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“AGAINST ACCOUNTABILITY”

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"Against Accountability"

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Abstract
Although relatively corrupt regimes require citizen monitoring and accountability enforced by the threat of sanction, this kind of relationship between citizens and their agents is inefficient and normatively unsatisfying. In relatively uncorrupt regimes, citizens do not need to depend so heavily on this "sanctions model," with its sanction-based accountability. Instead they can have a relationship with their representatives based on a "selection model" in which they select representatives who act "gyroscopically" from their own internal motivations and are replaced when the alignment between constituents and their representatives erodes. The more corrupt the regime, the more the relationship must be founded on sanction-based accountability. The less corrupt the regime, the more the citizens can afford representative relationships based primarily on a well-warranted sense of common purpose. The appropriate size of the selection "core" and sanction "periphery" depends in large part on the degree of corruption in the regime.

Keywords
Accountability, sanctions model, selection model.

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For an earlier treatment with complete references, see Mansbridge, "A 'Selection Model' of Political Representation," The Journal of Political Philosophy *17 (4): 369-398 (2009).*

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Everywhere you turn these days, you hear calls for greater accountability. I am not going to take a stand against all accountability – not against accountable political parties, for example, or against accountability in corrupt regimes. Instead I will argue against the wholesale application of what I think is in many cases a flawed model of what gets the best results.

To be clear at the outset, when I speak of accountability, I mean the understanding of accountability that is now relatively hegemonic in the discipline of political science – namely, that to hold an agent *accountable* means that you, the principal, have means of *monitoring* that agent and imposing *sanctions* if he or she does not do a good job. So to say that someone is not accountable means that they are relatively impervious to sanctions. For example, Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin, in an influential volume on accountability about ten years ago, adopted this meaning. The model they employ is the one that today I am going to argue is flawed.

This is the outline of my talk: first I will briefly describe the Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin model, which I will call the *sanctions* model. This is standard understanding of principal-agent relationships, based on what was the hegemonic economic model a decade or so ago and still is the dominant model. Then I will describe an alternative principal-agent relationship, which I call the *selection* model – a model that is possible only in certain specific circumstances. I will show how the standard principal-agent relationship based on sanctions fits the standard understanding of accountability and how it is sometimes counterproductive. I will show how the alternative relationship based on selection fits an alternative understanding of accountability, and how, when this alternative relationship is possible, it can be both more efficient and more morally satisfying.

I will then discuss some of the implications of these two forms of principal-agent relationship. One implication is that sometimes the reigning assumptions in political science that competition in elections is good and long-term incumbency is bad may be just wrong. Another implication is that sometimes the many calls you hear for more transparency in the workings of government may also be wrong.

Finally, I will look at the potential pitfalls in this alternative that I am suggesting, and I will conclude, you will not be surprised, by saying that further work is needed. In my case, this is not an empty formula. I am laying out a somewhat new way of looking at a familiar object, political representation, and once you look at it in this new way, all sorts of interesting problems and insights arise.

To begin, let's look at the standard account of principal-agent relationships both in the discipline of economics and political science. In that model, the principal holds the agent to account through either positive or negative sanctions – promising inducements and making threats, offering carrots and threatening sticks.

I call this the "sanctions model." It works on the understanding of accountability that has now become standard – an understanding based on the principal's capacity to monitor and impose sanctions. I will focus on the imposition of negative sanctions, as that is the way the model is usually understood.

This model makes a lot of sense in the economic realm. We can reasonably assume, with Adam Smith, that "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we can expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest." Similarly, in economic matters, if we are the principals, we can assume that any agents we hire will be acting with regard to their own interest. Therefore we principals need to watch these agents carefully to make sure they are not

deviating from our interests. We need to monitor them. And we need to make them act in our interests by inducing them to do so with rewards and threatening them with sanctions if they deviate. For simplicity in this talk I will treat the threat not to provide a reward as a threat of sanction.

This standard model assumes conflicting interests between the principal and the agent. In the economic realm, where each is acting in regard to her own self-interest, one would usually expect those interests to conflict. For example, the agent would have incentives to shirk (that is, not to do the work), but the principal's interests would be to have the agent work hard.

The role of power in this model is pretty straightforward. Let us define power for purposes of this talk as coercive power, that is, the capacity of A to get B to do something that B would otherwise not do through the threat of sanctions or the use of force. In this model, A exercises power over B. That is how A, the principal, gets B, the agent, to do what B would otherwise not do.

So to put it all together, the concept of accountability in this model involves monitoring and sanctioning. In the pure case, the interests of principal and agent conflict and the agent is motivated to do what the principal wants the agent to do only by power -- the external sanctions that the principal can wield. In order to wield those sanctions effectively, the principal needs to monitor carefully. For that purpose the principal needs transparency.

That is the standard theory.

Now, suppose that the world is such that there is an agent out there who for some reason – some exogenous reason – already wants, internally, to do what the principal wants her to do. This agent is internally motivated. We need not inquire why. Perhaps she has been struck by kryptonite. Just assume that fortuitously the world produces some agents who are internally motivated to want to do whatever it is the principals want them to do. So fortuitously these agents' own interests are aligned with those of the principal.

When the world produces this fortuitous circumstance, it then pays the principal to put in a lot of effort *ex ante*, to select the right agent, whose interests really are aligned with the principal's own interests, and then after that, let that agent act more or less on her own initiative – rather than putting in all the work *ex post*, to monitor and sanction the agent.

If the agent's and the principal's interests are well aligned, the principal can afford to have less monitoring and sanctioning after selection, because the research before selection – for example, looking at the agent's past reputation – has given the principal good reason to believe the principal's and agent's interests are aligned. This is the "selection model."

Here is an example of the selection model. If you hire a caregiver to take care of your kids, you look and look until you find someone you think really loves kids, intrinsically, so that when you are gone, she will act as much as possible the way you would like to have acted. You know you are not going to be able to monitor very well what happens when you are gone. And you know that there will be many unexpected circumstances in which you will want your caregiver to use her best judgment.

Similarly, if you appoint a judge, you want to find someone who intrinsically cares about justice. For constitutional reasons you may want to make that judge's tenure relatively secure. So constitutionally you limit sharply your capacity to sanction. In this case you want to invest relatively heavily *ex ante*, beforehand, in a process of training and selection that will produce people who, because of their own internal motivation, will act the way you want them to act. In this case, of course, the training and the creation of a profession does not eliminate all sanction; it displaces much of sanctioning to the profession, both formally and informally, so that if the system works well, the judges themselves sanction those among them who depart from the norms of good judging. In the organizational literature this is called "network accountability." It has the obvious problem of needing to find ways to call the network itself to account. But for my purposes the main point is that now, after all this training and self-selection, or sorting, into the profession, you can actually find people who have internalized the norms of justice – who now, for their own internal reasons, want to judge justly – and you can select them for a position in which constitutionally you have deprived yourself of much of the capacity to sanction.

Tenure is another example. In order to promote knowledge, we want our senior academics to be relatively insulated from political pressures and the whims of their superiors. But bestowing tenure also limits sharply our future capacity to sanction. In that case, we want to invest relatively heavily in an *ex ante* process of selection that will choose those academics who, because of their own internal motivation, will keep studying whatever they have been studying with the same intensity, dedication, and intelligence as they had before tenure.

Human nature is such, however, that it would be a rare case in which we could do away entirely with sanction. There will always be what I call a *selection core* and a *sanction periphery*. The question is in each set of different circumstances – how big can we make the selection core and how light and delicate the sanction periphery? So that the sanction periphery does a gentle job of disciplining, but is remains as thin as possible, in order not to interfere with the internal motivations that animate the selection core.

Whether or not we can create organizations with a large selection core and thin sanction periphery depends on several factors.

First, and most importantly, it depends on whether the world has produced or could relatively easily produce a sufficient number of potential agents who do have internally motivated interests that are aligned with the interests of the principals. Take, for example, mowing my lawn. Relatively few people out there in the world want to mow my lawn without any external inducement. So the principal-agent relationship between me and the person who mows my grass will have a relatively small selection core and a relatively large sanction periphery. On the other hand, that relationship will probably have *some* selection core. The world may have produced some people who, perhaps for reasons of internal pride, want to work hard and do a good job. If this is the case, then I will try to find and select one of those people. I will ask my neighbors whether they know anyone who is honest, works hard, cares about the work, and is competent. I will look for someone who has a reputation for internal motivation.

To take another example, a friend of mine had the job at Harvard of hiring undergraduates to work over the summer doing garden work, landscaping. She found that it was a good idea to hire athletes, because athletes for their own internal reasons wanted to keep in shape. The athletes had the internal motivation to work hard at the manual labor they were doing.

In short, even with lawn-mowing, the world may produce some differences among individuals in the degree to which they are internally motivated to do the work. When this is the case, if a principal can invest time *ex ante* to find such agents and select them, the principal can save *ex post* on monitoring and sanctioning.

A second factor is how possible it is in a particular job to monitor the work closely. With a caregiver, for example, I could install videocameras everywhere in the house to tape everything that happened while I was off at work. Then I could spend my evenings watching the tapes to discover deviations from duty. But most of us don't want to do that. So we have to trust the caregiver most of the time. Because we cannot monitor easily, we invest fairly heavily *ex ante* in trying to find and select someone who will want, for her own reasons, to do well by our child.

A third factor is the effects of monitoring and sanctioning on the worker. A caregiver who knew she was being taped constantly might not like it. Indeed, the lack of trust that such a procedure would signal might poison her relationship with me and even my child. So the act of monitoring would undermine whatever internal motivation the agent might have. Sanctioning also has costs. It is often expensive to punish. And even when the sanction itself is not costly, there are often considerable costs in finding another worker if the sanction drives the first worker to leave.

Finally, the more the principal wants the agent to use her initiative and act flexibly, in unforeseeable future circumstances, the more a selection model is efficient. By contrast, a system based on monitoring and sanctioning will induce the agent to do only whatever can be monitored and sanctioned, focusing on the measurable means and not the real goal.

These, then, are four important contingencies that determine when one should choose a selection model. A selection model is viable only when aligned agents exist or are in reasonable supply. It is cost-effective to the degree that monitoring is difficult, monitoring and sanctioning have

high costs and/or bad effects, and where flexibility in unpredictable circumstances is an important part of the job.

Before I apply this to politics, let me look briefly at the role of power in a selection model. Does the principal give up power in this model? Yes and no. The principal gives up power over the agent, but not over the effect. In the circumstances that make a selection model viable and efficient, the principal gets what she wants more often than if she had adopted a sanctions model. She influences the effect. The principal no longer gets the agent to do what the agent would otherwise not do. But if there is an institution involve, she gets the institution (for example, a parliament) to do what it would otherwise not do by placing this agent in it. Moreover, the principal retains the power to remove the agent.

Let me be clear about the difference between selecting and then removing an internally motivated agent, which is what happens in the selection model, and threatening an externally motivated agent with removal, which is what happens in the sanctions model. The means – removal – is exactly the same in each case. But in the (non-existent) pure case of an entirely self-motivated agent, the threat of removal would not affect at all what the agent did before removal. Because in this hypothetical pure case the motivation is entirely internal, the threat of sanction would have no effect. The principal would have no power over the agent per se. In the pure case the agent would always continue to try to act in the same way no matter what the principal did. The agent would always walk North, let us say. The agent would continue to try to walk North both before and after the threat. I call this concept of representation "gyroscopic" representation. The representative has inside herself a gyroscope keeping her going in the same direction. As Andrew Rehfeld has pointed out, there are two analytically separable components to this concept. The gyroscopic representative relies on her own internal judgment and she is relatively unresponsive to sanction.

In the selection model, however, the principal does have the power to remove the agent. For example, if the agent's internal motivation has changed its direction. Or the principal's goals have changed. Or a new issue arises in which the agent and the principal have different interests. Or another agent comes along whose internal motivation and interests are even better aligned with those of the principal or who is just more competent pursuing those interests. Then the principal's and the agent's interests become disaligned. If this disalignment appears, and if there are no significant transition costs, the principal will simply remove the current self-motivated agent from the scene and select another self-motivated agent whose interests are even better aligned with those of the principal.

To sum up, in selection model, characterized by a large selection core and only a very thin sanction periphery, the threat of removal should have little effect on the behavior of the self-motivated agent. By contrast, in the standard model, with the externally motivated agent, the threat of removal should result in changed behavior.

Let me conclude this general section with my point about accountability. The selection model does not feature the kind of accountability that we have become used to, the kind of accountability that people mean when they say, "We need more accountability!" They mean: "We want to be able to make our agents do what we want them to do!" That is, "We want to exercise power over them." "We want to be able to watch them carefully and punish them when they do not do what we want them to do." This is the sanctions model, with its reliance on monitoring and sanctioning, and this is its definition of accountability as monitoring and sanctioning. This is the definition of accountability that we find, for example, in the Przeworski, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin volume.

There is, however, an alternative understanding of accountability more compatible with the selection model. This meaning of accountability comes from an older tradition. It is a matter of "giving an account." The traditional meaning is the same in English, French, and German. The French "*rendre compte*" and the German "*Rechenshaft abgeben*" mean "giving an account." I call this alternative understanding "narrative" -- and "deliberative" -- accountability.

Narrative accountability is one-way. In it the agent explains what she did and why. This is the kind of accountability we expect of the U.S. Supreme Court. The justices must give a written account of what they decided and, most importantly, why.

Sometimes that narrative will not only explain but also try to educate the principals in why, let’s say, things were so difficult and so the results were not as expected, why some choices were made and not others, and what the prognosis might be for the future.

Sometimes, however, the giving of an account becomes dialogic, even deliberative, as the principal not only listens to the narrative but asks questions and perhaps volunteers information. So the interaction is two-way and often mutually educative. Ideally such an interaction can have positive normative properties – it can be an interaction among equals, or at least conduce to equality among the interlocutors.

These two models, the sanctions model and the selection model, apply in many realms. In the field of organizational studies, Douglas McGregor distinguished as early as 1960 between what he called “Theory X,” appropriate to situations in which employees will avoid work if they can and do not care about organizational goals, and “Theory Y,” appropriate to situations in which employees intrinsically enjoy their work, just as they enjoy play or leisure, and can be internally committed to the aims of the organization. Self-motivated employees, McGregor theorized, would be the more likely to exercise imagination, ingenuity, and creativity in their work.

The field of public administration in the early 1940s also saw what was called “the great debate” between Carl Friedrich and Herbert Finer on the best way to secure responsible and ethical conduct among public officials. Friedrich argued for selecting self-motivated persons who sincerely wanted to work for the public interest and reinforcing those internal commitments, while Finer argued for external sanctions and controls.

We can see a parallel these days in the funding world. In an earlier era, donors would select, to receive their money, organizations with a reputation for integrity, managed by individuals with a reputation for competence and integrity. They would then trust that their money was being used flexibly in the best way possible. Now donors want measurable outcomes, so that they can monitor the process and punish and reward accordingly. As a result, sometimes they get efforts aimed at creating the best measurable outcomes, which may not be the outcomes they actually want.

Strangely, in the debates between Friedrich and Finer in the 1940s, neither argued for “contingency theory” or what I am calling a “core-periphery” model balanced to match the context – that is, the four factors mentioned earlier.

Neither pointed out that when a context can support a selection model, selection will be more efficient than sanctions. But when a context cannot support a selection model – when most of the agents are narrowly self-interested or corrupt, for example – then you need a sanctions model

Nor did either make a normative argument for the value of certain kinds of relationships between principals and agents – relationships built on mutual respect, mutual trust, the capacity to forge common interests, or the feeling of solidarity that we all have experienced in working with others toward a common goal.

So this is what you should ask: “Can the situation support a selection model? Is it viable? Are there agents with trustworthy internal motivations out there? Is it hard to monitor what I want? Does monitoring and sanctioning have relatively high costs? Do I want from my agent flexible behavior adapted to unforeseen circumstances? If so, a model with a large selection core and a small sanction periphery will be better than a model based primarily on sanctions.

Now let me apply these models to the political realm. Here the principal is the voter, the constituent, and the agent is the representative.

I will begin with an historical story. Once upon a time, back in the U.S., everybody, that is, every educated political scientist, knew about these two models. Both of the models were once completely accepted in U.S. political science.

In the U.S., the very first article to study carefully the relationship between constituents and representatives was Warren Miller and Donald Stokes’s “Constituency Influence in Congress,” published in the *American Political Science Review* in 1963. This article has become a classic. It is the fifth most cited article in the APSR in its entire history. In this article, Miller and Stokes specified two ways in which constituencies control their representatives.

The first is "for the district to choose a Representative who so shares its views that in following his own convictions he does his constituents' will." This is the selection model. Unfortunately, their famous "diamond model," modeling the two paths, did not make the selection component conceptually central or even clear.

Their second path is "for the Congressman to follow his (at least tolerably accurate) perceptions of district attitude in order to win re-election." This is the sanctions model. Again, the diagram did not make the sanction component of the second path conceptually central or even clear.

But that is what these two paths are: a selection path and a sanctions path. These two paths formed the two sides of what Bob Erickson later called their "well-known 'diamond model' of political representation," which implicitly and non-controversially assumed that selection played a co-equal role with sanctions.

Ten years after Miller and Stokes, John Kingdon's classic *Congressmen's Voting Decisions* also made that assumption. He began his discussion of the mechanisms of constituency influence by stating, "The simplest mechanism through which constituents can influence a congressman is to select a person initially for office who agrees with their attitudes." "Members of Congress, he wrote, "fully recognize the importance" of this "simple, elemental point. It often happens that a congressman never feels pressured by his constituency and in fact never even takes them into account, simply because he is 'their kind of people' anyway." He concluded: "That the recruitment process [which I call "the selection model"] affects congressmen's voting is an elemental, easy-to-understand proposition, but its profound importance cannot be emphasized too strongly."

However, only a year after Kingdon's book, his "simple," "elemental," "easy-to-understand" point of "profound importance" began to lose much of its traction in the profession, at least in the U.S. A series of works on Congress, beginning with David Mayhew's *Congress: The Electoral Connection* and Morris Fiorina's *Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies*, began to depict a representative's prime motivation as the desire for reelection, with constituency control working through the sanctions made possible by this desire. This is the sanctions model.

Several political scientists noted that this model did not fit the facts as they saw them. So they tried to counter this trend. Robert Bernstein in his *Elections, Representation, and Congressional Voting Behavior: The Myth of Constituency Control* in 1986, showed that selection, not sanctions, did the work of producing constituency-representative agreement in most of his cases. Bill Bianco showed the same thing in his *Trust: Representatives and Constituents* in 1994. But they had no effect on the reigning paradigm.

However, the two economists who edited the first volume on principal-agent theory – Pratt and Zeckhauser – did give the selection model one page in their analysis, which was otherwise one hundred percent on the sanctions model. In this one-page discussion they even pointed out how efficient the selection model was whenever principals could find agents with aligned interests.

Two years later John Lott independently applied what was in effect a selection model to politics, and showed the selection model doing most of the work of representative-constituency congruence. He compared the votes of the members of the House of Representatives when they were coming up for reelection and thus subject to sanction to when they were in their last term and thus not subject to sanction, and found little difference. (This analysis has been redone, finding more sanction effect in the reanalysis but still a strong selection effect.) But Lott's work, although noted by economists, did not have any effect on the reigning model, which continued to be the sanctions model.

By the late 1990s, however, we began to see some breakthroughs among economists. Geoffrey Brennan wrote a great article on the subject and Tim Besley began what was to be a series of ground-breaking contributions. And in 1999, the first rational choice theorist in political science took it up – Jim Fearon – ironically, in the volume by Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin on accountability. That volume was otherwise all about the sanctions model of accountability. It is a measure of the hegemonic status of the sanctions model by this time in political science that the editors did not seem to notice the challenge that Fearon's chapter posed to what they were saying throughout. In the introduction, after they had said what they wanted to say, anchoring their work in the sanctions model (which they simply called "accountability"), in the part right at the end where they were summarizing each chapter, they said, "Jim Fearon says x, y, z," and just summarized his chapter

in a couple of sentences, then went on to summarize the next chapter. Hardly a hint that Fearon had posed a direct challenge to their entire model.

By now, however, in economics and to some degree in political science, the selection model has been rehabilitated.

I should point out that, at least in the U.S., the selection model, far more than the sanctions model, corresponds to what the voters and their representatives want. The voters may cry, "Accountability!" but they also want representatives who are internally motivated and are not driven by reelection incentives. When George W. Bush was running for the U.S. presidency against John Kerry in 2000, he was able to tar Kerry with the charge of "flip-flopping," meaning that Kerry was responding to constituency pressures. He did not charge Kerry with responding to special interests, but instead with responding, in effect, to the re-election sanctions of his own constituency. Bush knew that the voters would not like that. When John McCain was running for the presidency, he pointed with pride to the unpopular positions he had taken. Why? Because he knew that *not* responding to his constituency made him a more attractive candidate. Voters by and large prefer a selection candidate whom they learn enough about to begin to know and trust. Then they want that candidate to go on being what the candidate had been all along. They prefer candidates to act consistently like one or another recognizable type – a Democrat, a homeboy, a liberal, conservative, libertarian, or whatever, so they know who she is and can predict what she will do.

The representatives also like this model. They want to be themselves, often at a time of their lives when being themselves may be more important than any other incentive. They often went into politics because of a set of principles, and they want to continue to be able to practice those principles.

So is the selection model just Burke's "trustee" dressed up in economic wording? No. Of course there are similarities. But one big difference is that there need be no implication of hierarchy in the selection model. In the United States, one member of congress told Richard Fenno, "To me, representative government means you *hire a guy to use his own judgment*; and if you don't like what he does, you fire him. But you don't keep after him all the time. If it isn't my function to use my judgment, then what the hell is my function? And if that's not my function, I don't want the job." An Illinois state representative whom I interviewed in 1982 similarly imagined speaking to a constituent, "You hired me to use my judgment about things [that] you can't even know about yet, and I plan to use that judgment, and if you think that I have been wrong on a kind of consistent basis then you certainly have an obligation to move me out of office the next time round." Both of these legislators linked the use of their own self-reliant "judgment" to being "hired." Both saw themselves as exercising their judgment until such time as the voters decided to remove them. These features, described in such parallel language as to suggest a common perception, evoke a selection model. In the hiring model, the voters – the principals – are in status higher than the agent. They do the hiring and firing.

In fact, sometimes (not always) gyroscopic representatives in the selection model are descriptive representatives. They are "like" their constituents in some respect that the voters consider fundamental. They were born in the same part of the country, perhaps even in the same town if it is local representation. They have the same occupational background – they were farmers, or they grew up on a farm; they were miners, or came from a mining family. They are of their constituents' religion, or ethnicity, or gender. These are all characteristics that signal a likeness to the constituents that makes it more probable that when a representative follows her inner gyroscope, she will do what the constituent wants. The U.S. constitution has a descriptive requirement for anyone who becomes president – that they be born in the U.S. These cues are not hierarchical – they are horizontal. Voters can say of such representatives what the voters for Sarah Palin in the U.S. often said: "She's like us." This is not a hierarchical model.

This desire for "likeness" is one version of a selection model. The desire for a person of integrity committed to one's own political principles is another version. The desire for a trustee, possibly stronger in earlier eras, is yet another.

One major implication of the sanctions model is that competitive elections are good and long incumbencies are bad. Competition allows sanctions to be wielded and makes the candidate responsive to sanctions. That's good. Incumbency protects a representative from sanctions. That's bad. In a selection model, however, these implications do not necessarily follow. In a selection model, it depends on the circumstances. To see if a non-competitive seat is good or bad, to see if a long incumbency is good or bad, you have to look at the circumstances.

First, you see if the policy preferences of the representative and the constituencies are more or less congruent.

Second, you see if the party system that produced the incumbent and accompanies the incumbent is lively or not, able to produce a more competent, more congruent replacement, or not. In some seats, the party is more or less in the incumbent's pocket. Even if there were a more competent, honest, or even more congruent potential replacement, the party would never dream of challenging the incumbent. That is bad.

Third, you see if the media in the district are vital, active, capable of investigating and reporting if there is any underhanded dealing, and eager to do so. If the incumbent swims in such active media, that can reassure you that in this long incumbency, the selection model is working. If not, that is bad.

In short, it is not the incumbency itself, or the lack of competition itself that is bad, but incumbency and lack of competition in the context of divergent preferences¸ a party subservient to the representative, and a moribund media.

Parties in the U.S., Great Britain, and Europe often work on a model with a relatively large selection core, in that the people the parties choose to run for office are usually individuals who already believe in the party principles. The party network, which is a relatively close interlocking network, allows the selectors to know quite a bit about the reputations of the other party members, so they can tell who is a "true blue" believer in the party principles. The selection model is a bit less strong in first past the post single member district systems and very strong in PR list systems, but it applies to some degree throughout. Long incumbency in such systems is not necessarily an evil.

Another implication has to do with transparency. If the representative genuinely has goals that are aligned with those of the principal, transparency is not so important.

Deliberative theorists are finally realizing that transparency often has great costs. Kant wrote, "All actions relating to the right of other human beings are wrong if their maxim is incompatible with publicity." It is the maxim that has to be open to publicity, not all instances of deliberation.

Any negotiation theorist or practitioner will tell you that "integrative solutions" are the negotiator's Holy Grail. An integrative solution is one in which you find some solution that meets both parties' needs without compromise. Mary Parker Follett, the great organizational theorist who invented the concept in 1925, gave as her example of an integrated solution an incident at the Harvard library when she wanted the window shut to avoid a draft while another patron wanted it open to get more air. Her solution, opening the window in the next room, gave both parties what they wanted. In another example, after the war between Egypt and Israel, Israel wanted the border between the two countries moved to afford them more protection. Egypt refused to give up any land. The problem as originally defined involved two points on the same scale, a clear zero-sum conflict. But if Egypt wants to maintain its national pride and sovereignty while Israel wants security, a demilitarized zone under Egyptian sovereignty gives each of the two parties much of what it wants. This is an integrative solution. To reach such a solution, each party has to reveal fairly frankly what it really wants. Sometimes one or both of the parties won't even know what they really want and have to find out in the course of negotiation. These negotiations cannot be public, as the parties will not be able to talk freely and frankly enough to do the work necessary to reach an integrative solution.

Gyroscopic representatives, working in a selection model, can be given considerable flexibility in such a situation. In such a situation they cannot be held accountable through close monitoring, but they can have the initiative and flexibility they need to come up with creative solutions.

We return now to accountability. As suggested earlier, in the pure case the selection model forgoes accountability based on monitoring and sanctions. It substitutes narrative and deliberative accountability.

The high courts of many countries, for example, and the EU bureaucracy practice narrative accountability. In the EU bureaucracy, narrative accountability is good, but not sufficient. But the knee-jerk response is to demand more accountability – in the sense of standard, sanctions-model accountability. I think this is wrong.

Is the solution to the EU's "democratic deficit" more accountability – i.e, increased monitoring and sanctioning? Not in all cases. It depends, as I've said, on the context. Are principals and agents really aligned? How would one know? The principals, in the case of a nation, may have internally conflicting interests. What are the costs and benefits of monitoring? Sanctioning? What is the need for initiative, flexibility?

I believe that in cases where a selection model is possible, it would often be more effective to institute more deliberative accountability than to give up and substitute a sanctions model. In the EU bureaucracy there is already considerable deliberative accountability through stakeholder groups – this system is relatively well developed. But what about developing more deliberative accountability with ordinary constituents? Perhaps bureaucrats promoting unpopular policies could meet with a random sample of the public in a Deliberative Poll. Perhaps they could be mandated to defend their policies at hearings called whenever a group had gathered a certain number of signatures. The selection model is in many ways a new idea, so it requires new thought and new suggestions.

I want to point out before closing that the selection model is not an ideal. It can be efficient, for the reasons I have shown. It has some attractive normative properties, in that it builds on and often sustains a well-founded relationship of trust between principal and agent. But it has significant pitfalls as well.

In many cases in world history, the selection of a leader because of assumed similarity of interests can be a façade for corruption and actual divergence of interests.

Sometimes the selected representative himself may genuinely see himself as one thing – a compassionate conservative, for example. Then he may turn out to be another thing – a neo-conservative.

Sometimes no matter what the potential representative says at election time, people may attach their fantasies to a selected representative and be deceived.

Sometimes a person can be a perfect gyroscopic representative on one issue (say, New Labor) and be selected on that dimension, but when another issue arises, say the Iraq war, act perfectly according to his own gyroscope but without anyone who voted for him knowing that this would be how he would act.

To sum up, then, the selection model is not perfect. But its defects may not always be appropriately remedied by simply moving over to a sanctions model. I am suggesting a more contextual approach.

- Recognize the significant costs of monitoring and sanctioning.

- Recognize the efficiency and moral values of a selection model.

- Recognize the specific pitfalls of a given selection model and work on those problems. Don't just throw the model out without thinking.

- Depending on the circumstances, ask how large the selection core and how large the sanction periphery should be.

- Enough of automatic calls for "more accountability."

Thank you.

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