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On Local Origins of Civil Society
in Post-Communist Transition

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ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE

**On Local Origins of Civil Society
in Post-Communist Transition**

WISLA SURAZSKA*

*Visiting Fellow RSC 1997-98

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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine the territorial patterns of post-communist transition. Three theoretical perspectives are adopted. The paradigm of modernisation stresses the importance of urbanisation and industrialisation as the decisive factors in economic and democratic development. Putnam, in turn, has shown how the working of democratic and economic institutions is affected by social and historical context of local communities. The third theoretical perspective is derived from Rokkan's concepts and makes development contingent on the incident of local mobilisation at the time of "critical juncture". The ecological method is adopted with territorial units as cases. The dependent are: the level of economic and civic development based on electoral returns and various economic and social indicators. The independent are: the level of modernisation and the factor of "rootedness", the latter calculated from census data on house and land ownership, religious practices, and demographic continuity. The factor of rootedness appears to have a strong impact on the civic factor, therefore both Rokkan's and Putnam's models are confirmed. The pattern of mobilization of the electorate shows however, that Rokkan's approach can be a better explanation of civic development than Putnam's historical pessimism. The level of economic development is better explained by modernisation theory. Civic and economic development in Poland and the Czech Republic are disjoined, with not much of an impact on each other and proceeding along different territorial patterns.

The distinct course of change in West European democracies since the early eighties has been devolution of power from central government to variously defined subnational units.¹ As a result, some apparently uniform nation states have begun showing internal differences, sometimes quite striking, in how their various regions make use of the newly acquired powers. It appears that regional governments, very much like the national ones, depend a great deal on local civic habits. What matters is whether people are willing to engage in public affairs, to cooperate with each other, to have common purposes and whether they are ready to give each other a credit of trust. Such individual credits add up to a social capital - the major ingredient of democratic institutions and markets which work well.²

Some regions have been able to mobilize local resources for democratic participation and economic growth whereas others, where the civic dimension is missing, democracy and economy slides into corruption and patronage. Inter-regional disparities in the performance of democratic institutions that operate within the same constitutional framework of a single nation state cast some doubt on the proposition that with the advance of modernization local differences would disappear. The argument reaches back to the Durkheimian distinction between "community" and "society" as two conflicting structures: the former exclusive, based on myths, subjecting the individual to primordial controls, whereas the latter rational, open, individualistic, advancing modern democratic and economic development. With the advance of modernization, "society" was to replace "community" with the beneficial consequences to the individual. This scenario has actually materialized to a large extent with the advance of industrialization, mass migrations, urbanization and other processes underlying the formation of a modern nation-state.

The ideal of the individual liberated from communal ties and pursuing his/her interests in a society at large brought problems of its own, however. A conservative reaction to the vicissitudes of modernization pointed to social anomie of a mass society resulting from the uprooting of large numbers of people in the course of rapid urbanization. Further, the phenomenon of secondary "communalisation" of large metropolises into small and more homogeneous units became another point of contention between liberal reformers and conservative

¹ See, for example: M. Keating, *State and Regional Nationalism. Territorial Politics and the European State*, Brighton: Harvester-Wheasheaf, 1988, R.J. Bennett (ed.) *Decentralization, Local Government and Markets: Towards a Post-welfare Agenda*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, L.J. Sharpe (ed.) *The Rise of Meso Government in Europe*, Sage, 1993.

² R. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work, Civic traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1993, F. Fukuyama, *Trust, The Social Virtues & the Creation of Prosperity*, Free Press, 1995

public choice theorists. At the same time, while studying the occurrences of regional mobilization in the seventies in Europe, Rokkan and Urwin pointed out that even the most modern societies have several layers of potential identity below the state level, and that their actual political expression was a matter of contingency.³

More and more evidence have been adduced to demonstrate the persistence of local civic habits. Further, Putnam has challenged the assumption that traditional communities are a hindrance to modernization and individual rights. He has shown how profoundly the working of democratic institutions is affected by social context and the history of places they serve: "Where the regional soil is fertile", he says, the local institutions "draw sustenance from regional traditions, but where the soil is poor, the new institutions are stunned".⁴ Further, Putnam has shown that the time honored paradigm of modernization theory that makes *democratic development* contingent on *economic conditions* may be spurious as both may have a common root - a civic community. This crucial asset consists of norms and networks of civic engagement with deep historic roots. Fukuyama has reached a similar conclusion: "The liberal democracy that emerges at the end of history is ... not entirely modern. If the institutions of democracy and capitalism are to work properly, they must coexist with certain premodern cultural habits that ensure their proper functioning."⁵

Putnam's concepts are not without problems of their own. His use of historical data is anecdotal rather than systematic. A heavy reliance on the theory of collective action puts somewhat artificial limits to his historic interpretations. As a result, his arguments suffer of over-simplifications similar to the one implied in the target of his criticism, that is - the paradigm of modernization. If modernization theory largely disregards a local civic history and culture - Putnam in turn considers them as a given and enduring attribute of the place. In this sense his historic explanations are in fact a-historic. Rokkan's reasoning was more specific in this regard and better grounded in historical data. Rokkan would have accepted Putnam's thesis about the enduring character of a civic culture once it is established. But he was much less deterministic about it.

Rokkan's theory of *critical junctures* explains how the opening of opportunities at the turning points of European history (Reformation, industrial, national and democratic revolutions) produced mass mobilization along cleavages

³ S. Rokkan, D.W. Urwin, *Economy, Territory Identity. Politics of West European Peripheries*, Sage, 1983.

⁴ R. Putnam, *Making democracy...* p.128

⁵ F. Fukuyama, *Trust*, p.11

that were unique for particular nations and regions due to their previous history.⁶ These patterns of cleavages, once established, may become “frozen” for a long time, nonetheless, there is always a room in Rokkan’s framework for another critical juncture, which may present new opportunities and prompt the new wave of mass mobilization. Although the direct reasons for such mobilization are contemporary, its patterns are historically grounded, based on the layers of sediments left by the previous critical junctures. For example, Rokkan and Lippset have showed how the mass political parties created at the critical juncture of democratic revolutions in the late nineteenth century had reproduced some cleavages left yet from the times of Reformation and carried them through up to the present.⁷

Three models of civic development

To sum up, three models can be roughly distinguished of relationships between the continuity of certain patterns of civic behavior, the level of modernization, and economic development. According to the modernization paradigm (in its most simplified version), *change* can be effected by the policy of modernization which leads to the economic growth which in turn improves the civic performance in modern societies. Putnam has branded this model as **economic determinism** and proposed his own, based in turn on **historical determinism**; it stresses the *continuity* of patterns of civic behavior reaching back into the local history. According to Putnam, these patterns shape permanently both the civic behavior and economic development. The third model is more complex than the previous two and has been derived from Stein Rokkan’s theory of **critical junctures** and his “freezing” hypothesis. It combines the basic assumptions of both *continuity* and *change*, tracing the origins of the latter in critical junctures, that is, the historic moments of mass mobilization. The appeal of these junctures is based on new opportunities produced by universal trends (such as industrial and democratic development), but local responses to these appeals are contingent on circumstances which are historically grounded. Three models discussed above are illustrated in the graphs below.

⁶ S. Rokkan, "Cities States and Nations" in: Eisenstadt and Rokkan, (eds.) *Building States and Nations*, 1970.

⁷ M.S. Lippset, S. Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments, Cross-National Perspectives*, New York, The Free Press, 1973

1. Economic determinism: *change* (modernization paradigm)

Modernization = economic development = civic performance

2. Historical determinism: *continuity* (Putnam's model)

= economic development

civic history

= civic performance

Critical junctures: *continuity and change* (Rokkan's model)

A critical juncture = local responses (mobilization) = "freezing" cleavages

The testing ground, methodology, and the level of data aggregation

The collapse of communist regimes and the two-pronged political and economic reform created a momentum for mass mobilization in post-communist societies, similar to Rokkan's critical juncture. The purpose of this study is to examine the territorial patterns of this mobilization and to find out how they can be explained. First, the differentiation of local conditions will be established regarding two factors: the level of local integration and modernization. Second, the magnitude of local responses to the opening of democratic and economic opportunities will be measured and the factors of civic and economic development will be established. Third, the models above will be tested through the examination of the relationships between these factors. The final model will be construed by means of the path dependency method.

Poland and the Czech Republic have been selected as the testing ground for this study. These two countries are considered the leaders in post-communist transformation, yet they both contain fairly strong regional contrasts⁸. The second reason for this selection was included in the dramatic events which took place in the border regions of Poland and the Czech Republic in the first post-war years. As a result of the Potsdam Treaty, in the first years after the W.W.II, the western and northern borderlands of contemporary Poland (the former East Prussia, Silesia, a large part of Brandenburg) and Czechoslovakia (the former Sudettenland) underwent an almost complete resettlement. **Thus we are in a**

⁸ W. Surazska, R. Bivand, "From Populist Vote to the Post-Communist Victory. Regional Differentiation" (with R.Bivand), *The European Journal of Urban and Regional Studies*, vol. 4, No. 1, January, 76 - 84, W. Surazska, J. Blazek "Municipal budgets in Poland and the Czech Republic in the third year of reform" (with Jiri Blazek of the Charles University in Prague) *Government and Policy*, vol. 14, 3-23.

position to compare the contemporary civic and economic development in the communities which are several hundred years old with those which were settled only 50 years ago. In this way a “zero hypothesis” on the role of local history in civic and economic development can be tested.

The ecological method has been adopted for this study with territorial units as cases.⁹ Until recently, such an approach has been regarded inappropriate in social studies. The paradigm of modernization gave priority to the studies on the vertical social structures over the horizontal ones. Another reason for the infrequent use of territorial units as cases has been that statistical methods in social studies were designed mainly for surveys and they needed some adjustments to be applied to ecological research. Such adjustments have already been advanced and the new methodology is being successfully applied by social geographers.¹⁰

A choice of a proper territorial unit for the secondary data collection in ecological studies is usually difficult. Using territorial units as cases always poses the problem of what these units represent and how meaningful they are as communal entities. This question is particularly relevant in Poland and the Czech Republic, where the historic regions were abolished and divided between much more numerous new provinces. In the research presented below, data come, whenever possible, from the municipal level. Making municipalities the basic unit of a territorial inquiry solves the problem of frequent shifts of administrative and political boundaries. In the Czech Republic, however, such a solution is not very practicable because of the large number of municipal units (more than 6000) most of which are very small. Therefore 315 judicial districts were adopted instead. These were the traditional local units, preserved from the Habsburg administration by the newly created Czechoslovak state between the wars and dissolved only by the Communist government after the W.W.II.

For the purpose of this study an extensive data base has been assembled including national censuses, electoral returns, municipal budgets and other indicators of civic and economic activities. Most of the data have been collected for the level of municipalities but they can be aggregated into larger territorial units when needed. These are 49 *województwa* in Poland and 76 *okresy* in the Czech Republic, that is, the highest administrative units below the national level

⁹ Rokkan, S., Urwin, D., Aarebrot, F., Malaba, P., Sande, T., *Centre-Periphery Structures in Europe, An ISSC Workbook in Comparative Analysis*, Campus Verlag GmbH, Frankfurt, 1987.

¹⁰ O'Loughlin, J., Flint, C., Anselin, L., “The geography of the Nazi Vote”, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 84(3), 1994, 351-80.

endowed with an indirectly elected assemblies, representing municipalities although with rather limited powers.¹¹

Rootedness and modernization as the independent factors

If the habits of civic engagement and economic co-operation are learnt locally, as the studies quoted above have suggested, then the question is - how are they preserved and transmitted through the generations? My hypothesis is that *local integration* is an intervening factor; only integrated communities can teach the individual the habits of civic behavior and a trust necessary to sustain social co-operation. But local integration takes time and requires some measure of demographic continuity. Further, for a community to be capable of socializing its inhabitants and absorbing newcomers, a modicum of a shared culture and identity is needed. In this respect, participation in religious practices seems important. Finally, the individual stakes in localities, such as the private ownership of land or a house may strengthen local ties.

In fact, the variables indicating the level of demographic continuity (the proportion of newcomers to those who were born in the area), church attendance as well as home and land ownership tend to inter-correlate highly in the countries under study. These variables constitute the **factor of "rootedness"** established for Poland and the Czech Republic, separately (Table 1). The second independent factor in the models to be tested is the level of modernization at the outset of the transition process. The factor of modernization has been constructed based on the features commonly ascribed to the modernized areas, that is, the level of urbanization and the development of tertiary and quaternary (information) sectors. The corresponding variables (density of population, % employed in tertiary sector and % of university graduates) are highly inter-correlated in both countries. The factor of modernization together with the loading for particular variables are presented in Tab.2.

¹¹ Surazska, W. Bucek, J, Malikova, L., Danek. P. "Towards Regional Government in Central Europe: On Territorial Restructuring of Post-Communist Regimes" In: *From Regional Administration to Regional Government: The Changing Meso-Level*, the special issue of *Government and Policy*, vol. 15, no. 4, November 1997

Table 1. The factor of rootedness and the loading for particular variables. Calculated for the Polish and Czech municipalities

Variables	Poland Explained variance 76%	Czech Republic Explained variance 73%
Loading		
Demographic continuity*	,88	,74
% of land in private agriculture	,85	N/A.
% of family houses (of all households)	N/A.	,64
Church attendance	,53	,80


* Per cent of inhabitants born in a municipality in its present population.

Table 2. The factor of modernization

Variables explained variance	Poland 75,6%	Czech Republic 72,3%
Loading		
Population density	,68	,95
Tertiary sector	,70	,60
% university graduates	,89	,94

One might expect a negative relationship between the level of modernization in the area and the degree of rootedness of its inhabitants. This is what modernization paradigm would have led us to expect. Modern urban areas are considered an opposite to the traditional, churchgoing and demographically stable communities. But there is no such relationship to be found either in Poland or in the Czech Republic (Figure 1). In both countries the most uprooted are the territories resettled after the war, regardless of their level of modernization. Large cities obtain a medium score on the rootedness factor whereas the highest score is typical of regions dominated by medium towns (Tarnów and Nowy Sącz in Poland, Orava, Zlin and Hodonin in the Czech Republic, see Fig. 1).

Fig. 1 The Polish and Czech districts (*województwa i okresy*) on the axes of rootedness and modernization. The level of rootedness is lowest in the resettled territories (black). There is no relationship between the two factors.



The “Zero hypothesis”

Poland and the Czech Republic have been selected as the cases providing a rare opportunity to test a “zero hypothesis” on the impact of rootedness on civic and economic development in particular regions. The western and northern borderlands in both countries underwent an almost complete resettlement in the first years after Second World War. The German inhabitants either fled in front of the approaching Red Army or were expelled by new administrations according to the provision for “population exchange” included in the Potsdam Treaty. In their stead the newcomers settled, mostly from the eastern regions of Poland and Czechoslovakia which were transferred to the Soviet Union. As a result the villages, towns and sometimes the entire cities underwent an almost complete resettlement. The resettled territories had a better industrial infrastructure than the rest of the Polish and Czechoslovak territory. As shown elsewhere, 50 years of communist modernization had hardly changed this geographic pattern.¹² Data in Fig. 1 above have already confirmed the low level of rootedness in the newly settled territories. Tab. 3 shows these differences in more detail. The resettlements alone cannot explain such a low level of rootedness in the areas concerned as displayed in Tab. 3. They took place 50 years ago and if the newly settled municipalities were to develop according to the migration patterns prevailing in each country since then, they should have been more “settled” by now. But they do not seem to “hold” their inhabitants very well, showing much higher levels of migrations than other areas. One of the reasons might have been that the resettlements were carried out together with the policies of rapid industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture, which did not encourage the formation of stable communities. In fact the government’s agenda was implemented more thoroughly in the resettled territories than elsewhere. For example, in Poland, the farmers resisted the policy of collectivization which failed everywhere except of the resettled regions, where the large state farms have been more numerous and a hindrance to economic transition.

¹² Surazska, W. and Blazek, J. “Municipal budgets in Poland and the Czech Republic in the third year of reform”, *Government and Policy*, 1996 v. 14, 3-23.

Table 3. Variables of the rootedness factor in the resettled and non-resettled territories.

Variables	Poland		Czech Republic	
	Resettled	Non-resettled	Resettled	Non-resettled
% born in municipality	29%	56%	36%	49%
% of private land	53%	88%	N/A.	N/A.
% of family houses**	N/A.	N/A	78%	89%
Church attendance	15 (index)*	20 (index)	36%	51%

*The index of religious practices produced by Catholic Church in Poland

** in the total number of dwellings in the area.

Considering the higher level of secularization, lower level of house and land ownership and a higher level of mobility, one may expect the resettled territories to differ in their patterns of civic behavior from those which have more of a tradition behind their settlements. The expected differences may vary, however, depending on the model applied. According to the classical paradigm of modernization, the newly settled territories should show a more dynamic civic development since the experience of migration have created a society less tied to traditional norms and therefore made it more ready to embrace new economic and political opportunities. In Putnam’s perspective, however, transition to democracy and markets might have been obstructed rather than advanced in the localities with little history from which to draw their civic potentials. Rokkan’s model, in turn, would have allowed for a fresh start at the moment of critical juncture, depending on the incident of local mobilization. In this case - the “patches” of development can be expected, explicable mainly by the internal factors operating within particular countries, regions or communities.

The electoral turnout is a widely accepted instance of civic behavior, providing the participation in elections is not compulsory, as is the case in Poland and the Czech Republic. A brief look at the maps presented in Fig. 2 and 3 provides the first insight on the impact of rootedness on electoral turnout. A common feature of both Polish and Czech maps is a strong coincidence between the areas of the lowest electoral turnout with those of mass resettlement. When calculated as an average for municipalities located in each area, in the Czech

Republic the turnout in 1991 parliamentary election was 82% for the resettled and 89% for the non-resettled territories. In the Polish presidential elections of 1990, the corresponding figures were 48 and 55 percent, respectively. In particular in the Baltic coast, the contrasts of electoral turnout between municipalities which were Polish prior to the war (within the so called “Gdansk corridor”) and those which were German and then resettled under Polish administration are remarkable (Fig. 3).

Figure 2 **The Czech Republic** - 1992 parliamentary elections. Contrasts in electoral turnout between the resettled and non-resettled territories: black - highest, gray - medium, white - lowest. Electoral data for aggregated municipal units.





Figure 3 **Poland**: the 1991 parliamentary elections. The turn-out in the northern municipalities: black=high, gray=medium, white=low. The double line represents the pre-war borders of Poland delineating the “Gdansk corridor”; the areas on both sides of the “corridor” were German before the war and became almost completely resettled after being transferred to Poland in 1945.



The use of one's vote is another indication of civic behavior. Populist vote is considered one of the traps of young democracies. The notion of a populist candidate or a party is not very clear and has often been abused in political controversies. In the case of Poland it is applied to the maverick candidate from the Polish presidential election of 1990, Stan Tyminski. He was an obscure expatriate, whose main campaign point was a black briefcase, supposedly containing some damaging evidence against the new democratic leadership (the briefcase was never opened). In the Czech Republic, the populist vote is represented by the extreme right-wing Republicans.

In both countries, the concentration of populist vote is highest in the resettled territories. The contrast is starker in Poland, where the populist candidate acquired in the 1990 presidential elections 31% in the resettled regions as compared to 20% in the non-resettled ones (both figures are the means of municipal results). The corresponding figures for the Czech Republic were 7% of the populist vote in the re-settled regions and 5% for the rest of the country. The map in Fig. 4 shows the concentration of populist vote in Poland in the territory of the former East Prussia.

In both countries, *communities with higher populist vote have also shown a lower electoral turnout*, the rule that applies in other democracies as well. Populist parties are called also the "non-voter parties"¹³. This relationship is illustrated on the scatterplot representing the results of parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic (1993). Although it is clear on Fig. 5, that both the low electoral turnout and the populist vote are concentrated mainly in the resettled territories, nevertheless, the rule seems to apply generally within each of the areas concerned.

¹³ R.J. Dalton, S.C. Flanagan, P.A. Beck (eds), *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Realignment or Dealignment?* Princeton University Press, 1984.

Figure 4 Populist vote in the Polish presidential elections of 1990 (for Stanisław Tymiński) in the territory of the former East Prussia. The broken line marks the pre-war Polish border. Black spots represent the municipalities with 35% of populist vote and more, white spots - all other municipalities.





Figure 5 Populist vote (on the extreme right-wing Republicans) in the resettled and non-resettled territories in the 1992 Czech parliamentary elections



The number of non-profit associations is another indication of local civic potentials. The relevant data are available only for Poland (for 49 wojewodztwa, *Statistical Annual* 1995). In 1991 there was about 20% less social, non-profit associations in the resettled territories than in the non-resettled ones. Three years later, in 1994, the number for the entire country had grown rapidly, but less so in the resettled territories than in the non-resettled ones ((2,6 and 3,2 times, respectively, see Tab. 4).

Table 4. The number of non-profit associations in 1991 and 1994 in the resettled and non-resettled territories in Poland (per 10000 inhabitants).

Year	Resettled	Non-resettled
1991	206	243
1994	542	780

The impact of rootedness and on civic behavior

The findings so far indicate that the recently resettled regions in Poland and the Czech Republic show low level of rootedness of the inhabitants (Fig. 1, and Tab 3) and also lower levels of civic potentials, as reflected in the low electoral turnout, high populist vote and the slower formation of non-profit associations. This would have generally supported both “historical models” of Putnam and Rokkan in their parts concerning the role of local continuity in the development of local civic culture. In order to substantiate this relationship, however, more evidence is necessary. To this purpose, the civic factor has been compiled, based on three variables discussed above, that is: (1) electoral turnout, (2) populist vote (negative), and (3) the number of non-profit associations in the area. The resulting factor explains 58% of variance of the respective variables in Poland and 75% in the Czech Republic. The loading of particular variables are presented in Tab. 5.

Table 5. The civic factor

Variables	Poland (Expl. variance 58%)	The Czech Rep. (Expl. variance 75%)
	Loading	
Electoral turnout Poland 1990 Czech Rep. 1992	,89	,86
Populist vote	-,87	-,86
The number of non-profit associations per 10000 inhabitants	,44	N/A.

Having established the factors of rootedness (Tab. 1) and the civic factor (Tab. 5 above) we are in a position to test the relationship between them. In fact, it appears to be quite strong. Figure 6 presents the scatterplot for these two factors for Poland and Czech Republic, which indicates a considerable impact of the level of rootedness on civic behavior in both countries ($R^2 = 0.55$). Therefore, the historical models received a strong confirmation.

How about the modernization paradigm? Is civic behavior determined by the level of modernization? If this were true, then, the more modernized urban areas ought to score higher on the civic factor than those which score lower on the factor of modernization. The results for both Poland and the Czech Republic do not confirm such dependency. As shown in Fig. 7, there is no significant relationship between the factor of modernization and the civic factor.

Figure 6 The scatterplot of civic factor on the factor of rootedness for Polish and Czech regions shows the strong relationship between them (Poland - black, the Czech Republic - white)





Figure 7 The scatterplot of the civic factor on the level of modernization shows no relationship between the two either for Poland or for the Czech Republic



Continuity and change

The results so far indicate that civic behavior at the beginning of democratic transition is historically derived. Popular movements that toppled communist regimes in Poland and Czechoslovakia inspired a nationwide mobilization but did so more effectively in some places than in other. Especially stark appeared to be the contrasts between the newly settled regions and those, which have more continuity behind their settlement. Nevertheless, the impact of rootedness on civic behavior proved to be more general, applying to all regions, resettled and non-resettled alike. But can it change? Is the civic potential determined once and for all, as Putnam seems to suggest, or can it be reshaped periodically under the appeal of a new critical juncture, according to the Rokkan's model?


If Putnam's historical pessimism is to be confirmed, the progress of democratic transition ought to be better in the places where civic potentials have already been high at the onset of transition than in the places where they were low. Rokkan's model allows, in turn, for a more "patchy" development, contingent on local circumstances. Changes in the electoral turnout in the subsequent elections may provide us with a clue on the matter.

An increase in the electoral turnout in the Polish presidential elections was from 54% in 1990 to 66% in 1995 (the mean of municipal turnouts). The turnout in both elections was compared through regression analysis for all Polish municipalities. Only less than half municipalities had a turnout in 1995 consistent with that of 1990 ($R_{sq} = 0.44$). The incidents of increasing turnout in 1995 cannot be explained by its initial level in 1990 (R_{sq} not significant). Thus Putnam's historical determinism is not confirmed. Further, a closer examination of the mobilization pattern in 1995 shows that it was directed towards supporting the winning candidate, A. Kwasniewski, who represented the post-communist party in Poland; when his result is added as another independent variable to the regression analysis, the predictive powers of the model increase by 5% (from R_{sq} 0,44 to 0,49). Thus the increase of the turnout in 1995 represents a new wave of mobilization which arose along the cleavages inherited from the previous regime. This seems to support Rokkan's model.

In the Czech Republic, the turnout in parliamentary elections decreased from 87% in 1992 to 77% in 1996 (means for municipal turnouts). At the same time, the continuity of territorial patterns is remarkable here: the regression analysis shows that the electoral turnout in 1996 can be explained in 78% by the turnout in 1992. A more careful analysis shows however, that this continuity applies much more consistently to the non-resettled territories than those which underwent the mass resettlement (R_{sq} 0.70 and 0.57 respectively, see Fig. 8). This might have indicated a somewhat

less predictable civic development in the resettled areas than in the areas with more stable communities.

Figure 8 Electoral turnout in 1992 and 1996 parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic, controlling for the resettled and non-resettled territories



The economic factor


Economic development constitutes another side of post-communist transition, parallel and complementary to democratization. Modernization paradigm makes economic development a precondition to the successful democratization. Putnam in turn explains both civic and economic developments as determined by a common factor inherent in local history and culture. In order to test both models the factor of economic development has been construed based on the following variables: (1) Personal Income Tax collected in the area, (2) small business tax paid to local government, and (3) the level of unemployment. The three variables intercorrelate highly. Their loading in the economic factor are presented in Table 6.

Table 6. The economic factor in Poland and the Czech Republic; explained variance and loading for particular variables.

	Poland (49 województwa)	Czech Rep. (74 okresy)
Explained variance	65.7%	54.8%
Loading		
Personal Income Tax	0.80	0.72
Small business tax	0.90	0.82
Unemployment	-0.71	-0.67

As expected by the paradigm of modernization, the economic development is determined by the level of modernization. Regression analysis has shown a significant relationship between the two factors for both countries ($R^2=0.42$), although the scatterplot presented in Fig. 10 shows that pattern of this relationship is somewhat different in each country. The factor of modernization in this study distinguishes strongly between more and less urbanized areas. Therefore, the relationship depicted in Fig 9 indicates faster economic growth in the urban areas of both countries as compared to those which are less urbanized.

Figure 9 The impact of the level of modernization on economic development in the Czech Republic (white) and Poland (black)




This relationship is particularly strong in Poland, where the few major cities have developed much faster than the rest of the country. In the Czech Republic, however, a number of relatively low urbanized districts show better economic development than expected by the model. These are predominantly the western and northern districts located on the German border and they represent the cases of “frontier economy”, supported also by the variety of EU programs of cross-border cooperation. Further study has shown that the proximity of German border has also been beneficial for the Polish regions.

The final model

Testing of dependencies between the established four factors has been performed by a series of step-wise regression analyses, with the factors of civic and economic development as dependent variables and the factors of rootedness and modernization as dependent ones. The beta weights are used as the final indicators of the impact . The models for Poland and the Czech Republic are produced below (Figure 10).

Figure 10 The final models for Poland and the Czech Republic



In both countries, the factor of rootedness has a predominant impact on civic development in post-communist transition (beta ,72 in Poland and ,78 in the Czech Republic). There is a small influence of the level of modernization on the civic factor in Poland (beta ,28) but none in the Czech Republic. But even in Poland, if the civic factor is regressed on the modernization factor alone, it does not bear a significant dependence; the significance of modernization appears only when the factor of rootedness is included in the regression. Thus the impact of the level of modernization on civic development is contingent: it may improve civic development only in the areas characterized by a relative rootedness.

As for economic development, it shows strong dependence on the level of modernization (beta ,81 for Poland and ,49 in the Czech Rep.). Furthermore, in the Czech Republic, there is a small negative impact of the factor of rootedness on economic development, which probably results from the economic boom in the resettled borderlands with Germany, where the civic factor is especially low (see the map 1b).

Conclusions

The general thesis that history matters in civic development which underlies both Putnam's and Rokkan's models has been tested in two ways. First the "5 hypothesis" was checked by comparing civic behavior in the territories which were resettled after the WW2 to the remaining parts of Poland and the Czech Republic. The resettled territories did show significantly lower scores on the civic factor, meaning, they had a lower electoral turnout, highest populist vote and the slower growth of civic associations than the rest of both countries. In this sense, both Rokkan's and Putnam's models were confirmed. The pattern of mobilization of the electorate showed however, that Rokkan's theory of critical junctures can be a better explanation of civic development in post-communist Poland than Putnam's historical pessimism.

Further, the factor of rootedness, calculated for the Polish and Czech regions, showed much greater impact on civic development than the level of modernization although the latter appeared significant for economic development. Civic and economic development in both countries seem to be disjoined, with not much of an impact on each other and proceeding along different territorial patterns.



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