

Introduction: 1
Comparing the New Hosts of Southern Europe 2

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1. Migration in Southern Europe: A European Challenge 7

Since the closure of legal immigration channels in Central and Northern Europe 8
in the mid-1970s, immigrants began to arrive in Southern European countries, 9
considering these countries partly as stepping stones towards their richer neigh- 10
bours and partly as immigration destinations in their own right. The economic 11
growth experienced by Southern Europe in the 1980s, the entry of Greece (1981) 12
and then Portugal and Spain (1986) in the European Communities, the increas- 13
ing education level of young populations and their consequent fleeing from low 14
skilled jobs, and the relative booming of the informal economy in these countries 15
have created employment opportunities for immigrants. As a matter of fact, 16
Southern European countries, Spain and Italy in particular, figure in recent years 17
at the top of the list as immigrant destinations among EU member states. 18

Post-1989 migration however presents some features that differentiate it from 19
the post-war migration in the 1960s and 1970s: 20

- Its origins are more varied, as immigrants come from different continents, 21
including a high presence of Latin Americans, absent in previous migratory 22
movements towards Europe. East Europeans form also a new and important 23
component of the immigration inflows in the post-1989 period. 24
- While post-war immigration flows in Europe were largely absorbed in indus- 25
trial jobs, post-1989 immigrants arrived in a post-industrial Europe, where 26
globalization, outplacement and outsourcing have reduced greatly the weight 27
of industrial jobs in the work market. Immigrants are predominantly 28
employed in construction, agriculture, retail trade, catering, caring, cleaning 29
and other types of services. Their employers are small and medium enter- 30
prises and private households and their jobs are highly affected by seasonal 31

1 changes. Moreover, small size companies and households face bigger
2 difficulties to anticipate or plan their labour needs.
3 – Contrary to the European immigration experience of the 1960s, immigra-
4 tion arrived to Southern Europe since the 1980s was neither mediated nor
5 planned by receiving States. The legal and political reaction of Southern
6 European countries in front of the phenomenon has been shaped by both
7 external (EU pressure to deal effectively with irregular migration particularly
8 since these countries entered the Schengen no-internal-border zone) and
9 internal factors (caught unprepared to deal with massive immigration,
10 southern European countries dealt with immigration though piecemeal
11 measures initially).

12 The uncoupling of North and South European migration phases has caused polit-
13 ical conflicts, as the second were receiving (and absorbing) large inflows of eco-
14 nomic immigrants while most of the first tried to avoid economic immigration.
15 In addition, during this last decade, security aspects in the emerging common
16 European immigration policy were reinforced as a response to international ter-
17 rorism. This pre-eminence of security over demographic or economic issues has
18 widened the distance between North and South on this realm, as the second was
19 frequently perceived as too permissive and hence counteracting the tightening of
20 immigration policy in the North. In this context of increased fear towards irregu-
21 lar migration and increasingly restrictive (even if difficult to implement) migra-
22 tion control policies, this special issue seeks to provide for a better understanding
23 of the migration challenges that the southern European countries have been fac-
24 ing and the ways they have tried to deal with them.

25 The main aim of this special issue is to analyse the development and implementa-
26 tion of migration management and control policies in the four southern Euro-
27 pean countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). In particular, we shall address
28 the socio-political context within which these migration policies were formulated
29 and seek to understand better the link between control and management policies.
30 We shall investigate the social and political forces that have influenced in each
31 country the making of migration policies, with special reference to public opin-
32 ion, media, political parties, trade unions and employers' associations.

33 **2. Comparing the New Hosts of Southern Europe**

34 Until a couple of decades ago, Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Por-
35 tugal and Spain) have been migration senders rather than hosts. Emigration,
36 however, nearly came to a halt in the mid to late 1970s after the tightening up of
37 migration regimes in Northern Europe. A positive net migration rate was regis-
38 tered in Greece and Italy during the 1970s and in Spain and Portugal in the early

1980s. Initially this immigration was to an extent return migration of former citizens and their descendants that had previously emigrated to South America, North America, Australia, other European countries or also in the case of Portugal to former Portuguese colonies in sub Saharan Africa. In all four countries immigration flows were related both to their own economic and political development and democratic consolidation but also to the geopolitical changes of 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe and the opening up of the borders of the former Communist countries.

There are a number of features that the four countries share apart from their rather sudden conversion from emigration to immigration societies.

First, these countries form the southern frontier of the European Union, three of which border the Mediterranean and geographic regions with a high potential for emigration. The economic differences between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean are large: the per capita income in Spain, for instance, is thirteen times that of Morocco. Compared with that, the difference between the USA and Mexico per capita income is much smaller (six times). Probably only the difference between the two Koreas is larger. Immigrants are attracted however not only by higher incomes, but also by other social goods, such as peace, freedom and human security. Greece particularly but also Spain and Italy, have an extensive and not easy to control coastline with several small islands that provide for 'stepping stones' in the journey of irregular migrants into the southern European countries and potentially into other EU countries. Furthermore, tourism is one of the most important economic sectors in Southern Europe, and efforts devoted to improve the borders control to avoid irregular migration can hinder the tourist movement. At the same time, overstaying tourist visas is the most important source of irregular immigration.

Second, all four countries are characterised by segmented labour markets. With the exception of northern Italy and some Spanish regions, Southern European countries suffer by rather weak and structurally imbalanced economies. Domestic unemployment exists side by side with the employment (formal or irregular) of hundreds of thousands of migrant workers in the low pay and low status sectors of the labour market. Industry is rather weak (again with the exception of northern Italy and some Spanish regions) and migrants are absorbed in sectors like agriculture, construction, tourism, trade, catering and private care services, notably all labour-intensive sectors where informal employment is rife.

In striking difference with Central and Northern European countries that try to attract highly qualified immigration and avoid or diminish the non-qualified one, Southern European countries have implicitly bet on low skilled immigrants to maintain low productivity economic sectors. Thousands of business which previously were based on intensive family work or on the hiring of low skilled local workers, be in the retail trade, agriculture or catering, would have disappeared since the improvement of level of education and labour options for local

1 younger generations had led them out of these sectors, where employers have
2 found in immigration the only source of available workforce.

3 Southern economies have thus maintained labour markets where three D jobs
4 continue to amount to a great portion of job offers, while Northern European
5 countries have reduced them to a much smaller size. A good example of this dif-
6 ference is the domestic sector (caring and cleaning jobs within private house-
7 holds). In Southern Europe in the past the sector was fed with unqualified women,
8 mostly rural, whose only job opportunity was this one. Many of them worked as
9 live-in domestic servants under labour conditions that could be seen as a form of
10 modern slavery. The offer of young girls or women from rural areas for this type
11 of domestic jobs had almost disappeared since the 1980s, as a consequence of the
12 increasing level of education of younger generations, especially women, and the
13 overall economic growth experienced in Southern Europe in the last decades.
14 However, the arrival of immigrant women willing to accept any kind of work,
15 again put this service, at the disposal of the broader middle class, while the price
16 paid for it declined markedly. Migrant women came to occupy both live-in and
17 live-out types of jobs in the cleaning and caring sector in private households. This
18 in turn allowed middle class women to take up jobs outside the home while
19 immigrant maids were left in charge of young children, elderly parents and gen-
20 eral household chores. In several northern European countries, it was welfare
21 state services, such as public kindergartens for all, welfare homes for the elderly,
22 longer maternity leaves and other types of infrastructure that created the condi-
23 tions necessary for women's participation in the labour market. In Southern
24 European countries, where such welfare provisions were largely insufficient,
25 migrant women helped ease the tensions on double-career families and allowed
26 women to work outside the home.

27 Third, all four countries lacked a legal framework and previous administrative
28 experience for managing migration. Although they all developed migration laws
29 and regularly reformed them, these laws had important shortcomings and were
30 usually unrealistic. Thus all four countries applied repeated regularisation pro-
31 grammes to address the existence of large numbers of undocumented migrants
32 who lived and worked in their territories while none of them adopted a proactive
33 migration management policy opening up viable channels for legal migration
34 that would respond both to the need for migrant labour and to the pressures of
35 incoming flows. In fact, regularisations became all over the area the most impor-
36 tant management policy while annual labour quotas (issued per sector of the
37 labour market and sometimes for specific nationalities) have not been shown to
38 affect in any significant way this situation. In one case for instance (in Italy in
39 2006) the programmed annual quota of 170,000 new workers was extended to
40 550,000 to cover for the 500,000 applications submitted by workers who were
41 actually not entering but already residing and working in the country, transform-
42 ing thus the quota system to an ad hoc regularisation.

Fourth, in the wider Southern European region, national political culture is marked by mistrust towards the state and clientelistic, party-political networks play an important part in political life, especially at the local level. In Southern Europe there are important pre-modern features that shape the workings of their modern bureaucracies. These features acquire particular importance in the field of migration and migration policy implementation as migrants are particularly vulnerable subjects in their dealings with public administration. Thus, migration laws have often proven to be simply not working. Bureaucratic hurdles, delays, inaccuracies, lack of information and guidance and requirements that were impossible to fulfil have troubled the development of migration and migration policy in all four countries.

On the other hand, local societies are overall rather tolerant to irregular migration status and informal work conditions. Thus, irregular migrants are not stigmatised by local societies because of their being undocumented. The combination of unrealistic laws, with ineffective bureaucracies and societies tolerant to illegality has produced an interesting mix of persistent illegality or semi-legality, individual/family-based integration in local contexts and perpetuation of informal working conditions.

Fifth, the scarcity of public resources devoted to manage immigration is another common feature in Southern Europe and explains much of the resulting irregularity. None of these States has developed a proactive policy to attract the immigrants they could need, nor did they define which kind of immigration they need. The measures taken on this realm (as annual quotas) have been always so obviously unrealistic; their numbers so small in comparison with the real inflows of migrants, that one can clearly infer that governments have opted for accepting irregular immigration while paying lip service to the fight against irregularity. The lack of financial investment in personnel and organizational resources that could provide accurate and up to date information on labour market needs, help issue and renew permits swiftly, cooperate with countries of origin and overall the enforcement policies and practices put in place (border and internal controls, police detention centres, repatriations), have generated a highly chaotic process for dealing with immigration, which in turn has provoked domestic and international dissatisfaction.

Sixth, main political parties have shown in all four countries extensive overlaps and continuities in their policies, balancing between restrictive and integration policies, in spite of their rhetoric differences. Both left and right governing parties have promoted regularisations and both have, at some moment, retreated to restrictive policies. The differences between governmental policies in the same country usually has more to do with changing circumstances and with the learning factor, than with ideological or preference differences. In Portugal and Greece, immigration does not even constitute an important issue or cleavage in political life. In Italy and Spain, where immigration has occupied in different moments a

1 key role in electoral competition, opposition parties tend to underline their dis-
2 agreement with governmental migration policies, stressing ideological differences,
3 while their practices when governing are not so different.

4 Seventh, trade unions have adopted in the four countries a cooperative and
5 positive position towards immigration, supporting regularisations and denounc-
6 ing the use of irregular migrants to undermine salaries and work conditions. This
7 broadly positive attitude towards immigrants can be explained by ideological as
8 well as interest elements. The solidarity approach to immigration has prevailed
9 among Southern European Trade Unions, mainly as a result of previous (and
10 actually quite recent) experiences of emigration (in Portugal we may even refer to
11 current experiences of emigration as this last has been increasing during the last
12 few years). Trade Unions have also interests in guaranteeing immigrants the same
13 rights as those for local workers, to avoid the formation of an offer of underprivi-
14 leged workers that could damage salaries and create illegitimate competition
15 in specific job sectors. Finally, as it happens all over Europe, trade unions are
16 stronger in those sectors where immigrants are almost non-existent, as big indus-
17 trial enterprises and the whole public sector, and this small presence or even
18 absence from the sectors where immigrants concentrate makes trade unions less
19 sensitive to the kind of frictions and competition – between local and immigrant
20 workers – that appear in the lowest levels of job qualification.

21 Having noticed these similarities among the countries included in this special
22 issue, it is worth noting an important difference related to the influx of religion
23 on public opinion towards immigrants. Although in Southern Europe the ser-
24 vices provided by immigrants have created a broad base of social support to immi-
25 gration among middle classes, be it as employers, as flat owners rented by migrants
26 or as users of services privately offered by business contracting immigrants, immi-
27 gration has also given rise to negative views and feelings among low-skilled workers
28 whose salaries and labour conditions have been affected by immigrant competi-
29 tion. Moreover, the lower socio-economic strata who reside in the same neigh-
30 bourhoods as immigrants are negatively affected by immigration since the public
31 services offered in these neighbourhoods have not received sufficient additional
32 funding to compensate for the increase of the population they must attend to.
33 These different social impacts of immigration form a base for diverging attitudes
34 towards it, but not all ambiguities found in public opinion on this topic can be
35 attributed to these objective impacts. Ideological and religious factors as national-
36 ism or, on the other side, Catholicism, also play a key role. Catholicism has greatly
37 influenced soft policies towards irregular immigrants in Italia, Spain and Portu-
38 gal. In Italy, for example, Catholic deputies belonging to both the government
39 and opposition parties stopped the government's proposal to increase the maxi-
40 mum period of detention for irregular stayers. In Spain, the Catholic Church and
41 Catholic NGOs were particularly active in their defense of equal social rights for
42 irregular or regular immigrants. In Portugal too, the Catholic Church has been a

prominent advocate of regularisations and the High Commissioners for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities have been always active Catholics, including a priest. The main Catholic NGO, Caritas, has been very influential in Spain and Italy, and Catholicism has inspired most of the solidarity-based approach towards immigrants, an influence that goes through party frontiers. The Orthodox Church, by contrast, has not played an important part in shaping the immigration policy in Greece, where it is the major and state religion. The Church has remained overall inactive on the topic. This inertia or implicit negative attitude towards immigration can be attributed to the very close ties between Orthodoxy and the Greek national identity, on the one hand, and by the lack of a strong missionary character of the Church in the Orthodox religious tradition, on the other.

3. The Contents of this Issue

The articles that follow in this issue present four country cases (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) outlining the main migration management and control challenges and policies in each country, the role of European Union, political parties, trade unions, churches and public opinion in shaping the policies and providing the context for their implementation. Last but not least, in each article we seek to assess the success or failure of the migration management policies and the ways in which they contribute to create order and disorder, legality and illegality in the current European context.

Claudia Finotelli and Giuseppe Sciortino in their article entitled *The importance of being Southern: The making of immigration policies in Italy*, focus on how being a 'new' immigration country in Southern Europe has influenced the making of Italian immigration policies in the last twenty years, stressing the ambiguous nature of Italian immigration policies. Italian governments had adopted a stop-and-contain attitude towards immigration, a price Italy had to pay for its European membership. The main efforts of the Italian government were thus concentrated on improving external controls. However, Italy did not deny the necessity of labour inflows and tried since the beginning to implement a quota system for the entry of labour migrants. Unfortunately, quotas always underestimated the necessity of the Italian economy and most of the procedures did not fit with the Italian policy-making and implementation infrastructure. In the Italian case, the difficulties in programming the new entries, weak internal controls as well as the attractiveness of the informal economy and the 'expansionist' outcomes of a common visa policy favoured the increase of irregular migration. In this context, regularizations of irregular migrants appeared as a very useful measure to re-establish the balance between market and state and to substitute a weak internal control system. Regularizations enjoyed a high acceptance because they were based on economic legitimisation, which was in line with the general

1 attitude of Italian citizens. Italians accept immigration as long as it provides
2 economic benefits, while irregular migrants are perceived as criminals. Such
3 twofold perception of immigration is reflected by the discourse of the main polit-
4 ical parties, which defended the economic integration of immigrants on the
5 one hand while turning the struggle against irregular migration and criminality
6 into a major point of their political program on the other. In this respect, the
7 security issue has become an important point of connection between right- and
8 left-wing parties while the influence of trade unions on the course of Italian
9 immigration policy has proved to be much more relevant than the harsh tones
10 of xenophobic parties.

11 In her article *Spain, the cheap model. Irregularity and regularisation as immi-*
12 *gration management policy*, Carmen González-Enríquez notes that Spain has
13 received more than five million immigrants in the last eight years without devel-
14 oping a realistic migration management policy and accepting irregularity as a
15 common feature of immigrants. The percentage of irregular immigration was
16 above 40% during most of the decade and even amounted to 50% in 2003.
17 According to Eurostat, since 2000 Spain has been the European country that
18 received most immigrants yearly, a third of all those reaching the EU, although
19 comparisons are difficult as Spain allows and promotes the registration of irregu-
20 lar immigrants. The Spanish attraction to immigrants was due not only to its
21 economic growth and the existence of a strong and rather vibrant informal econ-
22 omy, but also to the Spaniards' relatively positive social attitudes towards immi-
23 grants, the traditional tolerance towards illegality embedded in South European
24 political culture, and the granting of social rights for irregular immigrants.
25 During these years the design of immigration policy has been governed by ambi-
26 guity, ambivalence, shifting priorities between control and integration and trust
27 in the spontaneous adjustment between labour market demands and the arrival
28 of immigrants, in a context of rapid economic growth mainly based in the con-
29 struction sector and employment of immigrants in low qualified jobs either in the
30 formal or informal economy: While declaring their desire to promote ordered
31 immigration and to fight irregular arrivals, successive governments have in fact
32 allowed irregular immigrants to arrive, specially from Latin America, find work
33 and later regularise. The free access to medical care and to education for irregular
34 immigrants has worked as a kind of compensation and as the main instrument of
35 social integration. In short, a liberal, market approach dominated and gave prior-
36 ity to the demands of the job market over the ordering of the migratory flows.
37 The adjustment could have been done in a more orderly fashion, which would
38 have prevented much of the irregularity, but this would have been more costly:
39 the State would have had to invest much more in its foreign services and in inter-
40 nal Labour Inspection and job market services in order to regulate the arrival of
41 immigrants. Thus, 'extraordinary' regularizations have, de facto, become the main
42 instrument of immigration management, and have turned into a 'cheap way' to

adapt labour market demands to foreign workforce supply, relying on the efficiency of the ‘invisible hand of the market.’

The article on Greece entitled *Greek Immigration Policy at the Turn of the 21st Century, Lack of Political Will or Purposeful Mismanagement?*, written by Anna Triandafyllidou, discusses the development of Greek immigration policy during the past 18 years. Starting with inflows of co-ethnics from the former Soviet Union during Perestrojka in the 1980s, Greece experienced massive immigration from the Balkan region (Albania in particular) and also from the wider Central and Eastern European region (Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland among others) during the 1990s. While there is no more massive immigration during this decade, inflow has continued not only from the countries mentioned above, but also from much more distant countries located in Southeast Asia (Bangladesh and Pakistan) and sub-Saharan Africa.

Greek governments and Greek public opinion were unprepared to deal with these flows when they started and it took ten years for a Greek immigration policy to take shape. The aim of this article is to present and critically discuss the development of Greek immigration policy from 1991 to the present with a view to identifying the main factors that have shaped it, paying special attention to the role of political parties, trade unions, civil society actors and of course the European context within which these policies were formed. The study distinguishes between two phases of policy development: the early phase spanning between 1991 and 2001 when piecemeal restrictive measures and mass deportations were the main policy instrument, and the second phase covering the period between 2001 and today when a comprehensive even if non particularly effective approach has developed. The main features of each law are presented and their impact on the management of immigration flows and on immigrant integration is discussed critically. Special attention is paid to explaining why these particular laws were voted, what was the rationale that motivated different Greek governments to uphold an inefficient and unrealistic policy for managing immigration and migrant integration. The concluding section argues that Greek migration policy has to date been shaped less by left and right wing ideologies or policy choices and more by a weird combination of nationalist ideology, lack of political will and free market *laissez faire* principles.

Last but not least, Catarina Sabino, Alexandre Abreu and João Peixoto, in their article on *Immigration policies in Portugal: Limits and compromise in the quest for regulation* argue that the making of policies of immigration control in Portugal has faced special difficulties due to the variations experienced in the balance between inflows and outflows of migration. Contrary to Spain, Greece and Italy, Portugal has experienced a continuing declining of immigration during this decade and a relevant emigration, due to the economic crisis it is suffering since 2002. Inflows have not been stable and its characteristics have varied while EU membership constrained some of the classical regulation mechanisms,

1 notably since the opening of EU internal borders allowed by the Schengen Agree-
2 ment. Since immigration to Portugal was, until the mid-1990s, mostly composed
3 of Portuguese-speaking immigrants, a benevolent attitude may have been built,
4 given the historical, linguistic and cultural similarities. The fact that Portugal is
5 still facing a significant out-migration, mostly to other European countries (such
6 as Spain, the UK and Switzerland), has contributed to the association between
7 discourses on immigration and on emigration and an anti-immigrant discourse
8 has been weak and has not paid off until today in the Portuguese political system.
9 In fact, political elites showed a significant consensus along the time in immigra-
10 tion policy and the 'central bloc', a tacit or explicit alliance between the two main
11 parties, the Socialist and the Social Democratic, functioned more than once
12 on this realm.

13 However, despite this consensus, the gap between policy and outcome has been
14 considerable since the 1980s. The political discourse has been keen in proclaim-
15 ing an objective of strict regulation and control, while several measures were
16 launched to promote legal immigration and to manage international labour
17 recruitment, but all policy mechanisms devised to facilitate legal immigration
18 proved to be ineffective and the efforts for control have been insufficient (regard-
19 ing border and, mostly, internal control). Other factors were hindering political
20 regulation, as the high demand in labour-intensive sectors, particularly in the
21 informal economy and the pre-eminence of informal social networks. The open-
22 ing of borders in the Schengen space partly explains the arrival of thousands of
23 irregular immigrants from Eastern European countries but does not account for
24 other sources of irregular migrants coming from African countries and Brazil. In
25 short, irregular immigration has been endemic in Portuguese society and extra-
26 ordinary regularizations were frequently used as a substitute for the efficient man-
27 agement of migration flows.

28 The studies presented here are the result of a research project, *Immigration and*
29 *Party Systems*, financed by the Spanish Ministry of Science (SEJ2005-04193/
30 CPOL) and directed by Carmen González-Enríquez. This research developed
31 during the years 2007 and 2008 was based on a common outline in the four
32 countries and was elaborated through the analysis of primary and secondary
33 sources and of personal semi-structured interviews with decision-makers, politi-
34 cians, unionists, leaders of employers associations, ONGs, other stakeholders and
35 specialized scholars.