serb paramilitary forces.

May 14 - One of the worst days for Sarajevo. Nambiar is kidnapped by Serb forces for 24 hours. The EC, the Red Cross and, within a few days, the UN leave Sarajevo. Exodus of women, children and old people from the city²⁷. The Organisation of the Islamic Conference sends a letter to Boutros Ghali urging a response to Serb aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

May 15 - The UN Security Council Resolution 752 requests the immediate interruption of all external interferences in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the withdrawal of the JNA and the Croatian Army from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the disbanding of paramilitary forces. It also leaves open the possibility to send a UN peace-

²⁷ A convoy of some 7.000 people is hold-up by Serbs in the quarter of Ilidza, it will be free only after two days-negotiations. The UNHCR estimates there are already 1.5 million refugees within former Yugoslavia (Riva & Ventura, 1992).

keeping force to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, for the first time the Resolution urges an immediate end to the on-going "ethnic cleansing"²⁸.

May 19 - Croats and Muslims sign an agreement on the formation of a confederation including Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

May 22 - Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are admitted to the UN General Assembly (WEU doc. 1337).

- General Mladic replaces R. Karadzic as a commander of the Serbian forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina (*East European Report*, July-August, 1992²⁹).

May 23 - The Ministry of internal affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina files criminal charges against Karadzic and other Serb politicians for having permitted genocide against the nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (*EER*, July-August, 1992).

May 24 - Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Kosovo. Belgrade declares they are anti-constitutional.

May 27-29 - Unprecedented violent fighting in Sarajevo. Bombs fall on a children's hospital.

May 30 - The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 757, imposing on the FRY serious economic sanctions (embargo on all import/exports other than medical goods and foodstuffs), an embargo over landing and over flight rights, and their exclusion from sport and cultural events as well as from scientific and technical cooperation. Serbia and Montenegro are recognised as bearing the main responsibilities for the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Russia, at first opposed to the application of trade sanctions against Serbia, eventually agrees on them.

May 31 - Demonstrations against the Milosevic's regime take place in Belgrade³⁰.

²⁸ The concept was already formalised by 1986 in the previously quoted Belgrade Academy's *Memorandum*. One of its drafter was the eventual FRY's President Cosic. Although the text did not explicitly talk of "ethnic cleansing", it has been considered the inspirational document of such a practice in the Yugoslav wars, especially in the Bosnian conflict.

In the Chapter "Ethnic cleansing" of *War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, (1992: 63) the Helsinki Watch reports that "after Serbian forces have occupied territory in Bosnia Hercegovina, brutal measures have been taken to 'ethnically clean' the area of non-Serbs [], thereby creating an ethnically homogenous area. The 'cleansing' of such areas usually involves the execution, detention, confinement to ghetto areas, and the forcible displacement and/or deportation of non-Serbs, most frequently Muslims, and, to a lesser extent, Croats. Hundreds of thousands of civilians have been victims of the 'ethnic cleansing' practice". As the conflict went on, however, the practice has not remained confined to the Muslim 'genocide' committed by Serbs". Concentration camps and ethnic cleansing activities have been now denounced by all sides (Sahovic, 1992; Kandic, 1992, Vasilijevic; 1992).

²⁹ From now on "EER, months of the issue, year".

³⁰ However, at the administrative elections in the new FRY, Milosevic has 60% of votes while the ultra-nationalist Seselj 40%. The writer Dobrica Cosic will be the first President of the

June 4 - Meeting of the WEU Permanent Council to discuss the situation in former Yugoslavia (WEU doc. 1337). The President of the Bosnian Presidency, Aljia Izetbegovic, asks WEU for military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EER, July-August, 1992).

June 5-12 - Attempting to assure humanitarian aid to Sarajevo, the UN obtains the agreement of the Serb forces to place Sarajevo's airport under the UNPROFOR's control (EER, July-August, 1992). Consequently, the UN Security Council (Resolution 758, June 8), decides the deployment of a further 1.100 more Blue Helmets to supervise the withdrawal of heavy military equipment from the area surrounding the airport and to take control of it. Resolution 761 (June 29) reinforces the UN presence in the area.

- The Bosnian-Serb leader, Karadzic, announces a unilateral cease-fire (EER, July-August, 1992).

June 15 - Bosnia-Herzegovina's Foreign Minister officially demands military intervention from the international community. Izetbegovic reiterates the same demand at the UN on June 22.

June 17 - The Bosnian and Croat authorities sign a military alliance (EER, July-August, 1992).

June 19 - The WEU Council of Ministers stresses the urgency of delivering humanitarian aid, especially to Bosnia's inhabitants, and of placing Sarajevo and its surroundings under a security zone. The WEU expresses its support to the UN Resolution 758, and declares itself ready to contribute to the implementation of the UN Resolutions. For this purpose, it creates an *ad hoc* group to study the specific aspects of the question (WEU doc. 1337).

June 23 - Serb authorities prevent the opening session of the newly-elected Parliament of the "Republic of Kosovo". The newly-elected President, Rugova, chooses the strategy of the pacific opposition, refusing to embrace a logic of war.

June 25 - Carrington meets the Serb, Croat and Bosnian authorities in Strasbourg (EER, July-August, 1992).

June 26 - Lisbon meeting of the European Council: The EC heads of State and Government explore the possibility of using military tools to support humanitarian aid. They re-state their position on Macedonia (favourable of recognition but under another name) and Kosovo (calling for dialogue and for the

Serbo-Montenegrin federation. The opposition boycott the elections, only 60% of electors go to vote.

deployment of observers), and explicitly accuse Serbia of being the main responsible for the conflict.

June 28 - The French President, Mitterrand, makes a six-hour surprise visit to Sarajevo (only Soares and Kohl had been previously consulted). *"International institutions are very slow monuments to move - he explains - therefore, I believe in the symbolic force of acts"* (*Liberation*, 29/6/92)³¹. Mitterrand's trip leads to the withdrawal of Serb forces from Sarajevo's airport. A temporary cease-fire is reached.

June 29 - After the departure of Serb forces from Sarajevo's airport, the EC establishes an aerial bridge between Split, Zagreb (where the humanitarian aid is stocked) and Sarajevo³².

June 30 - The UN Security Council Resolution 762 extends the UNPROFOR's area of competence to the "pink areas" of Croatia: mainly Serb-populated areas where ethnic fighting takes place.

July 3 - The "Croatian community of Herzeg-Bosnia" is proclaimed in Grude (it controls around the 25% of the Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory). It is to have all the attributes of a State with Mostar as capital and Mate Boban as leader. The Bosnian Government declares the act unconstitutional, while Karadzic, leader of the SRBH (ab. 65% of the Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory), welcomes the new State (EER, July-August, 1992).

July 7 - The participants at the G7, meeting in Munich, agree that the UN Security Council should not exclude the use of military means to deliver

³¹ Until the European Council meeting in Lisbon, France maintained a cautious position towards the Yugoslavia crisis, never recognising any party as bearing the main responsibilities for the conflict. The historical link of this country with Serbia undoubtedly played an important role in the French position during the first year of the conflict. In Lisbon, for the first time, Mitterrand declares that *"Serbia is now the aggressor, even if the origin of the conflict is more remote"* (*Liberation*, Special Sarajevo, 10, Nov. 1992). But it is only with his surprise visit to Sarajevo that Mitterrand sends a clear message to the Serbian forces that France is not going to support/accept their attitude any further. The action is probably thought also to convey a message both to French public opinion (near to vote in the referendum for Maastricht) and to the EC partners (whose diplomatic activity does not seem to have been effective). Although not explicitly criticised by Great Britain, Mitterrand's initiative is not welcomed by the British who see it as a lack of support to EC coordination (especially as they were not informed despite assuming the EC Presidency on July 1!).

³² Twenty aeroplanes are supplied by various EC Member States, and more than 120 millions ECU are added for humanitarian aid to the 49 millions already devolved. On July 2, the UN Secretary General Gali will announce that further 1500 French, Egyptian and Ukrainian soldiers will join the UN forces in Sarajevo. The composition of the troops is intended to reflect the religious mix of Bosnia-Herzegovina's population (EER, July-August, 1992).

humanitarian aid (EER, July-August, 1992). Mitterrand proposes a large international conference under the UN auspices³³, while Great Britain, Belgium and Denmark oppose the initiative. However, in a few weeks (July 25) Major announces that an international conference on Yugoslavia will be convened by August 26-8³⁴.

July 9-10 - CSCE meeting in Helsinki decides to send observers to Kosovo, Vojvodina and Santjak to monitor Serb respect of human rights, while maintaining Yugoslavia's suspension from CSCE business until October 14 (*Financial Times*, 9/7/1992). Izetbegovic reiterates his request for an external military intervention.

At the same time, WEU Foreign Ministers decide to implement monitoring the UN embargo on Serbia sending in the Adriatic Sea naval forces (from Italy, France, Spain and Portugal). They also decide to take steps toward opening a corridor to Sarajevo, and to step up humanitarian aid (*The Times*, 11/7/92; WEU doc. 1337 and 1366). NATO soon agrees to coordinate its efforts with those of the WEU, sending an Adriatic contingent from the Standing Naval Force of the Mediterranean (including ships from Italy, Greece, Turkey, the US, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Great Britain) as well as AWACs aircraft (WEU doc. 1337). Both WEU and NATO missions, under Italian command, are limited to the monitoring of the embargo, lacking any power of enforcement. The presence of German forces causes domestic problems relative to Germany's constitutional impossibility of sending troops out of the NATO area.

July 14 - Milan Panic, an American businessman of Serb origin, is appointed Prime Minister of the FRY.

mid-July - First tensions between the EC and the UN: Carrington negotiates a cease-fire in Bosnia which would involve UN supervision concerning heavy weaponry, without consulting the UN. The UN Security Council, under British request, endorses the proposal without asking the UN Secretary General. The latter denounces the Security Council for paying too much attention to the problems of Europe as compared to the developing countries - e.g. Somalia; (*New York Times*, 24/7/92 and 3/8/92).

³³ He argues that it would have more weight than an EC-promoted conference and that it would have the advantage of including non-EC neighbours of former-Yugoslavia.

³⁴ The growing domestic pressure for armed intervention, and the accusations of dithering over Yugoslavia were important factors in Britain's shift of position towards the international conference (Wood, *forthcoming*).

July 20 - The EC Foreign Ministers vote to demand Yugoslavia's expulsion from the UN and other international organisations (Steinberg, *forthcoming*).

July 25 - Opening of the 25th Olympic Games in Barcelona. Under the UN request, Serbia's and Montenegro's athletes are allowed to participate only as individuals, without flag and national anthem.

July 29 - Geneva: Opening of the UNHCR conference on Yugoslav refugees. There are estimated to be approximately 2.3 million refugees since the beginning of the war³⁵. Germany, already hosting the highest proportion of refugees from former Yugoslavia, exhorts other European countries to accept refugees as well. France and Great Britain, worried about a mass exodus, propose an international effort to make possible the placement of refugees in areas near to their original home.

July 31 - Macedonia requests membership to the UN.

August 2 - The American newspaper *New York Newsday* (2/8/92) reveals the existence of internment camps and a UN Blue Helmets "memorandum" on the issue dated July 3³⁶. This leads to an increasing sensibilisation of the international public opinion to the Yugoslav atrocities, which are extensively denounced and witnessed by the media. Journalists denounce the UNPROFOR, the HCR and other international bodies to have known about the camps' existence since as early as June 1992. On August 6, in a *New York Times*' article, British former Prime Minister, M. Thatched, urges a rapid NATO intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina to re-establish the territorial integrity of the country (*New York Times*, 6/8/92). The Vatican makes a declaration supporting the right of intervention in the Bosnian Republic. By August 7, the UN Security Council discusses the possibility of resorting to force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is no general agreement on the type of military intervention: large scale (US) or limited to protect humanitarian aid (France; Great Britain).

Under international pressure, Karadzic invites the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit the detention camps (EER, Sept.-Oct., 1992).

³⁵ On July 23, the UNHCR estimates that, as a result of wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, about 628.000 of internally-displaced persons were in Croatia (of them 69.000 in the UNPAs), 850.00 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 382.500 in Serbia, 70.000 in Slovenia, 48.500 in Montenegro, and 31.000 in Macedonia. By July 24 Germany had accepted 200.000 refugees, Hungary 60.000, Austria 50.000, Sweden 44.000, Switzerland 12.200, Italy 7.000, and Great Britain 1.100 (*War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Helsinki Watch Report: 140-141).

³⁶ The newspaper wonders whether the document has ever reached the UN head quarters in New York, and why nothing has been done given that the UN Administration was informed of the existence of the camps.

August 4-9 - The Organisation of the Islamic Conference designates five countries to negotiate with the Security Council on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Muslims. The representatives of those States demand the use of force against the Serb troops under art. 42 of the UN Charter, and the lifting of the arms embargo on the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A few days later, many Islamic countries demand a military intervention.

August 10 - The authorities of the SRBR and Serbia, in order to avoid international retaliation, sign an agreement to allow women and children to leave Sarajevo (August 10) and stop obstacle humanitarian convoys, and propose (Cosic's proposal) to name the Peace-Nobel Prize Wiesel as the Chief of a UN intelligence commission in former Yugoslavia. However, both the UNHCR and the ICRC denounce the continuation of the policy of "ethnic cleansing", even under formal legality.

August 13 - The UN Security Council adopts Resolutions 770 and 771. Resolution 770, *"calls upon all States, or regional organisations, to take all measures necessary to facilitate the UN or other humanitarian organisations to deliver humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina"*³⁷. Resolution 771, concerns the great violations of the international humanitarian law committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It reminds all parties of their duties relative to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and explicitly condemns "ethnic cleansing". It also calls for the camps, prisons and detention centres to be opened to the ICRC, and demands States and humanitarian organisations to collect data on great breaches of the international humanitarian law, and report them to the UN Security Council.

- At the same time - under the US's request - the UNHCR meets in Geneva. The Commission strongly condemns the practice of "ethnic cleansing", and names M.T. Mazowiecki - Poland's former Prime Minister - special rapporteur for violation of human rights in former Yugoslavia.

- Belgrade officially recognises the independent Republic of Slovenia.

August 25 - The res. 46/L76 of the UN General Assembly, on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, proposed by forty-seven Islamic countries, calls for the UN,

³⁷There is little consensus on how to implement this provision. NATO's initial proposal of some 100.000 troops will be rejected for a far more modest one of 6.000 NATO's countries troops under UN command (Security Council's authorisation on September 14, 1992). On August 14, France declares ready to send other 1.100 men to Yugoslavia, Great Britain 1.800 and Italy 1.500 (WEU doc. 1337). However, on September 11, the Serbs put their veto on the deployment of Italian blue helmets in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Italian soldiers will be employed only for logistic support.

other international or regional organisations, and countries to take serious steps toward the implementation of the UN declarations and Resolutions. It welcomes the EC/UN efforts to search for peace.

August 26-28 - London: opening of the EC/UN co-sponsored peace conference on Yugoslaviaco-chaired by Major, for the EC, and Boutros Ghali, for the UN. Owen, former leader of Great Britain's Social Democrat Party, replaces Carrington as EC-mediator and co-chairman with UN-mediator Vance³⁸.

By the end of the two-days negotiations the participants agree on a common "declaration of principles" and on a final document. The stated principles should be the basic conditions of all future negotiations. They include: the cessation of fighting, the non-recognition of territorial gains achieved by force, the respect of fundamental rights and freedom, the "total" denounce of expulsions, detentions and modification of the ethnic composition of regions, respect of the international humanitarian law, etc³⁹.

August 28 - Extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council in connection with the peace conference 5.000 men, various means of transports and logistical equipment are made immediately available to the UN (WEU doc. 1337).

August 27-30 - Fighting continues on the main fronts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Resumption of the Serb artillery fire in Dubrovnik.

- The French Foreign Minister, Dumas, repeats France's proposal for an air-exclusion zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina to protect civilians against bombing.

August 31 - Mazowiecki's report calls for the deployment of UN observers in ethnically problematic areas in Serbia (Kosovo, Vojvodina, Sandzak) in order to

³⁸ The Conference is attended by Presidents of all six former Yugoslav Republics and the Prime Minister of the FRY (which brings an implicit recognition of the 'third Yugoslavia!'), while representatives of the SRBH of Bosnian-Croats, Kosovo Albanians and Vajvodina Hungarians attend as observers; Foreign Ministers of the US, Russia, Japan, China, Turkey, Canada, Switzerland and former-Yugoslavia's neighbours, as well as representatives of the EC Commission, CSCE, ICRC, ICO, take part to the Conference.

³⁹ The final document previews more intensive and permanent negotiations in Geneva by September 3, with the use of six working-groups - five of which are inherited from the European peace conference: Bosnia-Herzegovina, national minorities, the succession to the State of Yugoslavia, economic relations, security and confidence building measures, the humanitarian issue. Three of them chaired by EC and three by the UN. Fighting parties agree to a ban on military flights, international monitoring of the Serbia-Bosnia border, sanctions enforcement, full cooperation with programs of humanitarian relieves delivery. Furthermore, SRBH's leaders unilaterally pledge that their heavy weapons are to be put under UN supervision.

prevent the spread of conflicts. It also denounces the everyday practice of ethnic cleansing (*New York Times*, 1/9/92).

- Belgrade's socialist and ultra-nationalist deputies table a motion of censure for Panic, accused of not defending Serb interests at the peace conference. However, the motion will be rejected by the Federal Parliament on September 5 (WEU doc. 1337).

- Vance and Owen start a rich diplomatic tour both in European capitals and in former Yugoslavia. Diplomatic meetings on the implementation the UN Resolutions take place also between Western leaders.

September 2 - NATO decides to support action, taken under the responsibility of the UN, to protect humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina delivered by road or rail (WEU doc. 1337).

September 3 - Geneva: opening of the standing conference on former Yugoslavia.

- Brussels: the Twelve decide to strengthen the trade embargo on Serbia and Montenegro.

- Paris: extraordinary meeting of the WEU Assembly's Standing Committee, which recommends the complete blockade and exclusion from international organisation of Serbia and Montenegro, until they respect UN Resolutions. The Assembly also recommends to assure Greece's respect of the embargo before continuing negotiations on WEU membership⁴⁰.

- Greece Prime Minister, C. Mitsotakis, denies that Greece has infringed the embargo on Serbia and Montenegro, and confirms it will not support an eventual military intervention in former Yugoslavia.

- An Italian relief aircraft is shot down by a missile near Sarajevo. Humanitarian flights to the capital are suspended (EER, Nov.-Dec., 1992).

September 10 - Panic replaces the entire FRY delegation to the peace conference. The federal Foreign Minister, Jvanovic, in disagreement with Panic's policy, resigns (WEU doc. 1337).

September 12 - Bosnian-Serbs start placing their heavy weaponry under the UNPROFOR control as requested by Owen (WEU doc. 1337).

⁴⁰ The Assembly recommends that the Council "*insist that Greece gives the necessary assurance of total compliance with the UN embargo before continuing the present negotiations for WEU membership, [and] offer to the SG of the UN to keep WEU forces available to the UN under European command and operational control, and institute a formal liaison mechanism with NATO headquarters*". It also recommends the practical cooperation of non-member countries, and the examination of an eventual military action to prevent the conflict from spreading (WEU Assembly Recommendation 525).

September 12-13 - The Twelve Foreign Ministers declare their support to the French idea of an air exclusive zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and call on the UN to exclude the FRY from all the UN bodies. This last request will come again from the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on September 15 (WEU doc. 1337).

September 14 - A fresh outbreak of fighting in Sarajevo jeopardises the Geneva talks.

September 15 - The UN Security Council Resolution 776 approves the last Secretary General's report, authorising the extension of the UNPROFOR mandate and the number of its troops, in order to support all humanitarian action. Some 6.000 European soldiers will join the 1.500 UNPROFOR troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina (WEU doc. 1337).

September 16 - Prague: the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials publishes an astonishing report on the situation in the detention camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina which damages the leaders of the three communities.

- In the context of the European Parliament plenary session, the European Parliament voted for an amendment supporting the use of force to protect convoys and, if necessary, to procure Serbian weapons (ER 1806: supplement).

September 17 - At the CSCE meeting in Prague, the Vatican proposes an eight-point plan to end the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It would imply a real complete naval, and eventually aerial, blockade, and the recourse to *all means* available to the international community in absence of the parties' good will (WEU doc. 1337).

September 18-21 - Geneva, negotiations on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Differences emerge also between the Croats and the Bosnian-Muslims: the former would want a divided State, while the latter would want to maintain a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina.

September 19 - The UN Security Council Resolution 777 states the FRY cannot automatically replace the SFRY in the UN as requested by the former. The FRY will be formally excluded from UN General Assembly on September 22.

September 22 - Izetbegovic asks the UN to issue an international tribunal on war crimes in former Yugoslavia. In the following days, the US submit to the UN Security Council a long list of 'substantiated' violations of HL in former Yugoslavia, which is expected to provide a basis for a war crimes persecution (EER, Nov.-Dec., 1992). The American press reveals that 3.000 Muslim prisoners have been massacred near Brcko by Serb militias in May and June 1992. Dumas asks the UN and the EC to hold an inquiry into the massacre (WEU

doc. 1337). Vance and Owen visit Banja Luka (capital of the SRBH) and Belgrade to report on violations of HL (EER, Nov.-Dec., 1992).

September 29 - The UNHCR declares approximately 400.000 people will die during the winter in Bosnia-Herzegovina if a large-scale intervention is not immediately undertaken (WEU doc. 1337).

September 30 - Panic obtains Washington's support for a partial lifting of the oil embargo to allow "Yugoslavs" to be heated during winter.

- Resumption of the Geneva Conference with Vance, Owen, Tadjman, Cosic (FRY President) and Karadzic presence. Tadjman and Cosic make a joint declaration in condemnation of ethnic cleansing and urgin the speeding of the normalisation of relations between their countries.

- French General Philippe Morillon is officially appointed head of the UNPROFOR troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina (WEU doc. 1337).

October 1 - In the presence of General Morillon, Serb, Croat and Muslim militaries negotiate their progressive withdrawal from Sarajevo.

October 2 - The US President, G. Bush, announces he is ready to send forces to implement the establishment of an exclusion air zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

- The EC Commission approves 120 million Ecus-emergency aid to refugees and displaced persons in the region. They come on top of the 93 million Ecus already allocated but not yet spent. The EC Commission asks the G24 Member States to contribute to the relief aid effort.

October 5 - The EC Foreign Ministers, meeting in Luxembourg, issue a political declaration calling for a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina, advocate the tightening of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, the release of prisoners, and the supervision of heavy weapons (ER 1801: I, 2). Karadzic consequently threatens to walk out of the Geneva peace conference if the UN adopts a Resolution banning military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Concerning Macedonia's name, the EC Foreign Ministers propose to Greece the compromise of *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* (FYRM)⁴¹. Greece signals its willingness to accept this contracted form. Now it is to the EC Commission to persuade the authorities in Skopje to agree on the compromise (ER 1801: I, 2-3).

October 6 - The UN Security Council Resolution 780 agrees to set up a commission of inquiry into war crimes committed in former Yugoslavia.

⁴¹ The use of this name is preventing relief aid from being delivered in the region as it was blocked in the Greek port of Thessaloniki (ER 1801: I, 2-3).

October 7 - Opening of the negotiations on the demilitarisation of Sarajevo (WEU doc. 1337). Serbs propose the ethnic cantonisation of Sarajevo itself as a precondition for peace in the city (EER, Nov.-Dec., 1992).

October 9 - The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 781, imposing an air exclusion zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Resolution, however, does not include any authorisation to militarily enforce the ban. The US, on the contrary urged that the Resolution should allow the shooting down of hostile planes but France and Great Britain advocated a more moderate approach (EER, Nov.-Dec., 1992).

October 10 - Serb forces, after seizing control of Boçanski-Brod, the last Croat and Muslim stronghold in Northern Bosnia (EER, Nov.-Dec., 1992), launch an aerial attack to Gradacac.

October 11 - Serbia boycotts the consultations between Croatia and the new FRY for the normalisation of relations between the two countries.

October 13 - Geneva: at a meeting with Vance and Owen, the leader of Bosnia Serbs, Karadzic, offers to withdraw all his aircraft from Bosnia-Herzegovina and group them in the FRY under the UN control (WEU doc. 1337). The Chief of Serb airforces, Ninkovic, opposes the withdrawal.

October 14 - Owen threatens Karadzic with military retaliation unless flights of Serbian warplanes from Banja Luka cease (EER, Nov.-Dec., 1992).

October 15 - Panic goes to Prostina (Kosovo) to establish a dialogue between Serbs and ethnic Albanians, who are calling for reintroduction of Albanian language teaching.

- Smith, chairman of the WEU Assembly Defence Committee, verifies that the Rumanians are respecting the embargo (WEU doc. 1337).

October 16 - The EC's Head of State and Government meeting fails to reach a decision on the fresh package of humanitarian aid proposed by J. Delors, agreeing only on an immediate 213 million Ecus relief aid, and on the establishment of a task force to support UNHCR's efforts. In its final declaration on former Yugoslavia (ER 1805: annex II), the European Council once again condemns the widespread violence in the country, and supports the efforts of Vance and Owen.

- The President of the FRY, Cosic, calls for the resignation of Milosevic, and denounces the risk of civil war in Serbia. Serb police, loyal to Milosevic, takes control of the Ministry of the Interior to oppose Panic's policy of compromise.

October 18 - Fighting between Muslim and Croat forces breaks out in Travnik and Vitez (EER, Nov.-Dec., 1992).

October 19 - Geneva, at their first meeting since the beginning of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Izetbegovic and Cosic, agree on efforts to normalise relations between their countries on the basis of mutual recognition. Cosic will undertake a similar agreement with the Croat President, Tudjman, on October 20 (WEU doc. 1337).

October 21 - Geneva: Izetbegovic agrees, for the first time, to send a delegation to the talks on the demilitarisation of Sarajevo although in principle he still rejects negotiations with "*genocidal criminals*" (EER, Nov.-Dec., 1992).

October 22 - The EC Commission adopts a Regulation on the implementation of the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro, avoiding its spread to Macedonia. Greece eventually agrees to allow the transit of goods and fuel to the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* - a name which will be, from now on, on all customs documents, but which does not imply an official diplomatic recognition (ER 1808: I, 3)⁴².

October 23 - For the first time since the beginning of hostilities, military leaders of the three warring communities meet in Sarajevo under the UN-aegis, to discuss the city's demilitarisation and the distribution of international aid (WEU doc. 1337). In the meantime, fighting between Muslims and Croats spreads to Mostar, where the Croatian army declares itself the only authority of the city. More and more Muslims accuse the Croats of making a deal with Serbs on the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina (EER, Nov.-Dec., 1992).

October 26 - A French battalion arrives in Bosnia-Herzegovina outside the UN command structure .

October 27 - Geneva: the international mediators Vance and Owen propose a peace plan with a view to creating seven to ten autonomous provinces within a single Bosnian State. According to the spokesman of the co-Chairman, Eckhard, the proposed constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina attempts to safeguard the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina (as Muslims demand), while guaranteeing wide autonomy to the provincial Governments (to satisfy Serbs and Croats)⁴³.

⁴² For sake of shortness, in the rest of the chronology either "Macedonia" or FYRM will be used to indicate the self-proclaimed independent Republic that in the ex-Yugoslav federation corresponded to the name of "Macedonia". Such a use does not imply any international formal acceptance of this as the actual name of the Republic.

⁴³ The proposed constitutional plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina previews the decentralisation of the State within its international borders (i.e. those it had as SFRY). The 7/10 autonomous provinces in which it is to be divided have to be drawn "*taking into account ethnic, geographical [...], historical, communication [...], economic viability and other important factors*". The provinces shall not have legal personality and may not reach agreements with foreign countries. "*Three major ethnic groups (national/religious), as well as a group of*

- Belgrade: Karadzic rejects the plan. At the same time the representant of the Serb delegation to Geneva declares the plan unacceptable.

October 28 - In his mission report the UN Rapporteur, Mazowiecki, denounces that ethnic cleansing has already largely reached its aims (WEU doc. 1337).

October 29 - Serb forces conquest the Muslim stronghold Jajce. This leads to an exodus of thousands refugees towards central Bosnia, who remain blocked at Croatia's southern frontier.

November 2 - Geneva: The President of the ICRC, Sammaruga, calls for the creation of protected areas to receive civilians from detention camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

November 3 - The Bosnian-Serb Parliament in Banja Luka rejects the Vance-Owen peace plan, and decides to withdraw its representatives from Geneva until recognition is granted to its republic. In Belgrade, the Parliament is called to

'others"', should be recognised in the Constitution. No constitutional change - secession included - should be permitted without amendments to the Constitution by a high majority. Some constitutional bodies should be transitionally manned by persons appointed by the International peace conference, and some functions should be internationally supervised.

The Governmental structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina should include a two-Chambers Parliament; a collective Presidency with a rotating President *among the groups* ; a Government constituted on the principle of group balance; a Judiciary system in respect of the group rotation principle. According to the draft constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Parliament should be composed by a Lower House proportionally elected on the whole territory of the State, and an Upper House appointed by and from the provincial governments. The Prime Minister should be elected by the Lower House. He would appoint the Ministers with the approval of the Presidency, with due account for group balance - in any event Foreign and Defence Ministers should belong to different groups.

The draft Constitution also includes a list of State/provinces competencies. There is an explicit reference to the respect of minority rights. On this point there is a list of international Human Rights Treaties and other instruments to be respected.

Among the various and noubros critics moved to the plan, it is worth quoting at least the following:

a) It widely recognises and ratifies the result of the war and the policy of ethnic cleansing. The final result of the division in ten provinces will probably be the creation of "ethnically pure" mini-States. The existence of a multi-ethnic State is implicitly denied. Furthermore, the plan allows for a constitutional transformation of the armed bands in different, and substantially "ethnic", police forces. This implies a high risk of new armed conflicts.

b) There is no real attention to intra-provinces minorities: the constitution encourages a process of ethnic cleansing.

c) The discussion over the delimitation of the internal borders worsens the situation on the battle field where the contending part aim at arriving at the negotiation table with more conquered territory so as to have it recognised on paper.

d) The negotiation process in general gives international legal power to Lords of War such as Karadzic, Boban, Milosevic, Tudjman, etc. No voice is given to civic movements and inter-ethnic forces.

e) The plan is far more favourable to Serbs and Croats than to Muslims. This could imply a future integralisation of Bosnian-Muslims and the danger of an integralist Muslim State, supported by the Islamic world, in the core of Europe.

decide on a motion of censure against Panic's Government whose compromise-based policy is perceived by former Communists as a betrayal of Serbia. On November 5, during his meeting with Delors, Panic asks for political recognition of its country and for an end to economic sanctions against it (ER 1810: V, 15).

November 5 - Brussels, the EC and Slovenia initiate a Trade and Economic Agreement due to be the first one the EC concludes with a former Yugoslav country.

November 8 - Karadzic announces a peace plan aimed at confirming Serb gains on the ground. He proposes a Bosnian confederation with three nation States (WEU doc. 1337). After their ground successes in central Bosnia, Serb forces increase their offensive in northern Bosnia.

November 9 - Brussels, EC Foreign Ministers, discussing Owen's report, call for further UN Security Council measures to reinforce sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. They also consider the plights of the Macedonia, which is still subject to a *de facto* blockade by Greece, and agree over taking in some 5.000 refugees recently liberated from internment camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina (ER 1811: V, 8-9)⁴⁴.

November 13 - The UN publishes a list of companies and ships - mostly Greek, Maltese, Italian and Egyptian - that violated the embargo by delivering large quantities of petroleum products to the Montenegrin port of Bar. The UN Security Council, however, does not comply with the Organisation of the Islamic Conference's quest for partial lift of the arms embargo to Bosnian-Moslems. On the other side, within UN Security Council's debates, Owen and Vance do not rule out the possibility of military intervention, as the last resort to stop the conflict (ER 1813: V, 10).

November 14 - R. Dumas proposes a meeting of the London Conference entirely devoted to Bosnia (WEU doc. 1337).

November 16 - The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 787 on the reinforcement of sanctions monitoring around Serbia and Montenegro⁴⁵.

November 18 - Following UN Resolution 787, the NATO Council agrees in principle to allow closer inspections of boat movements in the Adriatic Sea.

⁴⁴ UN rapporteur for human rights Mazowiecki confirms that nearly 15.000 people are still in these camps - camps which the London Conference demanded to be demolished already in August 1991 (ER 1811: V, 9).

⁴⁵The Resolution bans transit through the FRY of crude oil, material for energy production and motors of all kinds. It also asks the countries lying on the Adriatic coast or the Danube to stop all merchant and control their cargo and destination. Resolution 787 is taken with thirteen votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Zimbabwe).

NATO forces will act in cooperation and coordination with those of the WEU and possibly other countries. However, most diplomats recognise that most of the goods to the Serbia and Montenegro are transported via Danube or by land (ER 1814: V, 6).

November 19 - Strasbourg, the European Parliament denounces the violent acts against civilians being committed particularly by Serbs, and the policy of ethnic cleansing. It also lends its support to the efforts of Vance and Owen, and to the proposal of a draft constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the respect for its territorial integrity. It demands international observers to be sent to Kosovo, and proposes the delivery of emergency relief aid to the FYRM (ER 1814: V, 6).

November 20 - Greece signs a protocol to become a member of the WEU.

November 25 - During the Istanbul Conference on the prevention of fighting in former Yugoslavia spilling over into other countries, the ten participant States call for UN troops to be sent in the region. Their final communiqué also calls for the creation of military protected safety zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as corridors for convoys carrying humanitarian aid.

- Speaking before the EP's Foreign Affairs Committee, E. Ganic, Vice-President of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, asks the international community to arm his people, and to define UN role in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

- Meanwhile, Greece makes a series of contacts with European capitals, to offer its "mediation" to find a solution to the war in former Yugoslavia (ER 1816: V, 10).

November 26 - Madrid, Owen affirms that the UN Security Council is prepared to intervene if Serbia continues to infringe the no-fly zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina (ER 1816: V, 10).

November 30 - The WEU Member States meet in Paris for four days to discuss problems in ex-Yugoslavia. A report draft by J. Ward, denouncing the attitude of the Greek Government towards the FYRM, is taken off due to the opposition of various Governments, especially Great Britain. Within the same meeting, the Italian Foreign Minister and WEU President-in-office, Colombo, is questioned about the violations of the embargo (ER 1818: V, 16).

December 11-12 - The EC leaders meeting in Edinburgh are divided on the possibility of taking military action against Serbia, and continue to give priority to a political solution of the crisis. They call on the UN to look into Serbian planes' regular violations of the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, on Dec. 14 - after the EC Summit and immediately before the CSCE ministerial meeting - France goes a step further asking the UN Security Council to authorise a "*stricter*

enforcement" of the no-fly zone. The Council expresses satisfaction about the deployment of 700 UN peace-keepers in Macedonia, and decides to devolve a 50 Ecus aid to it. An equivalent aid is expected to come from the EC Member States (ER 1821: V, 6) ⁴⁶.

December 14 - Yugoslavia ceases to be a member of the IMF. According to the rules of the International Bank for Reconstruction and development, Yugoslavia will consequently cease to be a member of the Bank within three months. At that time, the five former Yugoslav Republics could join the IMF and the World Bank (ER 1842: V, 12). Former Yugoslavia, due to its disintegration, dropped OECD on December 3 (ER 1816: V, 10).

December 15 - Eight EC unarmed observers travel to the border between former Yugoslavia and Hungary for a monitoring mission. They will report to the EC Presidency and the CSCE (ER 1822: V, 6).

December 16 - The three ministerial meetings held in the week before Christmas - CSCE in Stockholm, NATO in Brussels and the Peace Conference in Geneva - highlight the deep division among Western powers on sending military forces to make Serbs respect the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At the EC-Canada Summit, Great Britain Prime Minister, Major, calls for precaution and care on behalf of the international community before getting directly involved in the conflict, and stresses that any decision would have to go through the UN Security Council. Along with Great Britain, also Belgium is hesitant about the use of force to protect the no-fly zone. On the contrary, the US, France and the Netherlands declare themselves prepared to send fighter planes for the purpose. In particular, France is trying to get a UN Resolution in favour of military force adopted.

- The leader of Bosnian-Serbs, R. Karadzic, in a letter to the EC President in charge Major, threatens reprisals against the UN Blue helmets if a UN Resolution on the use of force is passed (ER 1822: V, 6).

- Germany announces it would admit 6.000 detainees from Serbian camps in Bosnia.

December 20 - Elections in Serbia: Milosevic wins on the West's preferred candidate Panic.

December 21 - At the EC Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels, the EC confirms its impotence and hesitance *vis à vis* the Yugoslav crisis.

⁴⁶ Greece, still imposing a *de facto* embargo on Macedonia, does not even consider contributing to the programme (ER 1821: V, 6).

December 27 - The UNPROFOR's Head Quarter leaves Sarajevo for Kiseljak.

December 31 - Boutros Ghali and Vance visit Sarajevo.

January 4, 1993 - Geneva, as only the Croats have agreed on signing the Vance-Owen Plan, peace negotiations are adjourned until January 10. The Muslims are afraid the cease-fire would approve the military situation on the ground, thus giving a clear advantage to the Serbs. The Bosnian-Serbs reject the principle of a unitary State, demanding the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina in three separated States for each constituent nation (ER 1824: V, 6).

January 7 - The new Danish Presidency of the EC Council is against military intervention in Bosnia (ER 1825: V, 9).

- Macedonia officially apply for the UN membership (Keesing's: 39279).

January 8 - Back from Belgrade, Vance and Owen comment that no progress has been made neither "*on the map (division of Bosnia into ten provinces)*" nor on the constitutional provision denying the international personality of the provinces (ER 1825: V, 9).

- Back from former Yugoslavia, the observatory team of EC Commission presents a shocking report on the situation of Muslim women being raped by Serbian forces (ER 1825: V, 9). On January 21, Amnesty International will report that women from all sides, but mainly Muslims, have suffered terrible sexual violations in the Bosnian conflict. It also recommends the investigating of "violation camps" and whether a systematic abuse have been used as a weapon of war (Keesing's: 39278).

January 10 - Vance and Owen give the Bosnian-Serb leader, Karadzic, until the morning of January 12 to completely accept the proposed peace plan (that is, mainly the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina), but do not issue a proper *ultimatum*.

January 11 - In response to Dumas's proposal of using force to free detainees from Bosnian camps, Serbs threaten retaliation if such an action is taken, and accuse Dumas's proposal of being inspired by France's internal political problems (ER 1826: V, 6).

January 12 - Under heavy pressure from Milosevic and the federal President, Cosic, Karadzic provisionally agrees on the constitutional proposal for Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the condition it is approved by Bosnian-Serb parliament (*Keesing's Record of World Events*: 39278⁴⁷).

⁴⁷ From now on "Keesing's: progressive page-number".

January 13 - The EC Foreign Ministers, meeting in Paris, declare that if Bosnian-Serbs will not *unconditionally* accept the draft constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina within six days, the EC and its Member States will take "*all necessary measures to completely isolate*" Serbia and Montenegro. Furthermore, the UN would be asked to take appropriate measures and control over the implementation of Resolution 781 - on the no-fly zone over Bosnia. EC Foreign Ministers also stress the need for an International Criminal Court to judge crimes in former Yugoslavia.

As far as the recognition of Macedonia is concerned, France recommends that the EC sets up a court of arbitration to settle the dispute over the name, but the Macedonian President Gligorov refuses it. The Danish Foreign Minister proposes to pass the question to the UN Security Council. During the press conference, Van Den Broek, EC Commissioner for External Political Relations, suggests sending a mission on the border between Macedonia and Greece to help the latter responding to accusations of not respecting the embargo against the FRY. However, the Greek Foreign Minister immediately rejects the proposal, declaring Greece would not allow EC observers on its soil (ER 1827: V, 6).

January 17 - Stojanovic, chief advisor of the FRY's President Cosic, accuses the international community of a *racist* attitude towards the Serbian people. Stojanovic goes on warning he would leave the negotiation-table if Ellemann-Jensen continues with his threats against the Serbs (ER 1827: V, 6).

- The main UN Security Council members (France, the US, Great Britain, and Spain) meet to reach an agreement on the possibility of a UN Resolution for the military enforcement of the no-fly zone. Russia takes part in the talks expressing reservations on the Resolution, whose presentation to the other members of the UN Security Council will depend on the result of the January 19 vote of the Bosnian-Serb "Parliament" over the peace plan.

- In spite of his conditional consent to the plan, Karadzic insists he will be holding onto the corridor linking "his" territories to Serbia - a corridor which, according to the plan, should return to Croatia (ER 1828: V, 9).

January 18 - The EC Commission announces the first direct humanitarian aid operation of ECHO (EC Emergency Humanitarian Aid Office) in Serbia and Montenegro. The aim is to provide aid to displaced people and refugees in the area (ER 1828: V, 9).

January 20 - The "Parliament" of the self-proclaimed SRBH accepts the constitutional principles for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Karadzic has already accepted two of the three points of the peace plan (constitutional principles and cease-fire

arrangements, but not the map of Bosnia-Herzegovina); only the Bosnian-Croat leader, Boban, has accepted them all (Keesing's: 39278).

January 20-21- At the plenary session of the European Parliament, Elleman-Jensen, Chairman of EC Council Presidency, criticises Greece for posing its veto on EC's recognition of Macedonia. The Greek members of the European assembly immediately denounce Elleman-Jensen's statement as improper and unacceptable.

The Members of the EP (MEPs) call on the EC to urge the UN to guarantee the application of its Resolutions on former Yugoslavia (ER 1829: V, 9).

January 21 - Violent fighting between Croat Croats and Croat Serbs re-emerge in the "pink area" around Zara, in the Krajina of Knin (in a territory in south Croatia, controlled by Serbs), and in eastern Slavonia and Barania. Tudjman justifies his massive attack to the UN-protected area of Krajina as necessary to secure the area in order to be able to reconstruct the Maslenica bridge - which would reunite, after 13 months, northern and southern Croatia. The FRY's Chief General, Panic, accuses the UN Blue Helmets of not having been able to protect the Serbs of Croatia, and threatens to use the federal army in help of Knin's Serbs (*Il Corriere della Sera*, 25/1/93). Fighting also in South Western Herzegovina in spite of the cease-fire agreed on January 20. Heavy fire also on Sarajevo. JNA again become involved in the fighting against Muslims (Keesing's: 39278).

January 25 - The EC and its Member States issue a political statement to call on Croatia to stop hostilities which have broken out around Zadar, in the Serbian-held rebel enclave of Krajina. They also call on all parts to support peace negotiations in Geneva (ER 1830: V, 8). The UN Security Council as well issues a Resolution warning it will take measures if Croat troops will not be withdrawn (Keesing's: 39279). Germany too demands Croatia an immediate halt of the offensive. Despite Western threats, in the future two weeks Croats will press to establish political and military control over Muslim-populated areas in central Bosnia-Herzegovina. The effort is to reinforce their claim over areas assigned to them by the Vance/Owen plan. Croat officials have also sought to control the humanitarian aid distribution by international relief workers (*Herald Tribune*, 4/2/93)⁴⁸. On January 29, Croat President, Tudjman, says he ordered his troops to

⁴⁸ The strategy of halting aid-convoys directs to the civilian population of other ethnicities is a constant tool of this terrible war. Serbs, as well as Croat and Muslims are frequently reported to halt international aid convoys thereby causing starvation of civilians (*The Independent*, 15/2/93).

cease all offensive actions, but that Serb forces are preventing them to (Keesing's: 39279).

January 27-28 - Talking before the European Parliament and the EC Commission, the President of the FYRM, Gligorov, pleads the international recognition of Macedonia. Asked about the unofficial proposal of France, Great Britain and Spain of having his country admitted to the UN with the temporary name of *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, he replies that it is only up to the people to decide on the name of their country through a referendum (ER 1831: V, 8-9).

January 29 - UN-sponsored investigators begin examining a mass grave outside Vukovar where some 200 hospitalised and some other 1000 Croats might have been buried by Serb forces during the siege of Vukovar (Keesing's: 39279).

February 3 - Izetbegovic appeals to Clinton, whose Administration has expressed major reservations about the Vance/Owen peace plan, to reject it. At this point of the crisis management, only the Bosnian-Croat leader, Boban, is supporting the plan. For this reason, Vance and Owen suspend the Geneva talks to seek for the UN Security Council to impose the plan.

February 4 - The Italian Prime Minister, Amato, after meeting the Macedonian Prime Minister, Crvenkovski, announces that Italy would shortly break with the EC in recognising the Republic (Keesing's: 39328). He explicitly says that the Italian "*communitarian solidarity with Greece cannot render [Italy] of an injustice*" (*La Repubblica*, 6/2/93). The Greek press strongly denounces Amato's declaration.

February 6 - Owen accuses the US President of blocking a negotiated solution to the crisis by letting the Muslim Government in Sarajevo hope for an American military intervention (ER 1833: V, 8). In reality, for the moment the perspective is far from reality, however Clinton reserves himself to go back to the strategy proposed in the electoral campaign - arm the Muslims and bomb the Serbs - if diplomatic efforts fail to bring peace. He also criticises the Vance/Owen plan as disadvantaging Muslims and proposes to modify it with a six point plan, and to ask Russia to put pressure on Serbs to accept it (*La Repubblica*, 6/2/93)⁴⁹.

⁴⁹ The US initiative would endorse the following steps: a) creation of a commission to monitor human rights in Bosnia; b) tightening of international economic sanctions against Serbia; c) creation of an international war crimes tribunal; d) US enforcement of an eventual agreement - even if it is not clearly stated how; e) warn on Serbia that the US Administration would not tolerate an aggression to Kosovo (*Herald Tribune*, 10/2/93).

Bartholomew is appointed US special envoy to the negotiations (ER 1835: V, 12).

February 15 - US approval of the peace plan.

February 16 - Advisors to the EC Member States' Permanent Representatives meet in Brussels to try to "harmonise" Member States' positions on US sanctions against FRY (ER 1833: V, 8).

- The UN Security Council meet in New York to discuss the issue of Macedonia. Greece finally accepts the compromise over the name of the ex-Yugoslav Republic conditionally to the establishment of "confidence measures" which include: promises from Skopje to put an end to anti-Greek propaganda, removal of the symbols on the Macedonian flag, revision of several articles of the Macedonian constitution - which Athens claims express "expansionist designs" (ER 1833: V, 8)⁵⁰. However, Macedonian President Glogorov rejects the idea of Macedonia being accepted in the UN under "a temporary name", while a permanent one will be found by means of international arbitration (ER 1837: V, 11).

February 17 - Meeting NATO officials and the EP's President in Brussels, the Rumanian President, Illiescu, affirms his country resolved to enforce the UN embargo but rules out the idea of using force in the international waters of the Danube (ER 1837: V, 11). Petersen, Chairman of EC Council Presidency (DK), talking before the EP, advises against any military solution to the Yugoslav crisis (ER 1837: V, 11).

- As a protest against the failure of all fighting parties to respect humanitarian principles, the UN High Commissioner for Refugee, Ogata, orders to suspend relief operations in all Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sarajevo. Such a boycott will be lifted only on February 22, when all parties will provide the requested guarantees (Keesing's: 39327).

February 18 - The European Parliament organises a public hearing on the rape of women in former Yugoslavia (ER 1837: V, 12).

February 19 - A UN Security Council Resolution extends the mandate of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Macedonia until March 31, and call for UN troops in ex-Yugoslavia to be armed for self-protection (Keesing's: 39327).

⁵⁰ As a consequence of Greece's changed attitude regarding the Macedonian question, opponents of the Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis - both from inside and outside its party - call for his resignation (Keesing's: 39328).

February 23 - The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development presents the first operational development strategy prepared for Slovenia since its independence (ER 1838: V, 4).

- Throughout the month of February, Russia, Romania and Ukraine call for international compensation for the losses suffered as a result of UN sanctions on Yugoslavia (Keesing's: 39327).

- Clinton announces that US aircraft will supplement the UN relief convoys with air-drop relief supplies to areas cut off from UN operations. The first "drop" in eastern Bosnia on March 1 (Keesing's: 39327). France and Germany will soon start to assist the operation and Russia, on March 2, declares itself ready to participate too (Keesing's: 39374).

February 28 - In a message to Serbian President Milosevic, Clinton warns that in case of Serbian-caused conflict in Kosovo he would be ready to "*send military force against the Serbs in Kosovo and further afield in Serbia*" (Keesing's: 39376).

March 3 - In a political statement the EC and its Member States condemn the renewal of fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serbian forces atrocities, committed in spite of the negotiations still going in New York. The *communiqué* echoes Vance and Owen's earlier declarations. The EC Commissioner Van den Broek hints that military intervention might prove necessary if a political solution is not found (ER 1841: V, 4).

- General Wahlgren replaces General Morillon as Commander of the UNPROFOR force.

- The EC Commission decides over other 60 million Ecus emergency aid for former Yugoslavia (ER 1841: V, 4)⁵¹.

- During the new round of peace talks in New York, on March 3, Izetbegovic signs the military section of the continuously-revised Vance-Owen peace plan. He still has not agreed on the map section, while Bosnian-Serbs have refused the whole plan (Keesing's: 39374).

- Agreeing with Lord Owen's advice, the EC Foreign Ministers, meeting in Brussels, decide for no-additional sanctions against the FRY. Rather, they decide to strength the existing sanctions and increase pressure on the Bosnian-Serbs to

⁵¹ The EC is giving the largest aid to former Yugoslavia, with its nearly 50% contribution to the entire UNHCR budget and with its 13 million Ecus-aid in 1991, and 277 million Ecus-aid in 1992 (ER 1840: V, 14). With the decision of March 3 1993, the total amount of aid is of 350 million Ecus (see ER 1850).

make them accept the peace plan. Germany's Foreign Minister, Kinkel, disagree with the EC decision (ER 1842: V, 13).

- Meanwhile, on the battle field, the Bosnian Army Commander, General Halilovic, breaks the unilateral cease-fire declared by Izetbegovic in February, leaves the UN-sponsored truce talks, and orders a full-scale offensive to defend Muslims in Konjevic Polje and Srebrenica (housed by some 60.000 Muslims under Serb siege for almost a year).

March 5-6 - General Morillon, Commander of UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, visits the besieged areas of Cerska and Konjevic Polje and secures an agreement for the evacuation of Muslims from Konjevic Polje and Srebrenica. The UN attempted evacuation of Muslims from besieged areas, however, brings concerns over serving the Serbs' interest of having those areas ethnically-purified.

March 9 - Significant movements of Serbian troops are reported on the border between Kosovo and Albania. Ethnic Albanians continue to be forced out of their job and some 500.000 are believed to have left the province under the pressure of Serb militias led by the terrible General "Arkan" (whose real name is Zeljko Raznjatovic).

March 11 - A UN convoy due to remove the wounded from Konjevic Polje fails its mission because of the Serbs' opposition, and forces masses of Muslims to move to Srebrenica. General Morillon enters Srebrenica on the very same day, bringing medicaments. Having seen the situation of Muslims there, he decides to remain until the siege is lifted.

- Mitterrand meets Milosevic in Paris, to try to resolve the deadlock created by Bosnian-Serbs on the Vance-Owen plan (Keesing's: 39375).

March 16 - The WEU Permanent Council agrees in principle at sending police forces and equipment to help Rumania and Bulgaria enforcing the embargo along the Danube. Contemporaneously, the US decides to render available to Rumania three fast 27-foot patrol boats and a coast guard team for training (WEU doc. 1367). Denmark and Greece are reported to be violating the embargo. The former exporting agri-food products in the FRY, and the latter supplying it with fuel (ER 1847: V).

March 23 - Serb leaders agree to open an air corridor from Tuzla to Srebrenica the following day, in order to allow wounded, women and children to be flown out and supplies to be brought in. In return, Serb families would be flown out of Tuzla. In reality, the operation fails due to Serb bombing of the UN helicopters both in Tuzla and Srebrenica (Keesing's: 39374). The operation, however, will be

possible from March 28, when the Morillon-Milosevic and UN-Bosnian-Serbs talks lead to a cease-fire agreement.

March 25 - Muslim and Croat leaders agree, in New York, to sign the entire Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, also the "map part", slightly revised compared to the January version⁵². Only Serbs are still "reserving their position" on the proposed political settlement (ER 1847: V, 9).

March 26 - The EC threatens "*the total isolation of Serbia and Montenegro*", if Bosnian-Serbs continue to refuse to accept the agreement (Keesing's: 39375).

March 30 - As a consequence of the UN Security Council Resolution 815 - treating Krajina as an integral part of Croatia, the representatives of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) leave the peace talks in Geneva.

- The mandate of UNPROFOR, due to expire on March 31, is extended for a further three months. Tudjman continues to call for the implementation of the 1992 UN peace-keeping plan for the Serb-occupied areas of Croatia (Keesing's: 39375).

- Two Bosnian-Serbs soldiers are sentenced to death by military court in Sarajevo in the first war crimes trial in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The sentences represent the first attempt made by Bosnian Government to demonstrate the existence of a Serb programmed strategy of "ethnic cleansing" (Keesing's: 39395).

2.4. "The uneven assertiveness of the West and Russia" (April 1993-April 1994)
- *UN Security Council Resolution 816 allowing military enforcement of the no-fly zone (31/3/93). First NATO's war operation (12/4/93). Additional sanctions on Serbia. Diffused unwillingness to military intervention: empty threats.*

- *NATO's successful ultimatum for heavy-weapons withdrawal from "exclusion zone" around Sarajevo (February, 1994).*

- *Serb siege of the should-be-UN-protected Muslim town of Gorazde.*

- *Muslim-Croat agreement over Bosnia-Herzegovina (March, 1994)*

March 31 - The UN Security Council Resolution 816 allows NATO aircraft to shot down planes violating the no-fly zone imposed on the Bosnian airspace in October 1992 (Keesing's: 39375). Frequent violations of the fly-ban have been discovered since the imposition of the no-fly zone.

April 2 - NATO endorses the UN Resolution 816. However, worried with long-term implications of confronting Bosnian-Serbs with force, NATO sets strict

⁵² In this version the Sarajevo province should be put under Muslim rather than tripartite control (Keesing's: 39375).

guideline procedures: Serb aircraft violating the ban should be first warned and shot down only if they continue to ignore the warning. Furthermore, Serbian ground forces cannot be attacked (Keesing's: 39426).

- The self-proclaimed Assembly of Bosnian-Serbs rejects a Resolution allowing for a conditional acceptance of the Vance-Owen plan. The main reason is the attribution to Serbs of the 43% of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory compared with the 70% actually occupied by Serb forces. However, Karadzic is careful enough not to reject the plan outright and to call for direct negotiations between the warring parties. A proposal rejected by the Bosnia-Herzegovina's President, Izetbegovic (Keesing's: 39426).

April 5 - Luxembourg, the Council of Ministers of the WEU issues a declaration on the implementation of UN sanctions, welcoming an effective coordination of the EC, CSCE and WEU efforts, and offering its concrete support to the Danubian States for the organisation of a police and customs operations on the Danube. Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania - present at the meeting - express their reserve due to the reported Serb threats to blow up a petrol tanker barge on the Danube. Furthermore, in the following weeks, Hungary affirms its desire for WEU troops not to be enabled to use force and to serve under Hungarian command and flag. What will be eventually implemented is *a civilian operation* in coordination with the EC, the CSCE, and the Sanctions Assistance Mission (WEU doc. 1367). Some 3.000 civilians and 11 patrol boats will be sent to the area.

- The EC Foreign Ministers sign a Trade Economic Cooperation Agreement with Slovenia - the first with a former Yugoslav Republic (ER 1850). They also threaten - in spite of Great Britain's objection - to unilaterally implement tougher sanctions against Serbia if the UN Security Council continues to postpone the decision (Keesing's: 39426).

April 8 - Germany's Constitutional Court decides to allow German forces to participate in the mission enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina (Keesing's: 39426).

April 9 - Bosnian-Serb forces humiliate the UN commander General Morillon by not permitting him to reach the besieged enclave of Srebrenica. Milosevic is reported to be at a height of his strength and Serbian troops are carrying out their offensive in eastern Bosnia, even across the Serbian border. Meanwhile Moscow declares their opposition to the sole policy option espoused by Clinton to stop Serbian bragging about western indecision - i.e. tightening sanctions (*Guardian*, 10/4/93).

April 12 - At 2.00 PM starts the NATO operation "deny fly" in the Bosnia's airspace: US F15, French *Mirages* and Dutch F16s leave from various Italian basis. British *Tornado*, as well as Turkish air forces, will join the operation in the near future. The war operation - the first for NATO, commanded by General Rossetti, is due to bomb any plane breaking the UN imposed no-fly-zone over Bosnia.

The first mechanical accident to a NATO plane occurs only a few hours later.

- The US, Great Britain, France and Spain agree on the Russian request to postpone until April 26 the UN Security Council decision over strengthening sanctions against Serbia (ER 1851: I, 2): the vote is planned after the Russian referendum, in order not to interfere with Russia's delicate internal situation.

- The Pope dedicates an important part of his Easter message to the Yugoslav war, urging once again the West to stop it (*La Stampa*, 13/4/93).

- The UN recognises Macedonia under the compromised name of "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia". Denmark will be the first EC State of the European Community to recognise it, on April 13. Albania has recognised it on April 9 (Keesing's: 39428).

April 16 - The NATO command in Brussels publicizes the plan for 18 Turkish F16s to take part in the *Deny-Flight* operation. Greece declares its ban on Turkish flights over its airspace.

April 14-15 - Tokyo, Ministers taking part in the G7 meeting (mainly due to discuss aid to Russia) call for tougher sanctions against the FRY. Their appeal is interestingly echoed by Russia - which until now has tried to postpone the decision (Keesing's: 39426).

- A delegation from the Russian Supreme Soviet visits Croatia to discuss about the Yugoslav crisis. Russian special envoy to the Geneva talks, Churkin, meets President Tudjman (Keesing's: 39428).

April 17 - The dramatic events of Srebrenica force the UN Security Council to anticipate the decision over strengthening last May's sanctions against Serbia (UN Resolution 820). In spite of the opposition of the Russian representative, the new measures are decided to enter into force on April 26 if Milosevic has not agreed on the peace plan by then. This decision passed with two abstentions - China and Russia (Keesing's: 39426).

April 18 - Srebrenica falls after a one-year long siege of the Serb forces. Srebrenica's case rises concern on the UN peace-keeping role, as is testified by the arrival, on April 23, of a six-member fact-finding mission of the UN, composed of members from non-aligned countries (Keesing's: 39427).

April 20 - The EC Commission decides to allocate 500.000 Ecus for medical and psychological aid to Muslim women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially for those who have been raped (ER 1853: V, 6).

April 21 - An European Parliament draft Resolution calling for the use of force against Serbs is rejected by the Socialist and Communist groups. In response to the European Parliament demand, the President of the Council Presidency, Petersen, affirms that any decision on military intervention could be taken only by the UN (ER 1853: I, 3).

- The FYRM joins the IMF and agrees, as Croatia and Slovenia already have, to take a portion of the debt of ex-Yugoslavia (ER 1852: V, 9).

April 23 - The US President, Clinton, announces that the decision to bomb Serbs heavy artillery in Bosnia should be taken within ten days. No operation with land troops is foreseen. Most of the US Congress supports the hypothesis of a military intervention. Meanwhile, Clinton awaits the result of the Russian referendum and for the US Secretary of State, Christopher, consultations with the European NATO allies (*La Repubblica*, 25-25/4/93).

April 24-25 - Belgrade. Karadzic refuses Owen's proposal to create UN-controlled corridors between Serbia and the Bosnian regions assigned to the Serbs by the UN/EC co-sponsored plan. In revenge, Karadzic proposes the actual partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three separated regions (one of which would become part of a Greater Serbia (Keesing's: 39425)⁵³.

A few hours later, the EC Foreign Ministers, meeting in Copenhagen, state, for the first time, their readiness to use force if Serbs continue to refuse the peace plan. Even Great Britain's Foreign Minister, Hurd, - after consultations with Christopher - withdraws his reserve on a joint military action. However, the EC considers indispensable a previous UN Resolution allowing the use of force, which the UN Secretary General, Boutros Ghali, is still not willing to support. Furthermore, France and Great Britain fear an eventual Serb retaliation against their soldiers wearing the blue helmet in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (*La Repubblica*, 25-25/4/93).

April 25-26 - The self-styled Bosnian-Serb Assembly, in an emergency meeting session, votes overwhelmingly to reject the proposed territorial arrangements of the Vance-Owen plan, endorsed by Muslims and Bosnian-Croats. The final decision is left to a referendum that Bosnian-Serbs will hold on May 15-16. The

⁵³ Many Western observers interpret the Bosnian-Serb decision as the result of West's lack of credibility (Keesing's: 39425).

decision of the Assembly is dismissed by the Western Governments as a stalling tactic (Keesing's: 39425). The decision meets condemnation also from Serbia and the FRY - "*Bosnian-Serbs patrons and suppliers*", as they are called in the *Keesing's Record of World Events* (Keesing's: 39425).

April 26 - The EC formally decides to put into effect the UN Resolution 820. The new anti-Serb sanctions will enter into force by April 27⁵⁴. Furthermore, the EC Foreign Ministers vote to exclude the FRY from international organisations, and double the number of EC sanctions monitors, but reject the German proposal of calling back EC Ambassadors from Belgrade. Also Switzerland - which is only an observer at the UN - applies tougher sanctions against the FRY; the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania will endorse tougher sanctions, respectively on April 25, 26 and 29 (ER 1854; Keesing's: 39426). The US Government announces it will freeze all US business in the FRY, and block all Yugoslav assets in the US.

- Germany's Foreign Minister, Kinkel, proposes to open a new peace conference under the auspices of the EC, without the participation of the belligerent parties.

- Indecision emerges from Clinton's conflicting declarations: if on the one side he pushes the Europeans for a selective military action, on the other he states such an action will not resolve the problem (*Il Corriere della Sera*, 27/4/93). The US Congress favours lifting the UN arms embargo on Bosnian-Muslims, and using air strikes and diplomatic pressure to reinforce sanctions. Among the Europeans, only Germany welcomes the idea of the lift of the embargo. The others oppose both a "rearmament of Muslims" and a strategy of limited air strikes. However, Owen advocates such strikes would be useful to break the deadlock (Keesing's: 39426).

April 27 - At their Brussels meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the NATO Member States (excluding France) make no mention to the possibility of air strike against Serbian forces in Bosnia (ER 1855). General Powell, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, is reported to say that the US Government would not contemplate any military intervention without a specific authority from the UN. The chairmen of the NATO's military committee, Vincent, attacks Western

⁵⁴ The new measures include: a ban on internal transport of goods except humanitarian aid approved by the UN; a ban of Yugoslavian naval traffic on the Danube outside territorial water; controlled foreign transport on the river; 12-miles-naval prohibition in the Adriatic Sea; freezing of FRY's assets abroad; confiscation of Serbian means of transport abroad and foreign means of transports suspected to breaking the embargo; a ban on all services - financial or other - with Yugoslavia except telecommunications, mail, and legal matters (*La Repubblica*, 25-26/4/93).

politicians and warns them to clarify first their aim in Bosnia-Herzegovina before debating over any form of military action (Keesing's: 39426).

- Russia's President, Yeltsin, reinforced by the results of the domestic referendum, warns Bosnian-Serbs no to expect a Russian protection if they continue to reject the Vance-Owen plan (Keesing's: 39426/7).

- Serb irregular forces enter a Bosnian-Muslim enclave near Bihac. The French UN troops in Bihac receive UN orders to protect the 300.000 Muslim civilians living there (Keesing's: 39426). On this same day, Serb forces attack the north eastern town of Gorazde, Gradacac and villages near Brcko. Movings are reported also near Tuzla, where thousands of Muslims went when escaping from Srebrenica.

April 28 - The French Government announces that it would consider calling back its 5.000 troops from ex-Yugoslavia if the UN does not clarify its role and improve its organisation on the ground. France had already, in early April, threatened to recall General Morillon - the UN Commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Keesing's: 39427).

- As a consequence of the more conciliatory stance now assumed by Milosevic towards the West, the Serbia's Assembly endorses the Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina⁵⁵. The new strategy of Milosevic seems to be the main reason for the split in the ruling alliance between Milosevic's Socialist Party and Seselj's ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party. Western analysts mainly attribute Milosevic's new position to the fact that Bosnian-Serbs have already achieved their military aims, and now they want to have the gains politically recognised and the international legitimacy re-gained (Keesing's: 39427).

April 29 - Russia's National Salvation Front threatens a strong reaction of the Russian population in case of an "aggression" of the "forces of the new world order" against the Serbs (ER 1855).

May 2 - Athens, under intense pressure from Milosevic, Karadzic accepts the Vance-Owen peace plan but subordinates its final approval to the Bosnian-Serb Assembly. The Western reaction is sceptical, whilst the Greeks are more optimistic (ER 1856).

May 5 - The Bosnian-Serbs Parliament rejects the Vance-Owen plan despite the presence of the Greek Prime Minister, Mitsotakis, the Yugoslav Federal

⁵⁵ Throughout the month of April, there has been intense diplomatic work in Geneva to convince Milosevic to exert pressure on Bosnian-Serbs in order to make them accept the Vance-Owen plan. The Russian envoy to the peace talks, as well as the Greek Prime Minister and UN officials have taken a very active role in this diplomatic effort.

President, Cosic, and the Serbian President, Milosevic, all urging acceptance (Keesing's: 39471).

May 6 - The US Secretary of State, Christopher, flies to Brussels to try to win the European support for the possible use of force in Bosnia. He, however, encounters the European - mainly French and British - opposition to either bombing Serbs positions in Bosnia-Herzegovina or lifting the arms embargo against Muslims.

- The UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 824, which declares Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Srebrenica to be "protected zones", orders all parties concerned to guarantee their freedom from "*armed attacks or any other hostile act*", and allows UN military observers to monitor their security. The UN workers on the ground fear that such areas would become 'ghettos'.

- Belgrade decides to close its borders with Bosnia and apply sanctions against the Bosnian-Serbs. Milosevic declares that the aim is to convince the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace plan in return for the West lifting of the UN-imposed sanctions on Serbia. The Assemblies of the FRY and Montenegro join Serbia's decision (Keesing's: 39471). Russia expresses "annoyance" with continuing Bosnian-Serb refusals (ER 1857: V).

May 9 - The UN Security Council condemns a major offensive launched in the areas of Mostar, Jablanica and Dreznica by the Bosnian-Croat Defence Force (HVO) reportedly supported by the Croat regular army. Tudjman, rather than condemn the HVO offensive, is reported to have conducted a triumphant tour in the area, proclaiming the Croats as the sole authority there (Keesing's: 39471). Analysts see the offensive as part of the Croat "ethnic cleansing" policy towards Muslims in areas in which the latter would have the majority under the Vance-Owen plan (Keesing's: 39471).

May 10 - The EC Foreign Ministers prefer to believe in Milosevic's changed attitude and reject the US suggestions to use force against Serb targets in Bosnia-Herzegovina or to relax the arms embargo on Muslims. They also ask the US and Russia to deploy ground-based forces in Bosnia, and warn the Croats to stop their offensive in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Civilian observers will be sent on the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Serbia and Croatia (ER 1858: V, 6).

May 14 - Pan-Serb Assembly in Belgrade: taking advantage of Bosnian-Serbs absence, Milosevic assures the passage of a Resolution in favour of the Vance-Owen plan (Keesing's: 39471).

May 18 - The EC Member States issue a political statement in which they consider the Bosnian-Serb referendum, which refused the Vance-Owen plan,

"invalid" (ER 1860). In an interview to *Le Monde*, the French Prime Minister, Balladur, calls on the US to collaborate with the Europeans in sharing the burden of operations on the battle field.

- Within a UN-convened meeting between Croats and Croat-Serbs, in Topusko (inside Serb-controlled territory) the disputing sides sign an "unconditional" cease-fire. This important result - the first since the serious escalation of conflict in January 1993 - has been prepared by intense diplomatic work of the Russian special envoy to the peace talks, Churkin, and the Russian ambassador to Croatia, Kerestdzhiyants (Keesing's: 39471).

May 19 - Karadzic, confidant of the Western hesitant response, calls for talks with Croats and Muslims on a partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three separated States (Keesing's: 39470).

May 21 - Josip Manolic, Speaker of the Upper House of the Croat Assembly, and very close to Tudjman, is reported to be back from secret talks with Serbia aimed at normalising the bilateral relations between the two countries (Keesing's: 39471)⁵⁶.

May 22 - France, the US, Russia, Spain and Great Britain, at a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Washington, adopt a joint action plan to "contain" the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina and guard UN "safe areas" for Muslim enclaves⁵⁷. Most Western analysts fiercely criticise the new plan judging it as a

⁵⁶ Manolic's strategy is reported to be the recognition of the autonomy of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) in exchange for Serbia's recognition of Croatia. However, the RSK claims that Croatia has not abandoned a military solution for the Krajina question. As a matter of fact, the Croat position has always been that of fully reincorporating all rebel-controlled areas. On the other hand, the RSK demands that the normalising of the Serbo-Croat relations should be submitted to Croatia's recognition of the independence of the RSK (Keesing's: 39472).

⁵⁷ Summarized, the Washington agreement includes the following points: (i) UN economic sanctions on the FRY would be maintained "until the necessary conditions" are met - including the withdrawal of Bosnian-Serb forces; (ii) Monitors - including aerial surveillance - and technical assistance would be provided to seal the Serbia-Bosnia border and guarantee Bosnian-Serb compliance with the international peace process; (iii) expansion of "safe areas" with Russian troops possibly joining French, British and the other troops presently protecting UN forces; (iv) the "no-fly" zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina would be retained; (v) rapid establishment of the War Crimes Tribunal; (vi) durable negotiated settlement should be reached based on the Vance-Owen - no better specified - "process"; (vii) Croatia should be deterred from helping Bosnian-Croat forces in their fight against Bosnian-Muslims; (viii) the number of monitors in Macedonia and the mainly-Albanian province of Kosovo-Motohija in Serbia is to be increased. No act of aggression versus Macedonia, Kosovo or other areas where minorities live would be tolerated; at the same time, however, no declaration of

de facto recognition of Serb and Croat military achievements on the battle field and their aim to partitioning Bosnia-Herzegovina at the expense of the Muslim population (Keesing's: 39469). The plan is also considered as a *de facto* renunciation to the Vance-Owen plan and to the implementation of a military option.

Izetbegovic rejects the plan as providing a basis for the creation of ghettos, and a legitimisation of Serb achievements on the battle-field (ER 1861: V, 9). The Organisation of the Islamic Conference condemns the plan as legitimising aggression against Bosnian-Muslims. Karadzic judges the plan as "*more realistic approach*" by the West. Milosevic rules out the possibility of deploying international observers on the Bosnia-Serbia border - as proposed in the May 22-plan - but keeps the sanctions towards Bosnian-Serbs. Hard-line Serbian nationalists such as Seselj, welcome the May plan as a victory for the Bosnian-Serbs (Keesing's: 39471). Disagreement among Western powers will emerge on how to put the plan into operation (Keesing's: 39469).

May 24 - Copenhagen, the EC Troika Foreign Ministers confirm that the joint plan is to be conceived only as an intermediate step aimed at saving human lives (ER 1861). The NATO Defence Ministers also discuss the May 22 plan reaching the conclusion that the "safe areas" proposal should not be seen as a substitute to the Vance-Owen plan, rather as a means of keeping it alive⁵⁸. On the contrary, on May 27, the European Parliament adopts a Resolution expressing Euro-MPs' disapproval of the May 22 joint plan, considering it as a form of acceptance of the achievements of the Serb aggression. The members of the Parliament also call for further EC humanitarian aid, urge the use by the UN and NATO of "*all necessary means*" - including the use of force - to stop the war, and urge the International Tribunal wto be activated "*without further delay*" (ER 1863).

- The relations between Slovenia and Croatia are reported to be severely strained over a border dispute over which bed of river the Dragonja should be taken to mark the border between the two States. Such a decision would involve the property of Portoroz with its airport and salt works (Keesing's: 39472).

independence by those areas would be supported; (ix) the possibility of recourse to new and tougher measures should be left open (Keesing's: 39469).

⁵⁸ The US Defence Minister, Les Aspin, supports the (new) plan, while his Dutch, Turkish, German and Italian colleagues express grave doubts - the latter two, in particular, because they have not been previously consulted (Keesing's: 39470). The nature and extent of UN future military involvement in field operations in ex-Yugoslavia remains nuclear (Keesing's: 39470).

May 25 - The UN Security Council agrees unanimously on Resolution 827, which establishes an International War Crimes Court for former Yugoslavia. Its task is to hear charges of war crimes committed in the country between January 1, 1991 and a date to be decided by the UN Security Council once peace has been restored⁵⁹ (Keesing's: 39470). Karadzic immediately denies his collaboration with the tribunal, judging it as "*an attempt to choose sides and proclaim one side guilty*" (Keesing's: 39470).

May 26 - Sarajevo, the new UN mediator, Stoltenberg, unsuccessfully tries to persuade the Bosnian leader, Izetbegovic, to accept the Washington accord.

May 27 - The Bosnian-Serb artillery crosses the UN cease-fire line and enters the Muslim-led town of Maglaj. Some 32.000 Muslim civilians are trapped. Analysts consider this as the final part of the Serb strategy to open a corridor across Northern Bosnia linking Bosnian-Serb strongholds to Serbia proper (Keesing's: 39471).

June 1 - In what is perceived as a consolidation of Milosevic's power, the FRY's Assembly passes a Resolution to remove from office the President of the FRY, Cosic, from June 1992. Lalic, Speaker of the Serbian Assembly, is to become the new President (Keesing's: 39518).

June 3 - The EC Commissioner for External Relations, Van den Broek, denounces the damage to the EC image that the failure in the management of the Yugoslav crisis has caused. He also stresses that in case "*Serbs do not wish to cooperate, we will have to choose between the use of armed force, air or other strike, or decide to allow Muslims to procure weapons with which to defend themselves*" (ER 1864: V, 14).

- The EC Commission grants 25 million Ecus to the FYRM in the context of the PHARE program⁶⁰. On June 7, the EC Commission will announce a ECHO support to independent media in former Yugoslavia of 3.7 million Ecus (ER 1864: V, 14)⁶¹.

⁵⁹ Resolution 827 embraces measures recommended by Secretary General Boutros Ghali in his report commissioned by the UN Security Council in February (in occasion of Resolution 808, with which it agreed in principle to the establishment of such a tribunal). The Tribunal is due to consist of one persecutor, two trial chambers and an appeal chamber, with a total of 11 judges. The death penalty cannot be imposed (Keesing's: 39471).

⁶⁰ The FYRM has already received 10 million Ecus in the context of the PHARE program and 15 million Ecus as a ECHO operation (ER 1864).

⁶¹ 1.5 million Ecus will be devoted to pay for the radio-ship *Broda* which transmits from the Adriatic international waters. 2.5 millions Ecus will be used to support four independent journals and a radio: *Oslobodenje, Monitor, Vreme, Borba* and *Radio B 92* (ER 1865).

- Meanwhile, Greece Prime Minister, Mitsotakis, refuses to accept the word "Macedonia" being included in the name of the Republic. However he declared himself ready to hold direct talks with Skopje's authorities (ER 1864: V, 14).

June 4 - The UN Security Council Resolution 836 allows the UNPROFOR to use force, including air power, in reply to attacks against the established "safe areas" in Bosnia-Herzegovina - see May 22 joint plan - or as reprisals against the obstruction of humanitarian convoys.

The Bosnian Government announces its readiness to cooperate with UNPROFOR on the basis of Resolution 836, but demands the extension of "safe areas", the establishment of corridors between them, and the withdrawal of surrounding Serb artillery (Keesing's: 39516).

June 8 - In a joint session, the North Atlantic Council and the Council of the WEU, approve the NATO/WEU co-ordinated operations which have been undertaken since July 1992 to monitor the embargo in the Adriatic Sea. Furthermore, the two Councils decide to take similar steps of joint action to implement the UN Resolution 820 (WEU doc. 1367: Ch. 3).

- Following an appeal from Lord Owen, the EC Foreign Ministers agree to increase the commitment of ground forces to protect the six safe areas. The next day the US Secretary of State, Christopher, echoes the Twelve, but links the eventual contribution in ground forces to the agreement of all the three parties in conflict on the Vance-Owen plan (Keesing's: 39516).

June 9 - Seeking compensation of \$500 million, Greece hands a report to the EC Commission on the damage that the embargo on the FRY and the Yugoslav war itself has caused on the Greek economy (ER, 1866: V, 4).

Meanwhile, following a scoop of the Danish newspaper *Jyske Vestkysten*, the members of the European Parliament call for the EC Commission to investigate over a Greek firm - probably supported through EC structural funds - suspected of having sold military equipment to Serbia.

- The EC Foreign Ministers meeting, Christopher and Owen present, agree on giving priority to the implementation of UN Resolution 836 - on setting up "safe heavens"- and the "the joint action programme". However, all technical procedures are left to NATO officials, and no answers are provided to the problems of financial contributions and size of military force⁶². Both Europeans and Americans impose implicit limits to their undertaking: the EC Member States,

⁶² Experts estimate between 5.000 and 50.000 soldiers will be needed to protect six safe heavens.

unprepared to supply extra contingents, discuss about asking Scandinavian and moderate Muslims, Russia and other Eastern European States to send troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Christopher repeats that the US is ready to provide air support to UNPROFOR only "when a negotiated settlement between the warring factions has been achieved" (ER 1866: V, 10).

June 9-13 - Intensive consultation, especially conducted by the international mediators Owen and Stoltenberg, takes place in order to prepare the re-opening of Geneva talks on June 16 (Keesing's: 39517).

June 10 - Paris, the French Prime Minister, Balladur, proposes a plan, prepared in cooperation with President Mitterrand, for a "pact on security and stability in Europe" as the first diplomatic act in the context of the future CFSP⁶³.

- Athens, at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting, Christopher announces the first US offer of ground troops to be deployed in former Yugoslavia - in particular, the 300 troops offered are due to be sent to the FYRM (Keesing's: 39518). The proposal of additional personnel is authorised by the UN Security Council with Resolution 842, unanimously passed on June 18. On the same day, the Council passes also Resolution 845 calling on Macedonia and Greece to reach a settlement on the ex-Yugoslav republic's name by the end of September (Keesing's: 39519).

June 11 - British troops escorting a Muslim relief convoy shot two HVO militiamen repeatedly attacking the convoy. This is the first reported killing by UNPROFOR soldiers (Keesing's: 39517).

June 13 - Some 50 Bosnian hospital patients and staff members are reported to have been killed at Gorazde under attack from Serb artillery. This is but the latest of a great number of deplorable incidents against civilian targets since the war started. Also UN forces members, reporters and journalists have been killed during the fighting.

⁶³ Those called to attend the conference would be Eastern European countries and some countries of the CIS facing territorial disputes and ethnic problems. In order to avoid conflicts of the Yugoslav type, the pact would oversee restricted talks between two or three countries searching for a stable agreement on the status of minorities, ethnic problems and questions of frontiers. The resulting agreements would be enshrined in a European pact. Using a diplomatic "stick and carrot strategy", Balladur proposes that any new EC membership should be contemplated only for those countries that have solved "any problem that could threaten European stability" (ER, 1866: 4). Balladur proposes to his Danish counterpart (Denmark holding the Presidency) to discuss the plan at the June 21-22 Summit of the EC in Copenhagen.

June 14 - Vienna, World Conference on Human Rights: Boutros Ghali embraces the idea of a *"new London Conference on former Yugoslavia, with a return to the basic principles adopted in London [in August 1992]"* (ER 1867: V, 9). The US Secretary of State declares to endorse the idea in so far as the Conference produces concrete results.

- Meanwhile, in Bosnia, the EC observers are excluded from an unprecedented agreement between Serbs and Croats for a transfer of civilians with exchange houses (a sort of "smooth ethnic cleansing"?!).

June 16 - Geneva, Serb and Croat representatives agree on a plan which would establish a confederation between the three ethnic entities present in Bosnia. It provides for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three independent nations of which the Muslim one would be reduced to central Bosnia with a *free zone* in the port of Ploce, on the Adriatic. The plan, disadvantageous for the Muslims, is rejected by them. As a consequence of the Geneva agreement, Owen seems willing to admit its co-authored plan - transformation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into an integrated State with 10 semi-autonomous provinces - is dead (ER 1869: V, 5).

- Meanwhile, the situation around Gorazde is deteriorating.

- The UN Security Council approves the proposal of the Secretary General to send further 7.600 troops for the implementation of the UN Resolutions.

June 19 - The Croat Serbs of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) hold a referendum for the unification of the RSK with the neighbouring "Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina" and with "other Serbian lands", and the establishing of a unitary Serb State (Keesing's: 39518).

June 21-22 - EC Summit in Copenhagen: President Izetbegovic in person calls for an end to the arms embargo on the Muslims⁶⁴. Germany and the Netherlands, in isolation, support the Bosnian request. The eventual collective position is again one of great moderation.

⁶⁴ During the month of June, Izetbegovic undertakes an extensive series of visits to European capitals - Paris, Vienna, Madrid, Ankara, Copenhagen - with the intent of sensibilising the European leaders to the plight of the Bosnian-Muslims, and to ask for a lifting of the arms embargo against them. However, the US, main adherents of lifting the UN arms embargo with respect to the Bosnian-Muslims, fail to gain the UN Security Council's approval for a Resolution on the issue (June 29). Boutros Ghali, for his part, opposes such a possibility, judging that would put the UN peace-keeping and humanitarian operations under serious danger (Keesing's: 39517).

- The UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 844 (June 22), which formally authorises the reinforcement of the UNPROFOR with respect to the safe areas (Keesing's: 39517).

June 28 - Within the EPC context, the EC Member States make a further call for the release of the Serb opposition leader Draskovik and his wife, imprisoned by Belgrade authorities. The first, unanswered, appeal was on June 7.

June 30 - The UN Security Council Resolution 847 extends the mandate of UNPROFOR for a further three months, and reserves to evaluate in a month-time UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia, in the light of a Secretary General report on the issue (Keesing's: 39517).

July 1 - General Cot replaces General Wahlgren as Commander of the UNPROFOR force (Keesing's: 39517).

July 5 - Copenhagen, the Vice President of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly - recently back from a visit to former Yugoslavia - strongly accuses Greece to have broken the embargo against Serbia, and asks for "*Greece's exclusion from the EC if it fails to apply these sanctions to the letter*". Greece's official spokesman declared the statement "*ridiculous*" (EC 1873: V, 10). Meanwhile, in Athens, an agreement on a "preventive surveillance" on Greek exports of oil to former Yugoslavia is reached. The surveillance is due to be exercised in Greece by national authorities and in ex-Yugoslavia by the EC Sanctions Assistance Mission (ER 1874).

July 7 - The national leaders of the G7 meeting in Tokyo threaten to withhold aid for economic reconstruction to Serbs and Croats if they do not stop their aggression against Bosnian-Muslims. They also declare that their States are ready to provide military and financial support for the implementation of the UN Resolution 836.

July 12 - New York, Owen and Stoltenberg issue a warning that the UN could withdraw from former Yugoslavia if the situation continues to deteriorate. The report is denounced by the Bosnian representative to the UN as a strategy aimed at pushing the Muslims to accept the Serb-Croat partition plan.

July 19 - Most EC Foreign Ministers, meeting in Brussels, favour the idea of imposing economic sanctions against Croatia. But Germany, supported by the Netherlands, warns that such sanctions would mainly weigh against the hundreds of thousands refugees - mainly Muslim - now living in Croatia. As a result, EC Foreign Ministers ask the Belgian counterpart - Belgium holding the EC Presidency - Claes to issue to Croatia and Serbia a statement of reproof (ER

1877: V, 9). However, Claes will be able to meet only Croat and Muslim leaders, and with no concrete success (ER 1878).

July 23 - A cache of 120 tonnes of arms is discovered in Slovenia, hidden in humanitarian aid containers. In August, the Slovene weekly *Mladina* will report that arms were sent from Saudi Arabia to support Bosnian-Muslims (Keesing's: 39606).

July 27 - The Geneva talks are resumed against a backdrop of continuing fighting - through which each warring party is trying to gain as much territory as possible before the conclusion of any peace agreement. After six months, face-to-face negotiations are resumed. On July 29, Izetbegovic reluctantly agrees on the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three constituent republics - Croat, Muslim and Serb - within a demilitarised Union of Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina. While Karadzic expresses his satisfaction, Izetbegovic stresses the agreement is only a "preliminary" one: *"The hardest part of the job remains [... :] maps"* (Keesing's: 39563).

July 28 - The EC Commission is careful enough to point out that an eventual auspicious inclusion of Macedonia in the PHARE list, would not have any implication for the name on which the EC Member States will eventually agree to recognise the country (ER 1880).

August 1 - The Geneva talks will not be resumed until August 16, since Izetbegovic will not agree to attend until Serb forces withdraw from their positions in the mountains surrounding Sarajevo (Keesing's: 39603).

August 2 - Mazowiecki, the UN special envoy for human rights in ex-Yugoslavia, expresses concern over the decision of the Croatian authorities of expelling war refugees and deporting them to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

- Behind the demand of the US, NATO's 16 members of the North Atlantic Council hold a two-day meeting in Brussels and reach an agreement over an extensive interpretation of UN Resolution 836: the possible use of air strikes is applicable not only to defend the UN troops in Bosnia, but also - as proposed by the US - to attack the positions of the Serb artillery around Sarajevo - still under siege (Keesing's: 39603)⁶⁵.

⁶⁵ The US President Clinton congratulates the North Atlantic Council for the decision, while Russia's special envoy defines the initiative as coming *"at a very bad time for negotiations"* (Keesing's: 39604). France and Canada, which, unlike the US, have ground troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina, express their concern for those forces. The UN Secretary General, Boutros Ghali, recalls that any possible use of aerial force has to be in total coordination and conformity with the UN (*Agence Europe*, 5/8/93).

However, a week later, the North Atlantic Council tones down its declaration, as - according to *The Guardian* - it "*tacitly acknowledged that the alliance lacked the political will for air strikes*" (*The Guardian*, 10/8/1993). The new communiqué states that possible air strikes will be limited to the support of humanitarian relief and "*must not be interpreted as a decision to intervene militarily in the conflict*".

- Despite this changed attitude, thanks both to NATO's threats and to the talks at the Sarajevo airport between General Briquemont (UN Commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina), General Mladic (Commander of Serb forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina) and General Delic (Commander of the Muslim-led Bosnian army), Serbs troops start to withdraw from the mountains surrounding Sarajevo. Only on August 15, however, General Briquemont announces the complete withdrawal from Mounts Bjelasnica and Igman.

August 9 - The UN Security Council Resolution 855 calls on the Government of the FRY to reconsider its decision of preventing the monitors of the CSCE to continue their work in Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina (Keesing's: 39606).

- From mid-August, Great Britain, followed by other States, starts a sort of aerial-lift of a selected number of sick and wounded children who could not be cured in Sarajevo⁶⁶.

August 16 - The Muslim-Croat fighting has even intensified during summer, especially in Mostar, where the UN and the ICRC reports that massive brutal acts - including "ethnic cleansing" and various types of human rights violations - have been perpetrated by Croat forces against the Muslim population. Meanwhile, also the fighting between the Croat troops and the RSK's troops continue (Keesing's: 39605).

August 16-20 - The negotiations in Geneva restart. Karadzic, Boban and Izetbegovic agree that Sarajevo should be demilitarised (except for the presence of the UN troops) and put under UN control for two years. An administrator should be appointed by the UN Secretary General and assisted by a multi-ethnic advisory body. Major divergencies emerged regarding the territories (i) around the Muslim enclaves of Gorazde, Zepa and Srebrenica - mostly Muslim before the war but now mainly Serb-controlled; (ii) central Bosnia; (ii) the cities of Mostar, Brcko, Bihac; (iv) the Bosnian access to the Adriatic Sea and the Sava river.

⁶⁶ Bosnian health authorities in mid-August '93 estimate that there are about 14.000 wounded children only in Sarajevo, and 39.000 in the whole Bosnia-Herzegovina (Keesing's: 39604).

On August 20 the talks are adjourned for 10 days in order to allow the participants to present the "Owen-Stoltenberg plan" to their respective parliaments (Keesing's: 39604). The plan consists of a tripartite division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, according to which: the Muslim population (previously the 44% of the Bosnian population) would have the 30% of Bosnia-Herzegovina in four blocks of land connected with corridors, with control of a part of Boko in order to have access to waterfront on the River Sava. Mostar would be put under the EC administration. The Serbs (previously the 30% of the population, now controlling the 70% of Bosnia-Herzegovina) would get the 52.5% of the territory, and the Croats (17% of the population) the 17.5% of land.

The implementation of the plan is estimated to require at least further 40.000 UN troops (Keesing's: 39605).

August 25 - The International Court of Justice meets to decide upon the request of the Bosnian Government to impose new "restrictory measures" against the FRY for its policy of genocide (*Agence Europe*, 30/7/93).

August 26 - The Supreme Defence Council of the FRY carries out a large scale purge of Army Generals. Meanwhile, in Kosovo, numerous reports testify to the rising tension. The President of the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, Rugova, is temporarily detained in Prostinja. EC observers report of Serb incursions also beyond the Albanian border (Keesing's: 39606).

- The Belgian Presidency of EC Council of Ministers issues a *communiqué* declaring that the EC Member States agree, in principle, to provide a provisional Government for the city of Mostar (Southern Bosnia). Nevertheless, after August 26, EC Member States argue over disparities in the interpretation of the *communiqué* (a temporary EC Government vs. a UN administration). Bosnian-Muslims would prefer a temporary EC Government to a UN administration of Mostar. Some UN plans for the administration of Sarajevo have been negotiated, but none of them can be implemented before the final result of the Geneva talks (ER 1881: V, 6).

August 27-28 - The Parliaments of the Bosnia-Herzegovina, and of the self-proclaimed Serbian and the Croat Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina debate the Owen-Stoltenberg plan. Serbs accept by 55 votes to 14, Croats accept subject to the condition of a previous acceptance of the other two sides and the correction of "*injustices committed against the Croat nation*". Three Croat members of the Bosnian Parliament leave and join the Bosnian-Croat negotiating team. The Bosnian Assembly assumes a divided position which leads to a conditional acceptance of the plan. The conditional factors are (i) that mediators should

resume the basic principles of 1992 London Conference - which included the rejection of territorial conquest by either force or ethnic cleansing; (ii) that the map should embrace those principles especially in eastern Bosnia (so that Muslims could regain the former Muslim-majority towns, now under Serb control, and access to the Adriatic Sea through the Croat-held port of Neum); and (iii) that the US and NATO guarantee the deal (Keesing's: 39605).

- Izetbegovic refuses to sign a peace formula as the Croats would not cede the town of Neum, which is considered a minimum requirement by the Bosnian-Muslims (Keesing's: 39645). For this reasons negotiations in Geneva break down again.

September 2 - German and British Foreign Ministers, meeting in Bonn, agree that there is no alternative to a continuation of peace talks (ER 1882).

September 5 - During his 4-day visit to the US, Izetbegovic requests assistance and support for Bosnian-Muslims and urges the UN Security Council to allow them to defend themselves by lifting the arms embargo (Keesing's: 39645 and 36945).

- A series of arrests prevent the Kosovian delegation from attending the Geneva meeting dealing with the problem of cultural and linguistic rights of the ethnic-Albanians (Keesing's: 39646).

September 9 - The Croatian army units launch an offensive in the RSK (Keesing's: 39646).

September 12 - Brussels, the US Defence Secretary, Les Aspin, declares that the NATO could provide 50,000 troops of whom no more than half from the USA. The troops should be requested by the UN to enforce a possible Bosnian peace agreement (Keesing's: 39645).

September 14 - After a long discussion, the European Parliament - with 99 votes in favour, 73 against and 4 abstentions - votes to ask Lord Owen to account for his role in peace negotiations (ER 1890).

- Izetbegovic and Tudjman carry out a joint declaration calling for a cease-fire between Bosnian troops and HVO by the 18th. They also agree on releasing by September 21 all prisoners held in the detention camps. An analogous agreement is reached between Izetbegovic and the Bosnian-Serbs' representative Krajcinski (Keesing's: 39645).

- Bosnian troops attack Uzdol, civilians die in the assault. The Bosnian military authorities promise an investigation. (Keesing's: 39645).

September 16 - The European Parliament adopts a Resolution supporting a military intervention under the auspices of the UN, in order to enforce the UN

Security Council Resolutions. The European Parliament also supports the Bosnian plea for access to the Adriatic Sea and for territorial corridors between central Bosnia and other Muslim enclaves. It also requires sanctions against Croatia - which continues to support aggression against the Bosnian population (ER 1886: V, 13).

October 4 - The EC Foreign Ministers call for the re-opening of the peace talks in Geneva - which Owen and Stoltenberg consider as having little prospect of beginning soon. The British Foreign Minister, Hurd, calls for the adoption of a global approach, an approach which would consider at the same time the relations between the Serbs and Croats, the Bosnian conflict and the issue of the Albanian minority in Kosovo. The EC Foreign Ministers also ask the WEU to provide for the organisation of a police force and the improvement of the operations in Mostar - a city which should be under an EC-appointed administrator for two years (ER 1892: V, 9). Consequently, the WEU sets up a working group to analyse the practical problems related to the administration of Mostar. The police force will be located in the Southern Bosnia and control the disputes between Croats and Muslims (ER 1892: V, 9).

October 7 - After a three-week inquiry the UN accuses the Croat forces of a "*comprehensive scorched earth policy*" in their offensive of September 9 (Keesing's: 39697)

October 11 - Talks between Macedonia's Minister of Privatisation and Coordinator of European Affairs with various EC officials, including Sir Leon Brittan. The EC will allocate half of the 110 million Ecus to the FYRM. Of this sum, 25 million was earmarked in June 1992 to help the import of raw materials. Another 35 million Ecus will be assigned through PHARE. The talks regard also a privatisation programme which includes 1,400 companies (ER 1893: V, 7-8).

October 12 - China and Macedonia agree to establish diplomatic relations (Keesing's: 39698). Belgium is the tenth EC Member State to officially recognise the FYRM (ER, 1898: V, 4-5).

October 14 - The UN Security Council condemns two Serbian organisations for blocking the Danube, and the Government of the FRY for doing nothing to stop them (Keesing's: 39697).

October 20 - Milosevic dissolves the Serbian People's Assembly and calls for an early general election on December 19 (Keesing's: 39697).

November 1 - Official introduction of the Treaty on the Union: The EC becomes EU.

Early November - A number of ethnic Albanians arrested in Macedonia (Keesing's: 39745).

November 2 - The US weekly *Newsday* describes an UNPROFOR's report on the human situation near Sarajevo. Serbs, heavily attacked by the reported situation, reply that it is all the result of a Western campaign against them (Keesing's: 39744).

November 4 - The European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security expresses the need to adopt a regulation in order to harmonise the possible sanctions which might be required in the case of an infringement of the EC embargo against the FRY (ER 1990: V, 12-13).

November 4-5 - Several leaders of the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS) are arrested. Milosevic is trying to undermine the SRS before the next elections, in December (Keesing's: 39745).

November 9 - Mostar bridge, a symbol of the unity of the two parts of the city, is definitively destroyed by Croat bombs⁶⁷. Meanwhile a new tragic massacre in Sarajevo kills children leaving school.

- Italy: a petition presented to the Italian President demands ethnic rape to be condemned by the tribunal on former Yugoslavia as a "crime against humanity" (*La Repubblica*, 10/11/93).

November 8 - *The Washington Post* reports of the temporary cooperation of international Mafias (Turkish, Albanian, Italian, Russian) for the development of a drug-arms traffic in the Balkans. The *Albanian Connection* seems to be the hinge of the system (*La Repubblica*, 10/11/93).

November 14 - The Italian Foreign Minister, Andreatta, affirms that his country is to recognise the FYRM within few days (ER 1903: V, 3).

- Karadzic calls for an immediate currency union between Serbia and the Serbian-inhabited territories of Bosnia and Croatia. This would be the first step toward the political unification of Serbian lands according to the right of self-determination (Keesing's: 39743)

November 17 - The international tribunal on war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, established by the UN Security Council in May 1993, holds its

⁶⁷ The 1566 bridge, a piece of ottoman art, was the last of the seven connecting the two parts of Mostar. Its symbolic value - erected during the ottoman occupation - and its strategic importance - it represented the only access to a source of drinking water for the 50.000 Muslims besieged in the western part of the town - rendered it one of Croats most preferred targets.

inaugural session in The Hague. However, the annual budget of the tribunal is still to be approved (Keesing's: 39763).

November 19 - Owen declares that the main problem in the negotiations is the Croat-Muslim war: *'there [are] many Croatian Army forces fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina and this has changed very much the dynamic of the civil war'* (Keesing's: 39744).

- The British Foreign Minister, Hurd, warns that the continuation of fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina could lead to the withdrawal of the British peace-keeping troops (Keesing's: 39784).

November 22 - The EC Foreign Ministers adopt the joint Franco-German proposal of conditional lifting of sanctions against Serbia: a gradual suspension of sanctions in exchange for territorial concessions to the Muslims (3%-4% more than provided in the September agreements), and an agreement of *modus vivendi* and confidence-building measures in Krajina. The Croats are requested to concede to the Bosnian-Muslims the access to the Adriatic Sea. Moreover, the EC Foreign Ministers threaten to have recourse to force if the parties involved fail again to respect humanitarian convoys. (ER 1904: V, 9-10).

In spite of those statements, Owen asserts that the Bosnian Government continues to seek a military rather than a diplomatic solution (Keesing's: 39743).

November 29 - Geneva, one-day meeting of the peace conference. A new agreement for a free movement of humanitarian convoys and UN personnel is signed (the previous one having been broken).

- Great Britain rejects Germany's proposal - backed by Greece - to establish an EU system of quotas for sharing refugees from former Yugoslavia⁶⁸.

- Greece's Foreign Minister, Pangalos, accuses Germany and its partners *"of plotting secretly"* to establish diplomatic relations with Macedonia. Greek diplomats in Brussels mitigate the significance of the Pangalos' statement. A German spokesman says that any decision on Macedonia could not be made without taking account of Greece's views (ER 1906: V, 14-15).

⁶⁸ Germany, having already admitted 370.000 refugees from ex-Yugoslavia, and Greece, fearing a massive influx of Albanians, convince their partners to consider the question. The Council states it will reflect on the question of *all* refugees in Europe, but many Member States, led by Great Britain, oppose any "burden sharing", quoting the UNHCR norm according to which displaced people should be placed as near as possible to original homes (ER 1907: I, 1).

November 30 - The EC Commission decides to provide a fund of 16,9 million Ecus to help victims of the conflict in the FRY. This sum would bring EU assistance to war victims in the FRY to 700 Ecus (ER 1906: V, 10).

- CSCE meeting at the level of meeting Foreign Ministers: Macedonia's membership is still blocked by Greece; the FRY remains suspended (Keesing's: 39795).

December 2 - France announces to establish diplomatic relations with Macedonia before the end of 1993 (ER 1907: V, 14). France is the only State of the EU, except from Greece, not to have *de facto* recognised the FYRM. France and Germany are now pushing for a "*greater recognition of the new republic*" by the EU Member States (ER 1907: V, 14)⁶⁹. In response, Greece Prime Minister, Papandreu, suggests that a diplomatic recognition of Macedonia might prompt Greece to close its borders with the republic (Keesing's: 39785). At the December 10-11 European Council, Greek officials stress "*the need for an EU bond of fellowship and the common and external policy principles agreed upon in the Maastricht Treaty*". The position of the Greek Government on the matter - they continue - is "*non-negotiable*" (ER 1909: V, 3).

December 6 - Radio Sarajevo reports that the Bosnian Prime Minister has denounced the Bosnian-Serbs for using chemical weapons to the UN Security Council. On the other hand, on December 1, the Bosnian-Serbs leader, Mladic, demanded UNPROFOR intervention in order to stop the production of chemical weapons in the Muslim-controlled city of Tuzla (Keesing's: 39785).

- The ICRC states that 90% of its emergency aid has been obstructed by the warring parties. In an attempt to let Muslims-controlled areas receive aid, on December 10 UNPROFOR announces the suspension of essential fuel to Bosnian-Serbs (Keesing's: 39785).

December 10-11 - Brussels, the European Council - adopting a "carrot-like-strategy" - reinforces its last November promise of progressively suspend sanctions against Serbs if they make "*real territorial concessions*" to Bosnian-Muslims and accept "*the modus vivendi in Croatia*" (ibidem)⁷⁰. Belgium,

⁶⁹ On November 29, the Greek Foreign Minister, Pangalos, in criticising Germany for its "dangerous" policy of early recognition of ex-Yugoslav Republics, described it as "*a giant with bestial force and a child's brain*". The diplomatic incident, however, was solved in a few days with Pangalos excuses to the German Foreign Minister, Kinkel (Keesing's: 39786).

⁷⁰ Actually, at the negotiations table, the Serbian side is still refusing to concede to Bosnian-Muslims the additional 3-4% of territory requested. Muslims' demand for one third of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory and access to the sea is regarded as legitimate and fair by the EU

Germany and the Netherlands are reported to have criticised Owen for having failed on his November 29-December 2 efforts to make the Bosnian-Serbs concede more territory to the Bosnian-Muslims (Keesing's: 39784).

December 14 - Izetbegovic's claim of increasing military strength of Bosnians seems to underscore Owen's assertion that the Bosnian Government would prefer a military rather than a diplomatic solution to the crisis (Keesing's: 39785).

December 16 - Six EU Member States - Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Great Britain - recognise Macedonia under the name of *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM)*. The decision is described by Greece's spokesman as "*a bad blow to European Solidarity*". However, on December 20, the EU Foreign Ministers assure Greece that the decision to establish diplomatic ties with Macedonia is not at all a recognition of its flag and symbols. The six make it clear that a *de facto* recognition of the country is in existence by April 1993, when the UN accepted Macedonia's membership (ER 1911: V, 6).

December 17 - Officials from the EU and the UN meet the Bosnian-Muslim leaders in Vienna to gain a clearer picture of Muslims' needs and demands (ER 1911: V, 6).

December 19 - Echoing a November 19 warning by Great Britain's Foreign Minister, Hurd, on the possibility of withdrawing UN troops from Bosnia-Herzegovina, France Defence Minister, Léotard, states that a decision on continuing the UN presence in former Yugoslavia should be taken before next spring: failure to reach peace diminish the European willingness to maintain troops on the field.

- Legislative elections in Serbia: the Socialist Party of Serbia gains 22 seats as compared to the elections of December 1992. The electoral results are notably for a decisive shift to the nationalist right by a number of opposition parties. The neo-fascist Serbian Radical Party (SRS) comes out as the third largest party in Parliament. The elections are boycotted by Albanian Kosovians (Keesing's: 39785).

December 20-21 - The UN General Assembly overwhelmingly passes a Resolution urging the UN Security Council to consider lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government and preventing the FRY from supporting the Bosnian-Serbs with arms (Keesing's: 39785).

leaders, which have also appealed on the Croat Government on this point (ER 1910: document).

- Geneva, Milosevic and Tudjman agree on a draft agreement proposal envisaging a partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Muslims occupying the 33.3% of the territory, Croats the 17.5%, and Serbs the remaining 49%⁷¹. Izetbegovic refuses the deal as the Muslim republic would be divided into several enclaves, and with an unclear control over Sarajevo - whose status is still to be decided. Karadzic threatens that unless the Bosnian-Muslims accept the deal by January 15, a sovereign Serb State occupying 70% of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be proclaimed (Keesing's: 39784).

December 23 - The Bosnian-Croat Leader, Boban, agrees on an EU provisional administration over Mostar, the scene of month-long fierce fighting between Croats and Bosnians (Keesing's: 39784).

January 4, 1994 - In an interview to BBC, Owen threatens the withdrawal of the UN troops from Bosnia if negotiations do not make significant progress.

January 5 - The Greek Premier, President-in-Office of the European Council from January 1, meeting President of the EC Commission, Delors, underlines Greece's special concerns in the Balkans. Particularly, he calls upon his partners in the EU to "*at least make use of*" their "*unfortunate*" opening of diplomatic relations with Macedonia to "*exercise pressure*" on the republic in order to force it to "*make concessions*" on particular constitutional reforms and the use of Greek symbols⁷². Papandreu also touches the Cyprus question, which Greece's partners have recently used as a "compensatory" measure to the recognition of the FYRM, by assuring the presence of the EU Commission at the New York negotiations table for the division of the island (ER 1905: I, 1; V, 5).

Meanwhile, the Greek Foreign Minister, Pangalos, condemns the embargo against Serbia as "*ineffective and unilateral, whereas a fairer attitude would be to impose sanctions on all three sides*" (ER 1905: V, 7).

January 6 - Albright, the US permanent representative at the UN, warns that the continuation of the Croat military involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina could lead

⁷¹ The Bosnian-Serb agreement offering more territory to Muslims was offered in spite of Bosnian-Serb military leader Gen. Mladic's veto on land concessions (*Financial Times*, 10/12/93). Until now, Bosnian-Serbs were prepared to offer only 31% of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory for a Muslim-populated Republic (Keesing's: 39784).

⁷² At this time the FYRM has nine embassies from EU Member States. Spain and Portugal do not yet have formal representation in Skopje, allegedly due to a form of "Mediterranean solidarity" with Germany. However, both of them are also reported to be likely to follow the other EU Member States in the future (ER 1905: V, 5).

to the imposition of economic sanctions against Croatia. On December 28, the Croat Defence Minister, Susak, threatened full-scale intervention unless the genocide of Bosnian-Croats by the Bosnian Government was not stopped (Keesing's: 39606).

January 10 - Izetbegovic rejects and describes as "too late" the Croat proposal to create a common market between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, with open borders and free access to the sea (Keesing's: 39606).

January 11 - At the NATO summit in Brussels, the allies "continue to believe that the conflict in Bosnia must be settled at the negotiating table and not on the battlefield." (final *Communiqué*, reported in ER 1916: V, 9). However, the 16 Member States approve a plan for possible aerial selective bombing of Serb military strongholds to re-open the airport of Tuzla and allow the substitution of Canadian forces stuck in Srebrenica⁷³. In reality, NATO Member States do not seem so keen on the idea of launching air-strikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Great Britain and France fear for their troops on the field and the US call for "an express demand" from the Security Council before taking any action. In the light of all these uncertainties, Croats and Serbs intensify aerial attacks and violate the no-fly-zone (*La Repubblica* 30/1/93; ER 1917: V, 10).

- The Vatican Council "Justitia et pax" uses strong words against the ineffectiveness of the international community intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina and restate the Pope's appeal (30/11/93 and 5/1/94) against a division of the country on ethnic basis (*Il Corriere della Sera*, 12/1/94; ER 1917: V, 10).

January 13 - In view of the new round of negotiations (Geneva, 18/1) and strong of the NATO's threat, Izetbegovic declares that the 33,3 % of the Bosnian territory gained at the negotiations table is "totally insufficient" for Muslims.

January 18 - The French General Cot, Commander in Chief of the UNPROFOR, will be replaced. Ghali demanded to the French Government his withdrawal after Cot's request for decisional authority over a possible military actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina (*La Repubblica* 19/1/94). The Commander of the UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, General Briquemont, resigns and is replaced by General

⁷³ Several reports suggest that the question of Bosnian safe areas is put into NATO's agenda due to French insistence. As a matter of fact, many countries, Great Britain first, are concerned for their troops on the ground in case of possible air-strikes. US officials are even reported to be "annoyed" by French insistence (Keesing's: 39606). Russian *Duma*, for its part, passes a motion on January 21, warning about the dangers of air strikes and call for lifting sanctions against Serbia.

Rose on January 24. Behind his "personal reasons" there might have been his denounced dissatisfaction with the insufficient resources provided for the implementation of the UN Resolutions.

- The failure of the new round of talks and the events on the battle field lead the international community to fear a preparation of an "all-out-war" in the spring. On January 31, Karadzic announces he is ordering full mobilisation. Furthermore, as a response to the continuing successes of Muslim forces, Croatia and Serbia commit regular forces to supplement, Bosnian-Croat and Bosnian-Serb forces respectively⁷⁴.

January 19 - As a result of bilateral negotiations in Geneva, the FRY and Croatia sign a joint declaration agreeing on the normalisation of diplomatic relations between them and the opening of a representative bureau in the other State's capital.

- Izetbegovic declares that the Muslims would consider sufficient the agreed one third of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory only if it includes 1.5 % of Croat "key-lands" and some "best quality" land attributed to Serbs.

January 20 - The EP, with 160 votes against 90, demands the withdrawal of Lord David Owen as mediator for the EU in the Bosnian conflict. In spite of the many critics to Owen's performance as EC/EU mediator - already pronounced by various European leaders - Owen's position does not seem under threat (ER 1922: supplement). The British Government expresses unequivocal support of him, and there not seem to exist any generally-acceptable alternative to him. As a matter of fact, one day later, the EU Member States issue a declaration whereby they renew their support to Owen (ER 1920: V, 6).

January 21 - France calls for an urgent EU summit on Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the presence of the US and Russia. France, Great Britain, Spain and Canada declare to be ready to withdraw their Blue Helmets from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

January 24 - The US President, Clinton, confirms his country's opposition to a military involvement in former Yugoslavia, declaring that the international community cannot stop the civil war between the Bosnian populations despite their willingness. The same position is taken by the US Secretary of State,

⁷⁴ According to the *Financial Times* of January 31, the Bosnian Government claims that some 20.000 regular Croatian troops are present in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both UN sources and Western newspapers (*The Guardian*, January 27) confirm the presence also of Serb troops in the Republic. The independent Croatian weekly *Feral Tribune* (January 5) reports of forcible conscription in both Serbia and Croatia to combat in Bosnia-Herzegovina - the information will be also reported by the UNHCR office of Belgrade (Keesing's: 39827).

Christopher, talking in Paris with the French Foreign Minister, Juppé (*La Repubblica* 26/1/93). The latter, on the contrary, would seek for stronger American pressure on the Muslims - who seem now to have taken the military initiative - to accept the peace plan. On January 25, Juppé warns the US that they would be responsible for "a catastrophe" in Bosnia-Herzegovina if they fail to join the European and Russian pressures on the warring parties to reach a settlement. Calls for prudence came also from Canada where the Foreign Minister, Ouellet, rejects that aerial attacks could solve the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (*La Repubblica*, 26/1/93).

January 25 - Izetbegovic affirms he would welcome the idea of a fresh and broader conference on Yugoslavia - on the type of 1991 Paris conference on Cambodia (ER 1920: V, 7).

January 26 - Moscow proposes an extraordinary summit of the UN Security Council at the level of Foreign Ministers, with the participation of directly involved leaders together with the Serb and Croat Presidents. The central aim of the meeting would be to impose a cease fire, and, in case of success, to release part of the economic sanctions against FRY. The US seem to welcome the initiative even if considering too easily talking of sanctions-lift. Of contrary advice is President Izetbegovic, is of contrary opinion, demanding the international community to lift the arms embargo against Muslims, to bomb Serbs strongholds, and to allow the replacement of eventually leaving-western Blue Helmets with Islamic soldiers. For his part, Van den Broek, speaking before EP's Commission on foreign affairs and security, calls for the lifting of the arms embargo on Muslims should EU and UN efforts fail to bring peace. The Commissioner had already affirmed this opinion before (ER 1921: V, 8).

Russian proposal of consultations on Bosnia-Herzegovina within the UN Security Council (where it enjoys the right of veto) is, however, not welcome to France and eventually rejected by the US (ER 1921: V, 8).

January 27 - Akashi announces that investigations into corruption of UNPROFOR members have not revealed any evidence. However, 23 soldiers are sent back home for disciplinary action (Keesing's: 39828).

January 28 - Three Italian journalists are killed in Mostar. General Cot, accuses the Bosnian-Croat Defence Force (HVO). The same troops that already attacked UN humanitarian aid convoys. Italian Foreign Minister Andreatta demands formal excuses from the Croat Government (*La Repubblica*, 30/1/94).

- In his report to the UN Security Council, Boutros Ghali states that the UN should be ready to send adequate land troops, in case air forces prove insufficient

to re-open Tuzla's airport and allow the replacement of the UN soldiers in Srebrenica.

January 31 - During his visit in Washington, the Greek Foreign Minister, Papoulias, calls for an end to the embargo on the FRY⁷⁵.

February 1 - In a letter to the UN Security Council, Boutros Ghali responds to his critics - that have accused his despotic and uneven performance - trying to show firmness in the Yugoslav crisis. "There is no reason - he states - for the UN not to use force in Bosnia". The letter is, however, a document of diplomatic prudence: his local representative, Akashi, is authorised to have recourse to aerial support in case international troops are attacked, but only with the agreement of the fighting parties - otherwise the question should turn back to the UN Security Council.

February 3 - The UN Security Council warns Croatia to withdraw its regular troops deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina or face "*serious measures*". On February 17, in a letter to the Security Council, Boutros Ghali states that some 3.000-5.000 Croat soldiers are still in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, both the international pressure on Croatia, and the resignation, on February 8, of the intransigent separatist Boban as leader of Bosnian-Croats, will lead to a cease-fire between Bosnian-Croat and Bosnian-Muslims on February 23.

- Russia formally recognises the independence of Macedonia (Keesing's: 39872).

February 5 - The death of dozens of civilians in a bomb attack on a market place in Sarajevo galvanise support amongst the international community. The US and Russia act more decisively, although not apparently in jointly, to put an end to the siege of the city (Keesing's: 39870).

As regards the responsibilities of such a grave breach of international law, the UN investigating commission judges the evidence "*insufficient to prove that any party or the other fired*"; Russian special envoy Churkin says he is "*almost certain*" Serbs were not the aggressors (Keesing's: 39870).

February 6 - UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali formally asks for NATO's confirmation that a future request of air strikes against Serb artillery in and

⁷⁵ He also expresses the opinion that all warring parties should be equally treated as equally responsible. On the contrary the US Administration considers the Muslims as the main victims of the war, therefore not to be put under the same pressure as the aggressors - which is one of the points of disagreement that the US have also with France (ER 1922: V, 13).

around Sarajevo - "*responsible for attacks to civilian targets*" - would be immediately granted (Keesing's: 39870)⁷⁶.

February 7 - The French proposal - supported by Italy and Belgium - to issue an *ultimatum* to demilitarise Sarajevo is firmly opposed by Great Britain, Germany, Greece, and Owen himself. Therefore, the six hour meeting of the Twelve Foreign Ministers ends with a declaration on the substantial absence of an alternative to the "peace plan" for a solution to the Yugoslav crisis (ER 1924: V, 8). Therefore, also the reiterated threat of air strikes, which also appears in the document, does not seem highly credible.

- The US recognises the FYRM. Spain delays this decision especially since it has been asked by UN Security Council to function as a mediator between Greece and Macedonia (ER 1926: V, 6). The US recognition leads to a rising apprehension in Greece and a great demonstration in the US organised by powerful American-Greek lobbies (ER 1927: V, 7).

- Second round of talks (the first on January 25) between the Prime Ministers of Slovenia and Croatia. The meetings do not resolve the dispute on the borders between the countries, but are reported to settle some important economic issues (Keesing's: 39872).

February 9 - Brussels, NATO ambassadors endorse Ghali's request to implement any future UN request of air strike⁷⁷, and give a ten-days *ultimatum* to Bosnian-Serbs to withdrawal or put under UN-control all their heavy weaponry in the 20 km belt round Sarajevo. Air strikes would be carried out against any Serb-controlled heavy weapons remaining in the "exclusion zone" by midnight on February 20-21⁷⁸. The *ultimatum* is criticised by Greece, Romania and Hungary⁷⁹.

⁷⁶ The legal basis for such action would lie in the UN Security Council Resolution 836, which authorised UNPROFOR "*to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas*" - established by UN Security Council Resolution 824 (May, 93).

⁷⁷ Germany is the only member of NATO that does not support air strikes. However, it agrees not to veto the decision over the *ultimatum* (Keesing's: 39870). NATO had already made provisions for air strikes in August 1993, when it took the decision to adopt "*stronger measures including air strikes*" in the event of strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas.

⁷⁸ The implementation of the *ultimatum* is reported to proceed with some confusion until February 17 because of diverging "ideas" of "UN control over Serb heavy weapons between NATO and the UN - 'delivery of vs. 'monitorage on' (see *Washington Post*, February 16). By February 17, only 20% of the estimated armaments are put under UN 'control'.

⁷⁹ Hungary is claimed to have changed attitude towards FRY in return for a concession of autonomy to Vajvodina - the Serb province mainly inhabited by ethnic Hungarians (Keesing's: 39870).

Russia expresses grave doubts, while countries with troops on the ground - such as Canada - fear a Serb retaliation (as threatened by Serbian opposition politicians) - (Keesing's: 39870).

- The UN call for further troops to be sent in to ex-Yugoslavia. Despite the negative reactions of Great Britain to the request, on February 27, General Rose asks again for reinforcements. General Rose also decides that relief convoys should move freely in Bosnia-Herzegovina, under armed escort and *without prior negotiation with local militia* (Keesing's: 39871)⁸⁰.

February 10 - The European Parliament issues a Resolution supporting NATO's *ultimatum*, and calling also for the respect of the "safe heavens" and the humanitarian aid. During the debate on the Resolution, the Greek MEPs express their regret at the NATO's decision, objecting that any military action could lead to a dangerous escalation of the conflict (ER 1925: V, 5).

February 12 - Sarajevo enjoys the first day with no-casualties in 22 months (Keesing's: 39870). However, the actual large-scale withdrawal of Serb equipment from the "exclusion zone" will take place only from February 17 on, after a controversial intervention of Russia. Although the Russian representative at the UN agreed on Boutros Ghali being empowered to order eventual air strikes (February 10), Churkin, on February 18, says air strikes would lead to "*all-out-war*", while Yeltsin on the warns the German Chancellor, Kohl, that his country would not allow attempts "*to resolve the problems of Bosnia without Russia*" (Keesing's: 39870)⁸¹.

February 16 - Without the prior consultation of its European partners, Greece decides to forbid supplies of hydrocarbons and other goods, arriving in the port of Salonika, to reach the FYRM, and closes the Greek embassy in Skopje. The EC Commission send Van den Broek to Skopje and Athens to mediate and report back on the possibility of instituting ECJ proceedings against Greece. Albania, Bulgaria, Italy, and Turkey reach an agreement with Macedonia on the creation of a road and rail transport corridor so as to ease the effects of Greece's blockade

⁸⁰ On February 3, Rose's threat to clear an aid route near Sarajevo by force persuaded Bosnian-Serbs to re-open the route to the UN vehicles.

⁸¹ The Russian's newfound assertive behaviour seems to be linked both to the growing pro-Serb sentiment among Russian nationalists - *à la* Zhyrinovsky - and to the Russian concern that its role in international politics has been neglected (Keesing's: 39870).

at Thessalonika - where about 90% of Macedonian fuel used to arrive (ER 1923: V, 10).

February 17 - During a meeting with Russia's special envoy, Churkin, Karadzic agrees on a deal according to which the Bosnian-Serbs would withdraw immediately the "exclusion zone" and will be replaced by some 800 Russian troops. According to a UN official, however, the Russian initiative is "*unilateral and has nothing to do with the UN*" (The Independent, February 18). The US welcome the initiative but express surprise for Russian troops deployed in Sarajevo. The Bosnian Government, for its part, whilst welcoming the withdrawal of Serbian heavy weaponry from round Sarajevo, fears the Russian troops could possibly favour the Serbs (Keesing's: 39871). As a matter of fact, the first 400 Russian troops arrive in Sarajevo, on February 20, "*greeted by jubilant crowds of Serbs*" (Keesing's: 39871).

February 20 - Despite the partial withdrawal of all Serb heavy weaponry by the deadline established by NATO, the UN special envoy, Akashi, declares that sufficient progress has been made and "*there is no need for air strikes*" (Keesing's: 39871). The UN General in Chief, Rose, however, warns the Serbs against any new shelling.

Furthermore, General Rose calls for an extension of the same "tactical model" to other areas of conflict, such as Mostar, or - as France and Great Britain are urging - the reopening of Tuzla's airport (Financial Times, 23/2/1994). However, both Clinton (February 21) and Churkin (February 22) are cautious about further threat of the use of force (Keesing's: 39871). The EU Foreign Ministers stress that the success of the *ultimatum* against Serb's siege of Sarajevo is "sufficient" for the time being and that it is paramount for the EU to maintain a united front so as not to weaken their action (ER 1928: V, 9).

February 22 - Germany stages and hosts a high-level international conference in Bonn with the aim of preparing a new international conference on Yugoslavia. The EU Member States, the three warring factions, the US, the UN, Canada and Russia are represented. However, the meeting does not lead very far as diverging positions emerge about what strategy to use next. If the Netherlands, Denmark, and Belgium propose to extend the *ultimatum* strategy to all cities under Serb siege, Russia opposes such a possibility. The US and France would assume a firm strategy but not as firm as the *ultimatum* issued for Sarajevo. Great Britain's Foreign Minister, Hurd, thinks the UN should have plans tailored to each specific area (ER 1928: V, 9).

February 23 - Cease-fire between Croats and Muslims (see February 3). Western media report that the US is making a great effort to back a plan of a Confederation of the Muslim and Croat regions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, possibly comprising also Croatia. Talks on the issue will start on February 26 in Washington, and will be attended by the Foreign Minister of Bosnia, Silajdzic, the leader of the Bosnian-Croats, Zupac, and Croatia's Foreign Minister, Granic (Keesing's: 39871).

- The Serbian-controlled authorities in Kosovo announce the immediate closure of the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Kosovo. The ethnic Albanian newspaper *Bukju* denounces the move as "*an act of genocide against Albanian science, culture and education*" (*Bukju*, 24/2/94; reported in Keesing's: 39872). The Academy had been officially abolished in 1992.

February 27 - In response to the request of the EU Commission to Greece to present a written explanation of its behaviour towards Macedonia, in a letter to the Commission the Greek Prime Minister, Papandreu, presents the legal ground for Greece's *de facto* embargo. Greece insists that the embargo will be lifted only once Macedonia has changed the required constitutional articles and abandoned certain emblems from its flag - considered to belong to Greece's heritage. On return from his mission, Van den Broek asserts that no negotiation would be possible whilst Greece maintains the embargo on Macedonian goods (ER 1923: V, 6).

The EU Commission will eventually consider Greece's action as "illegal" in terms of the Union law, as it blocks important trades between Macedonia and EU Member States. Furthermore, the action was not previously discussed with EU partners (against art. 224). However, the EU Commission decides not to take immediate legal action against Greece.

February 28 - The NATO aircraft enforcing the no-fly-zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina take the first aggressive military action not only of the Western management of the Yugoslav crisis, but of NATO's history. As a result, four Soko G-4 Super-Galeb aircraft are shot down near Banja Luka. Karadzic denies their suspected Bosnian-Serb origin.

March 1 - The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopts a Resolution condemning Greece's trade embargo on the FYRM (ER 1931: V, 7).

- At the end of a three-day meeting in Washington, the leaders of Croatian-Croats, Bosnian-Muslims and Croats, declare to have reached a provisional agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina (Keesing's: 39926). Further talks, taking place in Vienna on March 4-12, will lead to an agreement over a 52-pages

constitution - drafts by the US diplomats, which will eventually be signed on March 26⁸². In separate talks in Split on March 12, a preliminary agreement over a common Muslim-Croat army is reached. According to international media, the two sides are engaged in the orderly withdrawal of heavy weapons from lines of mutual confrontation (Keesing's: 39926).

March 3 - Akashi requests the presence of 10.650 more peace-keepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The British Government, in a striking change of attitude, is the first to respond with 900 extra troops.

March 7 - The President of the EU Commission, Delors, promotes a meeting between the Greek Foreign Minister, Papoulias, and the UN special envoy to the FYRM, Vance, to discuss the Greek embargo on Macedonia.

March 10 - In a Resolution on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the European Parliament calls on the EU Member States to make any effort in order to ensure the real application of the UN Resolutions *"not only in Sarajevo, but also in Maglaj, Mostar and Vitez, town which should already be under protection"*. The Serb militias - states the Resolution - should immediately halt their offensive on populated areas such as Srebrenica, Zepa, etc., and the EU Commission should *"immediately"* make available the necessary credit in order to provide material aid to support democracy. The MEPs also congratulate the European Federation of Journalists for their work on the ground (ER 1934: V, 2).

March 12 - A series of incidents causing the death of French soldiers, including the Serb bombardment of French positions by Serb heavy weapons, prompt French peace-keepers in the Muslim enclave of Bihac, to request air support. However, three hours pass before the request is met, this raises doubts about the real capacity of the UN to provide air support to the UNPROFOR troops⁸³.

March 15 - Peter Kessler, a UN spokesman, describes the Serb refusal to allow aid to reach the Maglaj - under Serb siege since May 1993 - as a strategy of "ethnic cleansing by starvation". The 100.000 Muslim inhabitants are surviving on food supplies dropped off by the UN aircraft (Keesing's: 39926).

March 16 - General De Lapresle succeeds General Cot as Commander in Chief of the UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

⁸² It is reported that the US have offered significant 'financial incentives' to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to obtain their cooperative attitude (Keesing's: 39926).

⁸³The UN chain of command requires first the approval of the Commander of the UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Gen. Rose, then of the Commander of the UN forces in former Yugoslavia, Gen. Cot, finally of Akashi (Keesing's: 39926).

March 18 - Washington, representatives from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia sign an agreement for the creation of a federation of the Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, and a *"preliminary agreement on the establishment of a confederation"* linking the planned Bosnian federation in a loose confederation with Croatia⁸⁴.

March 22 - A UN aircraft bearing 22 tones of aid and carrying the UN envoy, Akashi, lands at Tuzla's airport. It is the first time the airport is re-opened since its forceful closure by Serb troops in 1992⁸⁵. The event is mainly due to an agreement secured by the Russian Foreign Minister with Karadzic on March 1. Such an agreement includes the possibility for the UN aircraft to land, prior to a Serb inspection of the aid cargo (Keesing's: 39926).

March 23 - In spite of the opposition of the Bosnian-Serbs, Boutros Ghali authorises the deployment of Turkish troops in Bosnia under the UN banner. Greece immediately expresses its opposition, considering the UN decision a *"deviation from the basic principles in the UNPROFOR constitution"*. The Greek representative at the UN states that Turkey is not only the occupation force in Cyprus, but also a Balkan State with interests in former Yugoslavia. The Greek Government does not exclude the possibility of sending troops to ex-Yugoslavia too if Turkish personnel joins UNPROFOR (ER 1937: V, 11).

March 28 - Van den Broek issues Greece the final deadline, after which he will bring the case of its embargo on Macedonia before the ECJ. The Greek Government has until the resumption of work after the Easter break to make up its mind - i.e. until April 6. Also the other EU Member States took a criticising position towards Greece at their March 26-27 informal meeting in Ioannina (GR). For his part Vienizelos, spokesman for the Greek Government, dismisses the criticisms remarking that they will only encourage the FYRM to harden its position. As legal arguments in support of Greece's embargo, Vienizelos refers to art. 224 of the Treaty in its part concerning order and public security. The EU partners, however, reject Greece's claim of acting in response to an "external danger" (ER 1838: V, 7).

⁸⁴ The plan envisages a federation devised into Swiss-like cantons, with a strong central government responsible for defence, foreign affairs and economic policy. It contemplates the annual rotation of the Prime Minister office and Presidency between the two main ethnic groups. The three-sides-signed agreement over a confederation envisages the creation of a "Confederative Council" with an annually-rotating chair. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia - states the agreement - should take gradual steps towards the formation of a common market and monetary union at the proper time.

⁸⁵ Even if Tuzla is in a Muslim-controlled area, the Bosnian-Serb forces prevented any plane from landing in its airport by means of heavy weaponry surrounding the city.

- New Serb bombardments on the UN-proclaimed "safe haven" of Gorazde, in eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina. A spokesman of the UNHCR office in Sarajevo reports that Serb "ethnic cleansing" against the Muslim population is continuing in the Northern town of Banja Luka and the surrounding area.

March 30 - Thanks to the mediation of Russia's special envoy, Croatia agrees on a cease-fire with the self-declared Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK). The UNPROFOR will provide buffer-troops (Keesing's: 39927).

March 31 - On the basis of costs, the US veto a plan for the dispatch of further 8500 peace-keepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, agreeing on the compromised number of 3.500⁸⁶ (Keesing's: 39926).

April 6 - On the basis of art. 225 of the Treaty, the EC Commission dismisses Greece's use of art. 224 to justify the embargo against the FYRM. The case will be brought before the ECJ on April 13 if the embargo is not lifted before that date. Symptomatic of their intransigence is the declaration of the Greece's Minister of Public Order according to which the country would "*never give in to blackmail*". Almost all Greek newspapers share the perception expressed by the daily *Ta Nea* that "*the Union has put a gun to Greece's head*" (ER 1838: V, 10).

April 8 - The American and Russian negotiators step up the pressure on Serbs and Muslims to stop the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A diplomatic search for a global political settlement is the objective of a meeting in Sarajevo. Meanwhile, General Rose struggles unsuccessfully for an effective cease-fire in Gorazde (*Financial Times*, 9 and 12/4/94).

April 11 - The NATO aircraft attacks the Serb forces advancing towards Gorazde during the night (*Financial Times*, 12/4/94).

April 16 - The EC Commission brings Greece's case before ECJ. The formal registration on April 25. Meanwhile secrete diplomatic efforts continue. The UN special envoy to the FYRM, Vance, meets the Secretary General of the Greek Foreign Office, Zaharakis, in New York, on April 14 and 25 (ER 1942 and 1946: V).

April 18 - Bosnian-Serbs submit their terms for the effective partition of Gorazde, reiterating their promises of keeping guns out of a 3 km. zone on the

⁸⁶ The US pays about the 30% of the total cost of the UN operations, which are estimated to be about US \$ 1.000 million per year. However, some \$80 millions were already owed to the UN by the US. The *Guardian* on April 1, reports that the total number of UN troops, military observers and police in ex-Yugoslavia is about 31.334, of which some 14.400 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 14.000 in Croatia and 1.000 in Macedonia (Keesing's: 39927). The *Financial Times* on April 2 reports that the UN is considering the dispatch of 800 Ukrainian peace-keepers to Gorazde and the reinforcement of French peace-keeping contingent in Bihac.

west bank of river Drina. Meanwhile, a Muslim large scale offensive has been launched in the North of Bosnia-Herzegovina (*Financial Times*, 20/4/94).

- The EU Foreign Ministers, meeting within the European Council in Luxembourg, adopt a declaration condemning the Serb aggression at Gorazde and calling for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire in and around the town. The Resolution also calls for a coordinated and unified stance on the Bosnian crisis by the EU, the US, Russia and the UN. The basis for such a joint position should be the broad principles of the EU peace plan, which calls for Bosnia-Herzegovina to remain intact, with jurisdiction split according to a fixed formula of 33% to Bosnians, 17% to Croats and the rest to Serbs. A plan, says the Resolution, which is still applicable as relatively flexible and perfectly compatible with the Croat-Muslim accord of March 18 and the Serb-Croat accord in Krajina.

During the same meeting, the EU Foreign Ministers instruct Owen to contact US, Russia and UN officials on the question, and confirm Koshnik as the EU administrator of Mostar (ER 1944: V, 11).

April 19 - The Russian representatives at the negotiations table express strong disapproval for the Bosnian-Serbs' behaviour in Gorazde and feel outraged by their betrayal of the agreement with Russian mediators (*Financial Times*, 20/4/94).

April 20 - Brussels, NATO threatens further use of air-attacks and endorses Ghali's suggestion for more air support. However, it seek to delay any operation in order to have time to gain Russia's support - Russia still being contrary to the use of force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The European States too - especially those with ground-forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina - are worried about the bombing-option. The US, on the contrary, favours a general strategy *à la Sarajevo* in all UN-proclaimed safe zones, therefore also the bombing of Bosnian-Serbs in Gorazde (*Financial Times*, 21/4/94).

Acronyms

CFSP, Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS, Commonwealth of Independent States
CSBMs Confidence and Security Building Measures
CSCE, Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
EC/EU, European Community/European Union
ECJ, European Court of Justice
ECHO, EC Emergency Humanitarian Aid Office
EPC, European Political Cooperation
EFTA, European Free Trade Association
MEPs, Members of the European Parliament
FYRM, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
FRY, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
JNA, Yugoslav People's Army
HVO, Bosnian-Croat Defence Force
ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross
IMF, International Monetary Fund
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
RSK, Republic of Serbian Krajina
SFRY, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SRBH, Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
UN(O), United Nations (Organisation)
UNCHR, United Nations Committee for Human Rights
UNHCR, United Nations High Committee for Refugees
UNPROFOR, United Nations Protection Force
US(A), United States (of America)
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU, Western European Union

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