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From Imitation to Competitive-Cooperation
Ford Foundation and Management Education in Western Europe (1950's-1970's)
vol. I

GIULIANA GEMELLI

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From Imitation to Competitive-Cooperation
Ford Foundation and Management Education in Western Europe (1950’s-1970’s)

Vol. I

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Nothing will be done anymore without the whole meddling in it.
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Introduction

In January 1937 the historian Marc Bloch gave a speech to a group of engineers, economists and entrepreneurs, members of the famous “X-Crise” group. His subject centered on the relevant question “que demander à l’histoire?” and his answers were impressive:

“Celui qui veut s’en tenir au présent, à l’actuel” - said Bloch - “ne comprendra pas l’actuel. L’erreur couramment commise consiste à // confondre le récent et l’efficace, à oublier que les sociétés humaines sont douées d’une mémoire pleine de trous, parfois, mais aussi terriblement tenace. Les institutions, une fois créées, prennent quelque chose de rigide et, tenant par toutes sortes de liens à l’ensemble social, poussent de trop fortes racines pour pouvoir être aisément arrachées”.

This statement has relevant implications to the methodological premises of my work. Until a few years ago, there was a general agreement that the United States had always, systematically, led in the field of management education and for this reason, its models have been easily exported to Europe.

From the late Sixties until the early Eighties, Ford Foundation policy, in disseminating American patterns all over the world, contributed to strengthening this conviction. In a report of the Ford Foundation in 1966, the impressive title of which was "Management Education: A New Imperialism", Marshall Robinson, who at that time was officer in charge of the EDA program, stated that:

“the United States are the ideological center of the management education empire and some would pinpoint more specifically to the institutions located in the bank of the Charles river in Boston” - and that -“the Ford Foundation has been in the thick of this global movement”\(^1\).

This statement should be completed by mentioning the complementary role, played by Carnegie in the early Fifties, in developing a “new look” in American management education.

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management education, with its primary emphasis on the ‘scientific’ contributions to the art of business administration through mathematics and the social sciences rather than the “clinical approach”, as at Harvard. As we shall see this complementarity also had some relevance in the history of the Ford Foundation’s European program, where the dissemination of the Harvard Business Schools’ approach was by far the unique path to be developed.

In his paper Robinson also stated that:

“the reasons for American leadership in this field are many, but the most important is the fact that we simply started before anyone else. The strength of management education in the United States is also heightened by the fact that our culture awards prestige to business managers, tends to place great confidence in the educational system ... and gives less weight to family or social status as a means of deciding who its business leaders will be”2.

One of the specifics of American gospel in management education was that, at least since the mid-Sixties, it was addressed not only to Western countries but also to Eastern countries as well.

“It would appear that the Ford Foundation is seen as one of the most acceptable agencies to promote /../ contacts. The Foundation’s reputation in this field has spread East.” - Marshall Robinson observed at the European Luncheon Club in September 1969 - “It is not only the dollars which we can provide; the East Europeans are also looking for the Foundation’s road map through the management education country”3.

The interaction between Western countries and Eastern European areas was the product of interesting and complex strategies between US cultural and political diplomacy and European leaders and institutional builders. Its implications were larger than the diffusion of management, educational and training patterns, a point on which I will expand upon later.

First, it is important to observe, in order to clarify the problematic framework of my paper, the fact that in the early Eighties, when the Ford Foundation closed all its programs on management education, American domination seemed well established in the “world-wide campus of management education”. Ten years later, however, the scenario has changed.

2 *Ivi p.2*. A proposal was attached to this paper: *Business Management Development Program*. It was “designed to build- through management education- a stronger Atlantic Community capable of meeting the urgent demands of the 1970s and 1980s” and was conceived in three phases: 1) A survey of European business schools; 2) A policy conference; 3) Stimulation of programs on transatlantic basis[FFA 1966, Log 233].

Since the late Eighties the belief in American domination has been producing paradoxical effects. In Eastern countries American patterns in management education seem to have become a real challenge, while American domination has become questionable in Europe.

Some authors speak of Euromangement⁴ as opposed to, or at least different in comparison with American patterns, others following Robert Locke’s analytical path, stress, from a historical point of view, mechanisms of national and cultural resistance to American invasion. In terms of historical account the diffusion of management education in Europe and outside Europe reveals a number of hybrid situations, which are not limited to the most known cases of resistance to American MBA patterns, such as Germany or Japan. Even in the United States a recent issue of “Business History” underlines the outstanding results of some European business schools when compared to American ones. Moreover, the dominance of financial control and strategic planning functions,

“which once appeared as the solution to problems of investment, allocation and control in large diversified enterprises is now seen as responsible for a conception of management which subordinates and tends to neglect manufacturing and product innovation.”⁵

In short, a revisionist wind seems to be widespread, a “new intellectual orientation” whose basic ground is the revival of neglected aspects of “management thought” and particularly industrial engineering.

What about the methodological framework to analyze the historical roots of this new trend? Should one simply oppose a process of “de-Americanization” with a period of “Americanization”, which is now entering a phase of decline? I suspect that this is not the most profitable path on which to clarify the subject and that one should explore more unconventional conceptual tools. Similarly, from the historical point of view one should consider that a revisionist wind had started to blow since the mid-Eighties, precisely from Harvard Business Schools’ research groups.⁶ One should also recall that the pioneer of case method diffusion in Europe, was a Harvard Professor of Manufacturing, who in his classes never used the case method!!

⁴ See R. Calori and P. Lawrence (eds), The Business of Europe: Managing Change
⁵ Peter Armstrong, The abandonment of productive intervention in management teaching syllabi. A historical analysis. Warwick papers in Industrial relations Number 15, p.3.
Beginning with Marc Bloch's statement on historical memory, I will try to consider the problem of the diffusion of the patterns of American management education in terms of "selective appropriation" and "cross-fertilization processes" in hybrid and differentiated contexts, rather than as a problem of a linear and mechanical transfer of patterns from one continent to another. In other words, I think that not only in the present but also in the past there was a permanent and unsolved tension between isomorphism and differentiation.

This orientation implies some basic methodological assumptions:

a) The possibility of considering "management education" not only as a subject of analysis but also as a detector of social and historical processes of large extension. Thus revealing the embedded social behaviour of institutions, and actors, and their mutual interaction in different social and cultural systems and in different periods. A cross-fertilization approach implies that, in addition to the rules which govern the action of the individual as socio-institutional actors, one should also consider, "the effects of their initial position and of all the particular circumstances of the immediate environment to which each of them react in the course of the formation of that order." It implies also, that the actors' actions should be considered in terms of bounded rationality, that is, as something different from decisions and that, the order is not given but acted, and acted not by "big decisions" but also by small and unpredictable events or phenomena. According to Herbert Simon the most relevant effects in cross-fertilization policies, should be considered in terms of "an epsilon effect", which is at the same time infinitesimal and unpredictable, as far as complex systems are concerned and the reaction of actors and competitors is unpredictable;

b) The second consequence is the necessity, in constructing discursive representation of cross-cultural phenomena, to distinguish between strategy as project and strategy as conduct, by selecting relevant elements and considering uncertain dimensions of the actor's behaviour. This is especially true if one is to consider the Ford Foundation's history. Its policy/policies are in fact the result of various and not necessarily related programs and/or the presence of, at different

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8 See L. Zan, "Interactionism and systemic view in the strategic approach", in Advances in Strategic Management", vol. 12 A, 1955, pp. 277-279 who stresses the necessity to avoid both reductionism- when systemic features are ignored and reification when actors are ignored.
9 When applied to foundations' policy this statement implies that sometimes little grants could produce long-term effects and that intensive communication (diffusion, impact) is more important than dollars are.
times, different actors within the same program, and with an occasional lack of
the implementation of previous strategic designs and conducts. Actually, Ford
Foundation's history sometimes reveals ambivalent orientations which,
rhetorically, could be represented as *oxymorons*: like universalistic -
provincialism, (an ambivalence which is not necessarily related to the functional
distinction between International programs and domestic programs),
comprehensive-functionalism, neutral-imperialism, scientific-activism.

The list could be continued until the *oxymoron*, which inspired the title of this
paper, "competitive-cooperation" is reached. I should add that these
ambivalences are not only the product of policy rationale within the Ford
Foundation, which as F. Sutton shows in his paper is rather linear, but also an
effect of actors’ interaction and relational configuration, for example the kind of
relations between trustees and officers, or the interaction among different areas
sharing common projects. This is especially evident in the case of European
policy and programs, probably as a consequence of the continuing interference on
actors’ behaviour of basic, structural conditions: European strategic proximity
and socio-cultural distance on one side and the impossibility to reduce European
programs’ strategy to common patterns, such as *development* on the other.

From this point of view, a historical study of Ford Foundation’s European
programs appears as a wonderful field of analysis in which to explore the effects
of “policy networks” in creating informal linkages, based on cooperation and
trust, which overlap “with institutionalized structures of coordination, linking
different organizations independently from the formal relations between
them”10 and produce intentionally collective policy outcomes *despite* the diverging
interest of actors.

From a more general point of view, any historical account could be provided in
terms of linear history, whereas it is impossible, for example, to consider Ford
Foundation’s internal history independently from its context and from their mutual
interaction. Moreover a focus on subjective patterns (meanings) and their
indeterminable character should be considered in terms of relational (the attempt
of actors to anticipate and influence the conduct of other actors) and analytical
complexity (which means to consider interactionist approach and complex system
analysis).11 This implies a shift from an analysis of cultural and organizational
strategies as patterns in decision-making processes, to an analysis of strategic

University Institute, Florence, RSC Working Paper 97/19.
issues as "patterns in a stream of actions"12 whose rationale is the product of a multiplicity of factors and of the interdependence of actors in a dynamic system. This consideration leads to another methodological implication, that is:

c) the necessity to emphasize specifics and differences through the implementation of comparative strategies, analyzing not only different national areas, in terms of “contrast of contexts”, but also historical periods, in terms of selecting “events” which become crucial in order to analyze the logic of historical change (phases of continuity and discontinuity).

More specifically, in the field I am exploring, Ford Foundation’s long period of involvement in management education demands the introduction of many analytical factors, as detectors of changing situations, in order to identify the logic of historical change, related to relevant (structural) “events”. These factors concern strategic and structural phenomena such as the creation of the European Common Market and its political and cultural effects, especially between the late Fifties and the mid-Seventies, and the impact of economic crisis in the mid-Seventies in management development, especially at the level of multinational corporations. They concern also more punctual “events”, such as for example, the shift from the debate on the technological gap towards the debate on the managerial gap in 1967, which emerged as a consequence of a statement simultaneously made by a leading Ford Foundation Trustee, Robert Mc. Namara, in a famous speech, and a prominent French journalist, J. J. Servan Schreiber, in a famous book.

Actually one of the most relevant “structural events” in management education development and strategies is the conflict between East-West (an “event” which is in itself an enormous field of inquiry). In the preliminary proposal for the European Management Development Program, on the basis of the Atlantic Council Report, it was clearly stated that

"if we are to augment the strength and growth of the Free World /.../ then it is imperative that on both sides of the Atlantic we explore the opportunities for improved education in multinational business management".

Strategically, since the mid-Sixties, in particular but also before, management education became a crucial enjeu in more than one field. Following the conceptual approach of negotiation studies, one should point out that the main effect of those programs was to produce “an additional value to be shared” in a

complex process of interaction among unequal partners whose basic framework, goals and issues had more than one core. The enormous amount of studies on Americanisms and Americanization which have been carried out, stress the integration of ideology and power which is implied in these concepts.

What I would like to analyze is the production of “cooperation”, and its embedded effects as an additional factor, which is, in my perspective a strategic additional value. Was it the product of a linear and cumulative history, or should one reconsider this history by analyzing different phases in which management education played a diverse strategic role with different actors and through various factors?

Let us start from the beginning, that is from the pioneer and experimental phase which had an important role in some European countries. The background of my analysis is based on some preliminary considerations: first, one should observe that management education was certainly a relevant goal in Area III, EDA (Economic Development and Administration), but in the early Fifties this centrality was limited to the US, whereas outside the country, management education was not considered a strategic sector. Generally speaking in the context of European economic policies, the Ford Foundation was a special actor but not a unique one. Plus until the late Fifties, the interest of trustees in European programs was variable and sometimes ambiguous, Francis Sutton demonstrates this in his paper. Then thanks to the pressures of Shepard Stone and Joseph Slater a European program was finally started.

The core of Ford Foundation’s policy in Europe was much more related to the implementation of European-American diplomatic and strategic relations, especially in direction of Germany, after the signature of the Schuman Plan, as it was clearly stated in the reports concerning the creation and the activity of ACUE (American Committee on United Europe). ACUE’s main goal, according to its Chairman, William J. Donovan, was “seeking strong allies rather than amenable satellites”. As it is known ACUE, which had the strong support of leading personalities like Jean Monnet and G. Ball, developed a research project on federalism and its possible strategies in Europe. The research staff was largely drawn from Harvard Law School and in particular scholars who since World War II had great experience in European politics, constitutional and legal policies. Considering the role played by Harvard Business School in management education’s cross-fertilisation policies one should not forget that it was part of a more general orientation.

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Since World War II different faculties of Harvard University have had a central role in organizing national war effort and in transforming scholarly work in applied research. Moreover one should also consider that even in the United States “nothing preordained the rise of graduate management education in the post-war years” but many simultaneous and independent factors contributed to its rapid growth: the development of operational research, the strong will of a cohort of wartime economists “to expand the reach of quantitative analysis in their post-war research” and, last but not least, the fact that the Ford Foundation hired Rowan Gaither (who had just finished organizing the Rand Corporation).
Thanks to the advisorship of bright young experts like Leland Bach, Gaither developed the idea that “the Ford Foundation could contribute to enhancing US national security by improving the managerial capacities of both private firms and public agencies”¹⁴.

What I want to stress is that the origins of European programs in management training are not the simple and linear effects of exporting the “American design” outside the country, but a series of multiple paths, and “scattered” experiments in which main actors, Harvard Business School and the Ford Foundation, participated with different goals, negotiating their mutual role in each experiment.

The "promised land": Harvard’s Expansion to Europe in the Early Fifties.

The pioneer phase of the dissemination of Harvard Business School’s educational patterns in Europe started in the early Thirties and was related to the role played by outstanding figures like General Georges F. Doriot, a French born and American trained Harvard Business School professor of Manufacturing. Thanks to Doriot’s personal initiative and intensive contacts with French entrepreneurial and institutional milieu, rather than as an official requirement of Harvard Business School’s deanship, the CPA (Centre de préparation aux affaires), was created in Paris. The CPA was created with the organisational support of the Chamber of Commerce and the agreement of many important industrialists like Raoul de Vitry of Pechiney which was one of the first French firms to employ, since the interwar period, American consultants. I have extensively analyzed Doriot’s role and the origins of CPA in some published articles\textsuperscript{15}. Here I will only stress the continuity of his role in Europe and in particular the fact that during the crucial period of Ford Foundation’s involvement in European management education programs, Doriot had strong contacts with the Foundation’s board of Trustees. From this point of view he should be considered as an integral actor in many of the projects in this field of analysis. However, it is evident that the role which he chiefly played was that of an isolated innovator.

Harvard Business School and its teaching staff only began to play an official role in cross-fertilization dynamics in the early Fifties. Relevant factors were the development of the overseas program followed by the nomination, in 1953, of the Assistant Dean John B. Fox as Director of the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships Program. Despite initial negative expectations, this program was a factor which motivated Harvard professors’ visiting fellowships, as well as the cooperation between Harvard Business School and the Ford Foundation.

At the origins of the pioneer stage there was, without doubt Ford Foundation’s interest in developing strategic relationships in economic and cultural programs in the Near East and progressively, with the development of the productivity programs also in Europe. A crucial point of intersection of these two “lines”, (the

Ford Foundation’s and Harvard Business School’s overseas policies, from the point of view of “actors”, is related to the role of Harvard Business School’s Dean, Donald D. David in the early Fifties as a trustee of the Ford Foundation and to the continuity of interest which different experts, within Harvard Business School’s overseas activities, developed by continuing the kind of policy “investment” made by their predecessors. It is well known that Dean David played along with Thomas Carroll a crucial role in developing the “new look” in management education in the most prominent American business schools. He was also one of the pioneers of Harvard expansion to Europe, in cooperation with John Fox and R. Christensen, (rather than with Carroll, who was not a strong supporter of Ford Foundation’s European programs).

The role of these pioneer experiments was acknowledged some years later by A. Towl when the program of dissemination of the case method in Europe became a systemic project, under the organizational framework of the Ford Foundation.

“As my colleagues and I began inquiries in different countries for cases” - Towl wrote - “it soon became apparent that case development and the use of cases had been long and strongly influenced by vigorous pioneers.”

The role of Harvard’s expansion in Europe was progressively emphasized by the development of productivity strategies, (which should be analyzed as a basic framework in developing management education in Europe), and by the fact that these strategies were supported, during the years of the Marshall plan especially in some countries like UK and Italy, by American government campaigns “to persuade that management education was a condition of economic growth.” As one shall see this impact did not happen without resistance, but indeed with a resistance different in scale and patterns.

First of all one should note that in the early Fifties Harvard Business School’s overseas programs, as well as the activity of the EDA program of the Ford Foundation, were not uniquely directed towards European countries. At this time even the concept of European identity was only in its developing phase.

In the early Fifties a relevant concept was that of a Mediterranean area, which included Italy and Greece as well as some countries of the near East, like Turkey.

16 Andrew Towl, A Note of Appreciation to Participants in a collective effort, FFA Reel No. 1542, Grant No. 71197, Section 1.
In what concerns management education one of the first and well documented experiments was the attempt to introduce management education in Turkey, which despite its irregular development should not be considered as a failure, especially from the point of view of its level of interaction with parallel experiments in Europe. Significantly through some of the actors involved in this project, the Turkish experiment (which extended, with various grants and patterns, from 1954 until the early Seventies, with a total financial support of $1,005,000), crossed the Italian experiment of IPSOA, which in terms of the size of the grant should be considered as a “peripheric” project. In fact, Harvard financed the development of IPSOA’s faculty through a Ford Foundation grant of $13,000.

I have written extensively on this last case study in two recent articles, where I have tried to show that despite the small size of the grant, and the institutional failure of IPSOA, the experiment had important effects in the long period. I would like to stress here, only some elements which seem to be useful in order to make comparative considerations. What Turkey and Italy had in common, despite a very different political, cultural and economic environment, was the perspective of a rapid economic growth which demanded to be supported by an equally rapid transformation of social and educational patterns. One of the crucial elements in the picture was the lack of relations between the university system and the business community. However, this lack was not a peculiarity of Turkey and Italy but also of more developed industrial countries, especially England where management education was slow to develop but for reasons which were different from what was going on in Turkey and Italy. In England, despite the creation in 1948 of the British Institute of Management, and the strong incentives given by managers/intellectuals, like Lyndal Urwick, and the role played by the Anglo-American Productivity Council, the first business schools were only established in the 1960’s.

However, despite the attempt of the Americans to create a British Harvard, the Harvard Business School was not really at work in England as it was in Turkey and Italy due to the Ford Foundation’s program support. In the Italian and Turkish case, the effect of the introduction of business education’s curricula presented similarities but also strong differences. These similarities and differences produced for the actors involved in both programs, an increasing consciousness of the constraints which the “environment” could have in the diffusion of the case method approach.

The most relevant similarity is that of the program’s by-products. In both countries, for different reasons, the possibility to integrate management intellectuals and experts within the academic system was very limited. In the case of IPSOA, (which was created outside the university), this constraint could be represented as its isolating factor - perhaps a golden isolation - within the “Torino system” which was based on a strong network, including the Politecnico, the faculty of Economics’ professors, and Fiat high quarters (Valletta), all under the same flag, (an authoritarian and antidemocratic style), which dominated both the factory and the academic system.

In Turkey the initiators of the Istanbul Institute of Business Administration had hoped that the participation of business leaders would lead to a curriculum based on both theory and practice. “This proved to be an illusion”- said Robert W. Kerwin, a graduate from Johns Hopkins University with a dissertation on Etatism and the Industrialisation of Turkey, (who also worked as a consultant of the Ford Foundation). The Board of Directors had little to do with the curriculum, this was the province of the academic staff. Attempts to recruit businessmen as teaching staff were generally unsuccessful.

In fact, as the IIBA developed during the period 1954-60, the business participants became somewhat disillusioned with the project. They criticized the MBA courses as being too theoretical and insufficiently oriented to Turkish business problems and practices.” 19 It is interesting to observe that this negative impact in Turkey had similar consequences in Italy, related however to opposite behaviour of the business elites. In Italy, because of the resistance of companies and firms to introduce IPSOA’s graduates within the “system”, many of them were “compelled” to become consultants, that is, in most cases to invent a “new profession” by creating their own consulting firms. In Turkey the business elite was sufficiently compact to stimulate an adaptation of Ford Foundation’s programs to the Turkish context.

As their disillusionment with university management education grew, some of the businessmen, who had been active in the development of the Institute of Business Administration at Istanbul University, turned to the idea of establishing a non-profit professional management organisation as a means of providing more practical and functional training at the post-experience level outside the Universities. The TMA (Turkish Management Association) was founded in

Istanbul in 1962 by business leaders “following some two years of discussion of a non-university approach to management development”.

TMA had an important role in the internationalisation of the Turkish business community

“One of the foreign organisations contacted at the CECIOS meeting which had volunteered to send specialists to Turkey to help organise ad hoc training programs for the TMA, was the Rastor Corporation of Finland, a consulting company that evolved from the establishment of a national professional management association in the country. Based on their own experience, the Rastor people recommended that the TMA develop a consultancy service for Turkish industry as a means of training practising managers on the job and helping them to solve their growing problems in the area of production financing and accounting, marketing and personnel management /../. Basic to the TMA’s consultancy/training project was the opportunity for the professional association, as a private, non profit organisation, to recruit as staff-consultants experienced managers from industry at salary levels competitive with private sectors pay-scales”\textsuperscript{20}.

The consultancy/training project was given the name of the Turkish Management Development Center (TMCD) which rapidly developed, through a special Ford Foundation grant, large contacts with the activities of management organisations in Finland, Sweden, Belgium, England and France.

“The TMA group was highly impressed during its visit to England, with training possibilities for English speaking Turks at the Urwick Management Center. In fact Urwick-Orr and Partners, the British consulting firms that operated the UMC, was considered a model on which a Turkish consultancy/training organisation might be based.”\textsuperscript{21}

Since the mid-Sixties the TMA became instrumental in launching a new approach to generating business and industry support for University business schools through the creation of a Turkish Management Education Foundation in 1967, (the Ford Foundation contributed to the creation of this institution with a grant of $30,000).

At this time the models to imitate were the Fondation Industrie Université in Belgium and the Foundation for Management Education in England. Despite large investments made through EPA’s programs in training young teachers who were sent to the US (a large number of which had graduated from IPSOA), in Italy there was no real and productive interaction between the Comitato Nazionale per

\textsuperscript{20} Ivi p.7.

\textsuperscript{21} Ivi p.8.
la Produttività and IPSOA.\textsuperscript{22} At the same time the business community was totally deaf to the gospel of management training, or, as was the case for Valletta, supported the idea only in an instrumental way, Valletta’s strategy was to “get American money” to improve FIAT’s own business.

The positive impact of the case-method approach on the young generation of IPSOA students, in comparison to what happened in the same years in the Turkish context, created paradoxically a constraint, because it gave the false impression that American methods could easily be disseminated in the Italian context. IPSOA then became a kind of island without an “arcipelago”, an institutional “enclosure” within the Italian educational system which was unable to change and resisted new cultural and training patterns, maintaining its character of an academic citadel, centered on theoretical learning and ex-cathedra teaching.\textsuperscript{23} Until the late Seventies, innovation was a product of rather uncoordinated activities of dissemination, that is of individual initiatives taken mostly by an intellectual Diaspora, (a typical \textit{epsilon} effect), rather than a product of organisational strategies supported by an institutional design. Moreover IPSOA started its “long whimper”, a phase of decline, exactly when management education was entering a phase of coordinated and extensive development at the European level.

Paradoxically in the long period from the Fifties to the early Seventies changes were more relevant in the Turkish case than in Italy, particularly concerning attitudes and behaviour of business leaders towards management development. At first a graduate business school was thought to be the answer to all management development needs, both immediate and future. Then, a non university approach was thought to be the answer, but this also proved difficult to organise effectively.

When a consultancy input was introduced, management training became more on-the-job oriented, but then a return was made towards a partially academic approach by the demand for a residential training center coupled with on-the-job application.”\textsuperscript{24} Consequently, the Turkish experience shows that the best management education and training involves a careful balance between a theoretical and practical approach. It also shows the crucial role of non-profit institutions at the international level, not only because the Ford Foundation was

\textsuperscript{24} Ivi, p. 20.
active in all stages of the Turkish experiment, but also thanks to the pertinent role played at the national level, by the TMDC.

From the point of view of the American actors it is evident that in both cases, in Italy as well as in Turkey, the dominant pattern was "learning by doing", sometimes by developing comparative analysis. Documents related to this pioneer phase contain details on the activity of Harvard professors who participated to both of the programs, (the Istanbul Institute and IPSOA, Turin). An example of one such professor is, Pearson Hunt, a professor of Finance at Harvard, who tried to create a permanent faculty with a Harvard style at IPSOA and as an Eisenhower fellow travelled to the Istanbul Schools of Business Administration. In a letter to Kenneth H. Iverson, Near East Representative of the Ford Foundation, Hunt observed:

"Although I came more in the role of a visitor than a faculty member, I soon found myself involved in a complex crisis. Morale was lower than in any other organisation I've seen and as usual in such circumstances every one was blaming over every one else. To a certain extent I was reminded of IPSOA, because a large part of the troubles comes from the old Economics Faculty's honest (?) convictions that the new courses aren't academically useful".

Hunt stresses two important factors in developing management education strategies. First, the necessity to create "independent" schools, that is not necessarily separate from the university but based on "relationships ././ free enough to allow experiment to be worked out to their conclusion in a reasonably helpful environment".

The second condition was the creation of a full-time faculty:

"I have been given new evidence"- Hunt wrote -"of the wisdom of Ing. Enriques at IPSOA who insisted when we arrived in 1953 that for the first three months there should be no interruptions in the full-time work of the staff ././ A habit of attendance and work was established that lasted quite a while." 25

While comparing the relative facility in diffusing the case method approach in Italy with the difficulties of the Istanbul Institute, Hunt and a few others (but certainly not all the American experts, as one shall see) developed the feeling that the resistance came from incorporated patterns. Patterns such as in the case of

Turkey the fact that “when they started developing their educational system, they came under the influence of the French and German systems first.”

For some of the observers the “promised land” for Harvard’s expansion was not an undifferentiated continent but a system of selected islands. It should be mentioned at this point that, since 1954 an effort was made to put in contact the representatives of different experimental schools which were part of HBS overseas program and had adopted the case method approach. According to a memorandum sent from the Istanbul school’s American representatives to Iverson (one of the member of the special survey team sent in 1952 by the Ford Foundation to investigate the needs and program possibilities of countries in the Near East), “the Torino group”, that is Hunt and Wachsmann, were the promoters of the initiative. In the Italian case Harvard Business School had really a central and dominant role. As we have seen this was not the case in the Turkish experiment which developed a multi-donor strategy.

It is also interesting to observe that Harvard Business School and the Ford Foundation were not two inseparable partners. Harvard Business School and Ford, in fact, tried to develop the above mentioned strategic factors (commitment and stabilization of Business schools faculties and the development of dynamic relations between university system and business schools), through independent paths and programs. Since 1958, that is when the living experience of IPSOA was entering a phase of crisis in Turin, Harvard Business School strongly supported, without Ford Foundation grants, the creation of a permanent faculty at IMEDE in Switzerland.

In a recent letter I received from P. Hunt there are some interesting comments on this point:

“It’s not a detail to say that Dean David shifted his support /from IPSOA/ to IMEDE. The shift was dramatic. For IPSOA he was ready to accept the request for one Harvard Business Faculty member. It was made clear to me, for instance, that I would have to find colleagues from other schools /../ When it came to IMEDE, the Dean chose five HBS Professors and sent them to Lausanne all at one. This kind of staffing continued for several years. It is the difference between consent and strong initiative. I am sure in my own mind that a site in Switzerland (Holland was also considered) had higher status in the minds of the Dean and his advisors than a site in an industrial site in Italy.”

26 Richard D. Robinson, Memorandum to Walter S. Rogers: “In Turkey for the Ford Foundation or Random Thought on Economic Development”[FFA Reel, n° 5971, Grant n. 54, section 3].

27 Robert E. Stone, Letter to Kenneth R. Iverson, John B. Fox and Robert E. Culberton March 26, 1954.[FFA, Reel n. 5971, Grant n° 54, Section 3, p. 3].

28 P. Hunt, Letter to the Author January 26, 1996.
It is however interesting to observe that, Harvard professors started to rapidly consider the IMEDE experience as a kind of exceptional result of Harvard Business School foreign policy. In April 1958 the American co-director of the Istanbul school, R. Stone (who had resigned as Dean of the College of Business Administration of Syracuse to accept an appointment as professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School and to serve as American co-director at the Istanbul Institute), sent a letter to his Turkish colleague Sabri Ulgener, the subject of which was IMEDE institutional philosophy and pedagogical system as an example to be imitated by the Turkish Faculty! No mention was made of the differences of culture and industrial context in Turkey and in Switzerland.\(^29\) I suspect that this rather abstract behaviour of the American experts should be included as one of the factors which negatively influenced the first stage of Turkish experiment.

\(^{29}\) Robert E. Stone, *Memorandum to Sabri F. Ulgener*, April 30, 1958 [FFA Reel 5971, Grant n° 54, Section 3].
Europeanisation

The Belgian Experiment: Innovative Organisation

The implementation of the second factor mentioned by Hunt, "independence" of experimental schools in a context of interactive cooperation between the academic system and the business community, was really only at work in Belgium, this time with Ford Foundation’s direct initiative and the participation of a good number of American Schools of management, and not only Harvard Business School. Gaston Deurinck, an engineer with a degree in philosophy, was the young and energetic builder of the Belgian Productivity Committee. He was one of the few European intellectual managers to clearly perceive that in order to activate new educational strategies it was first of all necessary to produce the right environment, by transforming personal affinities and informal synergy's between business leaders and academic milieu in constructive and progressively “autopoietic” networks. His idea of strengthening this network through the Fondation Industrie Université, as a strategic complement to the activity of BCP is synthetically and clearly resumed in a Memorandum of L.A. Bekaert, (President of the Federation of Belgian Industries):

"After a long period of preliminary survey" -Bekaert wrote- “the Federation of Belgian Industries has set up in 1954 a committee for training and improvement of business management. This committee was instructed to determine, by the light of what has been done abroad, the best way for training of managers to proceed. First of all the committee examined the realizations already performed by the Belgian Productivity Center, which from 1953 had sketched the skeleton of an inter-university program for business management. As soon as the principles ././ had been laid down the committee selected a smaller group of its members to deal with specifying the modalities of application. This was done for the first time, at the Knoccke colloquium in 1955, which brought about the necessity of an entire cooperation to be given to the extent and development of the university program. The broadening of cooperation, the coordination of the several efforts on a nation-wide scale required however the creation of a Foundation /which/ must be a guarantee that enterprise managers will grant full attention to the training of executives"30

Thus the Fondation Industrie-Université was created in February 1956. Its board represented, to the largest possible extent, the idea of cooperation among educational functions and economic sectors, according to specific socio-economic patterns which have characterised Belgian society since the inter-war period. Cooperation not only concerned university professors and the representatives of different economic sectors but also the representatives of the different regions of the country. The New Foundation was supported by a Ford Foundation grant of

30 L.R. Bakaert, The Improvement of Belgian Managers [FFA, Reel 0068, Grant n° 5651].
$50,000, which was not quantitatively a conspicuous grant but certainly came at the right moment.

The perception of the strategic role that the Belgian Foundation could play came, notably not from within the Ford Foundation but from a very influential pressure group, specifically from John Ferguson, one of the partners of an international law firm, which included George Ball (Clery, Gottlieb, Freindly & Ball). In a letter of December 1955 addressed to Shepard Stone, Ferguson stressed the necessity to coordinate Stone’s idea of strengthening management training programs through a special program undertaken by the European Productivity Agency and Deurinck’s idea of an experimental program centered on Belgian managers in order to test its efficacy, with a view to expanding it slowly in the future.

“Deurinck believes,” Ferguson wrote- “and I agree with him, that it would be a mistake to send a sizeable group of trainers to one university where they would be treated as a European group and isolated from their American counterparts. It seems to me that it would be better to distribute them among several universities, where each would take his place in an existing program /../ I certainly agree that it would be useful for the Ford Foundation to support projects of an international and inter-European character/ ../ however, I do not feel that this approach should exclude national project, particularly when they provide you with experience useful in a later international programs”. 31

This document contains some interesting elements of reflection. It reveals that the basic framework for the development of management education’s European programs was not located in Area III but rather in the Area I of Ford Foundation activities including International Affairs and International Training and Research. Moreover it reveals the existence, since the mid-Fifties of new actors who shared the feeling of the increasing strategic role of management training, that is the Fondation Industrie-Université, whose action, as we shall see later, in the long term had a crucial role in strengthening Brussels’ centrality as a pole of cooperation strategies and the European Productivity Agency, which had existed since 1953 but developed a systematic program in management training only after 1955.

In March 1955 a group of experts from ten European countries arrived in New York for a period of two months, during which they visited many leading business schools, consulting agencies and industrial firms around the country in order to study the possibility to diffuse methods and organisational patterns of

31 John H. Ferguson, Letter to Shepard Stone, December 14, 1955, p. 2 [FFA, Reel 0068, Grant n° 5651, Section 3].
executive training in Europe. The group was composed of 23 outstanding personalities coming from different sectors of society (universities, business, bureaucracy). The project and its program had been outlined two years previous, after EPA's official creation. It was inspired by the necessity to develop the recommendations of an international conference which had been held in Henley-on-Thames in September 1953. The project was produced by EPA in April 1954 as project no. 229 and the results of the study group were discussed in June 1955 at the Chateau de la Muette.

The Role of the European Productivity Agency

This initiative was not part of a systematic plan to develop management education. Until the mid-Fifties, management training was just one of manifold initiatives supported by the Agency during its "experimental" phase. Actually 1955-56 was a crucial period in EPA's development. Even if organisational changes were formally ratified only in 1957, the intensification of programs in management education was a product of the mid-Fifties. EPA's formal decision of changing its organisational patterns, had been prepared by a crucial change concerning its leadership and decision making orientation which permitted a strategic choice among the outlined programs.

The first step in this direction was the resignation of Karl Harten (who had been chosen by the American O.E.C.E.'s representatives) from the position of EPA director in 1955. He was replaced by a French Conseiller d'Etat, Roger Grégoire, who had good relations and developed a positive cooperation with Alexander King, the pioneer of productivity gospel, as well as with the founder of CPA in Paris, General Georges F. Doriot, who at that time was launching the idea of creating an European business school in Paris.

Until the end of 1956 as director of the PRA committee, King was a kind of ideas' man in EPA' activities, based on the perception of the necessity of,

"aiding a cultural transition into a new kind of society where the ultimate sciences, natural, social and economics will live in harmony and an interdisciplinary approach would be taken in a general holistic context, and this is for example the evolution of training into education, the destruction of pure ivory towers bringing practical and theoretical concepts together, and industry more responsible" 32

In November 1956 he finally obtained an official and prestigious position when he took the place of Flechner as Vice-director of EPA. King was the true catalyst

32 Interview with Alexander King, Calleon France June 1995.
of the Agency institutional bodies and sectors as well as of its strategic aims, being at the same time “a man with a vision” and an outstanding scholar in applied research, as well as one the few experts in administration of science. King attended the Royal School of Sciences in London and became assistant of Sir Henry Tizard, who during World War I transformed the administration of science into a strategic weapon at the service of the British Government. After teaching at the Imperial College of Science in 1942 he became Scientific advisor to the Ministry of production and from 1943-47 head of the scientific mission of the United Kingdom to the Washington Embassy.

One of the first operations conducted by the team Grégoire and King was a one month trip in November-December 1955, to the United States the report of which, is a very illuminating one. The main goals of the trip were:

"examiner avec les autorités des Etats Unis les problèmes que posent à l’avenir l’existence, le financement et le fonctionnement de l’Agence; rechercher dans quelle mesure les fondations américaines seraient prêtes à participer à certains projets de l’AEP pour lesquels elles avaient déjà témoigné de l’intérêt; visiter un certain nombre d’écoles d'administration des entreprises organisées dans les universités américaines, examiner les conceptions américaines modernes sur ce genre d’enseignement, en raison notamment de la décision récente de créer à l’AEP un groupe spécialisé dans cette question." 33

As we shall see these three goals were focused towards a dominant issue, the professionalisation of management through research.

"On insiste partout" - King and Gregoire wrote- "sur la nécessité de poursuivre les recherches dans le domaine de l’Administration des entreprises et sur le fait que le progrès des connaissances doit précéder le progrès de l’enseignement. Comme l’Europe s’intéresse beaucoup à ces problèmes et comme l’enseignement de la gestion des affaires n’a pas encore intégralement droit de cité dans les Universités européennes /../ l’Europe doit suivre avec particulièrement d’attention les dernières expériences américaines dans ce domaine /../ et donner moins d’importance aux réalisations des écoles traditionnelles, même celles qui ont eu un certain succès" 34

King considered with interest the most recent experiences of introducing a “new look” within the curricula of the leading American business school based on the incorporation of the behavioural and social sciences inside a traditional set of disciplines, such as accounting, mathematics and econometrics.

34 Ibidem, p. 7
As mentioned above the Ford Foundation had been since the early Fifties the main actor in this relevant change. Moreover, in the second half of the Fifties the Foundation launched two other programs which strengthened the visibility of the "new look" in several disciplinary contexts and outside the US. In 1958 the foundation started a program whose aim was to transform management into an applied social science.

The leading scholars of this project, a highly interdisciplinary one, were three outstanding experts in different fields of social science; the political scientist Robert Dahl, the psychologist Maison Haire and the sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld, who developed a special project to implement the application in the social science field of Harvard’s case method approach. The general aim of the project was,

"to indicate to other researchers in their own discipline the challenge of research in problems dealing with the business community and to indicate to persons on the staff of business schools how the techniques and theoretical structure of the basic disciplines /../ applies to the traditional areas of marketing, organisation and administration".33

In the following years Lazarsfeld addressed to the Ford Foundation a proposal "for relating Harvard Business School cases to the social sciences". Another proposal was made through the BASR of the Columbia University and was related to "designing a study of the effects of business school training on business careers".

33 EDA, Planning memorandum FFA Reel 0119, grant n° 509.304 Section 3 See also Thomas H. Carrol “Foreword”: in R. Dahl, M. Haire and P. F. Lazarsfeld, Social Science Research in Business. Product and Potential, New York, Columbia University Press, 1959 "Since its inception in 1954, the Ford foundation's Program in Economic Development and Administration has had as one of its major interests the support of promising developments in higher education for business. Fruitful developments have occurred recently in the application of methodology and analysis from the social sciences, psychology and sociology, to the study of business problems. To stimulate the increased interest in the world of business as a subject for research by social scientists, and to encourage a greater appreciation on the part of faculty members in business administration of the potential contribution these underlying disciplines offer, the foundation initiated a special, multi-phase program in 1958. In one phase of this program ten outstanding professors in graduate faculties of sociology, psychology and political science, whose research interests are oriented towards problems of business, were granted "master fellowships" /../ In a second phase of this program, fellowships have been established to enable a selected number of business administration faculty members to spend a full year pursuing a self-defined course of study in the social sciences (other than economics, statistics and mathematics) /../ A third phase /../ has made three-year visiting professorships in the social sciences, applied mathematics and statistics available to five selected schools of business administration /../ The essays presented in this book constitute the final phase of the program".
Significantly, the development of these projects occurred in the period of intensification of Lazarsfeld’s trip to Europe, especially in France, where he acted as a leading scholar in the UNESCO project on “Main Trends in the Social Sciences” and, in the mid-sixties, tried to create, within the new project of the Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, a research laboratory with the same orientation of the BASR36.

The second relevant event was the publication in 1959 of the Gordon and Howell report on US management education, which the Foundation inspired in order to study the effects of the organisational change produced by its programs, the report was largely discussed in Europe. The effect of rationalisation, produced by EPA’s policy through its different programs in management education and training of productivity experts was certainly a relevant factor in stimulating this interest.

It is important to observe the particular use which King made of the reference to the organisational change introduced by the Ford Foundation, in order to stress the necessity of implementing the basically technical set of recipes of productivity with a large cultural background which was firmly rooted in European tradition.

King wrote in 1956 that,

“There is a reluctance on the part of Universities in some part of Europe to accept management as a subject of sufficient intellectual content for inclusion alongside the accepted disciplines. This has been supported by the tendency since the war /../ to introduce the subject in the form of particular techniques, sometimes trivial, apparently unconnected with each other and often without consideration of underlying principles. At the same time there is recognition of the need for well trained, progressive managers in European industry /../. It appears to us that accepted American methods of training for management, while developed more extensively and successfully than elsewhere, have tended to become somewhat traditional. On the other hand, the growing needs and complexities of industry are clearly making it necessary to develop managers of a new type, while the elaboration of scientific methods and the unfolding of the social sciences are offering new and dramatic possibilities”37.

36 For a more detailed account of Lazarsfeld’s role in developing social research in Europe and particularly in France see G. Gemelli, “Paul Lazarsfeld et la France au milieu des années soixante”, in Bernard P. Lecuyer, Paul F. Lazarsfeld. Sa vie. Son oeuvre. Paris, L’Harmattan (forthcoming)

37 A. King, Studies on Management Organisation in Various European Countries, EPA, Project n° 347, FFA, Reel 0068, Grant n° 56-51, Section III, pp.3 and 6.
This statement contains a clear agreement on the basic elements which inspired the "new look" of the Ford Foundation as a positive opportunity to develop European management education. It should be stressed that among the European experts there was a largely shared opinion: European management ought to be built on a large cultural and cross-disciplinary base, integrating the American patterns with the European transnational culture. As Alexander King pointed out, this interdisciplinary orientation should be based on an increasing use of quantitative methods and mathematical analysis, like for example, the theory of games, on the scientific method and operational research techniques as well as on the implementation of social and behavioural sciences research tradition.

Thus it is interesting to follow the dynamics of the interaction between EPA’s officials and Ford Foundation officers, particularly through Joseph Slater’s general correspondence, during a period in which, after the decision of ICA to reduce its contribution to EPA from $1,5 million to $1,1 million, Ford Foundation’s grants to EPA were negotiated.

On one side was EPA’s project of training European managers which emphasized and strengthened links with Harvard Business School. In particular, after 1958, when the Harvard School started the International Teachers Program, which became a crucial instrument in the diffusion of the case method approach. EPA’s long courses programs (9-12 months), for prospective or junior management teachers who would then specialize in a particular subject matter of Business Administration, 38 were normally part of the International Teachers Program, whose “design” was produced with the cooperation of Harvard’s professors who took part to the overseas program of the school in the early Fifties (Fox, Hunt).

On another side, however, EPA officials stressed the necessity of differentiated training strategies and emphasized the effect of transformation of American patterns through the contact with European contexts. Actually it was precisely during his trip to the US in 1955, that King became aware that the case method approach was not the unique method to be adopted in the US and that particular attention “should be given to the newer American experiments in this field and to the work of specialist groups on the social and industrial engineering fringe of the subject, rather than that of the traditional schools even where they are successful.”39

38 According to FF’s reports 350 European professors studied in the US under EPA’s programs 190 following the long courses, 160 following the short courses (6 weeks to 4 months)[FFA n° Reel 0527, PA 57-265, Section 3, Caracciolo Letter to Gordon, 28-2-1962].

39 UM, j.nr. 106.P.11, pk 2, C(50) 40 20.2, 1956, quoted by B. Boel, “The European Productivity Agency and the Development of Management Education in Western Europe in
The extension of the original problem related to productivity drive was associated to a perception that management development activities should have a new focus: the major objective was to bridge applied economics and industry and to develop interdisciplinary strategies. In a memorandum of November 7, 1957, Joseph Slater stated that,

“much of this activity has been focused around the creation of schools of business management in Europe and that the initial shortage of professors has been alleviated to some extent by EPA, by bringing American professors over, as well by training younger men at the assistant professor level from the faculties of economics, engineering and law. A possible development of this program could be supported through a Ford Foundation grant”.

EPA’s official Ottino Caracciolo observed however, that the influence of American teachers and methods was not a one way street and that in the new program it should also be considered the fact that, the influx of European professors has had an important influence on American business schools. For one thing, there was evidence that the case method at Harvard, which had tended in Europe to be regarded as the best method, was revealed to be only one among many good methods. Caracciolo also pointed out that US business schools “are becoming aware of the need for special training of their own students who are taking part in international business.”

Meanwhile one should consider that in different European countries there existed American experts, who had the same beliefs as Dunlap Smith, (the Dean of Carnegie Institute of Technology in Pittsburgh), who had stressed the necessity, “that Norway should not copy methods that were used in the US to increase productivity issues” in his 1953 report on the relationship between higher education and business in Norway.

Foundation officers and EPA officials agreed that new programs should be related to a more general project to introduce in Europe new concepts arising from "the

the 1950’s”, to be published in T. Gourvish and N. Tiratsoo, Americanisation and its limits, Manchester University Press.

40 This orientation was strongly supported by FF officers, particularly by J. Slater, History of the Ford Foundation’s International Affairs Program, December 3, 1965, pp. 49-56 [FFA Report n° 008727].

impact of science and technology on economic; the drive for European integration; changed patterns in the world trade”.

In the early Fifties the reconstruction of European economy was the foremost problem. EPA, therefore, transplanted from the US ideas and techniques which were readily applicable to European plants and industries. Essentially it was engaged in the dissemination of managerial techniques over a wide spectrum. Since the end of the Fifties, the European economy has been rebuilt to the pre-war level. The new focus was on economic development rather than on the development of productivity techniques. This new orientation implied a shift also in the development of Ford Foundation’s grants to EPA activity.

In the late Fifties EDA continued to make “classical” grants directed to productivity goals while the International Affairs Program developed an action directed to strengthen various academic and non academic centers and to the training of outstanding individuals, giving result to the development of “possible cooperation between EPA and the Foundation in economic development” and trying to integrate this cooperation within existing programs, like those developed in England (LSE and Nufflied College in Oxford)), in Italy (Spisa and Svimez and in Naples Rossi-Doria Center), in order to strengthen research and interdisciplinary strategies.

"Le souci de productivité reste vital pour l'Europe" - René Sergent, EPA's Secretary general wrote in July 1958- "mais il ne saurait pas être exclusif. A la phase de la reconstruction a succédé une phase de développement. L'objectif pour l'Europe est désormais de créer les conditions d'un progrès technique sans lequel le niveau de vie ne pourra être augmenté. Cela suppose des études et des expériences d'un niveau assez différent de celles entreprises jusqu'à présent. En fait, le programme de l'agence est depuis deux ans, orienté dans ce sens./../: dans tous les domaines la formation a pris le pas sur l'information".

This shift had its original and basic framework in the new orientation taken by EPA since 1956, through the activity of a small group of experts who "fancy" themselves as “intellectual entrepreneurs”. Their action implied, first of all, a stricter co-ordination between EPA’s short-terms programs (which were in essence related to the activity of National Productivity Centres in developing a series of Executive Development seminars, of short duration, aimed at giving new knowledge and skills to executive holding posts of responsibility in numerous small and medium-sized enterprises) and the long-term program. It aimed at creating “a network of competent institutions in Europe and to exploit their possibilities fully in the training of outstanding individuals/./ able to conceive,
organize and execute development programs” rather than a central management association. The focus should therefore be placed not only in capital and technology but also in the implementation of human factors.

Different permanent institutions within and outside the University system would primarily supply the managers and entrepreneurs needed by expanding and integrating economies of the European member countries and secondly become centers of study and research for the application to European countries of the general theories of management developed in the United States.

Kermit Gordon, a Ford Foundation officer, also suggested in November 1957, that the new European business schools would be the natural centers for research in productivity.

Ford Foundation reports of this period stress that the point of crisis was principally related to a serious shortage, if not total absence, of suitable professors. At the same time EPA’s officers and particularly Ottino Caracciolo di Fiorino, as mentioned before, pointed out that the flow of European professors trained by EPA’s fellowships has had an important influence on American business schools.

This was the basic framework in which the synergetic support of the Ford Foundation to EPA’s programs in management education took place in the late Fifties. Ford Foundation support was oriented towards a specific goal: financing for two years a program called "Pool of Professors in Management Education" with a grant of $98,000 in 1957 renewed in 1959. The strategic synergy with EPA was clearly stated: as supplying American professors whose double role consisted of conducting courses, as well as giving policy advice to the new institutions, staffing them with a body of competent assistants, generally those who have been trained by EPA’s programs in the US.

The draft of the project presented in 1957 to the Ford Foundation by Roger Gregoire was clearly directed to improve management education by creating a good, permanent and research trained teaching staff. Gregoire wrote:

"The present project aims at overcoming part of the shortage of teachers of Business Administration in Europe. The EPA and other programs in this field have, in fact, resulted in the creation of numerous schools of business management, for which qualified professors are urgently needed. The EPA with considerable financial support from the United States International Cooperation Administration, is endeavouring to increase both the numbers and the quality of management teachers by means of its

42 Memorandum from Waldemar A. Nielsen to Shepard Stone Paris, June 27, 1959 [FFA Joseph Slater General Correspondence].
reaches training projects in the USA and in Europe; however, it must be recognised that demand has outstripped the availability, primarily because of the length of time required to train qualified personnel and steps must be taken if European management teaching is to develop as rapidly as desired.\textsuperscript{43}

It was clear that the need for management teachers was deeply rooted in Europe during the late Fifties and was certainly strengthened by the European integration after the treaty of Rome. The economic expansion, which took place as a result of the European recovery, had a direct impact on private firms and, in particular, on small and medium-size enterprises.

One result of this growth in the size of the firms was to create a demand for a greater variety of specialised skills at the middle management level. The universities and other training institutions in Europe were not geared to provide individuals with these new fields of specialisation.

"In addition," - Gregoire observed - "the fear of economic distortions, presumably to be caused by the integration of European economies, caused grave concerns to small and medium entrepreneurs, who were in fact the body of public opinion which most resisted the various plan of economic integration. In this way EPA not only helped to overcome the resistance but helped in creating an atmosphere in which change was welcomed as an opportunity rather than feared as a difficulty."\textsuperscript{44}

The Pool of Professors Program

The main goal of the pool of professor program was not only to create centres of studies and research in management, but also to supply the managers needs with expanding and integrated economies of the European member countries. It was the long-term program which captured the Ford Foundation's attention. Ford Foundation's reply to EPA's requirements was a positive one: in total the Ford Foundation grants allowed for the recruitment of 25 American professors. The interest in this program was strong: in 1958/59 alone, fifty management training institutes expressed their interest in receiving American guest professors through this program. The 25 professors came from different American institutions and from different areas of the U.S.A. but a large percentage came from Michigan. This was an important factor with respect to the insertion of marketing and organisational behaviour as teaching subjects in the new European school's curricula, considering that these disciplines were considerably developed both by Ann Arbor and the Chicago School of Business Administration.

\textsuperscript{43} [FFA Reel n° 05265, Section 1].
\textsuperscript{44} [FFA, Reel n° 57265, Section 1].

As previously stated American professors had two main tasks: conducting courses as well as giving policy advice to the new institutions to set them off in the "right direction". This direction was of course related to the implementation of American standards which should create also a basic similarity among institutions disseminated in different countries. An important part of their work was also selecting young assistant professors who would receive a scholarship, (from different sponsors, including the Fulbright program which was well developed in many European countries since the early Fifties) to spend a one-year period in the United States during which they could specialise in a particular subject matter of business administration.

The evaluation of the background of the discussion of the goals of the FF grant to EPA is a very interesting account of the foundation general policy in this field:

"The development of business management training in European universities is considered to be important in terms of the objectives of the foundation's European program and in the program in Economic Development and Administration. Such training can contribute directly to strengthening the European economy and also have a direct effect on the structure, methods and orientation of European higher education. The encouragement of such professional schools in Europe, like the development of the social sciences generally, will help repair the broken link between European academic institutions and the pressing social, economic and political problems of the continent. Business management training has had rapid growth in post-war Europe and the problem at the moment is not only to encourage further growth but to keep it on a sound basis of competence and quality"[^45].

The Foundation's main goal was clearly to translate to Europe the basic patterns of American "organisational synthesis" rather than to simply export educational contents and teaching programs. Obviously, however, the possibility of developing this strategy largely depended on "contexts": in the countries where management (and not only management education) was still a no man's land, as well as in the countries where there was still a great reluctance to accept management as a subject of sufficient intellectual and scientific content to be included into higher education system, this transfer was mainly centred on contents and programs.

Considering the problem of "contrast of contexts" within a rather diffused strategy of dissemination, like that of the Ford Foundation during the late Fifties and the early Sixties, it is interesting to note that the demand for American guest professors came mostly from countries in which management education had met

[^45]: EPA, Business Management Training, 1957, Discussion [FFA, Reel 0527, Grant n.57265, Section 3].
serious obstacles in its process of institutionalisation, that is Italy (61%) and England (17.5%). Whereas the demand from other European countries emerged for another reason, the opportunity to introduce courses in English, such countries were; the Netherlands (15.5%), Sweden (5.5%) and Belgium (0.5%).

In Italy, especially at ISIDA in Palermo there was without doubt the highest concentration of American professors. It is evident that in its first three years of life (1956-1959) ISIDA profited from IPSOA’s crisis, which was already evident since 1957, by obtaining the best American professors available. [Ezra Solomon from Stanford and Mervin Waterman from Ann Arbor School of Business Administration taught Finance and Controls; Joseph W. Towl from Washington University and for a short period also Pearson Hunt from Harvard University who taught General Management; Paul Converse from the University of Illinois and Edward Cundiff from the University of Texas taught Marketing, Norman Maier from Ann Arbor thought Industrial Relations and Psychological Research]. The reports of the American professors reveal that ISIDA’s experiment and the interest of its Director, Gabriele Morello, in research and in organising at the Institute a general management curriculum (strongly different from the Italian trade schools curricula) was considered a positive result. ISIDA was, in this period, a promising institution in the European context as was IPSOA at the beginning of the Fifties. This was also the case for CUOA in Padua.

“...It is the first example I know in Italy of University action in this field. Most of the students will be men who already have a university degree in engineering. /.../ The case study method will be emphasized as well as the seminar method of instruction. If IPSOA had done nothing else, I think it helped lay the groundwork for this undertaking in Padua”, Waldemar Nielsen wrote in 1957.

Therefore, we can say that in the mid-Fifties, Italy was at the core of the American experiment of “exporting” management education to the old continent. The backwardness of Italy in this field was probably an element which facilitated an initial, rather mechanical transfer, which in a few years implemented its capabilities of adapting programs to an environment which was perceived as a dynamic one. Actually IPSOA was the first European business schools to develop, though for a short period, a permanent faculty. The situation changed rapidly in the first half of the Sixties when the dissemination of management education in Europe created an increasingly relevant asymmetry among institutions and national cultural patterns.

Unfortunately Italy was characterised by a rapid process of involution (at the same time economic, social and political) because of the crisis of the “centro
"Under the bonanza of the much praised 'economic miracles'" - Gabriele Morello wrote - "the need for investments in human resources was not felt. The number of executives who in the sixties went through regular learning exercises can be counted in terms of a few hundred per year. One could ask why the new initiatives did not originate from the universities. Historically, Italy was probably the first country to conceive the engineer as a man of vast and complex knowledge. But the technician of general education, this Leonardian type of all-round figures, did not last long, soon replaced, under the spurs of technological process by specialists. And thus it happened that Italian faculties were divided into small bit and pieces of specialised sciences and the Italian educational model was frozen into a monolithic system which kept adding new departments and disciplines while leaving unchanged the structure of the system. Since each small piece of science turned into a chair, meant status and personal gratification for somebody, the impetus for the citadels of knowledge to become citadels of power, was real and concrete.46

Italy: the "enclosure" effect

There remains one other element which should be added to this lucid analysis. While in the largest part of the European countries a post-graduate studies' strategy and structure were rapidly developed in most of the disciplines, in Italy, despite the energy devoted in this direction by a small group of enlightened intellectuals and administrators, strongly supported by Ford Foundation programs, (COSPOS, SPISA, Portici Institute, SVIMEZ) nothing happened.47 A post-graduate studies' structure was created only at the beginning of the Eighties, as an extreme "rattrappage" in order to avoid complete exclusion from European educational standards.

Moreover the Italian system was characterized by a hybrid situation in which some "islands of innovation") coexisted (as a sort of enclosures, however) with persistence within the Faculties of Economics, dominated by the tradition of "Economia aziandale", (which was closer to the German tradition of Betriebwirtschaftslehre and business economics rather than to “business administration" patterns), of a strong theoretical approach based on the general

theory of the unity of the firm and on the separation between pure and applied economics.

Finally, as stated in the “Frederick report” of 1968 the diagnosis of possible implementation of management education in Italy was rather sceptical:

“Some twenty programs exist; only five can be considered nationally significant; and none compares favourably with the best business schools of other European Nations. Several features of the Italian economic, political, social, and cultural environment conspire to frustrate the steady and healthy growth of training institutions /../ Presently the business schools are faced with serious problems of staffing, lack of research, business and government apathy, hostility of traditional academic groups and professional rivalry among themselves /../ The history of management education in Italy is one that has featured an erratic up-and-down cycle of development of individual programs and schools /../ The Italians have built each of their management training institutions on the aspirations, drive talents, and community contacts of a single man. This man -usually the director- has founded the program /../ his ideas and philosophy usually dominated it and his personal interest and continued involvement are absolutely essential to the survival of the institution /../ Very little institutionalization has occurred. Consequently, those training efforts are vulnerable to the whims of all those social forces that act upon the careers of the program directors. More so than in most nations, the institution is the man. The man is very largely the institution”.

Frederick quoted extensively a 1965 OECD report, whose statement about the future sounds now as a fulfilled prediction:

“The authorities confronted with a lowering of the general educational level of the managerial class in Italy have to deal with the question of development and renewal, the foundation for which must be laid between 1966 and 1975, although results will be felt only much later.”48

These considerations help to explain two sequences of events: firstly why Italy participated so intensively in the first phase of the Ford Foundation's international policies, but played an almost insignificant role in the second phase which was devoted to strengthening research and graduate-studies program rather than to simply export "American patterns" of training and education. Secondly, why the shift between the end of the Fifties and the mid-Sixties was so strong and evident especially in the relationships between the two sides of the Atlantic.

The development of new attitudes in American "cultural behaviour" basically oriented to a cross-fertilization policy, considering differences as well as similarities among countries and cultures, undoubtedly facilitated the already

48 William C. Frederick, Management Training Activities in Italy, 1968, pp. 3 and 13-17 [FFA Report 003597].
existent process of differentiation, in size and strategies, which characterized the development of the European business schools during the sixties. Actually the most visible "contrast of contexts" during this period depended on the asymmetry between the dynamic situation which characterized some European countries like France, Belgium and to some extent England (considering its basic "cultural-institutional" resistance to management education's development but also its strong tradition in social science research, through innovative institutions like the Tavistock Institute) and the Italian involution, which became evident at the end of the Sixties.

It was certainly supported by the consolidation of social factors, such as coherecitive authority, power and status which remained predominant both in the University system and among the managerial elite.

"Technical, economic, financial, or managerial skill is considered less important than kinship relations/./."
Frederick stated- "The result is a style of managing that is impermeable to rationality, inaccessible to all but a precious few, and unfathomable to those not closely acquainted with past and present family histories, social rivalries and political intrigues /./. The business and political practices are sufficiently intertwined/./ to make a major change in one sector difficult to achieve without serious upheavals in the other sectors."49

**Between Europeanization and Internationalization: INSEAD’ s origins**

What should be stressed is that, despite many shifts produced by historical factors, a basic ground for the new trend which characterized Ford Foundation's policies in European educational programs during the Sixties, should be retraced to the previous experimental phase, as described above. The "stream of actions" of this phase, progressively corrected and adapted to different environmental contexts, the idea of simply exporting American methods and patterns.

The reports which professors, engaged in the EPA's program, wrote on the situation of the schools they visited were precious instruments for the Ford Foundation both in defining its policy of investments in each country, with respect to the level of acceptance of management education at university, and in selecting the projects which had a priority in the Foundation's general policy. Moreover, one should consider the role of EPA in supporting the creation of INSEAD, the first European business school, in cooperation with the Chamber of Commerce in Paris, and with the agreement of industrialists like Raoul de Vitry, from Pechiney, and the president of Saint Gobain de Vogue, in fostering European training centers associations, giving advice and promoting contacts between them.

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49 Ivi, pp.21-22.
Furthermore, EPA supported the creation of the European Liaison Committee for Management Education Development with the purpose of stimulating the interaction between its members, which were the EAMTC, the IUC, the CECIOS and the FEACO. Many of the reports produced by the EPA advisory service and in particular the so-called Platt report, published in 1963 by a group of outstanding scholars including, Platt, Gaston Berger (replaced by P. Huvelin when he died) and Pierre Tabatoni, played an important role in the subsequent development of Ford Foundation design for Western Europe management education.

However, at the end of the Fifties, when the time of EPA was over, and the Ford Foundation went alone to the European arena, the agenda had changed. The focus was no longer on security problems and productivity drive but rather on the idea that cooperation strategies could implement the development of an equal partnership between the two continents and that the policy of science could be a strategic weapon in fostering East-West relations. One of the main elements of this shift was certainly the multiplier effect produced by European integration after the treaty of Rome, which is particularly evident in the French case, especially in the origins of INSEAD.

When INSEAD started its classes the French industrial and institutional environment was almost as inhospitable as the Italian one. The University system and above all the system of the grandes ecoles had the monopoly of higher education, even in commercial studies. Since 1881, in fact, the Ecole of Hautes Etudes Commerciales have been in existence and developing in France and have developed strong roots within the entrepreneurial elite's social milieu. Until the Second World War and even later, the French entrepreneurial environment was dominated by middle and little enterprises which had a low interest in MBA programs. Similar to the Italian case the engineering schools tradition was dominated by the production-engineers, well accustomed to taylorist gospel but rather unaware of new approaches.50

Nevertheless, unlike their Italian colleagues at IPSOA, INSEAD's pioneers could count on some opportunities which they were able to exploit at the point of transforming what appeared as an obstacle in an additional impetus. An important opportunity was created by the process of cross-fertilization, realized by the CPA whose methods and training patterns were assimilated by a large range of students who came from the most different institutions and who, later on, had different careers not only in the industrial milieu but also in bureaucracy, finance,

50 On this point see Bruce R. Scott Letter to Mariam Chamberlain, July 8, 1968 and the paper attached Implications of this study to action in France , pp.6-9[FFA, LOG 233-1966].
diplomacy. An excellent example of this process of "horizontal fertilization" of different social and institutional segments is that of Pierre Uri, a former CPA student who became head of the Commissariat au plan. As stated before, in order to resist the University system's opposition, IPSOA progressively transformed itself into a kind of "innovation enclosure" with lower and lower relationships with the entrepreneurial and the academic environment. On the contrary, INSEAD's founders, developing General Doriot's orientation, tried to consolidate a large network of supporters and donors not only in France but also in Europe and in the United States.

It should be noted that in the university milieu the resistance of some sectors was compensated by the behaviour of some actors, who, like the Director of the "Enseignement supérieur" Gaston Berger, played a crucial role in educational policies. In a memorandum of December 30, 1957, Waldemar Nielsen observed that:

"Berger is warmly in support of the business schools development, not only for its own sake but because of the invigorating effect such schools will have on French schools generally. He showed no trace of the snobbish and disrespectful attitude about business schools which is often encountered among European academicians. His support does not stop with general endorsement and he is now working on further specific steps to strengthen the business schools movement in France".

One should not forget that a few years before, in 1954, he had strongly supported the idea of creating (within the University system, but with a high level of autonomy under the formula of Faculty Institutes), the Institutes d'Administration des Enterprises. The design of this kind of institution came from a young graduate of the Faculty of Law, Pierre Tabatoni who in 1954 had just completed his training in the United States, at Harvard University, where by chance, he met General Doriot and came back to France carrying the fascinating impetus of Doriot's ideas about strengthening European management education. Despite some reservations on the idea of creating a European Business school which he considered premature, Berger was not totally against the idea of INSEAD and did not try to stop plans for the new school, considering it as an element of a developing system.

In any case INSEAD did not depend on the University system and never tried to be accepted within it. It developed instead as an independent school and found the financial basis of its existence not only in the Chamber of Commerce and EPA support, but also in an increasing way in the entrepreneurial environment. This element also marks a crucial distance vis-à-vis the American Business Schools' organizational patterns, which in most cases, depended on the attachment to a big University. An important opportunity for INSEAD
development was created, in the short term, by a rapidly changing political situation, characterized at the international level by the implementation of European unification which implied at its ground the strengthening of an intellectual (and virtually political) identity.

At the national level INSEAD could profit of the effects of Mendés-France policy whose main orientation was to create a solid and dynamic interface between the public sector and the private sector, between the bureaucratic system and the entrepreneurial milieu. Unfortunately this orientation, despite the effort of an enlightened group of reformers, was totally lacking in Italy. INSEAD could profit also of some socio-cultural changes like the emergence of a new generation of poly-technicians trained as “ingénieurs-économistes” who developed a process of scientification of applied economics through operational analysis and mathematical models which was very close to the intellectual and scientific patterns of the “new paradigm” in American management sciences.

The new generation of ingénieurs-economistes could act as industrialists in the private sector as well as experts in the State Administration. Significantly the young founders of INSEAD, Olivier Giscard d’Estaing, Roger Godino, and Claude Jansenn were all polytechnicians trained as ingénieurs-économistes with Maurice Allais and later on at Harvard, with Doriot. INSEAD could therefore profit from the opportunity created by the intellectual and the social capital of the founders who developed a good knowledge of the American educational patterns (including the case method). All these basic factors undoubtedly facilitated the relationships with the most important American business schools, (Harvard, Stanford and Columbia) and also the placement of young graduates in American firms and multinationals, exactly during the period in which European expansion was at the top. Then it is not surprising that INSEAD was one of the first business schools to take advantage of the Ford Foundation’s interest in developing a European program.

The first request to the Foundation was made as early as 1959 by the first president of the Institute, Postumus Meyjés who contacted Thomas H. Carroll and presented a request for a conspicuous grant of $2,200,000 with the following purposes:

a) carrying out additional Research and Case Development on the various aspects of the Common Market’s evolution and the impact this and any further steps toward European Economic Integration would have both within and outside of the Common Market Area;

b) to attract and hold high calibre faculty from both Europe and the US;

c) to develop and keep up to the best international library in Europe, and
d) to recruit the most outstanding candidates.
INSEAD founders’ expectations were certainly disillusioned when the IA staff decided to make a grant of $120,000, which basically respected the aims of the Ford Foundation’s programs in this area “to provide modest support to help stimulate cooperation in international management, training and research.” Requests by the Institute for the large-scale support of the Foundation were rejected on the grounds that European industry was in a position to provide its basic operational needs. A relevant goal of the grant was “to stimulate cooperative arrangements with other European management training centers and institutes, developing teaching materials on European and International management problems and provide a limited number of fellowships to highly qualified non French students who /were/ likely to become teachers of business management in their respective countries”. It is interesting to observe that the grant’s target contains, on a “small scale”, most of the relevant goals which became crucial in the late sixties as large scale policies. Furthermore, the limited amount of the grant was among the factors which stimulated the growing interaction of INSEAD with the business environment, through an increasing offering of “tailor-made” research projects, which in the long run became a factor of institutional competitiveness and a way to capture new grants from the Ford Foundation, when its “grand design” for Europe, grounded on professionalization of management through research started.

As Roger Godino stated in 1965, at a seminar held by INSEAD in cooperation with Harvard Business School and the McKinsey Foundation on Research Policies and Development, Technological Change and their International Effects, the possible solution for the increasing gap between US and Europe, “will be found when big US concerns stop taking their political lead solely from Washington and, as the importance of national control declines, help from one big borderless business block in the Western hemisphere”. This orientation met the basic goal of IA programs in a period in which strategic priorities were related to the necessity of bypassing national limitations to strengthen Atlantic Partnership. In their first application to the Ford Foundation, Olivier Giscard d’Estaing and Postumus Meyjès stressed that the development of INSEAD could be a relevant element “towards the conclusion of a wider North-Atlantic business community consistent with European goals” and that “it is a great opportunity that such a project is started in business administration, both because it will be a very efficient tool in forcing the unity of Europe and because it maintains and encourages Europe in a free enterprise system”.

Significantly, from the side Ford Foundation, Joseph Slater seemed to catch the message when he asked the Foundation staff:
“Why not propose a fluid fund research grant for INSEAD? The confidence in the institution would appear to justify such a grant and to warrant the assumption that they would design a research program more in keeping with the INSEAD mission. For example why not research on some of their multinational constituents, such as UNILEVER, ICI, Royal Dutch, Air France, Olivetti.”

The second grant ($150,000), made by the Ford Foundation to INSEAD in 1965 within the Harvard Business Schools’ International Teacher Program, reveals however the “Janus like” orientation of the Fontainebleau institute. In one year INSEAD teaching staff were able to detect the elements of weakness of the Harvard-Ford program, starting a campaign for the Europeanization of the program. In a memorandum sent by R. Catalano to J. Slater in June 1966 is was clearly stated that:

“The joint research (primarily case collection) program with Harvard, is not as good as it should be. Professor Mace - Business policy- and Smith- Finance- have used the program to gather case material, related to their particular research interest of primary benefit to their courses at Harvard /../. The case collection of Hansen- in marketing- has been much more useful to INSEAD. This is because he and Teresi worked closely together and planned the case collection to fit the needs of the School’s marketing course.”  

This was the first of a series of several complaints which prepared a revision of the ITP program and finally resulted in the creation of a European Consortium with the implementation of training methods which exceeded the Harvard case method.

One should note that the impact of ITP programs had different effects in different European institutions, according to the size and development of each school. For INSEAD the new orientation of ITP programs represented an important step in developing its role as the central institution in Europeanization processes which is clearly stated in a letter of Dean Berry’s to Marshall Robinson:

“The design of the ITP program is a rigid immersion course in the Harvard theology. I certainly don’t regard this at all bad but it does lead to a substantially different focus than the Europeans, collectively, feel they are after. The Europeans feel that it should be a program to train teachers. They do not think, for example, that everyone who attends the program should necessarily sit through every functional area and all the cases. They do feel that the program should stress how to teach and not to be a sanforized shrunk version of the MBA curriculum at Harvard. It became evident in our

51 R. Catalano, *Visit to INSEAD*, June 7, 1966 [FFA. Report n° 010779].
In Italy, where a new trend in management education development was just starting, after the static period of the Sixties, with the creation of SDA- Bocconi and ISTUD, the ITP program as well as the creation of a case method clearinghouse were relevant factors of the Americanisation of many sectors of European management education. Bocconi’s faculty largely depended on the SDA program, the young assistants who wanted to become professors were all under obligation to participate to an ITP.

The creation of the European Consortium in 1969 was not only the result of the perception that the Harvard Faculty was not sufficiently international in its outlook, but of several factors which included that “the calibre of participants varied greatly from brilliant to incompetent” and that there was a perception of a basic lack of structure within the ITP, (ITP participants attending Harvard Business School classes were frequently unprepared in comparison to the majority). Moreover the new dean, Larry Fouraker thought that times had changed and that spreading the Harvard message through professors circulating in different schools and national areas “could no longer be seen as a clear-cut benefit”.

From Harvard Business School’s perspective the focus turned to the idea of creating, at Mount Pellerin in Switzerland, a European based counterpart to the Advanced Management program at Harvard Business School. No doubt, however INSEAD’s resistance and, primarily the large grant that the Institute received by the Ford Foundation, had a role in changing Harvard Business School’s orientation. One should stress here, that since 1964 the Ford Foundation had manifested a strong interest in developing international business programs and made a conspicuous grant of $12,5 million to Harvard and $10,9 million to Columbia for international studies under the EDA program “EDA saw these business schools of the potential leaders among US business schools for the development of research and curricula about international business, a field of growing importance in business education.”

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53 One ITP’s history see S. Heptonstall, *Faculty development: the International Teachers Program: a Case Study*, CFM /INTERMAN, 1991, pp.3-4 who however reduces the complexity of the transition from the “Harvard ITP” to the European consortium to a simple agreement between European business schools and HBS Faculty.
54 EDA, Support of International Business Program [ FFA Reel 24, Grant n° 6772 section 1 Grant approval 1967].
INSEAD’s reaction to the “old Harvard Business School’s programs” and later on to the Mount Pellerin experiment were certainly useful to the Ford Foundation’s staff in defining the rationale of the grant to Harvard Business School. A letter of Marshall Robinson’s to Dean George Lombard of April 1972 is very clear on this point. While Robinson underlined the necessity of a central clearing house for case method development. He also stressed Ford Foundation’s strong endorsement of efforts to Europeanize the knowledge, norms and people of American business schools,

“but not by locating the schools in Europe. Thus” -Robinson suggested- “I hope our involvement with the case workshop and clearinghouse and with ITP will continue to foster creative learning experiences and research opportunities for your Faculty; and I hope that it will not be viewed as support for those who would open up a branch office in EEC. Finally let me note that I hope you will make every effort to keep a healthy distance between this effort and the idea of an HBS institutional presence in Europe.”

Ford Foundation behaviour vis-à-vis Harvard Business School had also a strategic effect in strengthening INSEAD visibility in the arenas of international business operations and research. Actually the growth of this “Janus like” orientation in INSEAD institutional development between Europeanization and Internationalization was directly and indirectly related to relevant crucial changes which occurred simultaneously both within the Foundation’s internal staff and programs and in the European environment of the mid Sixties. One should consider the fact that EPA stopped its activities and that, despite a series of reports related to different countries published in 1965, OECD did not take the release of EPA’s activities in management education. One should also consider the fact that in the early Sixties the American congress felt that European countries had reached the stage when they should provide to support themselves and American business was reluctant to give further assistance to possible competitors. Paradoxically, the most relevant effects of the Marshall plan became evident in the early and mid-Sixties.

“It may be argued that while the Marshall Plan was a one time, fixed-duration event, its significance lies not so much in its short-term economic results as in its long-terms impact.”

55 Marshall A. Robinson Letter to Dean George F. Lombard, April 3, 1972[FFA, Reel no 1542 Grant n° 71197, section 4] The project to develop case method and to create a clearinghouse started in 1972 with a grant of$ 300,000. Initially coordinated by Andrew Towl, Director of Case Development and the Intercollegiate Case Clearing House at Harvard, it continued after 1974 under European auspices.

56 I. Wexler, The Marshall Plan and the Beginning of the Cold War: Diplomatic History in Economic Perspective, paper presented at the International meeting Beyond the Cold War:
The Marshall plan embedded the stream of actions of some of the actors involved in EPA-Ford Foundation cooperation in the late Fifties and produced, as mentioned before, a kind of epsilon effect which cross-fertilized Ford Foundation’s policies after the end of the European reconstruction era. Some of these actors, (like Alexander King, Roger Gregoire and Joseph Slater), unconsciously anticipated elements of the crucial shift from security strategies as basic factors of productivity policies during the first phase of the Cold War to development policies, not only in terms of economic development but also in terms of research strategies and cultural-scientific development, which became relevant factors during the Sixties and the early Seventies.

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