International Migration and Consolidation of Democracy in East Central Europe: A Problematic Relationship in a Historical Perspective

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Two important processes triggered by the collapse of Soviet-block communist regimes in East Central Europe in 1989-90: transition to and subsequent consolidation of democracy on the one hand, and, on the other, greatly increased international migrations in and out of that region, have each attracted considerable attention from, to use the coinages of Schmitter and Karl (1994), "transitologists" and "consolidologists" and migration specialists, respectively (see Pridham and Vanhanen 1994; Pridham, Herring, and Sanford 1997; Linz and Stepan 1996; Liebich and Warner 1995; Linz, Stepan and Gunther 1995; Whitehead 1996; Meyer 1993 for the former, and Hoerder and Moch 1996; Fassmann and Munz 1994; Gould and Findlay 1994; Rudolph and Morokvasic 1993; Ardittis 1994; Castles and Miller 1993; Chelais 1992 for the latter studies). In both fields theorists and researchers alike have emphasized the necessity to locate postcommunist democratization (Diamond and Plattner 1996; Whitehead 1996; Pridham, Herring, and Sanford 1997; Hyde-Price 1994) and East-West migrations (Kritz and Zlotnik 1992; Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield 1994; Morawska and Spohn 1997) in the global context in order to understand their mechanisms and directions.

The constitutive role of these two concurrent processes in the incorporation of East Central European (ECE) societies into the capitalist-democratic world system, their embeddedness in international relations, and their apparently "natural" affinity in view of the fact that the vast majority of contemporary ECE migrants travel to or come from Western societies that are the main source of the ideas and practical models of democracy for these postcommunist countries (Przeworski 1995, 3), should make the connection between international migrations and democratization a standard discussion issue in both study areas. Surprisingly, that has not been the case. Excepting a few occasional references to what migrants with Western experience could or should do for their democratizing countries (e.g., "act as carriers of values and behavioral patterns associated with successful democracies"¹), the impact of international migrations on democratization processes in East Central Europe has thus far largely remained outside the purview of either democratic transition/consolidation or international migrations analyses. (My survey among specialists on international migration and democratic transition/consolidation in other parts of the world indicates that it has not been much studied elsewhere, either).²

An examination of the relationship between international migrations and, in particular, the movement to and from the Western world and the consolidation of democracy in present-day East Central Europe is worthwhile because of the reasons noted and because of the comparative-historical insights it can offer. Contemporary observers and historians of westbound travels from that region during the period of mass rural migrations one century ago (1880s-

¹ While assuming the full responsibility for the final product, the author heartily wishes to thank all her colleagues-migration specialists--their names are listed in the appendix--who respondend to questions about the references, or lack thereof (in which case they were asked for comments) to democracy/democratization in their studies, and Philippe Schmitter for his helpful suggestions regarding the conceptualization and arguments in this paper.
1914), in the era of ECE's belated urbanization-industrialization and its incorporation into the capitalist Atlantic world-system, have documented an active role of the (e)migrants abroad as well as the returnees in the development of democratic ideas and practices in their home countries. Has a more "densified" and polydimensional interconnectedness of different parts of the world today in comparison with the prior century enhanced and, if so, in which ways and directions, the relationship between international migrations and democratic developments in the sending societies? Or have the political, socioeconomic, and cultural contexts of these processes, on the home or host sides of these flows or in the international sphere, or their actor-carriers themselves changed in ways that diminish or modify this impact?

In what follows I argue that, paradoxically in view of the rapidly expanding connectedness of East Central Europe with the Western world to which ECE residents travel en masse and from which originate the democratic ideas and practices implemented in their home countries, as the result of specific configurations of internal and external circumstances in which these travelers find themselves, the relationship between those international migrations and democratization processes in their home countries has generally weakened. What remains of this relationship has considerably "complexified" vis-a-vis the situation at the turn of the twentieth century. This exercise is intended primarily to initiate discussion and as a step toward a rapprochement of international migrations and democratization studies. Rather than a conclusive statement about the considered subject, its main purpose is to demonstrate one mode of such getting together through a comparative-historical analysis--an approach that this author, a historical sociologist, has applied in her studies of East European migrations and that is compatible with the recent appreciation among "consolidologists" of the contingency of democratization processes on time- and space-specific circumstances and their resulting diversity and underdeterminacy (see, e.g., The Transition to Democracy 1991; Pridham and Vanhanen 1994; Rengger 1997; Linz and Stepan 1996; Schmitter and Santiso 1998).

The focus of this discussion on East Central Europe, specifically, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, rather than on the entire region of Eastern Europe has been dictated by the following considerations. All three countries received ratings above the minimal threshold of democratic practices on the Freedom House Scale of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (Gastil 1994: 677-78); in comparison, 80% of the 26 countries of post-communist Europe scored "borderline" or "below" that threshold).

Past the transition stage, these countries are now in the democratic consolidation phase; their pending incorporation into the European Union moderates and accelerates this process, at least in its legal/procedural-institutional aspect (see table 1 for the dimensions of democracy relevant for successful consolidation). The primary destination of international migrations from those three countries is Western Europe/North America, which, as already noted are also the main sources and models of democratic ideas and practices.
By comparison, elsewhere in the region these flows are mostly internal (CIS. excepting Jews and German Aussiedlers) or directed at East Central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary) which has the most advanced capitalist transformation in the region. These three ECE countries attract as well the largest numbers of highly skilled Westerners employed as facilitators of the transformation. The primary focus of the discussion is on the common features of the migration-democracy relationship in the three ECE countries. Within the limited scope of this paper, however, and to the extent the unsystematic data permit, when relevant for the issue under consideration here, the differences among Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are noted.

Two basic concepts inform this discussion: international migration and consolidation of democracy. The former is understood here as travel across state borders for purposes other than exclusively tourism, regardless of the duration of sojourn abroad. This encompassing definition of international migration has been dictated by the specificity of cross-statal travels of the residents of postcommunist East (Central) Europe and, in particular, the relatively short-distance or "borderland" and "pendel" nature of most of these migrations which are aimed mainly at generating or increasing income for individuals and households under pressure from capitalist transformation (after Iglicka, Jazwinska, and Okolski 1996, 18).

Besides the impact on home-country democratization of this largest category of migrants, I consider as well the influence of the emerging elite or "brain exchange" international travelers, including ECE highly skilled specialist-migrants, emigres/expatriates or members of the respective ethnic diasporas in the West who half-return or regularly visit their home countries, on the one hand, and, on the other, of Western (non-ECE) economic and business experts, international company employees, political consultants, and cultural advisors who come to Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic on shorter or longer sojourns. (The effect of the recent appearance in East Central Europe of migrants and refugees from non-European parts of the former Soviet Union, Asia, and Africa on popular us/others representations and ethnic/racial prejudices is treated as one among several components of the dominant profiles of cultural orientations [Kluckhohn 1950] in ECE migrants' home-countries that they take with(in) them while traveling to the West.)

The other concept requiring explanation is the consolidation of democracy.

It involves "substantial attitudinal support for and behavioral complaice with the democratic institutions and the 'rules of the game' which they establish" (Linz, Stepan, and Gunther 1995, 3; see also Linz and Stepan 1996). Table 1 contains the specification of the democratic institutions and "rules of the game" that require support of political elites and--a sine qua non of the successful progress of the consolidation of democracy--significant segments of the citizenry (cf. Gunther, Diamandrous, and Puhle 1995; Schmitter 1996).
Table 1. Constitutive elements of democracy

I. Democracy as a political system:

1. Government is elected by citizens and responsive to them
2. Government operates by parliamentary and majoritarian or consensual rules
3. Separation of judiciary, executive, and legislative powers
4. Government delegates and supervises carrying out of its "collective good functions"
5. System of laws/regulatory frameworks guarantees (1), (2), (3) and (4) and protects civil liberties of citizens (freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and protection of individual and group rights against arbitrary state action) and the fundamentals of the "Democratic Creed" [(8)(9)(10)]

II. Democracy as a form of community:

6. Existence of civil society or the plurality institutions and associations that operate independently from the state
7. Participation based on inclusion rather than exclusion and deriving from civic-universalist rather than ethnonationalist-particularistic criteria

III. Democracy as a culture or set of normatively binding concepts that inform social-political institutions and popular orientations:

8. Individualism, holding that the primary task of the government is to enable each individual to achieve the highest potential development
9. Liberty, which allows each individual the greatest amount of freedom consistent with order, and
9a. Postulating that individuals will cooperate in creating a wholesome society through the execution of their rights and duties through participation in civic-political affairs
10. Equality, maintaining that all people are created equal and have equal rights and opportunities
11. Deliberative-negotiatory (rather than zero-sum confrontational) manner of resolving conflicts and building consensus
12. Respect for the institutions and processes of political life and for their outcomes--laws, regulations, policies, and election returns--even if they are disliked

Sources:
The constitutive elements of democracy specified in table 1 involve legal-political, social-communal, and cultural-normative aspects in their macro and micro dimensions, and represent the extensive interpretation of this concept, combining procedural (conflict management and resolution) and deliberative-participatory (shared effort toward the common good) elements (on these two projects of democracy see, e.g., Dahrendorf 1974; Marshall 1950; Turner and Hamilton 1994; Transition to Democracy 1991; Habermas 1993; Walzer 1995). The choice of a broad rather than a narrow definition is dictated in this case by subject matter. Spaces most readily accessible to migrants' potential influence are primarily located at mezzo-to-micro levels of the democratization processes, especially in the arenas of the civil society conceived as at once a normative principle, a style of organization, and a form of participation, the economic society as a set of sociopolitically crafted and accepted rules and institutions that mediate between state and market, and local-to-middle levels of the political society, including, in particular, political parties and leadership and legislative bodies (after Linz and Stepan 1996, 7-14). These arenas, or phrasing of Schmitter (1995), "partial regimes" of consolidation processes are interdependent but vary in distinctive ways propelled by somewhat different sets of circumstances; they change at different paces and in nonidentical sequences.

I have used a variety of sources. Besides (sub)regional and individual country studies of democratization and international migration in postcommunist East Central Europe to provide broader explanatory contexts for the presence (or absence), arenas, and forms of relationship between these two processes, I have examined some twenty social surveys and ethnographic studies conducted during the 1990s in ECE and Western destination countries of (e)migrants from that region, drawing as well from my own ongoing comparative study of East European migrants' social microenvironments in Berlin and Philadelphia. In these studies I looked for and noted all, even passing, information about actual and potential travelers' "because of" and "in order to" purposes (Schutz 1962) of westbound migration, reasons for their preferences for particular destination countries, pre-migration expectations and after-return evaluations of the specific gains and losses from sojourns abroad for individual migrants and their families and for their local communities and for the country at large. In addition, I have inspected ECE press reportages and secondary analyses thereof on transnational population movements, in particular those dealing with the influx into that region of repatriate members of ethnic diasporas and Western highly skilled personnel, and with westbound migrations of ECE businessmen and professionals on the one hand, and, on the other, with "[cross-]borderland" movements between the three ECE countries considered here and Austria and Germany. I also examined the available statistical data on (registered) joint business/industrial ventures involving ECE and Western partners. Because a considerable number of the (above) sources dealing with contemporary ECE migrants did not contain any or only occasional references to the issues related to democracy/democratization, I personally contacted sixteen authors of these reports, five additional ECE migration specialists I met at the International Conferences on East and Central
European Migrations held in December 1997 in Pultusk, Poland, and two authors of the extensive press reportages on recent borderland migrations in that region, asking them to comment on issues of interest to me.

The information I have obtained from these sources has been sufficient to propose a preliminary interpretation of the impact of post-communist-era international migrations on democratization processes in East Central Europe. Unavoidably, however, given the lack of studies directly focused on this relationship, it has been far from satisfactory. Although one of my main theses, namely, that the democratic influence of the largest segment of present-day migrants has thus far been nearly nonexistent, is convincingly sustained by the analysis of contextual pressures on the sending and the receiving sides of migration, a considerable part of this proposition's empirical support comes from the researchers' and/or migrant-actors' "silence" on this issue. Although my follow-up questionning of the authors of the examined studies did make up for this shortcoming to some extent, explicit investigations, preferably interdisciplinary, are needed of the link between international migration and democratization.

This discussion has been informed by the conceptualization of different arenas of social life: the economy, politics, social relations, material and symbolic culture, not as separate structures but as criss-crossing reciprocal constructions, each structured by and structuring the other through human action and its intended and unintended consequences. Whereas the long-term and immediate configurations and pressures of forces at the upper structural layers set the limits of the possible and the impossible within which people act, it is at the level of the more proximate surroundings that individuals and groups evaluate their situations, define purposes, and undertake actions the intended and, often, unintended consequences of which, in turn, affect over time these larger-scope phenomena. (On the structuration model of society see Giddens 1976, 1984; Sewell 1992; on migration as structuration process see Moraw ska 1998; on the configurational analysis in comparative-historical sociology see Skocpol 1984; Ragin 1987.) The major macro- and micro-level factors that, as I argue, have in different configurations shaped the relationship between different types of contemporary westbound migrations and democratization processes in ECE are listed in table 2. The discussion of these configurations and their influence on the migration-democracy relationship has been set against a comparative background of turn-of-the-century mass migrations in that region.
Table 2. Major factors influencing the relationship of migration-democratization*  

I. The sending societies:  
- economic structure and developmental dynamics  
- political (state) independence and form of government  
- prevailing orientation(s), laws and policies regarding state-national membership: civic-universalist v. ethnonationalist-particularist  
- official and popular civic-political culture/practice regarding, in particular:  
  (i) respect for the law  
  (ii) trust in public institutions and their functionaries  
  (iii) negotiatory v. confrontational approach to conflict resolution  

II. The receiving societies:  
- economic structure and dynamics  
- "health" and vitality of the democratic system  
- immigration policies  
- degree of sociopolitical isolation/integration from/into mainstream society of (im)migrants and availability to the latter of models of democratic procedures and organization  

III. International relations:  
- international power politics, pressures and conflicts/disagreements, especially involving home-countries/region of (im)migrants  
- involvement of (im)migrants' home-countries/region in international agreements and institutions regulating/monitoring trans-statal population flows to and from these countries/region on the one hand, and, on the other, the latter's compliance with the democratic requirements (clear these democr requirements; rules? prescriptions)  

IV. Characteristics of (im)migrants:  
- economic status/location in the sending and the receiving society  
- political status in the receiving society  
- duration of stay abroad  
- scope and nature of contacts with natives  
- intra-group organization of (im)migrants  
- accustomed orientations regarding  
  (i) collective self/other perceptions  
  (ii) authority (especially state and law)  
  (iii) civic-political involvement  
  (iv) resolution of interpersonal and intergroup differences/conflicts  

* All the specified here factors are conceived not as fixed states/conditions but, in accord with the structuration approach, as inherently changeable situations.
Arbeits- and Handelstouristen and Democratization in ECE

The largest category of post-1989 ECE international migrants: the income-seeking Arbeittouristen and Handelstouristen, has been directed primarily to Western Europe (85%), especially to nearby Germany and Austria, and then to Scandinavia, France, and, increasingly, Italy; and across the Atlantic to North America (15%). Because a large proportion of those quasi-tourists remain and engage in work abroad without appropriate immigration documents or circumvent customs regulations by hiding the quantity of merchandise they carry or smuggle, only estimates of their numbers compiled from border-crossing statistics and studies of such "grey area" migrants are available. The volume of contemporary economic migrations from East Central Europe has increased enormously compared to similar flows of one century ago. Thus, in 1995 alone the volume of income-seeking travels of East Central Europeans, including short-term back-and-forth small business/trading moves across statal borders (but excluding noncommercial shopping trips), estimated at 25-30 million "crossings," about equaled the volume of mass international migrations za chlebem (after bread) in that region during the thirty years preceding World War I. (In comparison, the number of legal or contract ECE migrant workers reported in the West totaled 400,000-450,000 in 1995; for the estimates of present-day international migrations of East Central Europeans see Frejka 1996; Trends in International Migration/SOPEMI 1996; Tourism in Central and Eastern Europe/ECC 1995; Morokvasic and Rudolph 1996; on contemporary versus turn-of-the-century flows see Morawska and Spohn 1997; Morawska 1998.)

Of the three countries considered here and in proportion to the total number of international migrants from each of them, Poles have engaged in such indocumentado work and unreported commercial trade during their sojourns abroad considerably more often than have either Czechs or Hungarians. Between-country differences in the migration plans correspond to those in the volume of actual travels. According to 1994-95 surveys of ECE's intentions to migrate temporarily to Western countries to earn money, between 35% and 60% of Poles, 33% and 48% of Czechs, but only 10%-15% of Hungarians reported having such plans (after Berencsi and Sik 1995; Juhasz 1996; Slany 1996; Okolski 1996a, 1996b; Maresova 1996; Fassmann 1996; Uhlirova 1997).3

Available data reveal the following sociodemographic characteristics of income/work-seeking migrants (between-country differences have not been significant). Most of them (more than 70%) have been urban residents; men have been more numerous (about 60%) than women;4 in both gender groups migrants 30 to 40 years of age have predominated; a majority (52%-58%) have had middle-level education; and a considerable proportion (15%-25%) of them have been unemployed at the time of migration (compiled from Fassmann et al. 1996; Maresova 1996; Juhasz 1996; Morokvasic 1996; Okolski 1996a; Slany 1997; Berencsi and Sik 1995).
Asked about motives for their travel abroad, between 85% and 95% of migrants have pointed solely to economic reasons: to help their families make ends meet, or, increasingly since the early 1990s, to improve their living standards. "Learning about the world" as an accompanying motive has been mentioned by 7%-15% of respondents. (This and the following data pertain mostly to shorter- and middle-term tourist-workers, actual and those who planned such trips at the time of the survey/interview; they were compiled from Frejka 1996; Slany 1997; Cieslinska 1998; Okolski 1996b; Misiak 1995; Jazwinska and Okolski 1996; Karpiuk 1997; Siewiera 1995; Berencsi and Sik 1995; Cyrus 1995, 1995a; Morokvasic 1996; Poplawski 1995; Mydel and Fassmann 1997; Morawska [study in progress]; see also Fassmann et al. 1996). Not surprisingly, considering the dominant purpose of migrants' travel abroad, their images of the West in general and the particular countries they chose as their destinations predominantly focused on that part of world's economic affluence and high standard of living, and on much better than at home opportunities to earn and save money. (The 1995 GNP ratio of East Central European and West European/North American countries was 1:3, and that of average official ECE wages and average migrant income in Western informal economy 1: 5-106.) With no significant between-country differences, references to democratic politics or culture in the West as the appealing features, such as public order/security, rule of law, "good political climate," civil (kind) behavior in social relations, appeared, if at all, in no more than 1%-3% of answers in both closed (preset categories) and open-ended questions.7

Ethnographic and ethnosurvey studies of present-day westbound travels of East Central Europeans have also inquired about migrants' experience during their sojourns abroad and the effects of such migrations on their own and families' lives and for their local communities. Migrants' answers reflect, again, the primarily economic or income-seeking character of their Western sojourns. Regarding experience abroad, they focus on the opportunities to find and maintain work, working conditions, and, most of all, earnings and savings. Recurrent noneconomic motives have been here the experience of being treated "like inferiors" or "like dirt" and the underlying anxiety of being apprehended or actually having to cope with pending deportations and prohibitions against return. Occasionally, Western "lack of spiritual values" (contrasted with migrants' national culture) and the "brutality" of life have also been mentioned, but more constructive encounters with Western democratic ideas or institutions have been by and largely missing from these migrants' stories.

The gains from international migration for the respondents' families and local communities have likewise been perceived in almost exclusively economic/material terms. (The questions probing these issues were generally open-ended, leaving respondents the freedom of answer) For individual families members' Western migration permitted, first and foremost, consumer purchases (house/apartment, car, household amenities) and, thus, the elevation of social status that they could not have accomplished without it. Between 10% and 15% of the returnees founded business enterprises--an investment that, if successful, may in the future make them active supporters and practitioners of
the democratic ways in the arena of economic society, thus making international migration a background generating factor (see the next section on this category of migrants).

Local communities also gained from international migrations of their residents. (This question was addressed to residents of migrant communities at large.) The predominant evaluations pointed to the influx of money and increase of economic affluence and/or decrease of unemployment; possible effects on the local democracy, whether in the sphere of political or civil society have not been mentioned at all. The question about the effects of (outward) temporary migrations for the respective ECE countries posed in public opinion surveys elicited similar evaluations in contents and emphases. The nearly exclusive economic focus and the absence of references to this category of migrants' impact on or involvement in the democracy-strengthening activities/institutions in their home countries/local communities in press reportages on cross-border migrations in ECE or analyses thereof confirm the above findings.

Because in social survey and ethnographic studies of migration references to the issue(s) of democracy have been miniscule and generally without commentary, and press reports have been largely silent on these matters, I asked their authors, particularly those who have done "hands on" participatory research, to elaborate, as much as they could, on these findings/nonfindings. Their follow-up comments on the data and "impressions from the field" by and large support my tentative conclusion. Except by deflating possible eruptions "from below" in protest against pains and traumas of the economic transformation by providing the subsidiary work and income abroad (certainly not a bagatelle facilitator of democratic consolidation), and by creating potential "democratic investment" for the future in the minority of migrants who invest their savings in businesses, the largest contingent of contemporary westbound migrants has had a minimal or nonexistent impact on the consolidation of democracy in postcommunist East Central Europe.

This conclusion is intriguing in two ways. First, it suggests that rather than acting as an integral facilitator of the consolidation of democracy (see Whithead 1996), the international and, specifically, Western "entanglement" of postcommunist East Central Europe, has had differentiated and possibly contradictory effects on this process. Specifically, one important "link" in this interconnectedness, westbound travels of the immense numbers of that region's residents (especially Poles), has had an inconsequential or, as argue below, possibly even a negative impact. Second, it stands in sharp contrast to the already mentioned historical reports on the democratic involvement, both in the destination and, after return, the home societies of the turn-of-the-century predecessors of contemporary ECE income-seeking travelers, and, especially, so-called Amerikanci or peasant-migrants to the United States--the "land of dollars" in popular representations. Amerikanci constituted about one-third of the total westbound population movements from that region between the 1880s and 1914 and most of them either intended to or--no less than 30% to 40%--
eventually did return to their home countries. (East European Jews, whose emigration was permanent, were the exception and have been excluded from this discussion. On 1880-1914 ECE international population movements, see Hoerder and Moch 1996; Nugent 1992; Bade 1992; Berger 1983\(^3\)).

Democratic initiatives of turn-of-the-century migrants were neither forceful enough nor sufficiently long and deeply embedded in social forms and political institutions of East Central Europe still waist-deep in the remnants of the feudal past really to transform them before several closely following adversarial developments "from above" (two devastating World Wars separated by the Great Depression of the 1930s and followed by the communist takeover in 1945) eradicated and destroyed these budding developments. But they were visible enough to be recorded by contemporaries and involved several elements of democratization at local and national levels as well, including the founding of People's Houses and agricultural cooperatives in villages, active participation in emergent labor unions in the cities, promotion of democratic ways in the forming peasant and working-class political parties, and (an important "demonstration effect" for migrants' countrymen only one or two generations removed from feudal serfdom\(^10\) the newly acquired sense of independent personhood or "you don't have to be poddanem [subordinate] to anyone," and the value of individual and collective liberties. (On these activities of turn-of-the-century ECE peasant-migrants in their home countries see Balch 1910; Bujak 1901, 1902; Slomka 1941; Witos 1968; Greene 1975; Morawska 1993; Wyman 1993; Puskas 1982; Stolarik 1980; also collections of (im)migrants' letters--more than 3 million of them arrived in East Europe from the United States between 1900 and 1906--sent to their families and friends in the villages, e.g. Kula et al. 1986; Drozdowski 1977.)

I briefly sketch below the major circumstances that induced turn-of-the-century migrants' participation in democratic activities and then, against this comparative background, outline the configuration of factors that greatly diminish or even corrupt this "democratic impulse" among their contemporaries (table 3 presents summary data on the economic background and selected sociodemographic characteristics of the 20th/21st-versus 19th/20th-centuries international migrations of East Central Europeans in all categories combined).
Table 3. ECE Migrations in a Historical Perspective: 20th/21st v. 19th/20th Centuries

1. Average ratios of ECE/NW (W.Europe and U.S.A. combined) per capita GNP and monthly wages
   - ECE/NW per capita GNP:
     1913: 42%
     1995: 33%
   - monthly wages:
     1913: 1:3 to 6
     1994: 1:5 to 10

2. Volumes, frequency, and destinations of ECE international migrations
   - Estimations of volume:
     1870-1914: 25-30 million westbound "comings" and "goings";
     1990s: 50-60 million
   - Frequency:
     1890-1910: average 1-2 annual trips per migrant
     1990s: 5-6
   - Most common destinations:
     1870-1914: Germany, U.S.A., Austria
     1990s: Germany, Austria, Scandinavia, Italy, U.S.A.

3. ECE migrants' occupational and gender distribution
   - Occupational distribution:
     1880-1914: 95% in agricultural occupations (Jews--80% in small trade and handicrafts);
     1990s: ca 65% in manufacturing/construction and services
     ca 15% in professions (Jews--ca 65% in professions)
   - Gender distribution:
     1880-1914: proportion of women 25% to 40% (Jews--ca 50%);
     1990s: proportion of women 40% to 70%

4. Most common migration types
   1880-1914: middle-to-longer-duration or permanent income-seeking/economic type (Jews:political-economic);
   1990s: short-to-middle-duration (Jews:permanent)
   - tourism combined with trade or undocumented employment;
   - family/friends visiting combined with undocumented employment;
   "pendel" trade and/or employment

5. Most common assistance networks
   1880-1914: informal networks (family at home and abroad, neighbors);
   1990s: informal networks (family/friends at home and abroad, ethnic communities abroad; native employers and friends/acquaintances abroad);
   combined informal-institutional networks;
   institutional networks
The units of comparison on the destination side are not identical—the conditions obtaining in the American society at the turn of the twentieth century, and, in the present, those in Western Europe (primarily) and America. Considering, however, that neither the relevant surrounding circumstances nor the position of contemporary ECE income-seeking migrants (minority) in the United States differ significantly from those of their (majority) fellow regionals in Western Europe and that the available data on "American" versus "West European" ECE migrants' experience of democracy abroad and subsequent involvement in democratization at home do not reveal any substantial differences, making such a comparison is justified.

A configuration of major factors "opened up" turn-of-the-century international migrants to democratic influences. Of primary importance on the sending (ECE) side was the multiple state of becoming or transition from feudal corporatism and ascription-based sense of selfhood and social organization, and Heimat or local (rather than Vaterland or broader-scope; see Ossowski 1967 on this distinction) collective attachments to modern civic-political and sociocultural commitments and identities among East Central European rural populations as the major source of turn-of-the-century westbound, also American, migrations. This situation of loosened old forms and unsettled new ones combined with those income-seeking peasant-travelers' genuine curiosity (documented in contemporary ethnographic studies and (im)migrant letters) about the faraway world into which they could and had ventured for the first time, facilitated their absorption of new ideas and practices. Their American sojourns provided the opportunity to experience and learn such new democratic ideas and practices. (A much smaller number of ECE peasant migrants who in that same period traveled to South America encountered a quite different social-political order and acquired a different civic knowledge and know-how—see, e.g., Kula 1982, 1983).

As unskilled industrial laborers (95 per cent of non-Jewish foreign-born East Central Europeans in American cities were so employed in 1910), (im)migrants found themselves at the bottom but right within one of the main sectors of the host society's economic structure. In several branches of industry (e.g., most of coal and steel and meat-packing companies that employed large numbers of ECE workers) they participated in labor union activities as early as the 1900s, learning through this experience the democratic skills of worker interest representation, the art of negotiation, the forms of protest and so on. In public institutions and in stores they observed an informal, egalitarian style of social relations: "In the office and in the bank, everywhere they treat a man with respect whether he is dressed up [in a genteel fashion] or dirty [from work" (after Drozdowski 1977, 477; this and the following information pertaining to turn-of-the-twentieth-century migrants' democratic experience in America has been compiled from Park 1922; Thomas and Znaniecki 1918; Greene 1975; Hoerder 1985; Bodnar 1985; Walaszek 1994; Harzig and Hoerder 1985; Puskas 1982; Stolarik 1980; Conzen et al. 1992).
Although middle-class native-born Americans (WASPS) perceived new (im)migrants from underdeveloped South-Eastern Europe as culturally inferior or "undercivilized," the spirit of Progressive Reform dictated that they assist these newcomers in embracing American civic-political ideals and the American way of life (see Timberlake 1966; Greenwald and Anderson 1996). Through so-called Settlement Houses established by WASP Progressives in foreign neighborhoods in most American cities in which the newcomers settled in greater numbers, (im)migrants were taught concepts and ideas entirely new in their experience: the principles of the "American creed" and rights and duties of citizenship and the procedures of democratic laws and government. In their neighborhoods, they also experienced practical workings of political democracy during local and national elections; although motivated primarily by the desire to augment their electorate, local representatives of the political parties combed (im)migrant neighborhoods, soliciting their residents to fill out naturalization papers to become citizens and--a revolutionary idea for peasant-migrants from postfeudal East Europe--"influence the affairs of America."

Important, too, for their apprenticeship in the workings of a democratic civic society, for the first time during their sojourn in America East Central European peasant-(im)migrants began to organize themselves, using the know-how acquired in Settlement Houses and American civics classes, into various mutual help and expressive associations. Among the variety of sociocultural institutions they created, those promoting translocal national consciousness and symbolic attachments to, in Benedict Anderson's famous phrase, "imagined communities" as Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, and so on, were particularly innovative. The Lithuanians referred to the United States as "the second birthplace of the[ir] nationality," and the same may be said of others as well (Park 1922, 51). These emerging national self-perceptions had been a new experience for millions of peasant-(im)migrants who came to the United States with the Heimat, or local, (region or community) rather than broader, national, or Vaterland identities (Ossowski 1967). Unlike their fellow ethnics in their home countries, however, whose acculturation into larger national communities occurred under immediate political oppression of their respective national groups by Russia, Germany, and Austria as regional superpowers that made the exclusionary "zero-sum" opposition of us/ingroup versus them/outgroup(s) the central theme in these emerging identities, the "nationalization" process of the Amerikanci, even though it unavoidably contained home-country motives of struggles against enemies, took place in a democratic environment and in a democratic manner.

None of the conditions that induced democratic involvement of turn-of-the-century ECE international travelers are present today and replacement facilitators scarcely exist; rather, multiple obstacles to such an engagement have emerged in the circumstances of contemporary migrants from that region.

On the side of the sending ECE societies and, specifically, the popular Weltanschauungen and accustomed practices of their citizens, including income-seeking migrants to the West, the major hindering factors have been the
following. In comparison with their predecessors one century ago who, too, were set in motion by large-scale socioeconomic transformations of their societies but for whom the notions of democracy and civic-national participation encountered during their Western sojourns represented entirely new and exciting ideas, contemporary migrants leave their home-countries and arrive at their destinations abroad encumbered by several undemocratic preconceptions and deeply embedded habits.

One of them has been the understanding of democracy prevalent in East Central Europe. During the communist era and by way of opposition to that politically authoritarian and economically inefficient regime, there formed a largely implicit (and outspoken in dissident circles) popular understanding of democracy as involving three elements "rolled into one": freedom from state controls (understood as the elimination of the communist regime), economic affluence for all, and regaining of national sovereignties by state-members of the "socialist family" controlled by the Kremlin (Whitehead 1996, 386; see also Przeworski 1995; Pehe 1988; Pridham and Vanhanen 1994; Meyer 1993; Liebich and Warner 1995). The collapse of the Soviet-dominated communist order was viewed as equivalent to the establishment of the Western-like capitalist-democratic one.

Although post-1989/90 experience of "real (capitalist) democracy" (like "real socialism"--see Marody 1996) and increased contacts with the Western world have been gradually bringing these representations closer to reality by making them more contradictory, two constitutive components of this fused image formed in the communist era--democracy understood primarily as individual and collective "negative freedom" from state legal and political-institutional constraints (elements I/5, II/6, and III/8 and 9 in table 1) and as the system that cares for its poor and weak (I/4) but at the same time assures economic affluence for everybody--have endured in popular understanding. Absent by and large from these common representations have thus far been the constitutive elements of "positive freedom" (II/7, III/9a, 11 and 12) as necessary contributors to the construction of a stable functional democracy (see Bruszt and Simon 1992; Siemienska 1997; Ingelhart 1996; Szelenyi, Szelenyi, and Poster 1996; Klingeman and Fuchs 1995; Liebich and Warner 1995; Kolarska-Bobinska 1998; Juhasz 1996; on the distinction between negative and positive freedoms see Berlin 1968).

The regaining of state-national sovereignty by East Central European societies has been indeed realized with the collapse of communist regimes in the region. But it has not eliminated the widespread preconceptions underlying these national aspirations that are incompatible with the principles of a democratic community (especially element II/7 in table 1) and a democratic culture (especially elements III/9 and 9a and regarding "equal liberties" for all law-abiding citizens and the groups they represent). Some (vocal) segments of these societies even reinforced these ideas by bringing them out into the public area. They involve, in particular, national orientations and group self-perceptions dominant in the region and traditionally informed by ethnic-
particularistic rather than civic-universalist principles. Whereas civic-universalist nationalism has relied in principle on voluntary commitment and, therefore, flexible criteria of membership in the national collectivity and on the legal-democratic, deliberative process in resolving intergroup tensions, in the ethnic-particularistic nationalism this membership is viewed as inherent and, thus, impossible to achieve for those who do not have it or to abandon for those born into it, and intergroup conflicts are viewed as and dealt with in a manicheian fashion as the confrontations of good and evil forces that cannot be resolved through negotiations and compromise. (On these two traditions of nationalism and the historical circumstances of the emergence of the latter type in East Europe see Kohn 1961; Connor 1994; Greenfeld 1992; Sugar and Lederer 1969; also Chirot 1989; Berend and Ranki 1974, 1982.)

Although national traditions of all three East Central European countries considered here have also contained the universalist-democratic component, it has been most alive in the collective memory and as part of contemporary national self-representations among the Czechs who, including present-day migrants, are in this sense less encumbered or better prepared mentally for functional democracy than their Polish and Hungarian fellow regionals. (On Thomas Masaryk and interwar Czechoslovakia's democratic order as relevant identificational references for postcommunist political leaders and public discourse see Krejci and Machonin 1996; Wolchik 1994; Svatek 1993; Batt 1997; but see Gellner 1983 on a particularist-exclusive element in this universalist-democratic tradition of Czech nationalism, namely, a tendency to view it(self) as unique and preceding all others.)

Unsolved problems with ethnic/national minorities within and outside of these three countries contribute to the persistence and often enhancement of particularistic-exclusionary nationalist orientations in the region. In this regard Hungary which has a large (1.6 mln) and discontented minority in Romania and sizeable and equally dissatisfied populations of Slovaks and Romanians (more than 0.5 million combined) within its borders, has entered the process of postcommunist transformation more encumbered by a ballast of undemocratic popular attitudes than has either Poland or the Czech Republic, both at present basically homogeneous in their ethnic/national compositions and with no significant conflicts over their minorities with neighboring countries (see Bugajski 1994; Juhasz 1996; Nagy 1995; Sidjanski 1997; on Hungary's implementation of the European Union's legal framework for dealing with ethnic minorities, see Nagy 1997; also Fullerton, Sik, and Toth 1995, 1997).

Another, more recent development in postcommunist East Central Europe has had undemocratic repercussions on that region's residents national self/others perceptions and intergroup relations, namely, the growing influx into those countries of (transit and permanent) immigrants and refugees from non-European parts of the former Soviet Union, Asia, and Africa. The numbers of these new arrivals have thus far been limited (excluding illegal worker-tourists and repatriate nationals from CIS, in 1993 about 10,000 [im]migrants from those regions entered the Czech Republic, 15,000 Poland, and 15,000
Hungary; the latter has also received considerably larger inflows of Romanian and Yugoslav refugees). But the appearance of these "visible aliens" on the streets--a new sight to the natives--combined with depictions of refugee camps in the media and discussions about the necessity to feed and house their residents from taxpayers' monies according to international agreements, have evoked common expressions of antipathy toward and occasional overt aggression against those newcomers reported in all three ECE countries (see Jasiewicz 1995; Hars 1997; Frejka 1996; Maresova 1996; Juhasz 1996; Okolski 1996a; Toth 1995; Trends in International Migrations/SOPEMI 1996: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary; Fullerton, Sik, and Toth 1997; Slany 1997; Nowicka 1997; Romaniszyn 1997).12

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the consolidation of democracy "from below," that is, with and through the active support of rank-and-file citizens of postcommunist ECE societies has been a syndrome of habituated popular outlooks and practices that during the communist period served as effective "survival strategies" and have endured to the present or even partially intensified. In particular, three such related elements of this \textit{homo sovieticus} syndrome or the accustomed resources for coping with the previous system that are now a hindrance to the construction of a functional democratic order have been a popular distrust of public institutions, especially the state, its organs, and functionaries combined with widespread civic apathy ("enemies" of the consolidation of democracy elements I/1, II/6, and III/9a in table 1), and the pervasive corruption that has made "beating the system" and "going around the law" into widely accepted social norms (hindrance to elements I/4 and III/10 and 12). Whereas the anti-state orientation in Poland has had the longest precommunist history and the broadest social reach during the communist era, the remaining two features seem to have been similarly widely and deeply embedded in all three ECE countries (see Tismanyanu 1992; Schopflin 1996).

After a short period of popular mobilization during the transition from communist to democratic regimes in East Central Europe, the deep-rooted habits/legacy of communist rule combined with the hardships of economic transformation that have affected large segments of the population in the region have again (re)produced widespread civic anomie or cynicism toward government and its representatives, which are again perceived as "them" (versus "us," rank-and-file citizens) and mass withdrawal from political involvement--two closely affiliated phenomena familiar from the communist era which Kenneth Jowitt (1992) has called "dissimulation," or the retraction of people from the official sphere into private circles (see also Schopflin 1995; Tismanyanu 1992; Rose 1996).

Social surveys conducted in Poland and Hungary in 1993-94, barely a half decade after the installment there of democratic regimes, show the vast majority (more than 70%) of young citizens, also the highly educated ones--the "future of democracy" in these societies--reporting lack of interest in politics and public matters generally. About three-quarters believe their influence on public matters is very limited and that politicians are by and large more
interested in gaining or retaining power than in the good of the country (Roberts and Jung 1995; Simon 1993; CBOS November 1997, March 1998; Jasiewicz 1995; see also Lewis 1993; Szelenyi, Szelenyi, and Poster 1996; Connor and Ploszajski 1992; Kolarska-Bobinska 1998). In comparison, perhaps because of the presence of very popular and charismatic leaders in top political positions in their country, even though their voting participation has been systematically diminishing since 1992, the Czechs in 1994 scored considerably higher than their two ECE neighbors on "trust in the government": more than 50% of affirmative answers compared to a little more than 20% in Poland and Hungary each. (In the wake of the corruption scandal involving prime minister Klaus in 1997, however, those ratings dropped rapidly to a level approaching Polish and Hungarian scores; see Rose and Haerpfer 1994, tables 23, 52, 58; Krejci and Machonin 1996; Palous 1995; Toka 1995.)

Another enduring component of the homo sovieticus syndrome that has been a significant obstacle for the stabilization of the rule of democratic law in public affairs and social life and the emergence of a functional economic society as the guarantor of the material base for carrying out by the state of its collective good functions has been widespread corruption and nepotism. Ubiquitous under communist rule, this "privatization of the public sphere" (as the other side of the politicization of the private realm characteristic of that command-and-control system) has persisted into the new era sustained by the embedded popular orientation-cum-practice of "working the system" and meaning, informed by the basic distrust of the official institutional structures, the reliance on informal connections and using roundabout or outright illegitimate means perceived as the best or only way toward one's purposes. (On corruption and nepotism in the communist system see Gittelman 1984; Wedel 1986; Los 1990; Jowitt 1992; in postcommunist Eastern and Central Europe see Kharkhordin 1994; Gubin and Kostiouchenko 1997; Krejci and Machonin 1996; Sik 1994a, 1994b, 1994c; Szara Gospodarka w Polsce 1996; Frieske 1997; Okolski 1996b).

Current losses to the state treasury in each of East Central European countries from unreported earnings in home or Western informal economies and unpaid or falsified taxes have been estimated at billions of dollars annually (Sik 1994a, 1994b, 1994c; Okolski 1996b; Witkowski 1995; Grabowski 1994; this disrespect for the law and the ensuing losses to the state are even much greater in the easternmost nation-states-former Soviet Republics--see, e.g., Handelman 1995; Konstantinov 1997; Dawisha and Parrott 1997).

Reinforcing the enduring homo sovieticus effects, the combination of economic deprivations accompanying post-1989/90 capitalist transformation (an average of more than one-third of the employed population in East Central European countries combined had lived below the poverty level and another one-third experienced difficulties in making ends meet in 1995, while unemployment caused by the economic restructuring ranged, depending on the region, between 20% to 50%--Berend 1995; for ECE national data see Frejka 1996) and frequent changes of laws and regulations (decided "from above"
without prior public discussion and consultations with the affected groups) regarding taxes, private property and investments have acted as an impediment to the active interest in and involvement on behalf of the consolidation of democracy of ECE populations.

The ECE migrants' experience during their sojourns in the West not only does not teach them, as was the case with their predecessors one century ago, democratic habits and does not modify the undemocratic ones they are accustomed to but, to the contrary, enhances some of the latter either by making them useful for migrants' purposes or through the "demonstration effect," that is, by showing the Western ways as not much different from the orientations and practices prevalent in migrants' home countries. The major reasons for this situation have been the following.

The overall politicization of contemporary international migrations has made the determination of who can enter, how long they can stay, what activities they can undertake, intricately entangled in politics and ideology that are negotiated at the national and international "upper structures" well above the heads of the migrant subjects of these decisions (see Zolberg 1983; Goodwin-Gill 1993; Esman 1992; Hollifield 1996; Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 1994; Weiner 1995; Sassen 1996; Richmond 1994). In comparison, at the turn of the twentieth century the decisions of whether, where, and for how long to go were by and large the prerogative of the migrants themselves, their families, and local communities. Contemporary ECE (and other outside of highly developed world core) migrants' subjection to receiver-country immigration policy limitations on stay duration and prohibition of work without a special permit has created in Western destination countries a large army of marginalized "illegal" migrants.

A profound economic restructuring of highly developed Western societies (and with them of the global economy) triggered by the international oil crisis of 1973 and the severe industrial downturn afterward has comprised two processes of direct consequence for the position of most of the East Central European migrants in these countries. Transformation from an industrial to a high-tech, services-driven economy has been accompanied by a shift to short-term, flexible production based on small, versatile companies. Related to the above has been a rapid growth of the informal ("third") economic sector offering variable, usually substandard, wages and no employment security, largely "detached" from mainstream advancement/integration opportunities and from the legal-institutional structures of the fiscal and welfare systems. (On the emergence of the postindustrial economy and its major features see, e.g., Sassen 1991; Postman 1992; Castells 1996; cf. also Harvey 1990).

Migrants involved in Arbeitstourismus or Handelstourismus make up the largest two categories among post-1989/90 East Central European travelers to the West. Whereas their predecessors one century ago found themselves at the lowest echelons but within mainstream political and economic structures of the receiving societies which facilitated their direct experience with democratic
ideas and practices, contemporary migrants' position as *indocumentado* informal-sector workers or "gray" or "black" market cross-border traders marginalizes and largely isolates them from everyday contacts with host-country mainstream institutions and its representatives. (On migrants' isolation from mainstream host societies see Siewiera 1995; Cyrus 1995, 1995a; Misiak 1995; Mydel and Fassmann 1997).

Contacts that exist are limited. For migrants engaged in illegal work, they involve personalized and subordinate relations with their native *patrons* or employers, occasionally with native workers whose employment conditions and living standards are glaringly better than their own, and, if unlucky, with immigration officers combing foreign neighborhoods and work sites for *indocumentados* like themselves. Cross-border traders engage in under-the-counter exchanges with the buyers or sellers of their merchandise and unpleasant encounters with customs officers. Neither of these contacts are amenable to learning the principles and operation of a democratic society (elements II/6 and 7 in table 1) and culture (III/10, 11 and 12). Actually, Western postindustrial employers' semiopen search for cheap informal foreign workers and the eagerness of "mini-transnational" business enterprises to deal in contraband merchandise sustain or even reinforce (because of the much greater remuneration it brings than at home) in ECE migrants their accustomed undemocratic beat-the-system/circumvent-the-law orientations of communist provenance that they find profitable in the West. The returnees then reimplant--Poles on the largest scale as the most numerous among ECE *Arbeits- and Handelstouristen*--this "renergized" undemocratic orientation-cum-practice into their home country economic societies.

In yet another way migrants' Western experience contributes to the reinforcement rather than modification of the preconceptions they bring with them from their homelands. Long since gone among the dominant sociocultural strata of Western societies is the "spirit of Progressive Reform" (or its contemporary European social- and Christian-democratic equivalents) that led members of turn-of-the-twentieth-century elites to immigrant neighborhoods to educate their residents in the practical rights and duties of citizenship. Today, moral philosophers and social scientists alike deplore the failing standards of Western democracies reflected in widespread cynicism regarding the once sacrosanct principles of the "democratic creed," political distrust and disillusionment, and the dwindling of civic participation, which have fallen victim to privatization and "consumerization" of citizens' interests and pursuits (see, e.g., Laski 1969; Koechler 1987; Entman 1989; Harvey 1989; Postman 1992; Boggs 1997; Kaase and Newton 1995).

The media, and especially the tv deluged by Western advertisements and entertainment programs watched avidly by East Central Europeans at home since the fall of communism and the subsequent spread of cable networks and during their sojourns in the West project these images convincingly enough. But the "good works" of democracy are scarcely represented, at least not in a way understandable to foreign viewers without linguistic skills and familiarity with
the intricacies of Western politics (in this matter turn-of-the-century Progressive Reformer civics classes for (im)migrants did a much better job). These representations do not correct but confirm migrants' accustomed concepts of democracy as, basically, the freedom to mind one's own business and to enjoy ever-proliferating consumer goods. So enhanced by Western experience, the "democratic attitudes" commonly displayed in today's East Central Europe among successful returned migrants express, according to one observer, the conviction that "what is important is not that the roads (in their countries) are in a bad state, but the fact that (they) drive on them in (their) Mercedeses" (after Abner 1997, 83).

Two more factors in the situation of contemporary ECE migrants during their Western sojourns diminish their opportunities to become acquainted with the (good) works of democracy and sustain instead their home-bred orientations and behavioral habits: the short-term, back-and-forth or pendel (shuttling) nature of their international travels, and their accustomed reluctance to organize themselves. In both these aspects present-day migrants differ from their turn-of-the-century predecessors.

The average duration of turn-of-the-twentieth-century nonpermanent ECE migrants' sojourns in America (the historical comparison used here) was three to five years. Visits of their contemporary successors, destined mostly for neighboring Western countries and constrained by time limitations imposed by receiver countries' immigration policies on the one hand, and, on the other, by the greater availability of flexible short-term rather than long-term jobs in Western postindustrial economies, have been of a much shorter duration, ranging from a couple of days (traders) to a few months to one year (illegal workers). A significantly increased presence of women among migrants (they average about 40% of the total as compared with 25% century ago), many of whom are married and have underage children at home, also shortens durations of work abroad.

In this situation contemporary migrants' lives during their sojourns abroad remain immersed, actually and symbolically, in their home-country habitats, outlooks, and concerns. Considering that the primary purpose of their travels is the improvement of the material standards and social status of their families and that because of their manifoldly insecure position while abroad this purpose is chronically endangered and requires alert "defensive attention," not much space is left in the existence of the typical migrants in the categories considered here to become acquainted with and to absorb new democratic ideas and practices.

Finally, contemporary ECE migrants' reluctance to organize themselves—a communist legacy of "dissimulation" or noninvolvement resulting from a generalized distrust of state/public institutions transplanted to the West—may be understandable. Undocumented worker migrants prefer to keep a low profile for fear of being deported. (This attitude, however, has been displayed also by those with legal status.) But it not only alienates them even further from
opportunities to acquire know-how of the workings of civil society, but, importantly, cuts them off from host country institutional sources of legal advice and, if necessary, defense, when they are abused by employers and in dealing with immigration bureaus, and police departments, as well as umbrella organizations (such as, e.g., the European Union Migrants' Forum [EUMF]) that represent migrant associations in national and international political forums. (On present-day ECE migrants as "invisible communities" and Western national and international associations that perform consultatory and representational functions for contemporary organized migrant groups, see Fijakowski 1994; Mydel and Fassmann 1997; Misiak 1995; Siewiera 1995; Cyrus 1997; Danese 1998; Marks and McAdam 1996; Kastoryano 1994).

Business and "Brain Exchange" Re-/Expatriates and Democratization in ECE

Although Arbeits- and Handelstouristen clearly predominate among present-day ECE cross-border migrants, the depiction here would be incomplete and the evaluation of the exiguous or outright negative impact of westbound migrations on the consolidation of democracy in East Central Europe exceedingly foreclosing without a consideration of the emergence of new kinds of international travelers or, better, milieus to emphasize professional connections and informal or "weak social ties" (Granovetter 1985) among their members, whose activities directly or indirectly contribute to the the building of functional democracies in that region. Although admittedly a wishful thinking, I call these new kinds of travelers harbingers of democratic role models among international migrants who with (considerable) time might, if not replace the now prevalent types, at least overcome or neutralize their contrary effects through repercussions from their "good works."

These new international migrants can be classified into four categories:

1. a minority of Handels- and Arbeitstouristen who become owners of small-to-middle-level enterprises;
2. highly skilled ECE migrants, including business executives, managers, and scientists who make regular professional trips to the West (or around the world);
3. repatriated or, more often, "shuttling" between the countries of their present and native residences highly skilled ECE emigres from the postwar (1945 to 1989/90) period; and
4. "expat" (from expatriate) Western specialists, consultants, managers of international companies, researchers, and the like who go to East Central Europe for shorter or longer sojourns for professional purposes or, in the case of emissaries of various EU and related NGO bodies, to monitor the preparations for the pending incorporation of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the European Union.
Although the (legitimate) business and professional activities they pursue and their secure economic and legal-political positions both in the sending and the receiving societies make migrants in all four categories into "natural allies" of the democratic order, their different social-institutional locations, life experiences, and habits and the particular focuses and purposes of their activities differently problematize their relationship with democratization processes in East Central Europe.

Ten to 15 percent of ECE tourist-workers and tourist-traders, almost exclusively men, invest the monies they earn in the West to fund their own businesses, often (registered) joint ventures with Western partners, in their local communities. They thus acquire legal status and move into the formal sector of the economy, actually, one of its transformation-driving segments whose growth postcommunist governments view as an important measure of their political success. For these fledgling businesses to put down firmer roots and, once established, to prosper, a consolidated, stable legal-institutional democratic environment is needed, and, especially (see table 1), components I/3 and 5 in the juridico-political arena, II/6 in the social sphere, and III/8 and 9 in the civic culture domain. The limited evidence that exists thus far on the attitudes and behaviors of such international migrants-turned-businessmen suggests that they support the consolidation of democracy not only in their home countries at large but also, importantly, in their local communities (see, e.g., Cieslinska 1997, and her personal communication to this author, 28 February, 1998; Misiak 1995, and his personal communication to this author, 3 March, 1998; Morawska [study in progress]).

A potential danger for functional democracy losing the support of this emerging group, lies in the possibility that they may opt for greater risk but much larger revenues from illegal big business, especially with (eager) partners in more eastern parts of East Europe where, particularly in politically and economically unstable Russia, criminal entrepreneurship is very common (see, e.g., Ulrich 1994; Brief on Crime and Corruption in Russia 1994). The slower the democratic consolidation in the upper layers of the ECE political and economic societies, the greater is the likelihood that, if such smaller-to-middle local establishments survive at all, they will move into that avenue. Conversely, although with a more gradual impact, the more and more vocal such local-level supporters of democracy among new businessmen, including international migrants are, the greater is the chance that the upper-state echelons will progress toward the solidification of a democratic order.

Highly skilled international travelers, the second group considered here, by the mid-1990s constituted about 12%-14% of the total number of post 1989/90 temporary westbound migrants (excluding "pure" tourists) from each of the three ECE countries (estimates compiled from Berencsi and Sik 1995; Juhasz 1996; Cermak 1997, Uhlirova 1997; Slany 1997). These are predominantly managers of successful private (as opposed to socialist state-owned) businesses, service and production centers, including those owned owned by East-West joint-venture and multinational companies that employ
increasing numbers of highly skilled native ECEs competent in foreign languages, scientists and researchers, including graduate and postgraduate students on Western fellowships (see Hottbrugge 1994; Redor 1994; Redei 1995; Hillmann and Rudolph 1997; Cermak 1997; Rudolph 1997).

The sociodemographic profile of these migrants— their young age (most are under 35), graduate or postgraduate education, professional occupation, and residence in large urban centers— locates them in the category that recent social surveys of changes in self/other perceptions and life-orientations in postcommunist societies in East Europe find better informed than others about public matters, most likely to identify with such democratic values as the universalist-inclusive bases of civic-political participation (element II/7 in table 1) as opposed to exclusive-particularist nationalism, and most decisively supporting governance of public institutions by democratic rules (I/1-5, III/9, 11 and 12) (see Meyer 1993; Liebich and Warner 1995; Ingelhart 1996; Slany 1997). Highly skilled migrants' professional activities and their participation, on a partnership (most commonly, junior partnership) basis, in the international institutional and social networks informed by democratic practices enhance these orientations and provide a "training ground" to turn preferences into habitual behavioral patterns.

One actual and two potential problems exist regarding the impact of these highly skilled ECE migrants on the consolidation of democracy in their home countries. Very considerable during the communist era, since the early 1990s the "brain drain" emigration from that region has significantly diminished. It nevertheless continues, depleting especially members of the youngest cohorts among highly skilled international migrants, namely graduate and postgraduate students, who leave on Western fellowships and upon graduation there search for—and often find— jobs in the West that offer greater professional opportunities and much higher salaries than those available at home (see Hryniewicz, Jalowiecki and Mync 1994; Drbohlav 1996; Juhasz 1996; Cermak 1997; Slany 1997). A similar reciprocal relationship to that noted regarding Handels- and Arbeitstouristen turned into modern capitalist businessmen (as different from protocapitalist or bazaar-type petty entrepreneurs) obtains here as well. The quicker and more effective the democratic consolidation in East Central Europe is as the base of economic growth and, especially in this case, the stabilization of the distributive functions of the state (element I/4 in table 1; here—support for science and research), the more likely its highly skilled international migrants will return to their ECE native countries. And, in turn, the larger the number of such migrants making their native countries the permanent or semipermanent bases of their professional activities, the greater the chance for the successful consolidation of democracy there.

Two potential problems exist. First, transnational professional activities and institutional networks, and, increasingly, also lifestyles of highly skilled international travelers locate them already in what Robert Dahl (1989) has called the third, global transformation or stage of democracy that in his scheme
evolves from lower-level historical democratic formations, the (premodern) local community and the (modern) nation-state. East Europe has already had an unfortunate experience with "jumping stages" (the Marxian "iron model" of historical development wherein communism was to issue from mature capitalism but not from the post-feudal/proto-capitalist socioeconomic order). Could this work this time? Could local- and national-level democracy develop "from above" or from a global democratic order? There are, of course, no ready answers to these questions, except, perhaps, the acknowledgment that the greatly increased interconnectedness of different parts and "levels" may facilitate such a development to an extent unprecedented in the past (on global democratization, provided the growth of structural interconnectedness is accompanied by purposeful focused effort by human actors, see Walzer 1995).

Second, on a lower plane, highly skilled ECE migrants' normative and practical "involvement with democracy" through their professional activities is by and large limited to its procedural aspects, leaving out the participatory dimension (elements II/6 and III/9a in table 1). Specialists on democratic transformations agree that a lively civil society whose members support not only the negative freedom from oppression and unnecessary control by the state but also the positive freedom actively to participate in public affairs to contribute to the common good is a sine qua non condition for the successful consolidation of democracy. This orientation-cum-practice is very much missing in postcommunist ECE societies where civic apathy is widespread. In this context, although not surprising in view of their institutional affiliations and professional purposes, the nearly exclusive emphasis on procedural democracy and the neglect of its participatory dimension in the experience of highly skilled ECE international migrants appears overly restricted in regard to the broader-scope needs of their societies as they build whole new democratic orders.

More concerned with civic participation as an aspect-condition of democratization has been another, smaller group of present-day highly skilled ECE international migrants, namely, the humanistic intelligentsia: writers, philosophers, historians, teachers, and public officials, including those--the group I focus on here--who had been involved in the oppositional "parallel society" under communist rule. The underlying idea or the spiritus movens of that dissident civil society was, in the words of Bronislaw Geremek, a historian and leading Solidarity activist in Poland, "the refusal to participate in falsehood" (Geremek 1996, 247; see also Konrad 1984; Havel 1985) represented by the official public sphere. Opting for "ethical anti-politics" as the way to oppose--and mentally and morally overcome by living "as if we were free" (Michnik 1985)--the communist system, these oppositional elites shared with popular opinion the implicit equation of the removal of that despised regime with the advent of democracy and national liberation and the taken-for-granted assumption that these two desired developments were integral to each other. The contradictions inherent in these presuppositions and, specifically, between a pluralist-democratic vision of the state and (never debated at that time) univalent-ethnocentric traditions of nationhood, on the one
hand, and, on the other, the "undemocratic antitotalitarianism" premised on the polarizing opposition of us-society/ethical and them-state/evil forces mirroring a rebours communist attitudes had largely gone unnoticed in political and philosophical discourses in ECE parallel society circles.

Unless they had emigrated earlier (see below), since the collapse of Soviet-controlled regimes in East Central Europe several members of this dissident intelligentsia have assumed political or other public functions either in national or international bodies, and in this capacity they now frequently travel abroad; others do the same as university lecturers, researchers, and publishers. Their now direct experience with the budding democracies in their home countries and with the malaise of the mature ones in the West has unavoidably made them aware of the aforementioned contradictions and the urgent need to revive the civil society and to reconcile it with the political one (the state) so that one can stimulate the other. They have been debating these issues not only in domestic forums, but also in international meetings and conferences on democratic transition/consolidation in postcommunist East Europe and in Western publications (see, e.g., Fullerton, Sik, and Toth 1995, 1997; Nagy 1997a; Szabo 1997; Csepeli and Sik 1995; Krol 1996; Geremek 1996; Palous 1995; Marody 1993; Svatek 1993).

A possible problem here is that the successful establishment of procedural democracy and the putting down roots of consumer capitalism accompanied by "status restructuring" of ECE societies will likely undermine--the signs are already present--the moral prestige and cultural impact those humanistic elites had traditionally had in the region, even among reluctant communist rulers. As East Central Europe "normalizes" according to Western liberal-democratic prescriptions, it may well happen that the voices of this intelligentsia on behalf of the encompassing, participatory democracy for common good will not be heard anymore.

Returned and, more commonly, half-returned ECE emigres from the communist era are the third category of highly skilled international migrants whose professional activities contribute to the consolidation of democracy in that region. A total of more than 3 million citizens of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia combined (Poles making up more than a half of that number) either stayed on in the West as so-called displaced persons (DPs) after the conclusion of World War II and the imposition of communist rule in East Central Europe or left during the fifty years it endured. The proportion of college-educated professionals among those emigres (with no significant between-country differences) has been a high 25%-30% (estimates, excluding German Aussiedlers, compiled from Okolski 1996a, 1996b; Juhasz 1996; Maresova 1996; Krejci and Mahonin 1996; Korcelli 1994; Dovenyi and Vukovich 1994; Slany 1995). Since 1989-90, encouraged by postcommunist governments in their native countries eager to establish links with potential political allies to help negotiate reintegration with the Western world and hoped for investors in the transforming ECE economies, considerable numbers of those highly skilled emigres have either repatriated, come to their native
countries on professional longer sojourns — mid-1990s estimates of these two categories combined range from 10,000-15,000 for the Czech Republic to 20,000-25,000 for Poland and Hungary each — or, in much larger numbers, visit there regularly on business.

These repatriates, either self-employed or working for international organizations—most commonly OECD, GATT, IMF, World Bank, UN Development Program, PHARE Foundation, Ford Foundation, American Agency for International Development, and different NGOs, or for ECE government bodies, hold multiple residence cards citizenships and memberships in professional organizations in several countries and represent a wide variety of specialists from investors of capital or (co)owners of production and service establishments, financial consultants, privatization experts, specialists, consultants and teachers of the market economy and effective management to international lawyers, political scientists, and organizational sociologists (see Pridham and Vanhanen 1994; Kennedy and Gianoplus 1994; Juhasz 1996, Hillmann and Rudolph 1997; Misiak 1995, and his personal communication to this author, 3 March, 1998; Okolski 1996b; Kruszewski 1998; Morawska [study in progress]; Cermak 1997).

Their professional expertise in the matters they concern themselves with while in East Central Europe and simultaneous involvement with Western (sending) companies and organizations and with ECE (receiver) institutions and people allow those specialists to demonstrate and teach the latter "hands on" the rules and procedures of functional democracy in their respective economic and political societies. They teach, especially, the art of "democratic craftsmanship" or the deliberative-negotiatory methods of solving conflicts and formulating consensus and respect for democratically implemented laws and policies of public institutions even if they are disliked (elements I/5 and III/11 and 12 in table 1). Importantly, because, unlike representatives of the second category of international migrants whose democratizing professional activities concentrate predominantly in the few largest urban centers in each of the countries considered here, a number of highly skilled re/emigrants involve themselves as well in provincial centers and small communities (Morawska [study in progress]; Misiak 1995, and personal communication to this author, 3 March, 1998; Goldyka 1997; Cieslinska 1997, and personal communication to this author, 1 March, 1998) so that the transformative and demonstration effects of their pursuits have a broader social reach.

One of the limitations of these effects has been, again, derived from the focus and purposes of the activities involved their almost exclusively procedural character. Another is the undemocratic (in the new circumstances) impact of the "diaspora legacy" imported by some reemigrre activists, especially those engaged in the political arena, and, specifically, the "totalizing antitotalitarianism," on the one hand, and, on the other, belligerent nationalism. Both of these attitudes have also been part of the popular outlooks in the native countries of recent reemigrants, but the latter's diaspora condition has sharpened and rigidified these positions.
There is no question that the intransigent antitotalitarianism of ECE political emigres supported, politically and financially, by the U.S.-led Western world because of its cold war era strategic interests in the containment of Soviet communism helped to erode authoritarian regimes and to pluralize ideas and information in their homelands in several ways: by challenging the former's domestic and international legitimacy, by supporting the domestic political opposition and contesting the regimes' attempts to suppress it, by exposing human rights violations in their home countries, and by making available uncensored information there that was competitive to Soviet-style newspeak. But the uncompromising calls by some of those reemigres for the radical "decommunization" of the political, cultural, and even economic societies in post-1989/90 East Central Europe has been an obstruction rather than a facilitation of the democratization processes in that region, especially consolidation of the elements I/1, 2 and 5, II/7, and III/9a, 11 and 12 (see table 1). Thus far it has been primarily domestic former dissidents who participate in the above-mentioned "reassessment debate" on the need of a new alliance between the society and the democratic state and the art of the compromise as a constitutive component of functional democracy.

Another such obstruction (and for the same elements) has been an intolerant, aggressive nationalism displayed in public arenas by some of the returnees, especially from the older, DP wave of emigration, and more among Poles and Hungarians than among Czechs. Highly "cultured" in the history and traditions of their countries, postwar political emigres from Soviet-dominated East Europe profoundly identified, as self-proclaimed nationalists or in an unreflective manner, with their Vaterlands' national orientations and collective representations shaped during the nineteenth century and informed, as noted earlier, by ethno-particularistic principles of membership and contradictory us/them valuations. Because of the enduring resentment on the part of many exiles of having been forced to abandon their homelands coerced into a new, this time political, subjection to Soviet rule, postwar emigres--those "pillars of fire," as Matthew Jacobson (1995) has called them--readily incorporated this old (Russia)/new (USSR) archenemy of East European nationhoods and civil liberties into their national sagas of "ancient struggles" between these oppressed nations and their enemies. (On postwar East European exiles' romantic ethnonationalism see Jacobson 1995; Jusdanis 1991; Rubchak 1993, 1993; Bakula 1997; Orlowski 1997; also Safran 1991; Shain 1993.)

Rather than extinguishing with the regaining of national sovereignty by East Central European societies in 1989-90, some of those "pillars of fire" flared up, either triumphantly or on an "defensive-offensive" alert for enemies lurking inside and outside national borders. Although much less common among reemigrants and less influential in public affairs than, for example, in postcommunist Slovakia or Ukraine, such voices of nationalist triumph or, alternately, paranoia coming from recent repatriates can also be heard in East Central Europe. Should they find responsive echoes in popular-level resentments (e.g., among Hungarians unhappy with the ways EU laws, soon-to-be binding also in ECE, deal with their ethnic minorities), political action
informed by such orientations could interfere with the progress of democratization in these countries.

The last group to be considered are highly skilled Western expatriates who come to East Central Europe in business and professional capacities similar, although usually in higher positions within their organizations, to those of the majority of ECE reemigrants. This is a quickly growing population: the 1995 estimates of college-educated longer-term work permit holders of non-ECE backgrounds from Western Europe and North America were more than double the figures three years prior or about 25,000 to 30,000 in each of the three countries included in this analysis. The numbers of short-term Western business visitors have been much larger. The average age of these expatriate migrant experts in East Central Europe is 40-45, and the largest proportions of them are from Germany, the United States, Austria, Great Britain, and France.22

The kinds of "hard" and "soft" skills, including attitudes and practices contributing to the consolidation of democratic organization and culture, that Western professional migrants bring to the ECE institutions they work in or with have already been noted in the discussion of highly trained reemigrants and, preceding this, the emerging stratum of ECE business and professional globetrotters, many of whom actually work under the supervision of Western expert expats. A few studies exist of the relations of the latter with their ECE work force and their opinions of its strengths and weaknesses (Wilk 1997; Murdoch 1996; Hillmann and Rudolph 1997; Kennedy and Gianopulos 1994; see also Redei 1995). The major strengths of ECE employees of these foreign firms and organizations in the eyes of their Western employers are their solid professional qualifications and their "enthusiasm" for the work they do. The most typical shortcomings noted by Western employers in each of the three countries considered here, which suggests their common source in legacies of ancient-regime outlooks and habits, are lack of organizational skills and, especially, the ability to delegate and share tasks and responsibilities, inflexibility in making and negotiating decisions, and accountability, that is, the assumption and execution of responsibility for one's own and group performance. As the interviewed expats emphasized, however, most of the young and eager ECE employees of these establishments are quick to learn and many have already successfully adapted to Western work and organizational practices.23

As these observations indicate, ECE employees of Western/international firms and organizations learn on the job not only the known-how of democratic procedures, but also elements of political culture (III/11 and 12 in table 1) as well as active responsibility for "the whole" (III/9a), in this case, the employer-institution. Because the loyalty to and identification with the firm are very strongly and, apparently, effectively emphasized --young ECE employees interviewed for the above studies, while talking about their jobs readily referred to being "part of the big family" whose success they testify to by their "entire person's" body and mind (Wilk 1997, 8)--it may be that rather than extending from work to other spheres of public life, this "participatory" commitment will
remain fragmentarily focused in this obviously important but narrow arena.

Two other potential problems related to the proliferation in ECE of Western/multinational companies (less so international organization-emissaries of the OECD, UN and other political and economic development agencies, and health, educational, environment protection, and NGOs) and the effects thereof should be noted. While discussing the native ECE highly skilled international travelers I pointed out that the effects of the training for practical democracy by Western/multinational companies are largely limited to the emerging-globally connected elites in the restructuring ECE societies and do not penetrate the larger segments of their populations. I also suggested that the rapidly "densifying" interconnectedness between different parts of the world and its different-level structures may facilitate the gradual trickling down of democratic ideas and practices from the global to the regional- and local-level environments. I raise here again the issue of these top-down divisions, this time more pessimistically.

The soon-to-be decade of experience with capitalist democracy in-the-making has significantly undermined its popular representation in East Central Europe representation as the paradise system of economic affluence for all. The velvet-revolution period of 1989-90 when "us" meant the united people and "them" the collapsing communist regime and its nomenklatura functionaries has long since given way to the perceptions of "us" as ordinary, struggling citizens versus "them" comprising new political and economic elites. ECE employees of international firms, clad in quality Western suits, paid four to eight times more than average local wages, and traveling around the world are viewed as the integral part of these new them-elites. Could it happen that the training for and incorporation of top skilled ECEs into world elite global commuters rather than broadening the base for the trickle down of democratic patterns to their societies at large, contribute instead to the expansion into that region of the familiar in highly developed postindustrial societies, hardening the division between super- (educated, earning, and interconnected) and underclasses?

Should development in this direction actually take place, it could be more complicated yet. Highly skilled ECE employees of Western and multinational companies--powerful lucky Krezuses in the eyes of their fellow nationals--usually occupy lower-level positions on the internal prestige ladders of their firms, earn two-to-three times less, and have lower ceilings on their promotion opportunities than is the case with their Western coworkers who are performing commensurable jobs (see Hillmann and Rudolph 1997; Hottbrugge 1994; Reide 1995; Wilk 1997). The ECE employees themselves tell also about their Western coworkers "living in their own [social] world" in different (better) neighborhoods and bigger houses, attending different (better) restaurants, exclusive clubs. and vacation places, not so much because of the differences in their views and preferences, but in the "contents of their wallets" (Wilk 1997, 5-6). This situation may well be temporary and with the passage of time, as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic join the European Union and if their economic transformations progress successfully, the positions and
prospects of talented natives of that region may well reach parity with those of their Western peers. But it may also not happen in which case East Central Europe together with its highly skilled international-firm employees would remain "poor partners" in the antechambers of world democratic capitalism dominated by its Western "core." 25

Conclusion

The purpose of this discussion has been to initiate a conversation among the specialists on turn-of-the-twenty-first-century transnational migrations and democratization of postauthoritarian regimes. Both these processes have been entangled in and shaped by international contexts and events, and their conditioning factors and outcomes have partially overlapped. I have argued that the ways in which they are affiliated have been far from straightforward, which should make the investigation of the relationship between contemporary transnational migrations and democratization processes more complex and interesting.

My examination of the impact of post-1989/90 international migrations of East Central Europeans (including Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians) on different arenas of democratic consolidation in that region produced two main conclusions. First, the vast majority of contemporary ECE migrants move to Western societies that have been the main source of ideas and practical models of democracy for postcommunist countries. Paradoxically, the contributions to democratization of this majority, or Handels- and Arbeitstouristen who constitute at present the bulk of westbound travelers (with Poles the most numerous among them) have been practically nonexistent. Their impact, if any, has been negative, that is, it has sustained rather than diminished the accustomed undemocratic ways in their home societies.

In explaining this phenomenon, I have identified the macro- and micro-level factors in the sending (ECE) and receiving (WE/USA) environments of migration. I have discussed the characteristics, resulting therefrom, of the political, economic, and social position, and outlooks and purposes of those migrants during their sojourns abroad that, superimposed, have been unfavorable to a positive but often conducive to a negative influence of their Western experience on the consolidation of specific elements of the democratic societies and cultures at home. To bring into sharper relief the relationship between contemporary ECE migrations and the democratization processes in their home countries, I have set this discussion against a contrasting pattern of the migration-democracy connection that obtained one century ago during the period (1880s-1914) of mass rural migrations from East Central Europe to America.

Second, during the 1990s there has appeared a growing and heterogeneous group of highly skilled international travelers to-and-from East Central Europe, composed of the emerging elite of native ECE business and
professional "globetrotters," returned or regularly visiting members of ECE world diasporas, and Western expatriate economic and political experts. Their structural location in the sending and the receiving countries and their professional activities in East Central Europe allow them to contribute tangibly to the implantation of the "hard" and "soft" skills needed to operate democratic economic and political societies. Because of different past and present situations and different pursuits of (sub)group members, however, these contributions have had different focuses and, thus, also deficiencies.

In view of the importance for the successful consolidation of democracy of a broad social base and lively civil society, on the one hand, and, on the other, the widespread persistence in postcommunist ECE societies of the ancien-regime legacy of civic apathy and "dissimulation," particularly regrettable has been the highly skilled migrants' nearly exclusive involvement with the procedural aspects of democracy to the neglect of its participatory dimension. With their primarily big-city, narrow-elite contacts they, therefore, influence and quickly transform the top echelons of the restructuring East Central European societies but barely, if at all penetrate into their larger segments.

More specifically focused investigations of the effects of international migrations on democratization processes in the turn-of-the-twenty-first-century world are obviously needed for a better-grounded assessment of this relationship. By showing that taking into account transnational migrations reveals the impact of the international contexts on democratic consolidation as much more problematic than some consolidologists have presented it, and that considering in migration studies the contributions of international movements to the progress (or the slowing) of this fundamental transformation makes the evaluations of these travels and their effects much more complex and more relevant to those involved with these democratization processes, this initial exercise has, hopefully, demonstrated the epistemic and possibly political gains from the rapprochement of these two fields of inquiry.
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Appendix

Contacted ECE migration and democratization specialists-authors of studies who provided additional information for this article (in the alphabetical order):

-Vladimir Cermak
-Barbara Cieslinska
-Norbert Cyrus
-Jeroen Doomernik
-Heinz Fassmann
-Tomas Frejka
-Leszek Goldyka
-Adam Grzeszak
-Krystyna Iglicka
-Judit Juhasz
-Mirosława Marody
-Silvia Mihalikova
-Władysław Misiak
-Jana Reschova
-Hedwig Rudolph
-Andrzej Sadowski
-Renata Siemienska
-Beata Siewiera
-Endre Sik
-Krystyna Slany
-Wisła Surazska
-Victor Susak
-Eva Uhlirova
Endnotes


2. The author's correspondence (January-March 1998) with Douglas Massey and Luis Guarnizo. Philippe Schmitter pointed out two reasons, both of the aperception-from-habit kind, for the neglect of international migration among political scientists-specialists on transition to/consolidation of democracy. First, because the domestic and not international factors had played the decisive role in the earlier, South European and Latin American transitions to democratic regimes and it has only been recently, in the wake of Communism's collapse in East Europe, that the significance of international influences became evident to these scholars who have not yet completely "mastered" this newly perceived space. And second, because some studies conducted in the late 1960s-early 1970s on the impact of migrants-guest workers returing from Western Europe on the democratic processes in their home countries did not show any such significant effects and as the result the issue has lost interest (P. Schmitter's conversation with this author, March 3, 1998).

3. However, based on the analysis of "looking for work" advertisements placed in Viennese papers by Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs between 1990 and 1992, the percentages of such in spe indocumentado migrants as reported by Fassmann, Kohlbacher, and Reeger (1996, 191) show Poles (26%) in the first place, but no significant difference between Czechs (11%) and Hungarians (15%).

I am not convinced by the explanations of the apparently greater "sedentariness" of the Hungarians in comparison with her ECE neighbors found in the literature of the subject (see, e.g., Morokvasic and de Tinguay 1992; Juhasz 1996), namely, that they are unusually "rooted" in heir Heimat (but so are Poles) or well-informed about the "realities of the West" (but the widely discrepant wage/salary ratio between East Central and Western Europe and opportunities to find "informal" work abroad are both well-known to economic migrants across the region). I would be inclined to look for an answer in more extensive and "user-habituated" support networks abroad relied on by migrating Poles, especially Arbeitstouristen, than reportedly by any other ECE group (see Slany 1997; Uhlirova 1997), but the issue clearly awaits further investigation.

4. The proportions of female migrants shown in table 3 below (40% to 55%) represent the ratio for all present-day ECE migrants rather than just the worker- and trade-tourist categories combined.

5. For migrants' preferred destination countries and reasons thereof I have used raw data from this study provided by this author rather than those reported in the published book because of some apparent inconsistencies in the latter.

6. Considerable differences among the three ECE countries in terms of per capita GNP should be noted: in 1993 in the Czech Republic it was 42%, in Hungary 32%, and in Poland 28% of the average figure for Western Europe and North America combined. On East central Europe's economic performance in comparison with the Western world, from the turn of the twentieth century until the 1990s, see Berend and Ranki 1974, 1982; Berend 1996.

7. In comparison, according to a 1994 Hungarian study, "democracy" was mentioned as an in-
order-to-motive by 9% of those planning permanent rather than temporary migration (after Berencsi and Sik 1995, 131).

8. In a recent study of migration from four Polish communities, over one-third of respondents replied to this question "I don't know" (Jazwinska and Okolski 1996, 195).

9. The rank-ordering, in terms of proportional numbers, of turn-of-the-last-century travels to America by migrants' country of origin differed from that prevailing today in that the Czechs rather than the Hungarians had been the least represented; then as now, Poles were the most numerous.

10. Feudal serfdom was abolished in 1848 in the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy and 1861-64 in Russia.

11. On these motives, see Morawska 1992; Jacobson 1995; Rubchak 1993.

12. The fragmentary data on the attitudes of (native ECE) migrant versus non-migrant populations toward these new arrivals in their home countries have been contradictory: some studies (e.g., Jazwinska and Okolski 1996) show migrants as more prejudiced than their stationary fellow countrymen, while others (e.g., Cieslinska 1994; personal communication March 2, 1998) suggest that sojourns abroad actually reduce such prejudice. Until more systematic information is gathered on this issue it is impossible to evaluate the impact of international migration of attitude-holders on their perceptions of foreigners in their own country.

13. In explaining low voter turnout in democratic Hungary, Szelenyi, Szelenyi, and Poster (1996, after Simon 1994) point to the pre-communist tradition of little mass-level interest in politics considered urí huncutság, a "gentleman's game" that ordinary citizens were not expect to understand and were not allowed to participate. This is an interesting hypothesis that would apply also to Poles, but not to the Czechs who, unlike these two ECE societies, never had such sharp division between the (large) gentry and peasant classes, but in the above discussions this proposition is asserted rather than demonstrated with actual evidence of such persistence and its mechanisms.

14. Some theories popular in the 1960s perceived corruption as useful for the development of the economically backward and politically over-bureaucratized countries because it enabled those with the "entrepreneurial spirit" to get around the "lacks" and "jams" in the existing infrastructures. As the situation in the underdeveloped countries over the last thirty years has demonstrated, however, rather than acting as an inducer of the increased wellbeing of their residents, pervasive corruption has contributed to the hardened division between the haves and have-nots and widespread alienation of the latter. More recent interpretations (see, e.g., Diamond and Plattner 1996; Linz and Stepan 1996) view embedded corruption as destructive for the operational capacity and, thus, stability, of both the economic and political systems within particular countries and the entire regions.

15. If there was any, the entry selection on the part of the receiver societies was based on the arrivals' individual characteristics (e.g., their age, healthy appearance, or criminal record). A precursor of the forthcoming "etatization" of international migrations was the German government, which intervened in migratory movements to a considerable extent by limiting the
length of stay of the migrant sojourners, particularly those from eastern Europe. On the sending side, the Russian government imposed, too, (e)migration controls by withholding exit passports for the petitioners from ethnic-national groups or political milieus considered "untrustworthy." Regarding the relatively open immigration policies of the receiving societies, especially the United States, it should be noted that throughout the entire period of turn-of-the-century mass immigration from South-Eastern Europe there continued there a heated public debate about the threats posed by those "culturally inferior" entrants and the means to control their influx until the latter was instituted in the 1920s--see John Higham 1975; Piktin 1975; Kraut 1994; Weil 1997.

16. This information comes from my analysis of the contents of Polish- (and also Russian-) language press in Berlin, interviews with Polish border-control officers, and from personal communications of the authors of press reportages on western and eastern Poland's border traffic.

17. Although the second and fourth categories of these new international migrants actually possessed their (quasi) parallels at the turn of the twentieth century in the form, respectively, of members of ECE intelligentsia travelling to the West for education and professional apprenticeship, and Western manufacturers and investors coming to the industrializing ECE on business, because of the lack of ready (i.e., existing in secondary sources) information comparable to that available for peasant-migrants in that period, a comparative analysis has been ommitted. I am planning, however, to extend this study in the future to include as well a comparison of the impact of the 19th/20th- versus 20th/21st-centuries professional migrants on the formation in East Central Europe of the economic society as one arena of the democratic order.

18. These estimates, compiled from Juhasz 1996, 1997; Redei 1995; Maresova 1996; Okolski 1996b; Hillmann and Rudolph 1997; Wilk 1997, and personal communications from the first and last two authors (March 7-16, 1998), should be treated with caution however, because the available statistics of foreign arrivals in ECE countries do not distinguish between repatriates and natives of sender-countries, and because managers of multinational companies and employees of international organizations do not need work permits in East Central Europe.

19. I omit here political lobbying on behalf of their fellow-ethnics at home by East European emigre minorities in the West, because, as the case of the Soviet Jews clearly indicates, its effects were mainly ad hoc relaxations of state [anti-]minority policies rather than democratization thereof--see Shain 1993; Krupnik 1995.

20. There existed, of course, important exceptions. A polyvalent civic-cultural and universalist national orientation has been consistently represented, for example, by the Polish emigre journal *Kultura* published in Paris since 1947 (see Pomian 1997).

21. Information obtained from, repsectively, Silvia Mihalikova and Victor Susak, personal communications to this author, March 3 and March 6, 1998; see also Prizel 1997.

22. The estimates of the numbers of highly skilled expatriates in East Central Europe have been compiled from Juhasz 1996, 1997; Wilk 1997; Redei 1995; Hillmann and Rudolph 1997; Iglicka 1997; Maresova 1996; and personal communications from the first five authors, March 6-20, 1998 (but see note #20 above on the necessary caution regarding these figures). Official
ECE (im)migration statistics are probably the least useful regarding the numbers of short-term business trips to East Central Europe by Western visitors. According to the 1996 World Tourist Organization report, more than 15 million visitors from the West entered Poland declaring business as the purpose of their trips (Markiewicz 1997); the actual nature of this business, however, was unspecified: it could have been first reconnaissance visits, one-day checks in situ of the already established enterprises, searching for prospective partners, employee training sessions etc.

23. The impact of business- and professional-purpose sojourns in ECE of Western experts on their own attitudes is beyond the scope of this paper, but it may be of interest to note some studies' reports on the "spoiling" or subverting effects of such longer-term visits, especially by way of low-key corruption or nepotistic "potlatch" games the foreigners are drawn into while working with the natives (see Wedel 1992; on a similar impact of Russian-Jewish immigrants in Berlin on German welfare services' officials, see Kessler 1997 and personal communication to this author, July 3, 1997).

24. This wide discrepancy results in part from the fact that Western expats sent to East central Europe (and other semi-peripheral regions) receive as a "compensation" 20% to 40% higher salaries than they would have had they remained in their home countries (after Hillmann and Rudolph 1997, 86; also personal communication of Hedwig Rudolph to this author, March 2, 1998)).

25. Reporting on her research on multinational companies in Poland and Lithuania and their native employees, Felicitas Hillmann (1997) argues that expatriate migration into these countries has been "much more a 'ferment' of transformation processes than a direct step towards colonization of the periphery through multinational enterprises" (Hillmann 1997, 21). Ewa Wilk's (1997) conversations with Polish employees of such companies suggest a much more ambiguous, ferment-and-dependency situation in this regard—in her respondents eyes, anyway. I believe however that it is too much early still to assess in any conclusive terms the impact of these multinational companies on the "catching up" of the distance to the highly developed world or else peripherization of postcommunist East Europe.
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