Robert Schuman Centre

Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy

Balancing Europe's Eastern and Southern Dimensions

ESTHER BARBÉ

RSC No. 97/71

EUI WORKING PAPERS

© The Author(s). European University Institute.
Barbé: Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. Balancing Europe's Eastern and Southern Dimensions
The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of European integration and public policy in Europe. While developing its own research projects, the Centre works in close relation with the four departments of the Institute and supports the specialized working groups organized by the researchers.
Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy
Balancing Europe’s
Eastern and Southern Dimensions

ESTHER BARBÉ

This paper will be published by Kluwer Law International
in the forthcoming book edited by Jan Zielonka,
Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy

EUI Working Paper RSC No. 97/71
BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI)
After the fall of the Berlin wall, Vaclav Havel was rumoured to have said that European history had 'started walking again.' In a sense, the disappearance of the most important border in Europe, separating the OECD countries from those of the Warsaw Pact, meant that once again both sides could independently pursue their goals. Since that moment a kind of Drang nach Osten has filtered the process of European construction. The 'return to Europe' of the Warsaw Pact countries became one of Europe's most important aims. Even before Maastricht, European foreign policy concentrated on Central and Eastern Europe, most notably through projects like the PHARE Plan in 1989, EBRD in 1990, and EU Association Agreements with the Visegrad countries in 1991. Other new institutional arrangements between Eastern and Western Europe include the Stability Pact (1994), the statute of WEU Associated Partnership, NATO Partnership for Peace, and the strategy for EU enlargement approved by the European Council in Essen (December 1994). Clearly, Europe has begun the process of integrating these countries in terms of political institutions and security concerns.

But, while the EU presumably has been concentrating its efforts on Central and Eastern European Countries, it has also dedicated more attention than ever before to non-EU Mediterranean Countries. The November 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Conference, organised under the leadership of the Spanish EU president and held in Barcelona, is the best example of the EU's paradoxical strategy. Much like Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean countries have established political dialogues with the EU (Barcelona process), WEU, and NATO. How can the EU's dual affection be explained? This paper examines the EU's paradoxical strategy and its links to the national policies of the Southern and Northern EU Member States. The explanation offered in this paper may also help to answer one of the main questions raised in this book: are the EU's policy objectives different from its Member States?

Geography rises again

Experience shows that among the many ways in which countries cooperate with each other, foreign policy coordination has always been the most difficult to achieve. Regelsberger and Wessels point out that the difficulty is due to the 'DDS (discreet, discretionary, sovereignty) syndrome;' that is, that coordination of foreign policy and security raises immediately, and most visibly, the issue of national sovereignty. According to Regelsberger and Wessels, the success of foreign policy coordination depends on bilateral efforts to accommodate differences in historical traditions, and an awareness of public prejudices in each country.
The divergent traditions and conflicting interests in the foreign policy of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) countries were obvious, but for two decades, this policy coordination mechanism functioned quite well. Since the end of the Cold War, however, cooperation has been shaky. The interests among EU countries have diverged in this period due to the so-called forces profondes. Elements of national power and traditional factors, such as geographical location, historical experience, and cultural links to non-EU countries, have also become stronger during this period. Examples of paradoxical behaviour abound: the negotiations on the transformation from EPC to Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), were held while Member States were simultaneously renationalising their security policies due to the ‘open space’ atmosphere. Such discrepancies show that the disappearance of the Iron Curtain has produced not only centripetal forces, deepening the European construction process, but also centrifugal forces that have driven the process of sub-regionalisation and created ‘spheres of influence’ among EU Member States. Southern European countries (Spain, France, Italy), motivated by the fear of a destabilised Arab world, have created a Mediterranean spécificité. In the North, Germany and the Nordic countries hope to recreate the Hanseatic world, now made possible by the disappearance of the Soviet Union. ‘Mental maps,’ based on geography, history, and culture, have emerged in the European collective consciousness: ‘Mittleuropa,’ or the Baltic sea as a ‘mythical source of identity’ may now propel the foreign and security policy of certain Member States.

Geography-based division of labour poses a clear danger to coordinated security. A Bertelsmann Foundation report warns that while

there may be some scope for the idea of some form of ‘military division of labour’ between WEU member states on functional lines...this should not be extended to a geographical division of labour, since, by appearing to endorse the idea of national ‘spheres of influence,’ it would tend to undermine rather than strengthen a common European approach. Some countries may have more military resources available for particular areas by virtue of geography -for example Sweden in the Baltic or Italy in the Mediterranean. But a primary purpose of a common defence policy is to ensure that members can rely on other members for support, wherever that support is needed...The organisation of ad hoc ‘coalitions of the willing’ in response to particular crises is unlikely to contribute to the strengthening of CFSP. Rather, there is a danger that such coalitions will be regarded as a reflection of the CFSP’s weakness, illustrating the very real risk that, with the Soviet threat gone, European defence will become increasingly ‘renationalised’

Evidence exists that the renationalisation process (converting European policy into policing each country’s sphere of influence) has already begun. Two cases demonstrate this shift: the German policy, favouring the diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, and the post-Cold War Spanish policy of linking
European construction to Mediterranean stability. In both cases, the national strategies pursued by individual countries were converted into EU policies. In the first case, Germany’s unilateral move to grant the rapid recognition of the two former Yugoslav republics, was a complete departure from all the collective policy commitments it had made, but nevertheless forced other European countries to follow its lead. Different theories have been offered to explain Germany’s behaviour. Traditional power-politics explanations (based on Germany’s geo-economic and geopolitical sphere of influence) have clashed with institutionalist approaches. The latter is best described by Bulmer and Paterson who argue that ‘Germany’s unilateralism was the product not only of domestic pressure for recognition [of Slovenia and Croatia] but also of dissatisfaction with the faltering nature of EPC decision making on Yugoslavia...German power will become more evident where European institutions prove to be weak.’10 (1996:17).

Spain could not act unilaterally as Germany had in pursuing its policies in the Mediterranean due to the high financial costs associated with stabilising the region. Instead, Spain undertook a traditional lobbying approach and was able to convince European organisations to commit to Spanish objectives. By May 1989, Spain, along with other EU-Mediterranean countries, were defined as EU ‘mentors’ for the Maghreb countries in the final resolution approved by the second Forum on the Western Mediterranean Countries.11

Shifting and balancing

Even before the fall of the Berlin wall, the relations between the EC and certain East-bloc countries had changed dramatically. Domestic changes in Poland and Hungary combined with Germany’s assertiveness in the EC brought about a pledge by the EC that Germany would have a privileged relationship with Central and Eastern European countries. During the Paris Arch Summit held in July 1989, the EC assigned Germany the task of coordinating the PHARE Plan. This move also meant that the Community was assuming comprehensive responsibilities in Central European countries, beyond simply economic assistance12

From that moment, lobbyists for the Mediterranean policy feared that the EC’s attention and resources would be completely shifted to the Central and Eastern European countries and away from the Mediterranean countries. To preempt this shift, Abel Matutes (the Spanish EC Commissioner in charge of Mediterranean policy, relations with Latin America and Asia, and North-South relations) suggested that the Community establish a ‘parallel program’ for Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean region.13 Matutes’s opinion was in complete agreement with the official Spanish position, which has been the driving force
behind EU Mediterranean policy. After Matutes’s term expired in 1992, his portfolio was given to another Spaniard, Manuel Marín. The Spanish policy has always been clear: Felipe González has repeatedly emphasised the dangers related to shifting the focus away from the Mediterranean countries. One clear example was his visit to Morocco in December 1995, where González advised the Moroccan prime minister to put pressure on Brussels to maintain its Mediterranean focus.

In other words, the Arab and the ACP countries’ status as the EC’s geopolitical and geo-economic ‘most favoured region’ ended in 1989. In the early 1990s, the ratio of EC aid to the Central and Eastern European Countries in comparison with that of the Mediterranean Countries was 2.5 to 1. When population differences are added, that ratio translates into one ECU of EC economic assistance for each Mediterranean citizen to five ECU for every East European citizen. This difference is greater still when taking into consideration other quantitative items, like bilateral economic assistance and private investment.

The paradox of this uneven ratio becomes evident when you consider Europe’s energy dependence on the Arab countries or Euro-Mediterranean trade figures, which alone could have justified a privileged relationship with the EC. The seemingly paradoxical behaviour of granting more aid to Eastern Europe is based on feelings of European ‘solidarity’ and historical responsibility for the region, while EC’s interest in the Mediterranean countries is solely based on security. Referring to the beginning of the post-Cold War era, Dinan points out that ‘the Community’s preoccupation with Eastern Europe almost blinded Brussels to developments in the South, where economics and political instability threaten the Community’s security.’ Southern EU members lobbying for Mediterranean countries began emphasising the security concerns in the region in an effort to compete with the excitement of EU’s Eastern expansion. As a result Matutes’s suggestion for a parallel policy for both Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean region evolved conceptually into a balancing strategy, based on the so-called solidarity vs security approach.

Balancing is a familiar concept in European construction. In fact, the life of the EU has been a history of balancing small and large countries, rich and poor countries, supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, and European aims and national priorities. Therefore, balancing Eastern and Mediterranean policies is a progressive step in the process of the European construction-and it is an important one.
Mediterranean stability means European construction

Many believe that the EU’s relationship with the Mediterranean countries will influence European construction. At the height of the Persian Gulf Crisis Felipe González said: ‘I think, like François Mitterrand, that the construction of Europe cannot be attained without first trying to resolve the explosive problems that are building up in North Africa with respect to demography, development, religion and the standard of living.’ The belief in Euro-Mediterranean interdependence has made the region a diplomatic priority for Spain, France, and Italy. These countries and the EC have promoted diplomatic initiatives in the Mediterranean region, based on the global security approach, as well as a multidimensional agenda involving environmental, socio-economic and cultural issues. One such initiative was the Spanish-Italian proposal of convening a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM). This initiative was presented by the flamboyant Italian foreign minister, Gianni de Michelis in September 1990. The CSCM proposal was based on a comprehensive approach to Mediterranean stability; tackling economic, social, political, and military dimensions of security. It adopted the CSCE’s methodology of dividing the areas of cooperation into three ‘baskets’: political and security, economic, humanitarian and cultural. The Gulf War prevented any meeting from taking place, but it did not invalidate the economic, social and cultural need for European involvement in the region. On the contrary, anti-Western demonstrations in some North African countries were a warning sign of the social and economic unrest existing in those societies. But Italian interest in Euro-Mediterranean relations faded once de Michelis resigned, and domestic instability became a priority in Italy.

The Euro-Mediterranean relationship emphasised the traditional civil power policy, based on economic, social, and cultural relations, whereas the Gulf War prompted certain EU member countries to promote the creation of a European military structure to face post-Cold War threats. During the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, these demands clashed with countries in favour of NATO. Article J.4 of the EU Treaty is the cautious result of that clash.

Mediterranean security risks have grown since the end of the Gulf War. Civil war in Algeria, Libyan support of terrorism, and the slowness of the Middle East peace process have compelled South European countries to strengthen their pro-Mediterranean lobbying policy in the EC. At the same time, the desirable incorporation of Central and East European countries into European organisations has led to the creation of a new set of institutions like WEU associate partnership (1992), NATO partnership for peace, and, at the European Council of Essen in 1994, EU structured dialogues.
The EU-Mediterranean lobby have supported that similar institutions be set up for the Mediterranean countries, although without the implication that these countries will eventually be included in the EU. This 'parallel program' is illustrated by many examples: the 1990 Italian proposal to create a Mediterranean Bank similar to EBRD; the Spanish and French proposal of creating a PHARE Plan for the Mediterranean; Spain's proposal to organise a Mediterranean Partnership for Peace during a September 1994 NATO meeting in Seville;26 France's proposal for a Stability Pact for the Mediterranean during the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona (November 1995) which Malta has also supported;27 and the 1996 Italian plan to create a structured dialogue on the issues of security and diplomacy with the Mediterranean region.28

Manuel Marín (the Spanish Commissioner in charge of the EU’s relations with non-member Mediterranean countries) was committed to adapting the partnership instruments, created for Central and Eastern Europe, to the Mediterranean area. In March 1995, Marín published an article in Le Figaro entitled 'La Méditerranée: une priorité au même titre que l'Europe ex-communiste.' The Commission’s policy eventually adopted Marín’s approach and he was personally supported by president Delors. According to Gillespie, Marín has been a central figure in the development of EU-Mediterranean policy since its former emphasis on cooperation to its current stress of partnership.29 (1996:210).

**Euro-Mediterranean partnership vs Eastern enlargement**

Marks30 points out that 'the Southern Mediterranean, along with the former Soviet Union is considered by Europe to be one of the two main strategic regions bordering a progressively enlarging EU.' The fact is, that both the emergence of the Mediterranean as a strategic region and the preparations for the Eastward enlargement of the EU are occurring simultaneously. This parallel course has been forcing the EU to link the two distinct projects and even make trade-offs between the two goals, in its attempt to balance the interests of the Eastern and Southern dimensions of Europe.

The balancing strategy initiated by the EU-Mediterranean lobby began to show results by mid-1994. In June 1994, the European Council of Corfu elaborated a new strategy towards both Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. The Council agreed that enlargement negotiations with East European countries should start after the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. Reciprocal concessions were made to the Euro-Mediterranean lobby. The Corfu summit decided to create a zone of cooperation in the Mediterranean and agreed that enlargement negotiations with Cyprus and Malta would start six months after the
Intergovernmental Conference. It is worth noting that the Greek president fought very hard to get Cyprus included in the next stage of enlargement.

Committed to developing a partnership between the EU and the Mediterranean region, the EC established a new policy which departed greatly from its former policy emphasising cooperation. The document proposing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership included the creation of a free-trade area, offered a substantial financial aid package, and designed a zone of cooperation leading towards a close association between the two regions. This Partnership emphasises two goals: in the short term it will expand the trade bloc surrounding the EU, and in the long term, it will create a real Euro-Mediterranean network, cooperating in the sectors of energy, environment, terrorism control, culture, and tourism.

In December 1996, The European Council of Essen endorsed the partnership idea proposed by the Commission, with the Mediterranean region constituting a priority zone of strategic importance for the European Union. The Council accepted Spain’s offer to organise a Euro-Mediterranean Conference in the second half of 1995. This decision is considered to be another reciprocal concession, given that the Essen summit simultaneously adopted a strategy of structured dialogue with Central and Eastern European countries on EU enlargement.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership project was presented by EC President Jacques Delors as an effort to mitigate the cleavage between the Mediterranean lobby, led by Spain and France, and the eastern lobby, led by Germany. Delors underlined that the French and Spanish presidencies will be able to make an ‘ambitious’ policy for the region, once the northern countries, particularly Germany, understand that it is necessary to send a message fort to the South. Delors’s statement seems to have foreshadowed the events of the European Council of Cannes in June 1995. During that summit, the ambitious Mediterranean policy of France and Spain clashed with German-led Northern interests when it came to the allocation of resources to the project.

Before the Cannes summit, the Commission had produced a document concerning the Union’s relations with the Mediterranean countries. The communiqué proposed offering the Mediterranean program 5.5 billion ECU in an effort. According to Marin, this amount was hoped to re-establish the credibility of the EU’s relationship with the Mediterranean countries, which had been neglected due to EU interests in the Central and Eastern European countries. The idea of putting the Mediterranean and Eastern European regions on equal footing was insisted upon as the only way that the balancing philosophy could be
fully implemented by the Commission. The East-South balance was also apparent in the first report adopted by the Council (on April 10, 1995), in preparation for the Euro-Mediterranean Conference. In fact, the report emphasised the EU’s hope of creating complementary policies for both the East and the South in the interest of geopolitical coherence.35

Despite these preceding agreements, the balancing philosophy was put to the test during the Cannes summit. For the first time, the objectives of the Mediterranean lobby openly clashed with EU Eastern enlargement policy. France and Spain hoped to grant 5.5 billion ECU to the Mediterranean and 7 billion ECU for Eastern Europe between 1995 and 1999. But the Northern countries (Germany, United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Denmark) favoured maintaining the policy in force from 1992 to 1996 and proposed grants be given to the two regions in a 5 to 1 ratio favouring Eastern European countries. The clash between Kohl and González finally resulted in increasing grants to the Mediterranean countries (4.685 billion ECU) by 22 percent while grants to Central and Eastern Europe were increased by 8 per cent.36

The outcome of the Cannes summit suggests two conclusions: first, that Spain was successful in playing a leading role in the Mediterranean lobby, and second, that trade-offs were inevitable given the dual aims of Eastern enlargement and creating a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. According to Gillespie,

Spanish lobbying to strengthen the Mediterranean policy has been linked at important junctures to other issues on which Madrid’s support has been sought by Germany and other Northern member states, particularly in relation to EU policy towards Central-Eastern Europe. Spain has never opposed the European Union’s eastward expansion, from which there will be costs and dangers for economies including Spain’s, but González’s last two governments were very careful about how Spain would give its consent, ensuring first that contrapartidas (reciprocal concessions), such as German acquiescence in the mid-1990s increase in the EU spending on the Mediterranean, were secured in return.37

CFSP agenda: Mediterranean plus Central and Eastern Europe

The June 1992 European Council of Lisbon adopted a report on the possible evolution of the CFSP. That report enumerated some factors that must be taken into consideration when defining the issues and areas of future cooperation, and included geographic proximity of regions, political and economic stability, and the existence of security threats.38 The report indicated several geographic areas in which the EU must be engaged: Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean-particularly the Maghreb and the Middle East.
One can only wonder if CFSP has also adopted a balancing strategy in developing its joint actions. I argue that, apart from the Maghreb policy, the CFSP agenda focuses on the same geographic areas that were traditionally on the EPC agenda. Central and Eastern Europe, as members of CSCE, as well as the Middle East conflict were some of the first issues addressed by the EPC in the early 1970s. CFSP has not changed the scope of its agenda—which was always determined by geography—but only the direction of their policies as a consequence of the new international order (the end of the Cold War and the peace process in the Middle East). For my purposes, the only CFSP-Central and Eastern European joint action deserving of attention is the Stability Pact, a kind of confidence and security-building mechanism mentioned in the Barcelona Declaration of 1995. As a result of the follow-up meetings after the Barcelona Conference, the European Council of Dublin (December 1996) proposed drafting a ‘Charter for Peace and Stability in the Euro-Mediterranean Region,’ with an aim to build security in the region through political dialogue, arms control, and Rule-of-Law mechanisms.

The Council has adopted two joint actions in support of the Middle East peace process. The first, adopted by the Council in April 1994, focuses on the organisation and observation of the Palestinian elections. The second policy, adopted in November 1996, appointed a European envoy to witness the peace process. These actions deserve two comments. First of all, it is necessary to emphasise the low profile role played by the Union in regard to the political dimension of the peace process. The above-mentioned joint actions left the crux of the negotiations in the hands of the United States. Even in its low-profile role, the Union has been much more engaged in Central and Eastern Europe, for example in its coordination of the PHARE Plan. As a matter of fact, the global coordination of international aid for the Middle East was entrusted to an ad hoc Liaison Committee and not directly to the Union which was the first donor to the area.  

Second, it is necessary to emphasise Spain’s high-profile position in EU policy making. For instance, Madrid was the venue for the October 1991 Middle East Peace Conference, and in November 1996, the Council appointed a Spanish diplomat, Miguel Angel Moratinos, as the European envoy following the Peace Process. The high-profile role of Spain in the Middle East and as lobbyist for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, leads one to wonder if the EU-Mediterranean lobby has a leader, playing a similar role to that of Germany in its support of Central and Eastern Europe.

Also, the Lisbon report brought a new priority to the European foreign policy agenda—the Maghreb. The report asserted that the stability of this region is
of 'great common interest for the Union. Demographic growth, the repeated social crises, large scale emigration and the increase of fundamentalism and religious intégrisme are problems that endanger this stability.\textsuperscript{40} On the basis of these dangers, the Lisbon Summit endorsed the idea of a Euro-Maghreb partnership in free trade, political dialogue, and economic, technical, cultural, and financial cooperation.

Since 1992, however, the problems for the Euro-Maghreb option have become obvious. The civil war in Algeria, the placement of economic sanctions on Libya by the CFSP (a common position adopted in November 1993), and the failure of the Arab-Maghreb Union have undermined the spirit of the Euro-Maghreb partnership. It became evident that the Maghreb is not a region in the process of economic integration, given its scarce horizontal exchanges. Nor is it an area of political entente. As a result, the Euro-Maghreb initiative was eventually turned into the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

The failure of the Maghreb option was a shock to the French leaders of EU-Mediterranean policy. France had always supported cooperation initiatives between Europe and the Western Mediterranean (for example, Mitterrand's proposal of convening a Western Mediterranean Conference in 1983 and the Western Mediterranean Group initiated in 1990). The Spanish-Italian proposal of convening a CSCM encompassing all of the Mediterranean countries was a challenge to the traditional French division between French-dominated Maghreb and Middle East. The French policy of chasse gardée in the Maghreb has muted in the 1990s in favour of Spain’s pro-Mediterranean lobby.\textsuperscript{41} According to Gillespie, 'by successfully competing for the European Commission portfolios relating to the Mediterranean, and making the Mediterranean a priority area for the diplomatic service, Spain in the first half of the 1990s was able to play a leading role in shaping this aspect of EU policy.'\textsuperscript{42} In short, it is impossible to talk of a cohesive Mediterranean block within the EU because of the French-Spanish competition for he leadership role in the region.

Nevertheless, neither France nor Spain have been interested on bringing attention to the Maghreb area following the CFSP scheme (common positions, joint actions, declarations). For instance, neither the Algerian civil war nor the Western Sahara conflict have received special attention in the CFSP agenda. Far from being a major issue, the Algerian civil war rendered only three declarations from the CFSP out of the 300 adopted between the entry into force of the Treaty and the second semester of 1996. It is a paradox that the European Union, commencing an ambitious Euro-Mediterranean policy, has ignored, in diplomatic terms, the conflicts in Northern Africa. Could it be the result of differences between the Union’s policy and some of its members’ interests? Could it be the...
result of applying instruments created for the Central and Eastern Europe to the Mediterranean region?

Conclusions: Priority and Mistrust

It is obvious that the Mediterranean members of the Union are directly affected by the developments on the Sea’s Southern shore. This claim is supported by the fact that millions of Maghrebians live in France, that Spain is dependant on Algeria and Libya for gas, that Spain holds territories in North Africa, that drug traffic runs across the Strait of Gibraltar, and that there are territorial disputes in the Aegean Sea. In addition to these material concerns Europe and the Mediterranean countries share common experiences, and even ‘past trauma,’ where colonialism left an important mark. The French-Algerian relationship is much more than a foreign affairs issue, but is a domestically sensitive issue. Moreover, Spain fought its last international war in the 1920s against Moroccan troops.

In other words, the relationship with some or all of the Mediterranean countries is a priority for the Southern European members of the Union, at both the low politics level (fishing, investment, trade, environment) and the high politics level (conflict mediation, migration, terrorism, weapons proliferation). Are national interests therefore clashing with the Union’s policy objectives? If this is the case, can the Union meet the national expectations of its Member States?

This paper argues that the East-South dilemma is an EU priority. Although the Southern members essentially support EU Eastern enlargement, these countries, especially Spain, have tried to make the Mediterranean policy an even bigger priority for the Union agenda and have tried to retain more resources and commitment to the Mediterranean region. In fact, creating a strong Euro-Mediterranean network was the main objective of the Barcelona Conference. The notion of interdependence, as the basis for increasing security in the region, is the main driving force of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

Northern EU Member States, feeling only indirectly affected by Mediterranean security issues, seem reluctant to accept some of the policies put forth by the Southern Member States, particularly when principles or financial resources are involved. But has the Union the means to meet the objectives of its Southern members? With regard to principles, the pragmatic policies adopted by Spain or France in the field of human rights in the Maghreb countries have already clashed with some European Parliament decisions. Concerning
resources, the Cannes summit is the best example that the Southern EU member-states were forced to temper their high expectations.

In any case, the Northern EU Member States have converging interests with their Southern partners on Mediterranean matters where trade and investment are concerned. In this sense, Marks points out that ‘the creation of a free-trade zone encompassing both flanks of the Mediterranean - and linked in to an area stretching North to the Arctic circle and East to the confines of the former Soviet Union-fits into the 1990s dynamic of building large transnational trading and investment blocs.’45 (1996:2). Inevitably, in terms of common foreign and security policy, sensitive issues for some members, like the Algerian civil war for France, will prevent a unanimous position on the matter. Apparently, the idea of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, resembling the Europe Agreements based on free trade, economic cooperation, and political dialogue, is too ambitious for the time being.

The EU-Central and Eastern Europe relationship is substantially different from the Euro-Mediterranean relationship. In terms of security, one can clearly see the difference. On the one hand, the relationship between the Union and Central and Eastern European countries is based on mutual confidence. In other words, these countries have psychologically agreed to be part of a pluralistic community of security formed by the Fifteen and, as far as they are concerned, these countries share an ‘EU identity.’ In Deutsch’s words, the countries forming a community of security eliminate the use of force among them.46 That is to say, they constitute a ‘zone of peace.’ The Franco-German reconciliation in the framework of the Union is the best example of this peace-making mechanism. Democratic regimes and the acceptance of the European integration principles constitute a basis for the community. On the other hand, the EU-Mediterranean relationship is more complex. In a sense, it is ‘a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that the national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.47 The existence of such a complex of security have been cited by Southern EU members as proof for the need to develop a partnership between both shores based the instruments used in the EU, WEU and NATO for Central and Eastern Europe.

The basic problem of that Partnership in matters of politics and security is the negative perception of the so-called complex of security. In other words, the mistrust between both shores. The Arab world has criticised the Euro-Mediterranean operation, arguing that the Europeans have turned Mediterranean economic and social problems into their own security problems. The mistrust stems as much from the traditional dimensions of security (military dimension) as from economic and societal dimensions, especially from factors relating to
identity. A case in point differences in interpreting human rights between Europe and the Mediterranean region. Another point of contention is the reluctance of the Maghreb countries to accept NATO’s new role in the Mediterranean. The Maghreb countries repeatedly have accused the Mediterranean lobby (France, Spain and Italy) of creating troops and units (Eurofor and Euromarfor) to interfere in South Mediterranean affairs.\textsuperscript{48} At the same time, European countries have compelled Mediterranean countries to participate in political dialogues in an effort to build confidence, beginning with the Barcelona follow-up process and later with NATO and WEU.\textsuperscript{49} These developments resembles more closely the defense-detente philosophy of the East-West period than the present relationship between the Union and Eastern Europe.

In short, EU’s policy of balancing its Eastern and Southern concerns has been more a pragmatic measure than a long-standing planned policy. For the time being, the international priorities of the individual states have been reconciled with common security concerns, without endangering the Union’s policy objectives.
Notes:


2 The present paper deals with the group of ten Central and Eastern European countries that are closer to Western Europe in terms of current institutional arrangements and future enlargement: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. They are members of the Council of Europe, and prior to accession they have signed Europe Agreements with the EC, they have the statute of WEU Associated Partnership, they participate in a privileged way in the NATO structures for Eastern Europe (NACC and Partnership for Peace), and some of them even have forces in Bosnia (IFOR, SFOR).

3 This contribution deals with the group of Mediterranean non-Union countries that have signed any kind of agreement with the EC. It's a group of eleven countries -Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey- and the Palestinian Authority. Libya is the outstanding exception.


15 ‘González insta a Marruecos a presionar a la CE para que no olvide el Magreb,’ El País (14 December 1995).

16 B. Khader, Europa y el Gran Magreb (Barcelona: Fundación Paulino Torras Domènech, 1992): 177.

17 In 1993, the trade between the EC and the Mediterranean countries implied 78.8 ECU billions meanwhile the EC-Central and Eastern European Countries implied 46.4 ECU billions. In the Mediterranean case the balance of trade was much more positive for the EC (12.4 ECU billions) than in the Eastern case (5.8 ECU billions). See B. Khader Le partenariat euro-méditerranéen (Louvain: CERMAC, 1995): 19.


33 Ibid.


38 ‘Informe al Consejo Europeo de Lisboa sobre el posible desarrollo de la Política Exterior y de Seguridad Común (PESC) con vistas a determinar los ámbitos en que pueden desarrollarse acciones comunes con respecto a países o grupos de países particulares’ (Anexo I), *Boletín de las Comunidades Europeas* 6 (1992): 20.


40 ‘Informe al Consejo Europeo de Lisboa sobre el posible desarrollo de la Política Exterior y de Seguridad Común (PESC) con vistas a determinar los ámbitos en que pueden desarrollarse acciones comunes con respecto a países o grupos de países particulares’ (Anexo I), *Boletín de las Comunidades Europeas* 6 (1992): 21.


49 NATO has started dialogues with Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Israel, Mauritania and Jordan. WEU has dialogues with Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania, Egypt and Israel.
EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the European University Institute, Florence

Copies can be obtained free of charge – depending on the availability of stocks – from:

The Publications Officer
European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana
I-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
Italy

Please use order form overleaf
Publications of the European University Institute

To

The Publications Officer  
European University Institute  
Badia Fiesolana  
I-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) – Italy  
Telefax No: +39/55/4685 636  
e-mail: publish@datacomm.iue.it  
http://www.iue.it

From

Name ...............................................................  
Address ...........................................................

□ Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers  
□ Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications  
□ Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1998/99

Please send me the following EUI Working Paper(s):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Date  ...............  

Signature  ......................
Working Papers of the Robert Schuman Centre
Published since 1997

RSC No. 97/1
Donatella della PORTA/Herbert REITER
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
The Policing of Protest in Contemporary Democracies

RSC No. 97/2
Robert REINER
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
Policing, Protest and Disorder in Britain

RSC No. 97/3
Clark McPHAIL/John McCARTHY/David SCHWEINGRUBER
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
Policing Protest in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s

RSC No. 97/4
Olivier FILLIEULE/Fabien JOBARD
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
The Policing of Protest in France: Towards a Model of Protest Policing

RSC No. 97/5
Dominique WISLER/Hanspeter KRIESI
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
Public Order, Protest Cycles and Political Process: Two Swiss Cities Compared

RSC No. 97/6
P.A.J. WADDINGTON
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
Controlling Protest in Contemporary, Historical and Comparative Perspective

RSC No. 97/7
Herbert REITER
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
Police and Public Order in Italy, 1944-1948. The Case of Florence

RSC No. 97/8
Oscar JAIME-JIMENEZ
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
The Policing of Social Protest in Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy

RSC No. 97/9
Martin WINTER
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies

RSC No. 97/10
Rocco DE BIASI
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
The Policing of Hooliganism in Italy

RSC No. 97/11
Donatella della PORTA
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in Contemporary Democracies
Police Knowledge and Public Order: Some Reflections on the Italian Case

RSC No. 97/12
Patrick A. McCARTHY
Positionality, Tension and Instability in the UN Security Council

RSC No. 97/13
Andrea LENSCHOW
Greening the EC Regional and Cohesion Funds. Explaining Variation Across Similar Policy Areas

RSC No. 97/14
Richard SINNOTT/Nessa WINSTON
Farmers, the CAP and Support for European Integration

RSC No. 97/15
Kees van KERSBERGEN
Double Allegiance in European Integration: Publics, Nation-States, and Social Policy

*out of print
RSC No. 97/16
Michael J. ARTIS/Wenda ZHANG
The Linkage of Interest Rates Within the EMU

RSC No. 97/17
Dimitri G. DEMEKAS/
Zenon G. KONTOLEMIS
Unemployment in Greece: A Survey of the Issues

RSC No. 97/18
Olivier FILIEULE
«Plus ça change, moins ça change» - Demonstrations in France During the Nineteen-Eighties

RSC No. 97/19
Tanja A. BÖRZEL
Policy Networks - A New Paradigm for European Governance?

RSC No. 97/20
Vladimir MIKHALEV
Poverty Alleviation in the Course of Transition: Policy Options for Russia

RSC No. 97/21
Susan SENIOR NELLO
Applying the New Political Economy Approach to Agricultural Policy Formation in the European Union

RSC No. 97/22
Repatriation. Legal and Policy Issues Concerning Refugees from the Former Yugoslavia
Proceedings of a Roundtable Discussion, organised by the Working Group on Refugees (RSC)

RSC No. 97/23
Simon BAGSHAW
Benchmarks or Deutschmarks? Determining the Criteria for the Repatriation of Refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina

RSC No. 97/24
Sven BISLEV
European Welfare States: Mechanisms of Convergence and Divergence

RSC No. 97/25
Pascal SCiarini/Ola LISTHAUG
Single Cases or a Unique Pair? The Swiss and Norwegian No to Europe

RSC No. 97/26
D. LESLIE/D. BLACKABY/S. DRINKWATER/P. MURPHY
Unemployment, Ethnic Minorities and Discrimination

RSC No. 97/27
Bernhard WINKLER
Maastricht Games and Maastricht Contracts

RSC No. 97/28
Horst SIEBERT
Labor Market Rigidities and Unemployment in Europe

RSC No. 97/29
Ute COLLIER
Prospects for a Sustainable Energy Policy in the European Union

RSC No. 97/30
John MYLES/Paul PIERSON
Friedman's Revenge: The Reform of 'Liberal' Welfare States in Canada and the United States

RSC No. 97/31
Liesbet HOOGHE/Gary MARKS
The Making of a Polity: The Struggle over European Integration

RSC No. 97/32
Pascal SCiarini/Simon HUG/Cédric DUPONT
Example, Exception or Both? Swiss National Identity in Perspective

RSC No. 97/33
Dolores O'REILLY
From State-Control to EC Competence. Air Transport Liberalisation

RSC No. 97/34
Giuliana GEMELLI

RSC No. 97/35
Giuliana GEMELLI

*out of print
RSC No. 97/36
Martin RHODES
Globalisation, Labour Markets and Welfare States: A Future of 'Competitive Corporatism'?

RSC No. 97/37
Jacques MÉLITZ/Axel A. WEBER
The Costs/Benefits of a Common Monetary Policy in France and Germany and Possible Lessons for Monetary Union

RSC No. 97/38
Jürgen R. GROTE
Interorganizational Networks and Social Capital Formation in the South of the South

RSC No. 97/39
Jean-Paul FITOUSSI
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic Aspects. Substituabilities vs Complementarities Between Structural and Macroeconomic Policies

RSC No. 97/40
Ray BARRELL/James SEFTON
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic Aspects. Fiscal Policy, Real Exchange Rates and Monetary Union

RSC No. 97/41
Peter SINCLAIR/Nicholas HORSEWOOD
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic Aspects. Has the Phillips Curve Been Reborn?

RSC No. 97/42
Riccardo FAINI/Giampaolo GALLI/Pietro GENNARI/Fulvio ROSSI

RSC No. 97/43
Peter WESTAWAY
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic Aspects. What Determines the Natural Rate of Unemployment? And What Does Not?

RSC No. 97/44
Neale O. KENNEDY
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic Aspects. Unemployment in the EU and the US: A Macroeconomic Perspective

RSC No. 97/45
Bruno CHIARINI/Paolo PISELLI
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic Aspects. Wage Setting, Wage Curve and Phillips Curve: The Italian Evidence

RSC No. 97/46
Rod CROSS/Julia DARBY/ Jonathan IRELAND
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic Aspects. Hysteresis and Ranges or Intervals for Equilibrium Unemployment

RSC No. 97/47
Frank BARRY/John BRADLEY/ Joanne McCARTAN
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic Aspects. Unemployment in the EU Periphery: Problems and Prospects

RSC No. 97/48
Winfried VOGT
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic Aspects. High Unemployment and Stabilisation Policy

RSC No. 97/49
Henrik HOFMAN
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic Aspects. Europe as an Entity. Possibilities and Limits in Economic Policy

RSC No. 97/50
Claude GIORNO/Alain DESERRES/
Peter STURM
European Unemployment: Macroeconomic Aspects. Macroeconomic Policy and the NAIRU in European Economies

RSC No. 97/51
Susan SENIOR NELLO/ Karen E. SMITH
The Consequences of Eastern Enlargement of the European Union in Stages

RSC No. 97/52
Michael J. ARTIS/Wenda ZHANG
On Identifying the Core of EMU: An Exploration of Some Empirical Criteria

RSC No. 97/53
Gabriele TONDL
The Ups and Downs of Regional Income Convergence in Europe. Evidence from a Cross-Section and a Cross-Section Time Series Analysis

*out of print*
RSC No. 97/54
Michael J. ARTIS/Bernhard WINKLER
The Stability Pact: Safeguarding the Credibility of the European Central Bank

RSC No. 97/55
Paul McALEAVY/Stefaan DE RYNCK
Regional or Local? The EU's Future Partners in Cohesion Policy

RSC No. 97/56
Christoph KNILL
Implementing European Policies: The Impact of National Administrative Traditions

RSC No. 97/57
Christoph KNILL/Andrea LENSCHOW
Coping with Europe: The Impact of British and German Administrations on the Implementation of EU Environmental Policy

RSC No. 97/58
James A. CAPORASO
Across the Great Divide: Integrating Comparative and International Politics

RSC No. 97/59
Anne DEIGHTON
On the Cusp: Britain, Maastricht and European Security

RSC No. 97/60
Martin RHODES/Bastiaan VAN APELDOORN
The Transformation of West European Capitalism?

RSC No. 97/61
Andrea LENSCHOW
Transformation in European Environmental Governance

RSC No. 97/62
Daniel VERDIER
Domestic Responses to Capital Market Internationalization under the Gold Standard, 1870-1914

RSC No. 97/63
Manfred RIST
Die Europäische Union als journalistische Herausforderung. Qualität im Spannungsfeld zwischen Infotainment und Sachinformation

RSC No. 97/64
Richard ROSECRANCE
Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. The European Union: A New Type of International Actor

RSC No. 97/65
Jean-Marie GUÉHENNO
Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. A Foreign Policy in Search of a Polity

RSC No. 97/66
Christopher J. HILL
Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. Convergence, Divergence and Dialectics: National Foreign Policies and the CFSP

RSC No. 97/67
Reinhardt RUMMEL/Jörg WIEDEMANN
Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. Identifying Institutional Paradoxes of CFSP

RSC No. 97/68
Karen Elizabeth SMITH
Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. The Instruments of European Union Foreign Policy

RSC No. 97/69
Knud Erik JØRGENSEN
Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. The European Union's Performance in World Politics: How Should We Measure Success

RSC No. 97/70
Guido LENZI
Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. Defining The European Security Policy

RSC No. 97/71
Esther BARBÈ
Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. Balancing Europe’s Eastern and Southern Dimensions

*out of print